

"The Effectiveness of Risk Management Within the DoD"

Funded by the Naval Postgraduate School, Dr. Keith Snider

Donald McKeon, PhD Defense Acquisition University Sterling Heights, MI 586-276-2172 don.mckeon@dau.mil

Donald C. McKeon, PhD Defense Acquisition University Presented at the 9th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium, May 16-17, 2012 in Monterey, CA. May 17, 2012 Slide 1 of 35



- 1. Uncertainty first, risk second
- 2. Based on GAO reports, some things aren't reducing risk
 - TRL's, Design Maturity, EVM
- 3. Software development and integration are being ignored
- 4. DoD Workforce are big risk takers even when they shouldn't be
- 5. Workforce needs risk management training that focuses on doing it effectively (Proficiency)
 - Not learning about likelihood, consequence, mitigation methods, software tools, etc.
- 6. If you're not successful at mitigating risks, don't do it.

"I have never let my schooling interfere with my education."

- Mark Twain




- 1. Facts concerning major weapon programs
- 2. Survey of the DoD workforce on risk management
- 3. Risk behavior of the DoD workforce
- 4. Monte Carlo modeling of risk
- 5. Interviews with DoD and Industry Program Managers

"If we don't succeed, we run the risk of failure." – J. Danforth Quayle



What I'm Not Going to Talk About





1. Facts concerning major weapon programs


- technology maturity (TRL), design maturity, software maturity, earned value management (EVM)
- 2. Survey of the DoD Workforce on risk management
 - feedback on how RM is used on programs
 - recommendations from survey participants
- 3. Risk behavior of the DoD workforce
 - propensity to take on risk
- 4. Simple Monte Carlo modeling of risk
 - Impact on program cost and schedule
- 5. Best practices, lessons learned and new approaches to risk management from DoD and Industry Program Managers



GAO Reports For Major Weapon Systems 2003-2011

Let's look backward to prepare for the future

- 9 years of GAO reports
- ▶ e.g. "Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs", GAO-03-476 (May 2003)
- Example report
 2 pages per yr.



Common Name: JLENS

JLENS Program

Technology Maturity

JLENS entered system development in August 2005 with only one of its five critical technologies mature. The program subsequently combined two of the critical technologies-the communications payload and the processing group-into the communications processing group. The communications processing group and platform are currently mature. The program expects to demonstrate the fire control radar and surveillance radar in a realistic environment before the program enters production. Many of the JLENS radar technologies have legacy components. However, sensor software items related to signal processing, timing, and control, as well as element measurement, are not vet mature. The program office has successfully conducted tests of the fire control radar antenna, but the integration of both the fire control radar and surveillance radar components in the program's system integration laboratory has yet to occur.

Design Maturity

The JLENS design appears stable, but the potential for design charges will remain unit key JLENS components have been integrated and tested. For example, a first high demonstration of the aerostat was successfully conducted in August 2006, but the program must still complete a service of tests integrating the JLENS model mooring station with the aerostat. In September 2010, the program experiment the loss of a platform following an aerostat accident. The program is analyzing the integration issues. The JLENS program has received approval to transport the model mooring station without armor, which mitigates a risk the program

Production Maturity

The JLENS program projects that it will enfor production with all 15 of its entited manufacturing processes mature and stable. According to the program offee, 12 of the program's entited manufacturing processes are currently in control. The JLENS program has also completed a number of key activities that are essential to effective production management, heidung updating its manufacturing plan and addressing areas such as supplier cognibilities and risks, cost, quality control, materials, producibility, and workforce skills.

Other Program Issues

The JLENS program is working to address several risks that could affect the program's cost, schedule and performance. First, the program received \$32 million less than the amount requested in the President's fiscal year 2010 budget. If additional funding is not provided in fiscal year 2012, the program reports it will not be able to procure the equipment to field an initial operational capability by the end of fiscal year 2013. Second, due to the September 2010 aerostat accident and subsequen loss of a platform, the program expects several key events, including the start of production, to be delayed. Third, if problems occur during systems integration and verification tests, the program expects that cost and schedule would be affected. Fourth, if test site preparations are not complete by April 2011, then the production timeline could be jeopardized. Finally, the program could also be affected by alignment with the Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense program. As part of the integrated strategy, the Army extended the system development and demonstration phase by 12 months. The JLENS program is waiting approval of a new acquisition program baseline with updated cost and schedule estimates that reflect this change

Program Office Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program stated that the Army is planning to request funds in its fiscal year 2012 budget to offset the fiscal year 2010 reduction. The program also reported experiencing development challenges that have caused system integration delays, and schedule challenges due to a September 2010 aerostat accident. The program office continues to work on a new acquisition program baseline. A new cost estimate was presented to the Army Cost Review Board in July 2009. The estimate will be updated based on the results of an Army review and submission of the President's fiscal year 2012 budget. A revised baseline is expected to be approved in the third quarter of fiscal year 2011. The Army provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Prop

"You can observe a lot by just watching." - Yogi Berra

Donald C. McKeon, PhD Defense Acquisition University



Disclaimer About Data in the GAO Reports

- Non-attribution (please).
- The data in the write-ups were used as is and there wasn't an attempt to fix any apparent discrepancies.
- The impact of changes in the program scope were hard to identify.
- Costs were adjusted for inflation.
- Hard to compare one program to another.

"Errors using inadequate data are much less than those using no data at all." - Charles Babbage



Technology, Design & Production Maturity – Program B

Year	Program Unit- Cost Growth*	Schedule Delay	Technology	Design	Drawings Completed
2003	9%	0%	4 of 5 mature	Stable	77%
2004	22%	8%	Remaining tech. has not matured	Changes to mostly attain better mfg'ing efficiencies	67%
2005	21%	10%	All mature	Released.	All released but 12% to be changed.
2006	36%	24%	All mature	Released	All released but 12% to be changed.
2007	34%	26%	All mature	Production decision delayed	82%
2008	169%	63%	All Mature	Redesigning	70%
2009	168%	63%	All Mature	Stable	94%
2010	178%	63%	All Mature	Design "will continue to evolve"	96%
2011	170%	71%	All Mature	"Still evolving"	-

• Mature technology.

• 170% Unit Cost Growth from 2003 to 2011

• Design never stabilized.


• 71% Schedule Delay

*Adjusted for inflation.

% Drawings completed dropped from 100% to 70%



Technology, Design & Production Maturity – Program B



Donald C. McKeon, PhD Defense Acquisition University Presented at the 9th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium, May 16-17, 2012 in Monterey, CA. May 17, 2012 Slide 9 of 35



- Technology Readiness Levels (TRL)
 - Measure of risk in technology development during EMD.
- Design Drawings
 - How the design is maturing during EMD.
- Software Maturity
- Earned Value Management (EVM)
 - Used to forecast cost over-runs and schedule delays & to enable better management of the program

EMD = Engineering and Manufacturing Development, DODI 5000.02

"The bigger the real-life problems, the greater the tendency for the discipline to retreat into a reassuring fantasy-land of abstract theory and technical manipulation." - Tom Naylor



Assessments From the GAO Reports – Technology Readiness Levels

Technology Readiness Levels (TRL)


- R&D Cost Growth* after reaching full maturity:
 - 75% over 8 years
 - 65% over 6 years
 - 16% over 7 years
 - 6.5% over 4 years
 - 120% over 3 years
 - 2 programs never reached full maturity; 1 program not counted
- Technology maturity was not a good indicator of successful engineering and manufacturing development.
- Technical maturity does not guarantee cost or schedule performance.
- Overall, TRL's are not as useful as we claim they are. They give us an overly optimistic assessment of program risk.




Assessments From the GAO Reports – Design Drawings

Of 8 programs...

- 4 had significant drops in "releasable" drawings
 - 100% to 70%, 98% to 80%, 98% to 90%, 100% to 82%
- 1 had a 10% drop after 5 years at 100%
- 2 had continuous design development
- 1 did not have useful data
- Lesson learned not an accurate way to measure the maturity of the design.
- Quoted values are very suspect.
- BUT, it's a leading indicator of future problems! (About 1 year)





"Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future." - Niels Bohr



Assessments From the GAO Reports – Software Risks

> ~37% of the program write-ups did not include software at all.

- Interesting quotes from the GAO reports
 - "Developing the complex flight software subsystem ... has already caused multiple delays, and DCMA has reported that the remaining software effort will likely further delay the launch ..."
 - ".. the greatest risk ... is software development and integration..."
- Lesson learned The focus of the write-ups tends to be "hardware" focused and the risk of software development and integration is often ignored. We have little insight into a major area of program risk.



Assessments From the GAO Reports – Earned Value Management

- For 8 programs over 9 years, Earned Value was only mentioned twice:
 - "The program office has had reduced insight into its prime contractor's work progress since December 2004 because it <u>has not received</u> <u>detailed earned value cost and schedule data</u>."
 - "The Defense Contract Audit Agency has identified <u>significant</u> <u>deficiencies</u> with the prime contractors' earned value management system that affects the Air Force's ability to oversee the cost aspects of the program."
- Lesson learned If EVM is being used on the 8 programs studied, it was not identified in the yearly write-ups. There is no indication that program execution is being influenced by EVM data.

"Experience is that marvelous thing that enables you to recognize a mistake when you make it again." - F. P. Jones




- 1. Facts concerning major weapon programs
 - technology maturity (TRL), design maturity, software maturity, earned value management (EVM)
- 2. Survey of the DoD Workforce on risk management
 - feedback on how RM is used on programs
 - recommendations from survey participants
- 3. Risk behavior of the DoD workforce
 - propensity to take on risk
- 4. Simple Monte Carlo modeling of risk
 - Impact on program cost and schedule
- 5. Best practices, lessons learned and new approaches to risk management from DoD and Industry Program Managers



Survey of DoD Workforce Members – Decision Making


- "How much are you willing to spend to reduce the likelihood of a risk from 50% to 10% With a Consequence of \$10,000?"
- Expected savings is \$4000.





Survey of DoD Workforce Members -Importance of Activities

"In your opinion, how important are the following activities for successful risk management?"





Survey of DoD Workforce Members -Importance of Activities

- > Theme #1
 - analysis and assessment (97%)
 - SME advice (95%)
 - mitigation planning (93%)
 - training (82%)
 - expertise in risk management (79%)
- This is doing risk management, not learning about likelihood, consequence, the risk matrix, the DoD Risk Management Guidebook, etc.
- Proficiency of doing risk management and mitigation.

"If you think education is expensive, try ignorance." - Derek Bok




- 1. Facts concerning major weapon programs
 - technology maturity (TRL), design maturity, software maturity, earned value management (EVM)
- 2. Survey of the DoD Workforce on risk management
 - feedback on how RM is used on programs
 - recommendations from survey participants
- 3. Risk behavior of the DoD workforce
 - propensity to take on risk
- 4. Simple Monte Carlo modeling of risk
 - Impact on program cost and schedule
- 5. Best practices, lessons learned and new approaches to risk management from DoD and Industry Program Managers

"I didn't think; I experimented." - Wilhelm Roentgen



Results of Risk Experiment #2-Rewards From Risk Taking



Donald C. McKeon, PhD Defense Acquisition University Presented at the 9th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium, May 16-17, 2012 in Monterey, CA.

Slide 20 of 35



- 1. Facts concerning major weapon programs
 - technology maturity (TRL), design maturity, software maturity, earned value management (EVM)
- 2. Survey of the DoD Workforce on risk management
 - feedback on how RM is used on programs
 - recommendations from survey participants
- 3. Risk behavior of the DoD workforce
 - propensity to take on risk
- 4. Simple Monte Carlo modeling of risk
 - Impact on program cost and schedule
- 5. Best practices, lessons learned and new approaches to risk management from DoD and Industry Program Managers

"The great tragedy of Science - the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis by an ugly fact." - Thomas Henry Huxley



- Don's consideration for this briefing
- Uncertainty in Effort
 - the task is required and will be completed in the future
 - there is some uncertainty in the cost and time to complete (typically < 10%)
- "Known" Risk (planned)
 - risk has been identified at the start of a program
 - negative outcome <u>may</u> occur in the future, risk mitigation plan exists, active mitigation is started at program start, cost and schedule have been planned for
- "Execution" Risk
 - risk has not been identified at the start of a program
 - often the result of actions outside of the program
 - negative outcome <u>may</u> occur in the future
 - risk mitigation plan does not exist, cost and schedule have not been planned for




- Extremely simple "Monte Carlo" modeling of risk
- Simulates 5 years during TD and EMD
- > Options:
 - cost increase for every task
 - cost variation for every task
 - setting a limit on cost uncertainty (i.e., no tasks less than budget)
 - probability of tasks that have risk
 - likelihood & consequence
 - cost to mitigate a risk
 - effectiveness of mitigation efforts
- For simplicity, the total budget is set to 1 and the total plan is 60 months.

"I have yet to see any problem, however complicated, which, when you looked at it in the right way, did not become still more complicated."


- Poul Anderson



The Impact on Variation in Task **Completion (aka Uncertainty)**



Or, assume no cost under-runs



- Win some lose some \triangleright
- \geq On average ...
- **Historical data** \triangleright
- Similar tasks \triangleright


Conditions that might prevent a cost under-run :

- timing of work \geq
- \triangleright different teams, divisions, organizations, companies, ...
- contract terms / subcontracting \triangleright
- different management objectives \geq
- different reward systems \geq
- \geq poor understanding of actual status
- deferred tasks \triangleright
- \geq "there's always more that can be done"
- \geq sub-optimization

Donald C. McKeon, PhD **Defense Acquisition University**




Actual Cost With Normal Uncertainty



Donald C. McKeon, PhD Defense Acquisition University



Actual Cost Without Under-Runs



Donald C. McKeon, PhD Defense Acquisition University




- When there is uncertainty in the effort to complete tasks, in practice there will be a cost over-runs.
- All DoD programs have ambitious goals and there is always uncertainty in program plans.
- Therefore, ALL DoD programs will have a cost over-run, a schedule slip and a likely reduction in "performance"*
- > A cost over-run and schedule slip to some degree is "natural".

"If there is a 50-50 chance that something can go wrong, then 9 times out of ten it will." - Paul Harvey



- The risk has not been identified at the start of a program
- High risk assumed: 10% of tasks have risk, likelihood = 50%, cost consequence is 50% of task cost
- ➢ Without mitigation, average cost increase is 2.5%.





If you mitigate all risks at the level of the expected loss (= Likelihood * \$Consequence)...

a. If all mitigation efforts are successful. Same answer: 2.5% increase.

- b. But if mitigation efforts are only 50% successful, the cost increase is 3.8%
- > Break-even point : $C_{\%Mit} = P_{SUCCESS}$
- Take-Away: If you aren't successful at risk mitigation, don't do it.
- Also, for optimal risk reduction, you need to know how successful you are at risk mitigation (i.e., you need data).

 $C_{\rm \% Mit}$ is the fraction of the expected loss that is spent on risk mitigation. $P_{\rm SUCCESS}$ is the probability of successfully mitigating risks.



- Execution Risk = The risk has not been identified at the start of a program
- All execution risks will lead to a cost increase and schedule delay, either due to mitigation efforts and/or consequences.
- The optimal risk mitigation strategy requires knowledge of the mitigation success rate.
- > You can't "manage the risk" for free.

- Performance might be reduced capabilities or fewer assets.
 - "All" really means "on average"



- 1. Facts concerning major weapon programs
 - technology maturity (TRL), design maturity, software maturity, earned value management (EVM)
- 2. Survey of the DoD Workforce on risk management
 - feedback on how RM is used on programs
 - recommendations from survey participants
- 3. Risk behavior of the DoD workforce
 - propensity to take on risk
- 4. Simple Monte Carlo modeling of risk
 - Impact on program cost and schedule
- 5. Best practices, lessons learned and new approaches to risk management from DoD and Industry Program Managers



- Highly profitable company outside of the defense industry.
- Consumer and business customers.
- An integrator of hardware, software/firmware, and IT.
- Size: 100 engineers / 7 platforms
- Close working relationship with ODM's (Original Design Manufacturers; 1 is critically important to business success)
- They do not spend a lot of time on <u>formalized</u> risk management and reviews.
- May brief 5-10 high risks at "phase" reviews. Have trigger points.
- Brainstorm. Balance. Highly empowered teams.
- Know from experience. Informal: everyone does it but they might not be consciously doing "risk management"
- Management by walking around.
- Business trade-off. Some flexibility in spending.



- Commercial IT Business Solutions
- Business IT solutions
- Risk to CFO company may fail
- Cannot put dollar or time value of risk
- (1) Business (2) People (3) Technology and (4) Process
- Client maturity
- Industry standard 10%
- Seller understands the fine print. Buyer doesn't know the fine print.
 - Works both ways for Gov't and contractor. RFP vs. proposal.
- ➢ More than 1 year, error in time and cost is 100%.
- A 1-day delay can turn into a 2-week slip
 - e.g., a delayed meeting might delay an important decision until the "decider" is available



- Manages via Risk Management.
- Effective RM avoids future problems so that time can be spent on program issues rather than fighting fires.
- Used DoD Risk Management Guidebook as the basis for RM, but tailored it for their needs.
- Two benefits for the Branch Manager are getting visibility into the program and forcing PM's to look at risk.
- Tried to add "urgency" as third element but too complex.
- "Believes" in payoff.
- Trying to measure the value of RM.
- During technology development:
 - No baseline.
 - All high risk.
 - Little consequence of failure: "go as far as you can"



- Uncertainty first, risk second.
- Based on GAO reports
 - TRL's, Design Drawings and EVM aren't reducing risk
 - Software development and integration are being ignored
- The DoD Workforce are big risk takers even when they shouldn't be.
- Workforce needs risk management training that focuses on doing it effectively (proficiency training).
- If you're not successful at mitigating risks, don't do it.
- Cost increases, schedule delays (and often performance shortfalls) are normal outcomes of uncertainty and "execution risks".
- Reduce cost over-runs by reducing uncertainty in plans.
- ➢ More deliverables between CDR and IOT&E.

"The secret of getting ahead is getting started. The secret of getting started is breaking your complex overwhelming tasks into small manageable tasks, and then starting on the first one." - Mark Twain