

Contracting for Reform: The Challenges of Procuring Security Training and Advisory Services in Fragile Environments

*AFCEA Acquisition Research Symposium
May 14-15, 2014 Monterey, CA*

Nicholas J. Armstrong, Ph.D.

Research Fellow, Institute for National
Security and Counterterrorism

Maxwell School of Syracuse University
Fellow, Centre for Security Governance

David M. Van Slyke, Ph.D.

Louis A. Bantle Chair in Business and
Government Policy

Professor of Public Administration and
International Affairs

Maxwell School of Syracuse University





Outline

- ❖ Security Sector Reform Overview
- ❖ SSR Contracting and State of Knowledge
- ❖ Complexity of Procuring Training and Advising Services
- ❖ Contract Theory and Complex Products
- ❖ Research Design
- ❖ Findings
- ❖ Next Steps

Security Sector Reform

❖ Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Assistance programs aimed at *transforming core security providers* (military, law enforcement, intelligence; defense and interior bureaucracies; oversight committees) into *more effective, professional, and accountable state institutions*

❖ SSR is highly variable

- ❖ Context: Developing, Democratizing, and Fragile/Postwar States
- ❖ Reform process leadership
 - ❖ Internally driven (South Africa, Poland, Ukraine, Indonesia)
 - ❖ Mixed (Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone)
 - ❖ Externally driven (Iraq, Kosovo, Timor Leste)
- ❖ Actors: Government Civilians, Military, NGOs, Contractors

❖ Key Activity: Training and Advising for Institutional Capacity and Change

Tactical Training and Advising

- ❖ Variable settings: classroom, training centers, command posts, field-based, on-the-job
- ❖ Variable content: literacy, marksmanship, leadership, small unit tactics, operational and logistics planning, rule of law
- ❖ Variable trainers: regular military, military police, special forces, contractors | individuals, embedded teams, whole units




Ministerial Advising



- ❖ More stable setting: headquarters offices, planning/conference rooms, occasional field trips
- ❖ More focused content: leadership, strategic policy, planning, budgeting processes, civ-mil relations, rule of law
- ❖ Mixed “Advisor Teams”: military officers, government civilians, civilian contractors

SSR Contracting and Research

Total U.S. Reconstruction Spending (\$89.42B)¹



Afghan Security Force Fund Activities (\$50.6B)²



■ Non-Security Reconstruction Activities

■ Other Afghan Security Force Support and Development Activities

■ Afghan Security Force Training and Advising Contracts

Notes:

Data range: Oct. '01-Apr. '12

1. SIGAR.

2. GAO

3. CWC

4. www.usaspending.gov

Estimated Fraud and Abuse Losses: \$31-61B (35-68%)³

Contractors as Trainers and Advisors



Complexity of Procuring Training and

(3) Key elements of being a good advisor:

(a) **Understanding your counterpart.** An advisor needs to become very familiar with his principal's background. One's ethnic background, educational background, and history are very important and influence that person. Understanding the principal's background will help communications and build solid relationships, leading to successful mission accomplishment.

(b) **Understand the principal's organization and key assistants.** An advisor should become familiar with his counterpart's organizational structure, work processes, key staff officers, and their background in order to provide effective assistance.

(c) **Establish a good relationship with your principal.** Professional relationships are important. However, good personal relationships are even more important, helping both sides to better understand the other's concerns and achieve good results. To establish and maintain good relations, it is important to travel and eat with Afghan counterparts. Sharing of meals, facing potential dangers are the best ways to demonstrate trust, and breakdown interpersonal barriers.

(d) **The advisor should understand his principal's issues and help solve them.** Anybody can relay CSTC-A information to his principal, and call it a job done. However, a good advisor will attempt to do everything he can to ensure his principal successfully accomplishes his endeavors. Some senior advisors have displayed genuine concern for their counterparts, and go beyond what they are required to do to help their counterparts and are fondly spoken of. Some of the things these advisors did were:

- 1) Provide situational awareness information such as daily ANP/ANA update, insights from other advisors, and media reports of interest, etc.
- 2) Train Afghan staff in their daily functions. When staff functional difficulties are observed, provide training and help.
- 3) Seek out the needs of their principals and help resolve them.
- 4) Be non-intrusive, but stay longer than required to be accessible, and provide any assistance as needed.

(e) These things made a difference in the relationship. It showed the advisors cared. Advisors should keep in mind that they are successful only when their principals are successful.

Contract Theory and Complex Products

- ❖ The promise of contracting is the “win-win” outcome
- ❖ Perfunctory versus consummate behavior
- ❖ How do you contract for SSR Training and Advising Services when they:
 - ❖ Are difficult to evaluate
 - ❖ Complex, evolving, and context-driven
 - ❖ Contracts demand flexibility (incomplete specification)
 - ❖ Assets (human capital) are highly specific investments
 - ❖ Lead to a complex contract design and high potential of “lock in”
- ❖ How do contracting frameworks (Brown et.al., 2010) for complex products, hold up for complex services in SSR environments like Afghanistan?
 - ❖ Understanding Product/Service Complexity
 - ❖ Importance of Rules (specificity, discretion)
 - ❖ Importance of Relationship Strategies (incentives/penalties, repeat exchanges, reputation)
 - ❖ Importance of Clear Communication & Understanding
 - ❖ Performance Assessment & Accountability
- ❖ Combine strengths of and avoid pitfalls associated with Rules or Relationships – Achieve cooperative behavior

Research Design



DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY
AUDIT REPORT NO. 3181-2007D17900008



November 27, 2009

PREPARED FOR: Office of Acquisition Management (A/LM/AQM)
 Department of State
 ATTN: Branch Chief, Quality Assurance [REDACTED]
 P.O. Box [REDACTED]

PREPARED BY: DCAA Fort Worth Branch Office
 DynCorp International LLC Suboffice
 PO Box [REDACTED]

Telephone No. (817) [REDACTED]
 FAX No. (817) [REDACTED]
 E-mail Address [REDACTED]@dcaa.mil

SUBJECT: Report on Audit of Labor Hour Billings through Public Voucher 1473-37, under Contract No. S-LMAQM-04-C-0030, Task Order S-AQMPD-05-F-1473 (Afghanistan)

SUBJECT OF AUDIT

As requested by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, on April 16, 2007, we examined DynCorp International LLC's (DI) direct labor hours on Contract No. S-LMAQM-04-C-0030, Task Order (TO) S-AQMPD-05-F-1473 (Afghanistan). This task order provides for the maintenance and operation of a Central Training Center and Regional Training Centers providing basic skills training for the Afghanistan National Police, Border Police, and Highway Patrol. The task order period of performance was September 16, 2004 thru August 31, 2005.

The accumulation, recording, and reporting of cost incurred and billed on contracts is the responsibility of the contractor. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the claimed labor costs based on our examination.

SCOPE OF AUDIT

We conducted our examination in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards (GAGAS), except DCAA does not currently have an external opinion on its quality control system as required by GAGAS 3.55. The most recent external quality control review opinion expired on August 26, 2009. A review of DCAA's quality control system is currently being performed. Those standards require that we plan and perform the examination to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the data and records examined are free of material misstatement. An examination includes:

- evaluating the contractor's internal controls, assessing control risk and determining the extent of audit testing needed based on the control risk assessment;
- examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the data and records evaluated;
- assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by the contractor;
- evaluating the overall data and records presentation; and
- determining the need for technical specialist assistance.

RESULTS OF AUDIT

In our opinion, \$ [REDACTED] of the \$ [REDACTED] claimed direct labor costs incurred during the period of September 16, 2004 through August 31, 2005 on Contract No. S-LMAQM-04-C-0030, Task Order (TO) 1473 are provisionally approved pending final acceptance. Final acceptance of amounts claimed under Government contracts does not take place until performance under the contract is completed and accepted by the cognizant authorities and the audit responsibilities have been completed.

We discussed the results of our examination with Ms. Dee Tansey, Director DI CIVPOL Contracts, in an exit conference held on June 4, 2009. Ms. Tansey concurred with the audit results.

The results of our examination are presented below:

Base Year:

CLIN	Description	Claimed	Questioned	Difference (Note 1)	Note
0015	Commanders/Executive Officers	\$ [REDACTED]	-	\$ [REDACTED]	
0020	Law Enforcement / Police Advisors	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	2
0024	Interpreters	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	
0025	Program Manager	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	
0026	Deputy Program Manager	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	
0027	Logistics Supervisor	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	
0028	Logistics Coordinator	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	
0029	Physicians Assistant	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	
0030	Registered Nurse	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	
0031	Medics	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	
0032	Administrative Assistants	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	
	TOTAL - Base Year	\$ [REDACTED]	\$ -	\$ [REDACTED]	

Findings: Trainer-Advisor Selection

“I think if anybody wanted to spend one more dollar adding a little more scrutiny to the preparation of advisors and screening of advisors, I would think that would be worth probably \$10 in savings of having the wrong people out there—not only the wrong people, but people that create systems and problems that cause more problems in the long run” (author interview).

country—Guatemala, I wouldn’t care what the other nine were like, but I would want the team leader to be the Zen master relationship builder because with that you can bring in subject matter experts all day long, but if you don’t have the relationship, a subject matter expert is a waste of time.” (author interview).

perspective to do their jobs at [that] level” (author interview).
interview).

Findings: Advisor Selection

6. SPECIFIC COST PLUS FIXED FEE TASK DESCRIPTION

- 6.1. CJ1 Personnel: 5 positions (1 Mentor, 4 SMEs) shall help develop, manage, and execute all manpower and personnel plans, programs and policies across all Afghan National Army Components and the MoD. Assist the Minister of Defense for Personnel and Education in recruiting, retaining and sustaining a high quality force through innovative and effective enterprise solutions. Ensure Human Resources readiness of the ANA across the full spectrum of operations within the MoD. Teach, train and implement new policies and procedures, revise as needed, and schedule and check the implementation and compliance through regularly scheduled Staff Assistance Visits (SAVs).
- 6.2. CJ2 Intelligence Training and Advisory Group (INTAG): 21 positions (1 Senior Mentor, 8 mentors, 7 SMEs, 1 Senior Trainer, 4 Trainers) shall mentor the ANA G2 in policy formulation, planning, programming, budgeting, management, staff supervision, evaluation, and oversight for intelligence activities for the ANA. CJ2 Intelligence has ANA Staff responsibility for overall coordination of major intelligence disciplines such as Imagery Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, Human Intelligence, Measurement and Signature Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Security Countermeasures. The contractor shall have the ability to identify systemic problems requiring a policy change, recommend solutions, and develop and implement the change. The contractor shall provide the necessary coaching and monitoring so the department can act independently.
- 6.3. CJ3 Operations: 2 positions (2 Mentors) shall provide GSG3 assistance in executing individual foreign country training and leadership development and mentoring to the GSG3 CSM.
- 6.4. CJ4 Logistics: 26 positions (1 Senior Mentor, 6 Mentors, 14 SMEs, 3 Senior Trainers, and 2 Trainers) shall support GSG4 and AT&L under the strategic direction of CJ4. The effort focuses on developing ANA logistics functions through Supply OJT training which includes both manual and automated systems. Contractor effort shall include the development of sustainable logistics systems which determine, prioritize and execute plans that acquire, manage, receive, store, issue and assess all classes of supply within the ANSF.
- 6.5. CJ5 Strategy and Policy: 11 positions (1 Senior Mentor, 7 Mentors; 2 SME, [1 mentor on hold]) shall mentor the MoD Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategy & Policy and senior staff in developing strategies and plans that produce effective ministerial organizations and departments, sustaining institutions and intermediate commands to include Counter Terrorism, Counter Narcotics, Reserve Forces, National Security, and Emergency planning for military support to civil authorities.

5. CJ5 Strategy and Policy (11 positions: 1 Senior Mentor, 8 Mentors; 2 SME, ([1 mentor on hold])
 - 5.1. Positions are required in order to develop Policy and Strategy formulation and implementation across AMoD S&P and GSG3 Strategy Mentors the MoD Assistant Minister for Strategy and Policy and staff in developing and integrating strategies and plans that produce effective ministerial organizations and departments, sustaining institutions and intermediate commands. These strategies and plans must be integrated within the MoD Staff, with the General Staff and with other GIRoA agencies. They provide transparency, accountability, governance and oversight across all areas of policy, execution and administration within the MoD. The MoD will plan in accordance with a Strategic Defense Planning System (SDPS) which is similar to the system used by the United States. This system and its processes are designed to be developed and reviewed annually and doctrinal standards are to be documented and developed to enable instruction on training schools. Primary focus for the contractor is to work with AMoD S&P leaders and staff to refine their staff coordination and integration skills as they continue to develop their strategic planning capability. Mentors the GSG3 Strategy and Plans section and advises them on integration of GS plans and orders with MoD policy guidance.
 - 5.2. Strategic Defense Planning Process Advisor (1 Senior Mentor at Eggers)
 - 5.2.1. Provide AMoD S&P training, mentorship and coaching on the Strategic Defense Planning Process, its components and directorates" responsibilities. The SPDS system consists of the following documents which must be updated each year in accordance with MoD guidance.
 - 5.2.1.1. National Military Strategy (NMS).
 - 5.2.1.2. Guidance for Operational Planning (GOP).
 - 5.2.1.3. General Staff Planning Guidance (GSPG).
 - 5.2.1.4. Defense Capabilities Planning Guidance (DCPG).
 - 5.2.1.5. Strategic Defense Planning Directive (SDPD).
 - 5.2.2. Provide AMoD S&P, and the Deputy, mentorship and training on Policy and Plan Development, distribution, and enforcement.
 - 5.2.3. Develop a systematic process to deliver appropriate mentoring and training that is progressive and meets the professional development needs of the AMoD S&P and is approved by the NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ5.
 - 5.2.4. Provide mentorship, leadership, supervision, guidance, and training in SDPS policy, process and product development to the AMoD S&P staff.
 - 5.2.5. Provide mentorship and suggest effective processes and systems to personal staff to AMoD S&P and Deputy AMoD S&P in order for those staffs to better support their executives.
 - 5.2.6. Mentor AMoD S&P as they produce the inputs and products necessary to the development of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS).
 - 5.2.7. Provide guidance, suggestions and Dari/English doctrine on staff officer professional development so that the Afghans can develop an officer professional development program within AMoD S&P.

Findings: Thin Labor Market

- ❖ Afghan Surge period (2008-2012) coincided with a significant increase in demand for advisors and trainers across the country to accelerate Afghan Security Force development.
- ❖ In 2010, DynCorp took over contracts to provide advisor support to both the Afghan MoI and MoD:
- ❖ Increased demand led to a diluted labor market for qualified trainers and advisors:
 - ❖ DynCorp could only fill 300 of 728 (41%) MoI contractor positions within 120 days (GAO)
 - ❖ Participants observed noticeable trade off between overall quality and scale of contractors
- ❖ The need to fill slots was viewed as more important than selecting quality personnel due to the \$10,000/day penalty.

“over time, you have less qualified advisors” (author interview)

“they’re fielding people that shouldn’t be fielded, but they have to or they will be fined so many tens of thousands per day” (author interview)

Developing a SSR Contracting Framework

- ❖ Evaluating Brown, et al.'s (2010) framework for SSR Contracting
 - ❖ Highly relevant to address buyer-seller uncertainty and contract incompleteness
 - ❖ Limited in suggesting context-specific governance mechanisms that would hold up in a complex contracting environment like Afghanistan.
- ❖ Contract Design
 - ❖ Agreement on several levels that SOWs and performance must be more clearly stated, agreed upon, monitored, measured, and evaluated against expected benchmarks or redressed through joint mediation and arbitration processes.
 - ❖ Contract penalties were counterproductive for ensuring quality
 - ❖ Specificity of the SOWs and performance measures should not be confused with the capabilities required to achieve mission goals.
- ❖ Contracting for Complex Services – Less Guidance, Equally Important


Next Steps

- ❖ Analyzing second round of interviews with current and former SSR contract employees (DynCorp, MPRI)
- ❖ Develop SSR contracting framework
 - ❖ Contract Design
 - ❖ Trainer-Advisor Selection
 - ❖ Structural incentives
 - ❖ Context-specific governance mechanisms
 - ❖ Performance measurement
 - ❖ Individual Incentives
- ❖ Explore/evaluate alternative civil-military authority relationships and organizational designs for multi-lateral training and advising missions

Questions and Comments?




Case Study: Afghanistan Training and Advising Contracts



- ❖ Training and advising contracts account for just over 5% of total U.S. spending on Afghanistan's reconstruction
- ❖ \$5 billion is small relative other reconstruction costs, but **still significant** in absolute terms

Timeline of Afghan Training and Advising Contracts



Select Data on Advisor-Trainer Selection

“I was slightly underwhelmed with the performance of several contractors in terms of not only how they were doing the advising mission but also their credentials for doing so....We’re talking about building a Ministry of State at the highest levels of a sovereign nation and several of the contractors that I worked with had never ever worked at an institutional level above division...Several of them have never worked at a headquarters staff, or in the Pentagon, or in any kind of civilian governance institution that they were either principally in charge of or in a very senior assisting role—it just struck me as increasingly odd. Not that some of them weren’t good people...have great combat records, or military backgrounds, but that they simply did not have the depth of experience or perspective to do their jobs at [that] level” (author interview).

“I think if anybody wanted to spend one more dollar adding a little more scrutiny to the preparation of advisors and screening of advisors, I would think that would be worth probably \$10 in savings of having the wrong people out there—not only the wrong people, but people that create systems and problems that cause more problems in the long run” (author interview).

“I think one error we make across the board, not just in MoDA [Ministry of Defense Advisors program], is just throwing people into advisory jobs, calling them advisors, and they’re in many cases more detrimental than they are effective. So I think there has to be a real hard selection process to pick the right people. In fact, I’ve told [a General], for example, if he were putting together a team of let’s say 10 guys to go to—I’ll pick a country—Guatemala, I wouldn’t care what the other nine were like, but I would want the team leader to be the Zen master relationship builder because with that you can bring in subject matter experts all day long, but if you don’t have the relationship, a subject matter expert is a waste of time.” (author interview).

“for police advisors, just because you wore a badge doesn’t mean you could be a good police advisor. I got a guy who’s a deputy sheriff in Norman, Oklahoma in a two-car police force. He knew how to give out tickets, he knew how to break up a bar fight, but as far as being a police professional to advise a country on how to set up their police force, no. I mean I had another guy that was a retired inspector—that is a special advisor to the police commissioner of the city of New York, okay? Contractors didn’t want to touch him but he was probably the best qualified guy to be an advisor, to be a police advisor....If he knew too much then he’s liable to fix it and then we’re liable to go home and the gravy train’s gone. So he ended up getting frustrated. He ended up going home and going back to work for Ray Kelly in New York City” (author interview).

Key Elements of Being a Good Advisor

Excerpt from Afghan Ministry of Interior (Mol) Advisor Guide, Version 1.0, May 2011, p. 6-11.

(3) Key elements of being a good advisor:

(a) **Understanding your counterpart.** An advisor needs to become very familiar with his principal's background. One's ethnic background, educational background, and history are very important and influence that person. Understanding the principal's background will help communications and build solid relationships, leading to successful mission accomplishment.

(b) **Understand the principal's organization and key assistants.** An advisor should become familiar with his counterpart's organizational structure, work processes, key staff officers, and their background in order to provide effective assistance.

(c) **Establish a good relationship with your principal.** Professional relationships are important. However, good personal relationships are even more important, helping both sides to better understand the other's concerns and achieve good results. To establish and maintain good relations, it is important to travel and eat with Afghan counterparts. Sharing of meals, facing potential dangers are the best ways to demonstrate trust, and breakdown interpersonal barriers.

(d) **The advisor should understand his principal's issues and help solve them.** Anybody can relay CSTC-A information to his principal, and call it a job done. However, a good advisor will attempt to do everything he can to ensure his principal successfully accomplishes his endeavors. Some senior advisors have displayed genuine concern for their counterparts, and go beyond what they are required to do to help their counterparts and are fondly spoken of. Some of the things these advisors did were:

1) Provide situational awareness information such as daily ANP/ANA update, insights from other advisors, and media reports of interest, etc.

2) Train Afghan staff in their daily functions. When staff functional difficulties are observed, provide training and help.

3) Seek out the needs of their principals and help resolve them.

4) Be non-intrusive, but stay longer than required to be accessible, and provide any assistance as needed.

(e) These things made a difference in the relationship. It showed the advisors cared. Advisors should keep in mind that they are successful only when their principals are successful.

General Qualifications for Contract-Advisors

Excerpt from Afghan MoD Performance Based Statement of Work, Contract W91CRB-1-C-0030, Oct. 9, 2011, pp. 3-5.

W91CRB-10-C-0030 Statement of Work 9 October, 2011

4. **PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS.** The general qualifications for most positions are listed below while detailed qualifications or exemptions are provided within the detailed position description:
- 4.1. Bachelors Degree desired for most positions in a related field from an accredited college or university;
 - 4.2. Ten or more years of work experience in the subject matter area at the appropriate level for the position assigned;
 - 4.3. Possess computer skills in Microsoft Office Suite (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and Outlook);
 - 4.4. Possess strong communication and interpersonal skills;
 - 4.5. Possess strong organizational and analytical skills;
 - 4.6. Ability to effectively communicate, advise, and train others in principles of the associated duties ranging from military staff through operational functions; or specific areas of expertise.
 - 4.7. There are five (5) skill levels required (additional qualifications listed below):
 - 4.7.1. Senior Mentor
 - 4.7.1.1. Senior Mentors assist in the development of senior MoD officials by providing leadership training, and coaching assisting their Afghan counterpart in completing requirements for the Afghan National Army. Equivalent experience of a 05-06 Battalion or Brigade commander.
 - 4.7.1.2. Senior Mentors may lead or participate on a team of international and Afghan advisors providing technical assistance (advice and guidance, training, organizational development and other capacity building services) to counterparts within the MoD.
 - 4.7.1.3. In organizations having more than a few contractor positions, the Senior Mentor shall have the ability to act as the single point of alignment among the various contracted positions ensuring unity of effort between the actions of NTM-A/CSTC-A and the contractor effort.
 - 4.7.2. Mentor
 - 4.7.2.1. Mentors assist in the development Staff, training and doctrine development or other responsibilities in support operations within the ANA. Equivalent experience of a military officer 04-06 or Command Sergeant Major with Battalion, Brigade, or Staff experience as CSM, XO, S3, or S4 like position.
 - 4.7.2.2. Recent operational experience in Afghanistan or Iraq training international forces is highly desired. Experience in professional development and training and working with Middle Eastern or Asian cultures is desired.
 - 4.7.2.3. Graduate of Combined Graduate Staff College (CGSC) or sister service equivalent preferred.
 - 4.7.3. Subject Matter Expert
 - 4.7.3.1. This individual will be part of a workforce providing instruction, coaching and mentoring in their functional area.
 - 4.7.3.2. Bachelors or experiential equivalent required.
 - 4.7.3.3. Experience as a subject matter expert in associated functional area as described in the detailed PBSOW.
 - 4.7.3.4. Former military experience either serving, or working with the military is desired but not required.
 - 4.7.4. Senior Trainer
 - 4.7.4.1. Ability to review relevant U.S. Field Manuals and publications for application to the Afghan National Army; in conjunction with NTM-A/CSTC-A, develops course of instruction and course materials; provides classroom training as required to teach, coach and train Afghan counterparts.
 - 4.7.4.2. Experience in training, operations, or maintenance, equivalent to a company grade officer or senior non-commissioned officer (E8 – E9) with Battalion experience or higher.
 - 4.7.4.3. Recent operational experience training in Afghanistan or Iraq forces is desired.
 - 4.7.5. Trainer
 - 4.7.5.1. Ability to train ANA personnel in narrowly scoped military type tasks; equivalent experience of a non-commissioned officer (E6-E7).
 - 4.7.5.2. Recent operational experience training Afghanistan or Iraq forces is preferred. This individual will be part of a multi-instructor workforce providing instruction in their functional area.
 - 4.7.6. Exemptions to listed qualifications: The contractor may request waiver through the directorate or unit to the NTM-A/CSTC-A Project Manger and the contracting officer for potential hires with equivalent private or public job expertise or experience.

Specific Task Descriptions for Contract-Advisors

Excerpt from Afghan MoD Performance Based Statement of Work, Contract W91CRB-1-C-0030, Oct. 9, 2011, pp. 6-7, 47-49.

6. SPECIFIC COST PLUS FIXED FEE TASK DESCRIPTION

6.1. CJ1 Personnel: 5 positions (1 Mentor, 4 SMEs) shall help develop, manage, and execute all manpower and personnel plans, programs and policies across all Afghan National Army Components and the MoD. Assist the Minister of Defense for Personnel and Education in recruiting, retaining and sustaining a high quality force through innovative and effective enterprise solutions. Ensure Human Resources readiness of the ANA across the full spectrum of operations within the MoD. Teach, train and implement new policies and procedures, revise as needed, and schedule and check the implementation and compliance through regularly scheduled Staff Assistance Visits (SAVs).

6.2. CJ2 Intelligence Training and Advisory Group (INTAG): 21 positions (1 Senior Mentor, 8 mentors, 7 SMEs, 1 Senior Trainer, 4 Trainers) shall mentor the ANA G2 in policy formulation, planning, programming, budgeting, management, staff supervision, evaluation, and oversight for intelligence activities for the ANA. CJ2 Intelligence has ANA Staff responsibility for overall coordination of major intelligence disciplines such as Imagery Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, Human Intelligence, Measurement and Signature Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Security Countermeasures. The contractor shall have the ability to identify systemic problems requiring a policy change, recommend solutions, and develop and implement the change. The contractor shall provide the necessary coaching and monitoring so the department can act independently.

6.3. CJ3 Operations: 2 positions (2 Mentors) shall provide GSG3 assistance in executing individual foreign country training and leadership development and mentoring to the GSG3 CSM.

6.4. CJ4 Logistics: 26 positions (1 Senior Mentor, 6 Mentors, 14 SMEs, 3 Senior Trainers, and 2 Trainers) shall support GSG4 and AT&L under the strategic direction of CJ4. The effort focuses on developing ANA logistics functions through Supply OJT training which includes both manual and automated systems. Contractor effort shall include the development of sustainable logistics systems which determine, prioritize and execute plans that acquire, manage, receive, store, issue and assess all classes of supply within the ANSF.

6.5. CJ5 Strategy and Policy: 11 positions (1 Senior Mentor, 7 Mentors; 2 SME, [1 mentor on hold]) shall mentor the MoD Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategy & Policy and senior staff in developing strategies and plans that produce effective ministerial organizations and departments, sustaining institutions and intermediate commands to include Counter Terrorism, Counter Narcotics, Reserve Forces, National Security, and Emergency planning for military support to civil authorities.

5. CJ5 Strategy and Policy (11 positions: 1 Senior Mentor, 8 Mentors; 2 SME, [1 mentor on hold])

5.1. Positions are required in order to develop Policy and Strategy formulation and implementation across AMoD S&P and GSG3 Strategy Mentors the MoD Assistant Minister for Strategy and Policy and staff in developing and integrating strategies and plans that produce effective ministerial organizations and departments, sustaining institutions and intermediate commands. These strategies and plans must be integrated within the MoD Staff, with the General Staff and with other GIRA agencies. They provide transparency, accountability, governance and oversight across all areas of policy, execution and administration within the MoD. The MoD will plan in accordance with a Strategic Defense Planning System (SDPS) which is similar to the system used by the United States. This system and its processes are designed to be developed and reviewed annually and doctrinal standards are to be documented and developed to enable instruction on training schools. Primary focus for the contractor is to work with AMoD S&P leaders and staff to refine their staff coordination and integration skills as they continue to develop their strategic planning capability. Mentors the GSG3 Strategy and Plans section and advises them on integration of GS plans and orders with MoD policy guidance.

5.2. Strategic Defense Planning Process Advisor (1 Senior Mentor at Eggers)

5.2.1. Provide AMoD S&P training, mentorship and coaching on the Strategic Defense Planning Process, its components and directorates' responsibilities. The SPDS system consists of the following documents which must be updated each year in accordance with MoD guidance.

5.2.1.1. National Military Strategy (NMS).

5.2.1.2. Guidance for Operational Planning (GOP).

5.2.1.3. General Staff Planning Guidance (GSPG).

5.2.1.4. Defense Capabilities Planning Guidance (DCPG).

5.2.1.5. Strategic Defense Planning Directive (SDPD).

5.2.2. Provide AMoD S&P, and the Deputy, mentorship and training on Policy and Plan Development, distribution, and enforcement.

5.2.3. Develop a systematic process to deliver appropriate mentoring and training that is progressive and meets the professional development needs of the AMoD S&P and is approved by the NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ5.

5.2.4. Provide mentorship, leadership, supervision, guidance, and training in SDPS policy, process and product development to the AMoD S&P staff.

5.2.5. Provide mentorship and suggest effective processes and systems to personal staff to AMoD S&P and Deputy AMoD S&P in order for those staffs to better support their executives.

5.2.6. Mentor AMoD S&P as they produce the inputs and products necessary to the development of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS).

5.2.7. Provide guidance, suggestions and Dari/English doctrine on staff officer professional development so that the Afghans can develop an officer professional development program within AMoD S&P.

DynCorp Job Posting for MoD Acquisition Advisor-Mentor

Accessed on April 8, 2013 at <http://jobs.jobs/>, Search terms: DynCorp, Ministry of Defense, Kabul

DynCorp International LLC.

Ministry of Defense Acquisition Advisor - Mentor in KABUL Afghanistan

Apply Now

(MoD) Acquisition Advisor (Mentor) (MAG), is responsible for mentoring the contracting functions of the Afghan Acquisition Agency (AA), and shall directly mentor and facilitate the Contracting Directorate. Principal Accountabilities Coach the AA counterparts towards advanced contracting techniques within the Afghan Procurement Law to ensure clear, transparent, and efficient solicitation, bidding, evaluation, and selection. Provide guidance and education necessary to address penalties and options for delivery orders and contracts that shall ensure that the best deal available for the Afghan National Army (ANA). Develop a coordinated system and guide/Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), in English and Dari, for measures of contract administration effectiveness to include performance measures indicators. This purpose of this guide/SOP is to provide Mentors and other coalition personnel the ability to evaluate the end user and cost effectiveness of contracts produced and managed by the AA. Develop a plan to accommodate the expected increase of requirements and funding from CSTC-A to the ANA as contract transitions accelerate. This task includes, but is not limited, to leading a team to track and report on a large number of contract administration actions. This task may also require additional subtasks as needed IAW type and quantity of contracts. Fully participate in the Afghan contract administration process and develop training and training products as needed. Plan and facilitate the smooth transition of contract administration responsibilities as ANA contracts supplant CSTC-A contracts; this may apply to any and all classes of supply, facilities, and services. Facilitate development of Contractor Performance Evaluation process for the AA. Other duties deemed necessary by management. Knowledge & Skills Excellent written and verbal communication skills are required. Must demonstrate creative problem solving skills and the ability to work independently or as part of a team equally well. Knowledge and experience in process improvement techniques, database management, and office automation programs such as Microsoft Project, MS Office, PowerPoint, Excel, and Microsoft Word is desired. Must be eligible for SECRET Level Security DoD Clearance (previously granted and never revoked or suspended). Experience & Education Former O4-O6 or equivalent civilian contractor possessing a Bachelor's degree with an emphasis on program management, contract management, business administration, or contracting is required. Master's degree is desired. Minimum seven years' experience in one or more of the following domains: contract management, contract administration, budget/finance management, general cost accounting, or program management. Level II Certified Program Management in Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) or equivalent commercial standard relating to experience and education is required. Experience in professional development in regards to training and working with Middle Eastern or Asian cultures is desired. Individuals with joint and combatant level assignments are preferred. Recent operational experience in Afghanistan or Iraq training international forces highly desired. Physical Requirements/Working Environment Must meet all physical, medical and other requirements for overseas deployment in accordance with current Department of Defense (DoD) regulations. Required to qualify with and carry a M-9 pistol. Must possess a fitness level appropriate to performing work in a field environment and current medical exam completed within the past 12 months. Dental and medical readiness must be up to date. Must be able to lift 50lbs. Ability to obtain and maintain a current US Passport. Posses the ability to

Jobs Browse Sites

DESCRIPTION: THE ABOVE INFORMATION ON THIS description has been designed to indicate the general nature and level of work performed by employees within this classification. It is not designed to contain or be interpreted as a comprehensive inventory of all duties, responsibilities, and qualifications required of employees assigned to this job. EXECUTIVE ORDER 11246 Prohibits discrimination against any employee or applicant on the basis of race, sex, color, religion, or national origin and requires affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and employees treated, without regard to race, sex, color, genetic information, religion, or national origin. (Enforcement Agency: U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs).

Currer

Dyn
Mini
KAE
Cler

DCAA Audit of DynCorp's CIVPOL Billing Practices, 2004-2005

Excerpt from DCAA Audit Report, Nov. 27, 2009, pp. 1-2, 14-15.



DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY
AUDIT REPORT NO. 3181-2007D17900008



November 27, 2009

PREPARED FOR: Office of Acquisition Management (A/LM/AQM)
 Department of State
 ATTN: Branch Chief, Quality Assurance [REDACTED]
 P.O. Box [REDACTED]

PREPARED BY: DCAA Fort Worth Branch Office
 DynCorp International LLC Suboffice
 PO Box [REDACTED]

Telephone No. (817) [REDACTED]
 FAX No. (817) [REDACTED]
 E-mail Address [REDACTED]@dcaa.mil

SUBJECT: Report on Audit of Labor Hour Billings through Public Voucher 1473-37, under Contract No. S-LMAQM-04-C-0030, Task Order S-AQMPD-05-F-1473 (Afghanistan)

SUBJECT OF AUDIT

As requested by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, on April 16, 2007, we examined DynCorp International LLC's (DI) direct labor hours on Contract No. S-LMAQM-04-C-0030, Task Order (TO) S-AQMPD-05-F-1473 (Afghanistan). This task order provides for the maintenance and operation of a Central Training Center and Regional Training Centers providing basic skills training for the Afghanistan National Police, Border Police, and Highway Patrol. The task order period of performance was September 16, 2004 thru August 31, 2005.

The accumulation, recording, and reporting of cost incurred and billed on contracts is the responsibility of the contractor. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the claimed labor costs based on our examination.

SCOPE OF AUDIT

We conducted our examination in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards (GAGAS), except DCAA does not currently have an external opinion on its quality control system as required by GAGAS 3.55. The most recent external quality control review opinion expired on August 26, 2009. A review of DCAA's quality control system is currently being performed. Those standards require that we plan and perform the examination to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the data and records examined are free of material misstatement. An examination includes:

- evaluating the contractor's internal controls, assessing control risk and determining the extent of audit testing needed based on the control risk assessment;
- examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the data and records evaluated;
- assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by the contractor;
- evaluating the overall data and records presentation; and
- determining the need for technical specialist assistance.

RESULTS OF AUDIT

In our opinion, \$ [REDACTED] of the \$ [REDACTED] claimed direct labor costs incurred during the period of September 16, 2004 through August 31, 2005 on Contract No. S-LMAQM-04-C-0030, Task Order (TO) 1473 are provisionally approved pending final acceptance. Final acceptance of amounts claimed under Government contracts does not take place until performance under the contract is completed and accepted by the cognizant authorities and the audit responsibilities have been completed.

We discussed the results of our examination with Ms. Dee Tansey, Director DI CIVPOL Contracts, in an exit conference held on June 4, 2009. Ms. Tansey concurred with the audit results.

The results of our examination are presented below:

Base Year:

CLIN	Description	Claimed	Questioned	Difference (Note 1)	Note
0015	Commanders/Executive Officers	\$ [REDACTED]	-	\$ [REDACTED]	2
0020	Law Enforcement / Police Advisors	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	
0024	Interpreters	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	
0025	Program Manager	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	
0026	Deputy Program Manager	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	
0027	Logistics Supervisor	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	
0028	Logistics Coordinator	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	
0029	Physicians Assistant	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	
0030	Registered Nurse	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	
0031	Medics	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	
0032	Administrative Assistants	[REDACTED]	-	[REDACTED]	
	TOTAL - Base Year	\$ [REDACTED]	\$ [REDACTED]	\$ [REDACTED]	