

Predicting Bid Protests: What Should Acquisition Teams (Not) Do?

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Overview

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Background

- Bid protests are increasing
 - Protests as a % of protest opportunities (i.e., awarded contract actions) increased from .16% in 2008 to .26% in 2016
- Bid protests are effective
 - Only 17% sustained, but an average of 42% of all protest cases were effective from 2009-2014
- Bid protest increase transaction costs in:
 - Prevention
 - Adjudication
- Congressional and Executive actions to thwart protests:
 - 1 May 2018, \$350 filing fee to GAO (for EPDS)
 - Temporarily banned prolific protestor Latvian Connection
 - DOD Pilot ('19-'22): LB (rev > \$250M) protestors to pay legal fees if unsuccessful
 - DOD's Enhanced debriefings (> \$100M, > \$10M for SB) includes SSDD and follow-up questions
 - Sponsored research (e.g., RAND)

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Background

- Measures taken to avoid protests:
 - (1) added layers of reviewers and legal counsel to scrutinize every document,
 - (2) added procurement lead time,

(3) additional discussions to allow offerors an opportunity to rectify weaknesses and deficiencies (technical leveling),

- (4) [unnecessarily] retaining offerors in the competitive range,
- (5) awarding more contracts than intended,
- (6) modifying existing contracts vs. new competitions,
- (7) shopping requirements to existing IDIQ contracts,
- (8) LPTA rather than full trade-off,
- (9) larger acquisition team, and
- (10) more extensive debriefings.




Purpose & Research Questions

Purpose:

- To better understand why bid protests are lodged by interested parties.
 - identify meso-level decisions and actions of buy-side acquisition teams that affect the receipt of a bid protest.

Research Questions:

- 1. What <u>characteristics of a procurement</u> affect whether a bid protest is received?
- 2. What acquisition <u>strategy variables/decisions</u> affect whether a bid protest is received?
- 3. What <u>human factors</u> contribute to receipt of a bid protest?
- 4. Are the pertinent theories surrounding inter-organizational exchange complete, and if not, what extensions should be considered?





Methodology

- Backward stepwise logistic regression
- Unit of analysis = FAR Part 15 source selection
- *n* = 240
- Original data collected via survey of USN contracting personnel



Results

Independent Variables	В	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)
Criticality	.18	.09	4.58	.03	1.20
Service	.89	.44	3.99	.05	2.43
Oral presentations	-1.65	.85	3.76	.05	.19
Cost reimbursement contract	.71	.41	2.92	.09	2.03
Protest fear	.13	.04	12.99	.001	1.14
Protest experience	.09	.05	3.98	.05	1.09
Sustained protest experience	1.16	.51	5.16	.02	3.19



Results

Туре	Count	%
Intended to award without discussions	190	79
Inappropriate to award without discussions	92	38
Held discussions	143	60
Dissatisfied with discussions	43	18
Oral presentations used	20	8.3
Oral presentations appropriate	57	24
Oral presentations appropriate and not used	50	88
Small business set-aside	102	43
Protests	43	18
Inappropriate source selection method used	17	7
LPTA used but inappropriate	12	17
Awarded more contracts than intended	12	5

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Results

	Average	Std Dev	Min	Max
Team Members	10.3	4.3	3	21
Transaction Costs	\$243,390	\$300,415	\$700	\$3,551,944
Transaction Costs/Contract Dollar	\$.066	\$.203	\$.00005	\$1.77
Document Revisions:				
SSDD	3.43	6.74	0	99
Comparative Assessment/Proposal Analysis Report	3.20	6.67	0	99
Evaluation Notices	13.94	98.63	0	1200
Source Selection Plan	3.10	2.778	0	30
Debriefing Scripts	2.43	3.56	0	27
Technical Evaluations	5.55	9.07	0	99
Past Performance Evaluations	4.22	8.65	0	99
Cost/price Analysis	3.06	4.77	0	60
Rating Charts	1.45	2.08	0	21
Evaluation Briefing Charts	1.87	1.81	0	10
TOTAL	42.2			



Results

Strategies to Avoid a Protest

Туре	Average Times per User	Total Times Used – All Respondents	Min	Max
Task/delivery order	43.5	2,308	0	300
Sole source	14.2	624	0	100
Modify existing contract	15.4	737	0	114



Managerial Implications

• Since source selections for services lend themselves to protests, more caution should be exercised in their design and execution.

•Reconsider the part-time, ad hoc approach to staffing source selection efforts.

- •(1) strategic sourcing, and
- •(2) mobile source selection centers of excellence.
- Acquisition leaders should gauge the criticality of each requirement
 - Assign more resources such as PALT and experienced personnel



Managerial Implications

- Oral presentations appear to be underutilized
 - Appropriate for the situation in 57 (24%) of the source selections, they were only used in 7 of those (\sim 12%).
 - Explore ways to broaden their use.
 - Revisit the prudence of conducting oral presentations without discussions.
- Apply more personnel to source selections involving cost reimbursement contracts. Additional training should be provided for the most vulnerable actions mandated by cost reimbursement contracts, such as cost realism analysis.
- Listen to the contracting officer's intuition as a gauge for protest propensity
- Source selection teams do not appear to be learning organizations.
- LPTA source selection method is sometimes used to source requirements that are inappropriate to the buying situation. Nevertheless, its use showed no statistical effect on mitigating protests.
- Awarding more contracts than intended has also been mentioned as a strategy to avoid protests no statistical effect on mitigating protests.



Managerial Implications

• Confirms the deliberate use of acquisition vehicles in order to circumvent the more stringent, protest-prone FAR Part 15 source selections.

- Be cognizant of effects on competition and SB
- Transaction costs of source selections is alarmingly high, averaging \$243K each, or 6.6% of contract spend higher than many surcharges
 - Transaction costs did not reduce the odds of a protest.



Theoretical Implications

• Shines light on an overlooked corner of justice theory – communications during relationship formation (i.e., source selection). This is important; much of the precedent of relational norms are established during the interactions during supplier selection.

• Oral presentations, in some way, thwart bid protests

• Whose justice takes priority? At what point does the cost of justice become unjust?



Conclusion

Future Research Directions:

- A better understanding of how oral presentations are conducted and whether such characteristics are meaningful in terms of contract outcomes and bid protests.
- Explore lack of learning from protest experience
- Is the procedural justice afforded by protests worth the high transaction costs of source selections.
- Any lingering impact of extreme or otherwise influential (in)justices in the past and how those (in)justices manifest themselves in future interactions, decisions, and behaviors.

Limitations

- Response rate from original survey
- Variables available in the data set do not include all possible causes of a protest (e.g., errors)
- Only 43 protests (of 240) unbalanced DV