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**Construction Management Module: Contingency Contracting
Synergistic Approach Integrating Joint Capabilities for
USSOCOM**

29 January 2010

by

Capt. Chris M. Hearl, USAF

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Abstract

This project investigates the effectiveness of Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) in executing construction requirements within the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). The study provides recommendations to address identified weaknesses associated with a CCO's ability to execute construction requirements for USSOCOM. One such recommendation is the development of a Construction Management Module (CM²) to better manage the contingency contracting process for construction requirements. This module will employ a synergistic approach (integrating joint capabilities) to planning and executing construction requirements in the USSOCOM contingency AOR.

Keywords: Expeditionary contracting, contingency contracting, construction management, training, USSOCOM operations, synergy, integration, joint capabilities, instructional design, self-instruction



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Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy position of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the Federal Government.



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Acronym Listing

AAR	After-action Report
ACC	Acquisition Community Connection
ADDIE	Analyze, Design, Develop, Implement, Evaluate
AFFARS	Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation System
AFB	Air Force Base
AFLMA	Air Force Logistics Management Agency
AMC	Army Material Command
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APDP	Acquisition Professional Development Program
AT&L	Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
BPA	Blanket Purchase Agreement
CAG	Competition Advocate General
CBO	Congressional Budget Office
CCJH	Contingency Contracting Joint Handbook
CCO	Contingency Contracting Officer
CERP	Commanders Emergency Response Program
CFSOCC	Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command
CINC	Commander in Chief
CJSOTF	Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CM ²	Construction Management Module
COCO	Chief of the Contracting Office
COCOM	Combatant Command
CONUS	Continental United States
COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
COTR	Contracting Officer's Technical Representative
<i>DAWIA</i>	<i>Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act</i>
DAU	Defense Acquisition University
DCMA	Defense Contract Management Agency
<i>DFARS</i>	<i>Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement</i>
D&F	Determination and Findings
DPAP	Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy
DoD	Department of Defense
DoP	Director of Procurement
DoS	Department of State



FAR	<i>Federal Acquisition Regulation</i>
FCO	Field Contracting Office
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FET	Facilities Engineering Team
FOO	Field Ordering Officer
GAO	General Accounting Office/Government Accountability Office
GCC	Geographical Combatant Commander
GSA	General Services Administration
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HCA	Head of Contracting Activity
HN	Host Nation
IAW	In Accordance With
IDIQ	Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity
IG	Inspector General
IGE	Independent Government Estimate
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
J1	Manpower and Personnel
J2	Intelligence
J3	Operations
J4	Logistics
J5	Plans
J6	Communications
J8	Programming and Comptroller
J&A	Justification and Approval
JARB	Joint Acquisition Review Board
JCC-I/A	Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan
JCMEB	Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board
JFC	Joint Forces Command
JFUB	Joint Facility Utilization Board
JMD	Joint Manning Document
JOA	Joint Operational Area
JTSCC	Joint Theatre Support Contracting Command
JULLS	Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System
LD	Liquidated Damages
LOGCAP	Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program
MAAWS	Money as a Weapon System
MFP-11	Major Force Program-11



MILCON	Military Construction (funding)
MIPR	Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request
MNF-I	Multi-national Force-Iraq
MOOTW	Military Operations Other than War
MTW	Major Theatre War
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-commissioned Officer
NCMA	National Contract Management Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OCO	Overseas Contingency Operations
OCONUS	Outside the Continental United States
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPCON	Operational Control
OPS	Operations
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PMR	Performance Management Reviews
PPO	Project Planning Officer
PRT	Provisional Reconstruction Team
PVO	Private Volunteer Organizations
QAE	Quality Assurance Evaluator
QAP	Quality Assurance Personnel
QDR	<i>Quadrennial Defense Review</i>
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
RCC	Regional Contracting Center
RCO	Regional Contracting Office
RM	Resource Manager
SAF/AQC	Secretary of the Air Force/Acquisitions
SCC	Small-scale Contingencies
SME	Subject-matter Expert
SCO	Senior Contracting Official
SOAE	Special Operations Acquisition Executive
SOAL	Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics
SOAL-K	Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics- Contracting



SOAL-KA	Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics- Contracting Operations Division
SOAL-KCC	Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics- Contracting Contingency Cell
SOCCE	Special Operations Command and Control Elements
SOCENT	Special Operations Central Command
SOF	Special Operations Forces
<i>SOFFAR</i>	<i>Special Operations Forces Federal Acquisition Regulation</i>
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SOW	Statement of Work
SSA	Source-selection Authority
UMD	Unit Manning Document
US	United States of America
USA	United States Army
USACE	United States Army Corp of Engineers
USAFRICOM	United States African Command
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United States Code
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command



Executive Summary

As a leader in front-line asymmetric threat operations, USSOCOM has increased its presence around the world in support of military and national security objectives. Its mission demands flexibility and adaptability at the highest extent allowable under the law. CCOs supporting this mission are often looked upon as logistics facilitators, business advisors, resource managers, and general tactical experts in achieving contractual requirements and arrangements supporting the USSOCOM mission. As key enablers of this mission, CCOs are often asked to fulfill construction contract requirements in austere locations with little or no training in construction terminology and concepts. This lack of expertise has posed a problem for the command. This study provides strategic and tactical recommendations to address identified problems areas, such as: proper training and manning of personnel, inadequate acquisition planning and contract management processes, and a lack of integration among a splintered platform of cross-functional stakeholders. As part of the tactical recommendation, the researcher also developed a Construction Management Module to improve specific problems realized with inadequate acquisition planning, insufficient oversight of work, and a failure to include the appropriate funding considerations, clauses and evaluation factors into construction contracts.



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I. Introduction

A. Overview

This chapter introduces the background, problem statement, and research elements associated with this project. As a leader in front-line asymmetric threat operations, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has increased its presence around the world in support of global operations against terrorist networks and other military and national security objectives. The USSOCOM mission demands flexibility and adaptability at the highest extent allowable under the law. Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) are often looked upon as logistics facilitators, business advisors, resource managers, and general tactical experts in achieving contractual requirements and arrangements supporting the USSOCOM mission. As key enablers of this mission, CCOs are often asked to fulfill construction requirements in austere locations with little or no training in construction terminology, concepts, and protocols. This lack of expertise has posed a problem for the command. This chapter presents this problem and outlines the subsequent research to illustrate the need for the creation of a construction management module.

B. Background

The command mission for USSOCOM is to provide fully capable Special Operations Forces (SOF) to defend the United States (US) and its interests while conducting synchronized planning of global operations against terrorist networks (Cannaday, 2008). The USSOCOM commander uses the Center for Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics (SOAL) to provide rapid and focused acquisition, technology, and logistics support to the SOF warfighter. SOAL is recognized as a “key enabler” of the USSOCOM global mission. The Directorate of Procurement (DoP) within SOAL acquires SOF-peculiar weapon systems, equipment, services, and construction in direct support of SOF Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) (Cluck, 2009).



To meet this challenging mission, the Director of Procurement utilizes the most innovative, streamlined, and expedited acquisition practices available, while maintaining strict compliance with required statutes and regulations. It is important for USSOCOM contracting personnel to rapidly execute objectives in an ever-changing joint battle-space. These assets often come from contracting organizations throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) that must quickly adapt to the USSOCOM mission and policies. The increasing role of contingency contracting in austere conditions demands a more agile and skilled workforce. The current operations tempo around the globe has resulted in both a growing number of bare-base initiatives with emergency requirements and continued sustainment of the existing infrastructure for our deployed forces. As a matter of prudent resource management and risk mitigation, more mature, sustainment-oriented environments in the contingency Area of Responsibility (AOR) must withstand increasing scrutiny and must meet higher expectations of statutory and regulatory compliance than that of bare-base environments in an immature AOR.

In order to meet these higher expectations, the DoP requested this study to determine how to better enable the mission effectiveness of USSOCOM CCOs while they are achieving this compliance and supporting strategic objectives. The focus of this study concerns enabling the CCOs to more effectively execute construction requirements in a contingency (expeditionary) environment through a practical, yet comprehensive, management module that facilitates the respective mission objectives.

C. Problem Statement

Through the NPS Acquisition Research Program, USSOCOM leadership expressed a need for a management module that would enable its CCOs to better execute expeditionary infrastructure requirements. In order to appropriately craft such a module, the researcher must analyze the existing operational environment to determine which content and focus areas need to be addressed. CCOs supporting USSOCOM missions are often in austere conditions, with little or no contact with the



larger regional or theatre-wide contracting centers. They are also under the Operational Control (OPCON) of other agencies and commands within the AOR. This situation presents a unique dynamic in which a CCO must use the regulations and contract authority of one specific command, while supporting the operational objectives of another particular geographical combatant commander on the ground.

A cross-functional and joint-force environment further compounds this problem because different military services and functional areas are accustomed to their own regulations, procedures, doctrines, and objectives. The interaction of these various forces can be combined to create an effect greater than the sum of their individual effects. In other words, cooperative interaction among the individual cross-functional and joint-force members can create enhanced effectiveness greater than the sum of their individual effectiveness. This phenomenon will be referred to throughout this report as synergy. A more synergistic approach to how CCOs manage requirements is needed to effectively integrate the capabilities of both the joint-force environment and cross-functional areas of the acquisition team (such as finance, engineering, legal, logistics, and the operational unit requesting contractual support). Creating this synergy is not easy; CCOs need a structured management process to bridge the gaps between their respective military services' training doctrine and their individual skills, as well as the expectations of commanders on the ground. This report found that some of the biggest effectiveness gaps that arise when CCOs are executing construction requirements include: inadequate training of personnel, confusing contract management policies and construction management standards, non-compliant contracts (e.g., a failure to include the appropriate clauses and drawings, deficient acquisition planning and integration of contracting into operational planning, insufficient oversight of work and poor interaction between units).

Construction requirements often are dynamic and more complex than simplified commodity purchases; they demand frequent integration and close coordination between a cross-functional acquisition team. This integration is often



troubled by the unpredictability of contingency environments and the speed of war. A construction management module focused on integrating the joint-force environment will allow even a relatively inexperienced CCO to better manage his/her environment and more effectively support SOF.

D. Research Questions

The specific research questions for this study include the following:

- (1) What are the gaps in the effectiveness of contingency contracting with respect to executing construction requirements?
- (2) Can a comprehensive management module be developed to effectively mitigate these gaps? If so, what would it entail?

E. Research Objectives

This project has two primary goals:

- (1) Examine the contingency contracting environment concerning expeditionary construction requirements.
- (2) Provide recommendations to address problems in the field. Among these will be the development, creation, and delivery of a prototype tactical training handbook for CCOs to better manage the contingency contracting process for construction requirements, known herein as the USSOCOM Construction Management Module (CM²).

F. Research Methodology

Practical, qualitative research was conducted using multiple methods. The foundation for planning this overall research project—determining the research questions and selecting subsequent sources—followed a mixed application of fundamental research concepts outlined by many different sources (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998; Marshall & Rossman, 1998; Creswell, 2003; Leedy & Ormond, 2005; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).

The researcher analyzed archival data, such as governmental reports, policies, training materials, and after-action reports (AARs) from USSOCOM.



Additionally, the researcher collected data using questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with key informants. Informants were made up of USSOCOM personnel and supporting SMEs, selected from individuals with diverse backgrounds and experience. These informants were selected from current USSOCOM CCOs, staff, and customers. Questionnaires were developed, and interviews were conducted using standard operating procedures approved by the NPS Institutional Review Board for the study of human subjects. Using data from the literature and informant feedback, the researcher compared and contrasted successes and failures documented throughout contingency contracting. This data was processed predominately using the Analyze, Design, Develop, Implement, and Evaluate (ADDIE) model with a rapid, prototyping approach (Strickland, 2006). The ADDIE method was used to apply principles, processes, and designs for self-instruction (Keirns, 1999). Additionally, the ARCS motivation model (Keller, 1984) was used to focus on the attention, relevance, confidence, and satisfaction of the CM² reader.

In an effort to clearly organize the collected data, the analysis (Chapter V) and subsequent strategic recommendations (Chapter VI) are organized into three overarching categories: people, processes, and platforms. These categories are used herein to represent strategic pillars of planning and executing joint operational contracting activities. The CM² prototype is intended for use by the tactical-level CCO during contingency operations. It was, therefore, organized in a manner to match that of typical contracting structure: operational framework, strategic alignment, pre-award, award, post-award.

G. Significance of Research

Anticipated benefits from this study include a current overview of existing problems faced by USSOCOM construction CCOs and recommendations to resolve or mitigate those problems—including a Construction Management Module to be distributed to future CCOs. Although a broad contingency contracting handbook titled *Contingency Contracting—A Joint Handbook for the 21st Century* exists, it does not adequately address construction requirements with respect to the unique



operating environment of the USSOCOM AOR. Up to this point, it has been unclear as to exactly what gaps in capabilities and knowledge currently exist in the field. By interviewing contracting officers, staff officials, end-users, and other SMEs, the researcher hopes to identify and address effective ways to mitigate these gaps.

H. Scope, Limitations and Assumptions

This research is focused on construction requirements in contingency contracting within USSOCOM. Although it will review the overall USSOCOM mission and contingency contracting concepts, trends, challenges, and capabilities for comprehensive background and context, this research will not evaluate a sample representation of the population of all CCOs or all SOF personnel. Feedback from respondents is limited to USSOCOM-related contingencies and may not address current issues outside this scope.

The following assumptions/disclaimers pertain to this report:

1. Research was conducted throughout 2009. It is not intended as an exclusive solution to long-term operational needs and must be evaluated and updated accordingly over time. Future evaluation procedures and methods are addressed in the final recommendations in Chapter VI.
2. The term construction as used herein includes materials, supplies, and real property alterations associated with building or rebuilding infrastructure—including some services used in support of establishing infrastructure.
3. The models and information addressed are to be used as a theoretical foundation or guide and shall not overrule any current or future laws, regulations, or policy.
4. DoD contracting and SOF professionals of various positions with diverse backgrounds comprise the sample for questionnaires and interviews. Results of feedback may or may not reflect overall position(s) of the DoD.



5. The research assumes the reader has a fundamental understanding of DoD contracting and military command structures within the joint landscape.

I. Summary

This chapter provided the background, problem statement, and research questions associated with improving USSOCOM CCO execution of construction requirements in expeditionary environments. Chapter II will provide the specific methodologies followed in the project research and development of the CM².



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II. Methodology

A. Overview

The nature of the identified problem necessitated the use of multiple research methods. Fundamentally, the problem was to develop instructional content addressing capability gaps found in USSOCOM contingency contracting. This instructional content was addressed by developing the CM² prototype. In developing the CM², the researcher followed Strickland's (2006) framework for designing self-directed instructional content. This qualitative research framework is referred to as the ADDIE model—analyze, design, develop, implement, and evaluate, and includes a rapid prototyping approach.

Qualitative research is often used to focus on real-world complexities, allowing the researcher to examine multiple perspectives of a problem or group of problems. It helps define what needs to be studied in order for a researcher to best describe what is happening in a given environment. This type of research is also focused on interpreting problems in a given environment and then evaluating the effectiveness of solutions to those problems (Hudgens, 2009). In order to obtain multiple perspectives of the perceived problem(s) associated with this research, the researcher conducted multiple methods of data gathering and analysis.

The researcher collected and analyzed archival data such as government reports, policies, training materials, and after-action reports (AARs) from USSOCOM. He also collected data from questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with key informants made up of USSOCOM personnel and supporting SMEs. He developed the questionnaires (see Appendices 1-3) and conducted the interviews using procedures approved by the NPS Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the study of human subjects. The information gathered from these informants suggests positive lessons learned, as well as challenges CCOs face within the contingency contracting environment. One such challenge was the need for



additional CCO training in dealing with construction requirements. According to Ausink, Baldwin, and Paul, “successful training programs tend to be multifunctional, involving personnel with diverse backgrounds that are relevant to new practices” (2004, p. 20); as such, targeted informants included USSOCOM staff members, customers, and CCOs of various rank and service backgrounds. The researcher then triangulated this resulting data from archival sources and informants to compare commonalities between the literature and feedback from informants. He then further utilized these commonalities to develop relevant learning objectives and content best suited for the CM².

The structure of the CM² follows various self-directed learning concepts as outlined by Keirns (1999) and Keller (1984). These concepts include the principles of self-instruction, ARCS model, and Blooms taxonomy. These concepts will be discussed in further details in the section on self-directed learning below.

B. Data Management

Data collection is a selective process to be controlled primarily by the researcher’s formulation of the problem (Brewer & Hunter, 1989). In this research, the problem involved determining capability gaps in USSOCOM contingency contracting and then developing instructional content to mitigate those gaps. The data selected by the researcher for analysis included reports from the following: Congressional Research Service (CRS) (10), Government Accounting Office (GAO) (6), RAND (3), Office Management & Budget (OMB) (2), Inspector General (IG) (2), Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2), and AARs (12). Other literature sources included: MBA theses (14), USSOCOM performance management reviews (PMR) (2), the Gansler report (USA, 2007), various DoD Instructions, regulations, and policy, along with related journal articles and training documents. This data was reviewed for evidence of lessons learned and positive or negative commonalities. The diverse selection of sources, while not covering all existing data on the problem area, did allow the researcher to draw a reasonably certain conclusion based on commonalities between unbiased and unrelated sources.



In addition to reviewing these reports, the researcher fielded questionnaires and conducted semi-structured interviews with USSOCOM CCOs, staff officers, and end-users. The questionnaires and interview questions were developed based on an extensive review of various university websites and published survey design guidance (Dillman & Salant, 1994; Spector, 1994, Couper, 2001; Kennett, 2006; Fowler, 2008; Dillman, Smyth & Christian, 2008; Cano, 2009). The questions were also developed through personal consultation with survey expert Professor Ronald Fricker of the Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School. The questions were designed to illicit open-ended and creative responses to several questions regarding contingency contracting. The questions were specifically related to training, integration, and effectiveness of contingency contracting. They were similar for all informants; however, questions were adapted for the different roles of the actual informant (CCO, staff, customer). The target informants for these questionnaires and interviews were selected based on relevant experience and diversity of background (rank, functional area, position, etc.). A strategy for selecting a sample for field research should be based on accessibility and relevance to the research question. This approach can be used to generalize, with reasonable confidence, that the sample is a fair representation of the data (Brewer & Hunter, 1989). This particular strategy uses a constant comparative method in which the informants are provided questions to address the environment, as well as information regarding where the outcome of the study could lead the development of the CM². In this research, the informants were asked to share their experience in the relevant areas and provide direct recommendations for solutions to any perceived problems. The informants were also asked direct questions regarding applicable content areas of training aides such as the CM². The researcher then compared these results to determine what commonalities exist among the responses. These commonalities, in turn, help to confirm the validity of the questions and expected outcome from the study.

Due to geographical and communication constraints, the sample of informants was limited to 20 current USSOCOM personnel. However, the



informants did include personnel with various functional backgrounds and deployment experience. Demographic information was obtained through the questionnaires and interviews. Demographic questions included military service, rank, years of service, current position, location of and number of times deployed, and contracting certification level (if applicable). In order to preserve anonymity of informants, the researcher will cite quotes from these questionnaires and interviews by position (division chief, chief of contracting, etc.) or role (CCO, staff, end-user). A support letter from the USSOCOM DoP (see Appendix 4) was presented to each informant to help remove fear of retribution and express the intention of the research.

Questionnaire informants consisted of the following USSOCOM personnel: four CCOs, three staff members, and two senior customers. Interview informants consisted of the following USSOCOM personnel: five senior staff members and six CCOs. Both questionnaire and interview attempts resulted in a 100% response rate. All CCO informants were currently deployed in support of USSOCOM during the time of the questionnaire or interview. A more rigorous research approach would have been to select a larger sample size making up past and present USSOCOM personnel. In an attempt to mitigate this primary-source limitation, the researcher analyzed all 16 USSOCOM AARs on file. Deployments preceding these AARs were conducted in the last four years and were written by CCOs from all four military services, serving in 12 different locations, across 11 countries.

C. Investigation and Analysis

The researcher began this project with an understanding of the perceived need by USSOCOM leadership of a management module to instruct USSOCOM CCOs how to better execute construction requirements. Thus, the research was conducted with the intent of garnering data to assist in the design of such a module, known herein as the CM². The field of instructional design provided the catalyst for research associated with the development of the CM².



Design is the systematic method of research, planning, developing, evaluating and managing an instructional process. All of these individual components are incorporated into the method termed instructional design (Strickland, 2006). All models of instructional design have three common functions: (1) identifying the outcomes of the instruction, (2) developing the instruction, and (3) evaluating the effectiveness of the instruction (Strickland, 2006).

The design process must be both systematic and specific. Systematic means an orderly, logical method of identifying, developing and evaluating a set of strategies aimed at attaining a particular instructional goal. Specific means each element of the plan must be applied with attention to precise details. By applying systematic procedures and being attentive to specific details, one can design effective instruction. One such systematic procedure is known as the ADDIE model (Strickland, 2006).

1. ADDIE Model

The ADDIE model is a generic and simplified instructional systems design (ISD) model. ADDIE is an acronym for Analyze, Design, Develop, Implement, and Evaluate (Strickland, 2006). This model follows traditional instructional systems design concepts for training developing while allowing a rapid prototyping approach to fielding the learning tool, in this case, the CM².

a. Analyze

In the analyze phase, the researcher applying the ADDIE model reviews the related literature to determine knowledge, skills, and gaps, to clarify instructional problem(s), to establish basic goals and objectives, and to identify the learning environment and learner characteristics (Strickland, 2006) According to Merriam-Webster, 2009, analyze means to study or determine the nature and relationship of the parts of by analysis. Analyzing suggests separating or distinguishing component parts of a substance, process or situation, so as to discover its true nature or inner relationships ("Analyze," 2009). Thus, to truly analyze the necessary elements of



this study, the researcher conducted literature review and key informant feedback analysis, as documented in Chapter V.

b. Design

In the design phase, the strategies for specific learning objectives are designed, mode of delivery is chosen, and conceptual method of evaluation is determined (Strickland, 2006). The researcher designed the framework and learning objectives for the CM² prototype during this phase. He coordinated the strategy with USSOCOM leadership to ensure applicability and synergy with existing policy and procedures. It was during this phase that the decision was made to include both strategic and tactical level recommendations to the reader. It was also during this phase that it became clear that the final evaluation of the prototype CM² would have to be accomplished by USSOCOM after delivery.

c. Develop

In the develop phase, materials are produced according to the decisions made during the design phase (Strickland, 2006). In this research, the specific content was developed for the CM² as part of this phase. The titling of chapters was also developed during this phase. The content and chapter development of the CM² was accomplished to provide the relevant information in a reader-friendly manner.

d. Implement

In the implement phase, the researcher initiates production and tests prototypes (with targeted audience). This is the phase in which an implementation plan is typically developed. An implementation plan establishes the implementation timeline and procedures for both training the facilitators and the learner, as well as delivering the final product. The final product is developed based on needs and errors discovered while utilizing a prototype product with members of the target audience (Strickland, 2006). In this phase, the researcher delivered the prototype CM² to USSOCOM. The USSOCOM staff was satisfied with the prototype product.



However, creating and executing the implementation plan and the final evaluation is the responsibility of USSOCOM.

e. Evaluate

Evaluation is an ongoing activity conducted at each phase of the ADDIE model. Evaluation consists of two parts: formative and summative. Formative evaluation is part of each proceeding phase and determines effectiveness and quality of each stage. Summative evaluation consists of tests for criterion-related referenced items, provides opportunity for feedback from the users and assesses learner outcomes (Strickland, 2006). Formative evaluation was conducted as part of due diligence by the researcher. The researcher kept in constant communication with USSOCOM leadership and experienced CCOs throughout the research process. He also ensured that internal validity was evaluated by NPS peer review and USSOCOM member review. Both validity measures resulted in positive feedback in terms of analysis, structure, and content. The final stages of summative evaluation will be accomplished by USSOCOM personnel after this research has concluded.

2. Self-directed Learning

Another concept of instructional design utilized as part of this research is the concept of self-directed learning. The term self-directed learning may be understood in a variety of ways. As a methodology for instruction, self-directed learning refers to a learning situation in which an individual works with instructional materials without direct supervision or guidance. "In situations in which many individuals must learn the same information but are unable to meet as a group, self-instructed materials may provide a very practical answer to the need" (Keirns, 1999, p. 8). A circumstance in which learners have a varied level of entry knowledge or skill but must all attain a given outcome competency is another illustration of where self-instructed materials are appropriate. Theoretical investigations of self-directed learning often focus on meta-cognition: the skills and abilities which individuals



employ to guide their cognitive experiences in learning situations (1999). The principles discussed by Keirns in *Designs for Self Instruction, Principles, Processes, and Issues in Developing Self-Directed Learning* were instrumental in the development of the CM². Table 1 below summarizes the principles of self-instruction as outlined in her book.

Table 1. Principles of Self-Instruction
(adapted from Keirns, 1999)

PRINCIPLES OF SELF-INSTRUCTION	
Active responding	Ask questions within the text applying the concepts discussed (e.g., yes or no, true or false type questions).
Immediate feedback	Put answers within text or include an accessible link for the reader.
Small steps	Maintain a step approach, keeping information organized in manageable sections so as not to overwhelm the reader.
Self-pacing	Do not include time limits, a method common for manual training.
Testing by the learner	Put quiz questions at the end of sections, with answers accessible to the reader.

In developing the content and end-of-chapter questions for the CM², the researcher took care to focus on motivating the reader toward the material. The John Keller ARCS motivation model was used for this function. The elements of the ARC model are summarized below in Table 2.



Table 2. ARCS Motivation Model
(adapted from Keirns, 1999; Keller, 1984)

ARCS MOTIVATION MODEL	
Attention	Grab attention from the reader with scenarios or other attention-getting strategies.
Relevance	Explain why a topic is important to the reader; reference policy or guidance from higher authority than the reader.
Confidence	Include quiz questions in each section; return to key concepts throughout the training.
Satisfaction	Consider whether the reader will be happy with the end product.

Furthermore, the researcher needed a way to classify the different types of learning to be achieved in each learning objective within the CM². This classification was accomplished by determining the domains of learning associated with each learning objective. “Most self-instruction occurs in the cognitive (knowing, thinking, acquiring, storing, and using information) domain” (Keirns, 1999, p. 12). One of the best known models for classifying different types of learning in the cognitive domain is *Bloom’s Taxonomy of Cognitive Objectives* (Keirns, 1999, p. 12). Table 3 depicts the categories within Blooms Taxonomy as they relate to describing cognitive objectives.



Table 3. Bloom's Taxonomy
(Keirns, 1999, p.12)

BLOOM'S TAXONOMY OF COGNITIVE OBJECTIVES	
CATEGORY	DESCRIPTION
Knowledge	Ability to recall previously learned material
Comprehension	Ability to grasp meaning, explain, restate ideas
Application	Ability to use learned material in new situations
Analysis	Ability to separate material into component parts and show relationship between parts
Synthesis	Ability to put together separate ideas, establish new relationships
Evaluation	Ability to judge the worth of material against stated criteria

The researcher took these cognitive objectives into account when analyzing the gaps found in the contingency contracting environment. Once he determined the gaps, the evidence and extent of those gaps were used to suggest a certain level of cognitive understanding based on the Bloom's categories described above. The researcher then used these categories to develop the learning objectives within the CM². Based on the analysis of this research, Chapter V defines these learning objectives and further discusses the cognitive category in which the learning objectives best fit.



D. Validity and Reliability

“Multi-method research validity is tested by triangulating multiple sets of data speaking to the same research question from different viewpoints” (Brewer & Hunter, 1989, p. 83). The researcher infers validity from the agreement between data sets. To support these inferences, the data must be collected by different means, employed independently of one another, but focused on the same research question(s) (1989). In this research, data was collected from various literature and informants using a variety of methods, as discussed above. All of the methods used focused on answering the same fundamental questions: what capability gaps exist within USSOCOM contingency contracting and can a management module be developed to mitigate those gaps. This multi-method approach avoided reliance on any preconceived bias by the researcher and allowed for objective triangulation of the data.

The prototype CM² was tested for internal validity and reliability through peer debriefing and member checks (Hudgens, 2009). The peer debriefing consisted of graduate-level, previously warranted CCOs reviewing the module for credibility. Their review was based on the CCO’s experience and training associated with construction requirements. These debriefings resulted in agreement from the peer members that the content and structure of the CM² would provide useful and effective training support for CCOs regardless of their military service, background, experience, or education. Furthermore, the researcher conducted USSOCOM member checks by distributing a draft version of the prototype through the USSOCOM staff headquarters to CCOs currently deployed in a contingency environment under USSOCOM warrant authority and supporting construction requirements. Feedback from the members suggested the prototype provides a comprehensive and effective tool. However, the researcher recommends further testing for validity and reliability using the aforementioned ADDIE method be conducted. In Chapter VI, the researcher provides additional information regarding recommended implementation and evaluation of the CM².



E. Summary

This chapter explained how the researcher conducted exploratory research using a variety of qualitative research methodologies. This research is focused on real-world complexities, allowing the researcher to examine multiple perspectives of a problem or group of problems with USSOCOM CCO's executing construction requirements in a contingency contracting environment. The researcher collected data from questionnaires and from semi-structured interviews with key informants made up of USSOCOM personnel and supporting SMEs using standard operating procedures approved by the NPS Institutional Review Board for the study of human subjects. The information gathered from these informants suggests positive lessons learned, as well as challenges CCOs face within the contingency contracting environment. Targeted informants included USSOCOM staff members, customers, and CCOs of various rank and military service backgrounds. Archival data such as government reports, policies, training materials, and AARs were also collected and analyzed.

The investigation and analysis herein follows a multi-method approach to qualitative research. The development of the CM² follows the Analyze, Design, Develop, Implement, and Evaluate (ADDIE) model, with a rapid prototyping approach (Strickland, 2006). The internal structure of the CM² follows various learning concepts as outlined by Keirns (1999) and Keller (1984). Prior to implementation, the validity and reliability of the prototype CM² was tested using peer debriefings and member checks. Chapter III will explain the background and current environment of contingency contracting. Chapter VI will address additional implementation and evaluation concerns.



III. Contingency Contracting

A. Overview

This chapter reviews the relevant literature surrounding the contingency contracting phenomenon. To give the reader the context in which identified problems exist, this chapter will breakdown the term contingency and define the concepts of contingency contracting. Chapter IV will then discuss the framework of USSOCOM and how CCOs operate within its structure. In Chapter V, the researcher will further analyze policy and guidance from the *Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)* and its supplements, USSOCOM Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), Inspector General (IG) and Government Accountability Office (GAO) Reports, related Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC I/A) policy directives, and feedback from USSOCOM personnel through questionnaires and AARs to identify key concerns and possible solutions to identified problems as they concern USSOCOM.

B. Historical Context

In the late Eighteenth Century, the United States military was established via the American Revolutionary militia. The American Revolutionaries focused their organic capabilities solely on the war strategies and battles at hand. Consequently, the leaders heavily depended on external logistical support to provide basic life support to the troops, such as food, clothing, and shelter (D'Angelo, Houglan, & Ruckwardt, 2007). The US government, even during its infancy, recognized the importance of outsourcing external support for the military (Luse, Madeline, Smith & Starr, 2005).

Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance in 1781, stated, “in all countries engaged in war, experience has sooner or later pointed out that contracts with private men of substance and understanding are necessary for the subsistence, covering, clothing, and moving of an Army” (Luse et al., 2005, p. 5). The process



was not formally recognized as contingency contracting at the time; however, the principles and objectives of the modern version of the process are identical to those Morris described. This direct purchase system, not unlike today's contingency contracting, had its share of problems. George Washington and Alexander Hamilton observed that contractors were often more concerned with increasing their profits than with providing the supplies and services the Army required (Shrader, 1990). Another significant problem during this period was contractors failing to meet delivery requirements. A notable delinquent contract was Eli Whitney's failure to meet a delivery schedule of 4,000 muskets to the War Department; the requirement was fulfilled eleven years after the established date (Nagle, 1992). Despite recurring problems, the military has continued to use private industry to augment its logistical force (D'Angelo et al., 2007).

While the term contingency contracting was coined only a decade or two ago, the United States military has been contracting out logistical support for its military forces—in different degrees, in both domestic and overseas operations, with varying levels of success—since 1775. Early attempts at contracting logistics support for military operations sometimes brought the expedition to ruins, but since World War II, contingency contracting has generally proved an integral part of the military's operational capabilities, although problems still exist today (Luse et al., 2005).

Reduced manpower and increased global positioning of military forces has increased demand for contractor support during contingencies. For decades, the military has been contracting for goods and services—becoming a less self-sufficient organization. This means contractors are more often relied upon for supplies, services, and construction in contingency environments (Hill, 2006). Metrics indicate there are more contractors on the battlefield than ever before; as of 2007, State and Defense department figures show 180,000 civilians working in Iraq under US contracts (Miller, 2007, June 4). The US must conduct contracting in contingency operations in order to provide essential support to time-sensitive operational objectives. Contingency contracting encompasses the procurement and acquisition



of supplies and services in a contingency environment—ranging from simplified acquisition procedures to complex defense system acquisitions, interagency support, services, and military construction.

C. Contingency Defined

A contingency is an event that requires the deployment of military forces in response to natural disasters, terrorist or subversive activities, collapse of law and order, political instability, or other military operations (Yoder, 2007). A contingency operation may either be declared or non-declared. According to 10 *United States Code (USC)*, a declared contingency in the DoD may be either:

- a. Designated by the Secretary of Defense when members of the Armed Forces may become involved in military actions against an enemy of the US and/or;
- b. Declared by the President or Congress when members of the uniformed forces are called on active duty (a reserve component mobilization) under any provision of law during a declared war/national emergency (*USC*, 2008, 101(a) (13)).

In contrast, a non-declared contingency operation is any other DoD operation other than those described above. Barbaris and Callanan explain that “The distinction between a declared contingency and a non-declared contingency is crucial in the contracting community” (2008, p. 9). In a declared contingency, often the regulations and policies outlined within the *FAR* (along with those of the various military services) are relaxed to provide flexible and streamlined guidance to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of expeditionary or wartime functions. *FAR* Part 18, entitled “Emergency Acquisitions,” details many of the streamlined processes (GSA, 2009).

D. Types of Contingency Operations

Since the inception of our nation, members of the US Armed Forces have deployed throughout the globe in response to emergency situations caused by natural disasters, wars, terrorist activities, and/or political instability. They have been



called upon for rescue and humanitarian relief efforts, and to protect US national security interests against demonstrations of force and raids worldwide. The volatile, urgent, and uncertain nature of these efforts creates the distinct need for advanced planning, rapid response, adaptable solutions, and flexible procedures during support of a contingency operation. The operational environment will influence the extent to which contracting forces are utilized. Contingency contracting support has evolved over time from support of military operations into more complex support of interagency needs (DPAP, 2009).

Four main types of DoD-supported contingency operations include major theater war, smaller-scale contingencies, military operations other than war (MOOTW), and domestic disaster/emergency relief operations (Barbaris & Callanan, 2008).

1. Major Theater War (MTW)

In a MTW, hostilities are ongoing, imminent or likely, and involve a substantial commitment of US military forces (DAU, 2005, pp. 2-7). These types of operations are generally conflicts that engage an entire force structure within a specific geographical area. Contracting support is provided to supplement a vigorous combat support and combat service support infrastructure. Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) are current examples of MTWs.

2. Small-scale Contingencies (SSCs)

The 1997 *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* established small-scale contingencies (SSCs) as a new mission for military operational requirements and a major consideration in deciding upon the appropriate force structure. Support provided for SSCs is similar in nature to that provided for a MTW, yet is less lengthy and can be as minor as a show of force. However, one key difference is that SSC operations are set in motion against a less compelling threat than those involved in MTW operations. They also dedicate fewer US forces and have a more restricted time schedule ("Small-scale Contingency," 2009). Operations URGENT FURY



(Grenada) and JUST CAUSE (Panama)—along with the Implementation Force/Stabilization Force (IFOR/SFOR) in Bosnia later associated with Operations ALLIED FORCE (Kosovo)—are all examples of SSCs.

3. Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW)

MOOTWs refer to a wide range of activities utilized by US military forces to support operations other than large-scale war. The main focus of these operations is to prevent war, resolve conflict, promote peace, and support civil authorities in response to domestic crises. They may involve both combat and noncombat operations. MOOTW are generally conducted outside the Continental United States (OCONUS); however, some types may be conducted within the Continental United States (CONUS) in support of civil authorities consistent with established law. Operations PROVIDE COMFORT (Northern Iraq) and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti) are two examples of MOOTWs conducted by the US over the past several years (Barbaris & Callanan, 2008).

4. Domestic Disaster/Emergency Relief (DD/ER)

The spectrum of assistance provided during DD/ER operations includes CONUS natural and man-made disasters, CONUS local community disturbances, and CONUS terrorist activity. However, the main focus of this type of support is to mitigate the effects of natural or man-made disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, oil spills, riots, and air, rail, or highway accidents (Barbaris & Callanan, 2008). DoD disaster relief efforts included clean-up and humanitarian assistance efforts resulting from hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and Katrina.

E. Contingency Contracting

The Defense Acquisition University's (DAU) *Contingency Contracting* course (CON234) defines Contingency Contracting as: "Direct contracting support to tactical and operational forces engaged in the full spectrum of armed conflict and MOOTW, both domestic and overseas" (Yoder, 2009, slide 6). Basically, contingency



contracting is the process by which essential supplies and services are obtained to support deployed forces. This can be during a declared war or peacetime and can take place either in the CONUS or OCONUS. The definition of contingency contracting is deliberately broad in order to include the four types of contingency operations discussed above (DAU, 2005, pp. 2-7).

Additionally, when planning for contingency operations, CCOs consider the maturity level of the environment to help determine the type and level of required contracting support. Existing resources available in a respective AOR are also considered. For example, a CCO would prepare for a contingency operation in the CONUS differently than OCONUS, and areas such as Western or Eastern Europe differently than in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Iran. A contingency environment can be classified as either mature or immature, as described below.

A mature environment is one that can be characterized by a sophisticated infrastructure capable of supporting and sustaining operations for extensive periods of time. A mature environment can have all or a combination of the following characteristics: legal framework, host-nation agreements, financial networks to support complex transactions, vigorous transportation systems, business capacity, capability, and a willingness to interact (Yoder, 2007). A mature environment has the capability to quickly adapt to changing requirements and priorities. It often consists of vendors and suppliers that have prior contracting experience with the US Government and that can comply with *FAR* requirements.

In contrast, an immature contracting environment is one lacking the support infrastructure detailed above. Few, if any, vendors may be available with which to conduct business, and they likely have had no previous experience working with the US Government (Barbaris & Callanan, 2008).

While no two contingency contracting operations are exactly alike, they fall into one or more of the four typical phases of a contingency: Phase I - Mobilization/Initial Deployment, Phase II - Buildup, Phase III - Sustainment, and/or



Phase IV - Termination/Redeployment (AFLMA, 2008, p. 126). It is important for CCOs to understand what phase of a contingency an operation falls within, as this classification can assist them in assessing their resources and preparing for the requirements needed to fulfill mission support. It is important to note that not all operations will follow the particular sequence detailed below; a location may be in a hybrid phase based on various factors—including, but not limited to operational environment, mission adjustments and personnel surges.

1. Phase I – Mobilization and Initial Deployment

The mobilization and initial deployment phase of an operation, normally the first 30-45 days, can be one of the most stressful and confusing environments a CCO will face. As initial support organizations may not be available upon arrival, a CCO may perform different roles in rapid sequence, such as: initial requestor, approving official, certifying officer, lodging officer, logistics coordinator, transportation officer, inspector, supply/inventory manager, and property administrator, among other things. The need to award contracts quickly upon arrival is usually imperative to the mission. The number one priority for contracting professionals during this stage is to be responsive to providing basic life-support requirements, security services, and support for arrival of the initial ground troops. These items can include food, water, shelter, utilities, transportation, fuel, sanitation, interpreters and guides.

A CCO expected to deploy during this phase of a contingency can plan ahead and obtain access to sample documents that may be needed for forming and administering contract awards. These documents include statements of work, logs of available contract numbers, contract forms, and award checklists. CCOs must remain flexible, as the number of available contracting personnel during this phase of a contingency is limited. The predominant types of contract vehicles used during this phase of a contingency operation are SF44s with cash payments, government-wide commercial purchase cards, and blanket purchase agreements (BPAs). In



addition, Standard Form 44s (SF 44) act as an all-in-one order: invoice and payment voucher with cash payments.

2. Phase II - Buildup

The buildup phase of a contingency operation, normally Day 45 and forward, is generally a continuation of the initial deployment phase. The main body of troops to support the mission will arrive, along with additional contracting personnel; however, the number of new contracting personnel may not seem proportional to the number of troops needing support. Again, the main focus is basic life-support and security requirements, but a CCO must also now pay attention to construction material, heavy equipment, quality-of-life items (audio/visual items, gym equipment, etc.), and office equipment. The establishment of a contracting office with a solid and reliable vendor base is a key priority in this phase. The use of cash transactions is limited at this point, as the contracting office is working towards establishment of BPAs with a network of ordering officers (who may have decentralized control of the ordering or may coordinate with the CCO for each order off the BPA).

3. Phase III - Sustainment

The sustainment phase of a contingency operation runs from the end of the buildup stage through the point that redeployment begins. Contracting activities will continue to focus on life-support and quality-of-life requirements; however, an increased focus will be given to providing permanent facilities and equipment, office supplies, and discretionary services. The main priority of a CCO and his or her support team will be establishing long-term, indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts and BPAs that consolidate requirements—thus benefiting from economies of scale and reducing costs. The improvement of contract files and documentation is crucial, as internal controls are established to minimize waste and abuse. The contracting team will also focus on increasing competition amongst its vendor base and on transitioning the workload for the next round of contracting personnel or termination and redeployment (Yoder, 2007).



4. Phase IV - Termination and Redeployment

This phase of a contingency operation will be characterized by an urgency to prepare the troops to go home or to deploy forward to other areas of an operation. The CCO will continue to focus on life-support contracts throughout the duration of the mission. New requirements may include packing and freight services, transportation of troops, and preparation of material and equipment for transfer (Yoder, 2007). Contracting personnel will be required to terminate and/or closeout existing contracts and orders. This includes ensuring final payment to contractors and closing any open issues associated with their contracts. If redeployment is scheduled, a CCO's team prepares the contract files and documentation for reassignment and coordinates with the appropriate agency or office. The CCO may transfer the files to an organization such as the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), or the CCO may be responsible for storing or destroying the files themselves as appropriate.

During all of these phases, CCOs are responsible for maintaining accurate and complete contract files in a complex and high-threat environment, while constantly adapting to new procedures, new technology, and new demands. These requirements get even more complicated, and the threat environment often increases when CCOs are deployed supporting USSOCOM SOF teams on the front lines.

F. Summary

Since 2001, DoD's contingency contracting environment has changed dramatically, mainly as a result of our reconstruction efforts in Iraq (and Afghanistan). Contingency contracting encompasses all contracting done in a contingency environment (declared and non-declared), including various phases of contingencies. As mentioned above, the DoD has also experienced an unprecedented reliance on contractors to support the force. Contractors are now called upon to fill a growing number of back office positions, provide front-line



support in contingencies, and help with the cradle-to-grave contracting process (DPAP, 2009).

This chapter defined the terms contingency and contingency contracting as they relate to the DoD and the four main types of DoD-supported contingency operations including: major theater wars, smaller-scale contingencies, military operations other than war, and domestic disaster/emergency relief operations. The researcher also explained mature versus immature contingency environments, followed by the four typical phases of a contingency: mobilization/initial deployment, buildup, sustainment, and/or termination/redeployment. In Chapter IV, the researcher will examine the USSOCOM organizational structure and explain how USSOCOM supports contingency contracting.



IV. USSOCOM

A. USSOCOM Framework

The National Defense Authorization Act of 1986 (SOAL-KA, 2008) established the concept of USSOCOM. A year later, the 1987 Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the *Goldwater-Nichols Act* (Hill, 2006) formally created USSOCOM and established the military service-component support roles. It also provided substantial autonomy for Special Operations Forces (SOF), to include unique budget and procurement authority for SOF units. “The broad intent of these provisions was to create a more effective special operations capability that was not beholden to parochial service attitudes or constrained by service priorities for conventional forces” (Hill, 2006, p. 3). However, since September 11, 2001, the focus of USSOCOM has shifted from that of a force provider to that of a Combatant Command. The command has a dual role as a unified combatant command, while still having unique military service-like authorities in terms of procurement and developing personnel. Key elements of these responsibilities are defined in Table 4

Table 4. USSOCOM Dual Responsibilities
(Cannaday, 2008)

<u>USSOCOM – A UNIQUE AND DYNAMIC ORGANIZATION</u> (Roles and Authorities)	
UNIFIED COMBATANT COMMAND	MILITARY DEPARTMENT (SERVICE-LIKE)
Command all US-based SOF	Organize, train, and equip SOF
Synchronize planning for global operations against terrorist networks	Develop SOF strategies, doctrine, and tactics
Deploy SOF to support Geographical Combatant Commander objectives	Program and budget for SOF
Conduct operations globally	Procure SOF-peculiar items (Procurement Authority)
Plan and execute pre-crisis activities	Monitor SOF personnel
	Conduct internal audits



Operations conducted by SOF teams encompass the use of small units in direct and indirect military actions designed for national security interest, strategic or organizational objectives. They require units with combinations of highly trained, specialized personnel and equipment, and tactics that exceed the routine capabilities of conventional military forces. The nature of SOF operations are often extremely politically sensitive missions, in which only the best equipped and most proficient forces are deployed to avoid detection and possible mission failure that could result in damage to the United States' prestige and interests (Cluck, 2009).




Figure 1. USSOCOM Services Command Headquarters (CONUS Footprint)
(Cannaday, 2008)

The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps commands of USSOCOM (illustrated in Figure 1 above) use authorities and budgets granted by legislation to the USSOCOM commander to organize, equip, train, and deploy their forces to support operational commanders around the globe. Olson (2009) explains, “When outside the United States, all SOF teams are under the operational control of

respective geographic Combatant Commander[s]” (p. 54). Administratively, the SOF forces still report to the respective theater special operations commands depicted in Figure 2 below.



Figure 2. Special Operations Theatre Commands
(Cannaday, 2008)

Over 10,000 members of SOF are under OPCON of Central Command (CENTCOM). Over 2,000 others are scattered throughout the globe, in over 60 countries—including over 100 SOF personnel assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) structure (Olson, 2009). Figure 3 below depicts the respective AORs for the US Combatant Commands throughout the world.



Figure 3. AOR for US Combatant Commands
(NGIA, 2008)



The USSOCOM commander has unique procurement authorities and responsibilities compared to that of other Combatant Commands (COCOMs). Similar to the authorities granted to each military Service, Title 10 *USC*, Section 167, vests in the USSOCOM commander the responsibility and authority to develop and acquire special operations-peculiar equipment, the authority to exercise the functions of the head of agency, and the authority to execute funds. USSOCOM uses special appropriation funding known as Major Force Program-11 (MFP-11) to support the development, acquisition, and sustainment activities for USSOCOM. This authority is delegated down to the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive (SOAE), Mr. James W. Cluck, as the Senior Procurement Executive for the command. He leads the Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics Center (SOAL) in executing USSOCOM funding authority (Cluck, 2009). Figure 4 depicts the matrix relationship of these organizations.




Figure 4. SOAL Location within the USSOCOM HQ Command Structure (SOAL-KA, 2008)



Although USSOCOM's budget is historically less than 2% of the total defense budget (Olson, 2009), this procurement authority has resulted in a significant increase to expenditures within USSOCOM. During the 1990s, USSOCOM expenditures averaged under \$400 million. As of the end of fiscal year 2008 (FY08), that number has grown to over \$2.68 billion (Cluck, 2009). While breakdowns of historical contingency expenditures are often classified, we do know that OCOs account for roughly \$200 million of the FY10 \$1.6 billion budget request (McKaughan, 2009).

B. USSOCOM Contingency Contracting

The contracting arm of SOAL is the Director of Procurement (also known as SOAL-K), located within the USSOCOM Headquarters, MacDill AFB, Florida. The Mission Statement of the SOAL-K Office depicts its goals: "contracting professionals teaming with acquisition and industry professionals to rapidly transform acquisition strategies into superior technologies, equipment and services for USSOCOM and SOF" (Cluck, 2009, p. 43). An overview of the various divisions within SOAL-K is depicted in Figure 5.



1. Contracting Versus Command Authority

The SOAL-KA division exercises the given procurement authority over the CCOs by issuing them a CCO warrant IAW *FAR* 2.101, which gives each CCO the signature authority to obligate USSOCOM MFP-11 funds, enter into contracts, terminate them, and make determinations and findings. A simplified depiction of where this authority begins and how it is delegated down to the CCO is provided in Figure 6.







Figure 6. Flow of Contracting Authority to a USSOCOM CCO
(Cannaday, 2008)

Lines of authority can be easily blurred with USSOCOM CCOs. Figure 7 depicts the typical Command Authority versus Contracting Authority in a standard Combatant Command. However, the USSOCOM authority is much more streamlined.



COMMAND AUTHORITY



CONTRACTING AUTHORITY





Figure 7. Flow of Contracting Authority to Conventional CCO
(AFLMA, 2008, p. 37)

Unlike USSOCOM's streamlined structure, a typical contingency contracting unit falls deep within a complex operational structure of forces. In larger or more complex contingency operations—such as Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM—there is a specific command established, conceptually known as a joint theatre support contracting command (JTSCC). This concept is defined in depth in *Contingency Contracting: A Joint Handbook for the 21st Century* (AFLMA, 2008, p. 47). The current JTSCC is better known as the Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A). This structure often requires more oversight than can typically be provided through a single lead-service organizational option, in which a contracting team falls deep within a single service chain of command responsible for all operations within the AOR.



Operational conditions that may drive this option could include, but may not be limited to the following:

- Extremely complex operation that requires direct control of theater support contracting by the JFC commander,
- Mission that is of long-term duration,
- Mission that is beyond the capability of a single military service,
- Mission that requires significant coordination of contracting and civil-military personnel on aspects of the JFC's campaign plan, and/or
- Significant numbers of different military service forces that may be operating in the same area or joint bases that may be served by the same local vendor base.

A JTSCC, by design, is a joint command that has command-and-control authority over designated, service-component, theater-support, contracting organizations and personnel within a designated support area. This command performs the same functions as a lead service contracting organization, but reports directly to the JFC. Since GCCs do not have their own contracting authority, the JTSCC's HCA authority flows from one of the service components (normally the executive agency or lead service component).

There is not a formally approved, set model for a JTSCC. Conceptually, the JTSCC will be initiated only for major sustained operations, as the JCC-I/A is currently. As seen in recent operations, these sustained operations may include major reconstruction and transition to civil authority mission requirements in addition to the standard joint-forces-support mission requirements. In these major, long-term stability operations, JFC commanders often prefer to establish a JTSCC with separate senior contracting officials (SCOs) responsible to support the JFC, host nation forces or transition operations, and reconstruction support.

The JTSCC structure is very robust and includes multiple layers of positions for leadership and personnel matrixed into subordinate units supporting the JTSCC commander. These positions are discussed below.



2. Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC) Overview:

a. Commander

The commander of a JTSCC is normally an O-7 or O-8 with significant contingency contracting experience. Because of the manner by which the military services develop their contingency contracting officers, this position will normally be filled by an Air Force or Army general officer. The JTSCC commander reports to the JFC commander and is responsible for ensuring the theater support contracting mission is conducted in an effective, efficient, and well-coordinated fashion. This commander would also serve as the JFC's principal advisor for contracting support.

b. Administrative Staff

The commander's administrative staff support is determined by the JTSCC commander. This support requires no specific rank and no contracting-related experience.

c. Chief of Staff

Like all chiefs of staff, the JTSCC chief of staff is responsible for integrating all special and primary staff functions within the command. Normally, this position would be an O-6 with contingency contracting experience.

d. J1

The JTSCC J1 performs personnel actions, to include working personnel assignments, joint manning document (JMD)-related actions (e.g., number of personnel slots), awards, and ratings. The J1 generally would be a personnel officer with no specific rank or contracting-related experience.

e. J2/3/5

A JTSCC does not typically have or need a J2, J3 or J5 office. If required by the JTSCC commander, the J2/3/5 officer—normally an O-5 with contracting



experience—is responsible to assist the commander and SCOs with synchronizing support to ongoing operations and planned future operations. The J2/3/5 focus is on supporting the JFC commander’s intent with effective and efficient contracting actions. If needed, the J2/3/5 could also contain separate policy and contract-compliance divisions.

f. J4

The JTSCC J4 performs logistics actions, to include general office supply, coordinating facility support, intra-theater travel, and other similar actions. The J4 is normally a logistics officer with no specific rank or contracting-related experience.

g. J6

The JTSCC J6 performs communications-support-related actions, to include coordinating communications support, website management, and related functions. The J6 normally would be a communications or signal officer with no specific rank or contracting-related experience.

h. Senior Contracting Official (SCO)

The JTSCC generally has one to three SCOs, normally at the O-6 level, with significant contracting-related experience and certifications. The SCO’s general responsibilities include:

- Overseeing day-to-day contracting operations within his/her area of contracting responsibility,
- Overseeing and assessing the effectiveness of contracting programs,
- Issuing warrants and determining delegated warrant authorities,
- Participating in the JARB (primarily the SCO for forces support),
- Chairing the JCSB as directed,
- Managing and executing unit inspections through procurement and performance management reviews,



- Developing and providing oversight and management-control programs,
- Conducting special reviews as required,
- Managing the contract audit follow-up program, and
- Suspension and debarment.

i. Senior Contracting Official Operations Staff

Each SCO will normally have an operations staff with primary duties that mirror the joint theater support contracting command J-staff functions listed previously. These staffs can vary in size and should be made up of officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO) with at least some contracting and acquisition experience.

j. Senior Contracting Official for Forces Support

The SCO for forces support is responsible for planning, coordinating, and managing theater support contracting for deployed US forces and multinational forces. This support may also include support to interagency personnel and facilities, but does not normally include support to other government-agency-led civil reconstruction projects. The SCO for forces support will generally have three or more RCCs. Each RCC will have with multiple Regional Contracting Offices (RCOs). Also, the SCO for forces support may have a specialty contracting division to handle common, joint operational area (JOA), or complex contracts that exceed RCC and RCO capabilities. Three contracting organizations that often report to the SCO for forces support and are established within a JTSCC include: RCCs, RCOs, and specialty contracts divisions.

k. Regional Contracting Centers (RCC)

The specific makeup of these RCCs is dependent on the specific mission support requirement; however, a typical RCC could consist of 10 to 25 warranted contracting officers, NCOs, and DoD civilians. It is also common practice to align



these RCCs to a major land force (division, corps, or Marine Expeditionary Force) headquarters or air expeditionary wing or group. The key to the proper manning of these RCCs and their subordinate RCOs is not the rank of the contracting officers on staff, but warrant and experience levels of the staff members.

I. Regional Contracting Offices (RCO)

RCOs are joint-staffed contracting organizations under the command and control of an RCC. RCOs are made up of two to eight warranted contracting officers, NCOs, and DoD civilians. The size and makeup of an RCO is based on actual mission-support requirements. RCOs normally provide area support to specific forward operating bases (FOBs) and designated areas within the JOA.

m. Specialty Contracts Division

In some operations, there may be a need to develop a specialty contracts division that can contract for common, JOA-wide services or supplies. Additionally, these contracting organizations may be utilized to perform complex contracting actions that exceed the RCC and RCO capabilities. The specialty contracts division will be made up of specially selected, highly trained contracting officers, NCOs, and DoD civilians who have the requisite experience and warrants to handle large, complex contract actions.

n. Senior Contracting Official for Host Nation (HN) Forces and Transition Support

This SCO for HN and transition support is responsible for planning, coordinating, and managing theater support contracting actions in support of the JFC mission to develop, organize, train, equip, and sustain HN security forces. The SCO for HN and transition support is also responsible for providing training and transition assistance to HN security forces (and other governmental agencies as directed) in order to facilitate the development and sustainment of their own contracting support capabilities.



o. Service and Commodity Divisions

The SCO for HN Forces and transition support would normally have some type of subordinate contracting organization (or organizations) responsible for managing HN security forces and theater support contracting actions that cannot be readily accommodated by the existing forces.

p. Transition Teams.

If established, the SCO for HN and transition support will normally have multiple transition teams. These transition teams are responsible for planning and executing support of HN security forces and, if directed, HN governmental contracting support organizations and capabilities. These teams will vary in size, but must be manned with military or DoD civilian personnel with the contracting experience required by their assigned mission.

q. Senior Contracting Official for Reconstruction Support.

The SCO for reconstruction is responsible for planning, coordinating, and managing theater support contracting actions in support of the civil reconstruction mission. Normally, the SCO for reconstruction would directly support the US Chief of Mission or US Agency for International Development (USAID). The SCO for reconstruction generally would have multiple-sector support-contracting organizations. These subordinate organizations could include, but are not limited to, the following reconstruction sector areas: water, sanitation, electricity, transportation, oil production, and other related functions. As much as resources permit, these staffs will be made up of select, highly trained contracting officers, NCOs, and DoD civilians who have the requisite experience and warrant to handle large, complex reconstruction-related contract actions (AFLMA, 2008).

Figure 8 depicts the textbook structure of a JTSCC as outlined in the most recent *Contingency Contracting: A Joint Handbook for the 21st Century* (AFLMA, 2008).






Figure 8. Typical Joint Theater Support Contracting Command Organization
(AFLMA, 2008, p. 47)

A typical USSOCOM contracting operation will be most similar to a Regional Contracting Office at best. Often, USSOCOM contracting units are made up of one to three CCOs operating in support of the theatre SOF teams in a particular AOR. They do not often fall within the robust structure outlined above; therefore, although streamlined, they do not have the vast network of personnel and resources available as a JTSCC would. Although as noted above, the command authority and OPCON comes from the local AOR GCC, while the procurement (contracting) authority comes direct from HQ USSOCOM. This differentiation can increase a CCO's ability to act in a more timely fashion; however, this also causes difficulty in coordinating and integrating with other functional areas.



C. Summary

This chapter explained the organizational construct of USSOCOM. It also provided the framework of USSOCOM, showing its unique procurement authority and how that authority is delegated down to the CCO through the SOAL. Information in this chapter provided a basic understanding of USSOCOM. This chapter also delineated the differences between a typical JTSCC (such as the JCC I/A) and the construct of operations faced by USSOCOM CCOs. Chapter IV identifies specific commonalities with construction requirements experienced by CCOs and their customers within USSOCOM operations.



V. Analysis

Chapter V provides a literature review, including findings from governmental reports and audits, scholarly reports, after-actions reports, and the results of interviews and fielded questionnaires with USSOCOM personnel. As a way to properly categorize the vast spectrum of information obtained during the data collection, the analysis is organized into three overarching pillars: people, processes, and platforms.

A. (People) Training of Personnel

As a fundamental pillar for success, the makeup and training of personnel is crucial in virtually any environment. This section will analyze the existing makeup of the acquisition workforce and describe the future direction in which experts believe that workforce is headed. The chapter will then describe the training opportunities, requirements, and shortfalls of acquisition personnel and how varying levels of effectiveness and standards exist for USSOCOM CCOs. The chapter will also describe how contingency contracting lessons learned are documented and how contracting leadership and CCOs can use this documentation to enhance their training programs.

1. Changing Workforce

In an April 2, 2008, breakout session at the National Contract Management Association's (NCMA) World Congress, Dr. Steven Kelman, Weatherhead Professor of Public Management, Harvard University, commented on the present state of government contracting, saying that the acquisition workforce is at risk of falling into a "death spiral" (as cited in Barbaris & Callanan, 2008). Kelman describes this as a combination of insufficient numbers of contingency contracting professionals and increasingly complex work requirements. This type of working environment raises error rates, and as a result, increases audits and management oversight (Barbaris & Callanan, 2008).



The contingency contracting environment is plagued by many of the same problems as the conventional acquisition workforce. In 2007, the Secretary of the Army established an Independent Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations. The commission was chaired by Dr. Jacques S. Gansler, former Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L)), and was tasked to review the Army's policies, procedures, and operations in contingency environments, and to recommend necessary changes to ensure that future military operations achieve greater efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency (USA, 2007). This report, commonly known as the Gansler Report, is widely respected as a comprehensive assessment of expeditionary contracting activities. The findings within this report documented systemic problems with expeditionary contracting that include, but are not limited to, the USSOCOM AOR. While USSOCOM is made up of all military services, the Army is the DoD Executive Agent for all contingency contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (USA, 2007). Therefore, it plays a critical role in training and shaping the personnel who support the effectiveness of USSOCOM CCO operations. This background is important when analyzing the results of the Gansler Report because as the lead SOF agent, the situation in the Army is directly linked to the outcomes in at least the two largest existing AORs for contingency contracting (Iraq and Afghanistan). These are two areas in which USSOCOM is "significantly involved," according to the SOAL-K Director Procurement. Currently, the Army is unable to fill the necessary contracting billets in terms of either quantity or qualifications. Although providing contracting support to the Army and Marine Corps is not part of Air Force doctrine, the Air Force provides over 67% of the contracting resources for JCC-I/A—including most of the complex actions such as reconstruction operations (USA, 2007). This percentage was estimated by the SOAL-KA division chief to be the same for USSOCOM billets throughout the world. This means that while the Army is leading the joint force in policy and procedure for contingency contracting, the Air Force is leading in manning of CCO taskings.



The USSOCM contingency contracting workforce is matrixed through tasking of personnel across all military services under an applicable CENTCOM UMD. In other words, members of the workforce do not come directly from special operations units; rather, they originate from the acquisition workforce of their respective military service. Based on relevant publications, congressional hearings and Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, the Army contracting community has a least four key problem areas that must be addressed, as they affect the Army's ability to effectively and efficiently respond in contingency contracting situations. Those four areas are: the changing war environment, increased contracting workload and complexity of contract actions, increased responsibility of acquisition professionals, and a declining capability of the acquisition workforce (Barbaris & Callanan, 2008, p. 17).

The changing war environment impacts how personnel train because it involves the move from a post-Cold War era to one in which asymmetric, non-state sponsored warfare is more prominent. This type of warfare is also known as fourth generation war (Lind, 2004). The first three generations of war sought to defeat the enemy's will with military power. However, the fourth generation of war will need to win on the moral, political, and social level rather than exclusively with military might (Lind, 2005). Army leaders indicate that the nation may continue to be engaged in an era of persistent conflict, characterized by protracted confrontation among many players. The tendency to employ violence to achieve political and ideological ends is not new, but modern networked terrorist cells pose new problems—particularly for a large, complex, and hierarchical bureaucracy (HQA, 2008). As described by former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, “the truth is, this will be a war like none other our nation has faced” (Rumsfeld, 2001, p. 1). This declaration was an early indication of the changes our armed forces would have to make in order to adapt to this new war environment. From an acquisition and contracting standpoint, there were initiatives set in place during the 1990s that should have supported this new environment; however, the training did not follow with the reform initiatives. This decade brought about a need for acquisition personnel to acquire new skill sets



and adapt to increasing workload and responsibility. The largest increase to the workload was in actions over \$100,000, with an increase of 28% over the decade (DoD, 2000). Despite workforce reductions of approximately 50% between 1990 and 2001, the workload for the DoD acquisition community increased by 12% (GAO, 2003). As a result, the training and credentials of federal acquisition personnel suffered. The DoD downsized the workforce without ensuring that remaining personnel had the specific skills and competencies needed to accomplish future DoD missions (GAO, 2008).

This environment led to further problems when more and more expeditionary contracting professionals (or CCOs) were needed to support two major-scale conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Gansler report found that the expeditionary environment requires more trained and experienced military officers and non-commissioned officers than they now have and that the Army is doing more with less people with an overall workload increase of 600% (USA, 2007).

A senior NCO currently serving in a USSOCOM CCO billet stated that “reductions in the force directly correlate to problems with managing customer education, CCO authority, acquisition planning, and oversight.” The CCO also noted that the force reductions don’t just affect contracting but have changed the “expected roles of personnel and overall reality of operations.” An example provided by this CCO was that by deploying a limited number of CCOs at each location, the “standard contracting office structure is lost in a deployed environment.” In his office, three CCOs, plus the chief of contracting (COCO), were supporting 58 locations with over 290 actions, and obligated just less than \$10 million in nine months. This same senior NCO noted that the force reductions also drove “inadequately trained engineers” to write, inspect, and accept projects on behalf of the government—a disturbing trend that will be discussed throughout this report.



The Army has made advancements to addressing the recommendations laid out in the Gansler Report in terms of the acquisition workforce. The Army has plans to hire an additional 1,400 contracting personnel (GAO, 2008, p. 9). In July 2008, the Army approved a concept plan detailing a recruitment strategy that will further increase its workforce over the next few years. In an attempt to attract new talent and to be able to hire personnel in an expedited manner, the US Army Material Command (AMC) has requested approval for direct-hire authority (Castellie, 2008).

A major initiative for the Army to improve its Contracting workforce was the establishment of the Army Contracting Command. General Benjamin Griffin, commander of the Army Contracting Command said the stand up of the organization was a “historic event, not because it was a new command but because the Army was demonstrating to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) leadership, Congress, and the American taxpayer that Army leadership was serious in taking steps to regain confidence in Army contracting and ensuring that it becomes one of the Army’s core competencies” (Leipold, 2008, p. 1). Other improvements to contracting training from the Army include: *Operational Contract Support* (Joint Publication 4-10); *Commanders Guide to Contracting Contractor Management* (Field Manual 4-10); and *Contract Support Brigade* (Field Manual Interim 4-93.42). The Army is also reexamining training curriculum for new acquisition officers and civilians (Parsons, 2008). These initiatives will further the capabilities of Army CCOs; such an increase will, in turn, provide a larger and more qualified pool of support for USSOCOM missions.

Through interviews with USSOCOM staff, the researcher found it apparent that USSOCOM does not have OPCON over its CCO tasking slots, nor is it responsible for a CCO’s training prior to his or her deployment under a USSOCOM billet. In fact, its CCO taskings come from the joint manning document (JMD) from the respective geographical combatant command (COCOM) in theatre. The COCOM gets its CCOs out of the pool of deployable contracting professionals throughout all the military services. As of summer 2009, USSOCOM leadership



noted that the Air Force is providing the majority of forces for all USSOCOM contracting deployments. The stand up of the Army Contracting Command and comments above suggests that future USSOCOM billets will be filled by more Army CCOs.

A joint initiative, brought about (at least in part) from the recommendation of the Gansler Report, has been the development, creation and publication of the *Contingency Contracting: A Joint Handbook for the 21st Century*, which began distribution in February of 2008 throughout the DoD. The handbook is made up of a hardcopy book and supporting DVD. The intention is for the handbook to be revised each fiscal year to accommodate changing regulations, policies, and lessons learned from the OSD. The second and latest version was published in December of 2008.

The shortfall with this handbook is that there is no section devoted to unique USSOCOM policies or the complexities of construction contracting; in fact, there's simply a page that defines the term construction (AFLMA, 2008). A current USSOCOM CCO serving as the COCO noted in a questionnaire for this research that construction is significantly different when it is conducted in a deployed area, and that the existing Defense Acquisition University (DAU) *Joint Contingency Contracting* course (CON 234), used as the primary contingency contracting training, does not adequately cover construction. This CCO respondent felt construction should be the focus of at least one week of the course. The past few decades have brought about change across the DoD in regard to specific training requirements and opportunities.

2. Training

From 1975 to 1990, the United States deployed its forces 26 times to various overseas contingencies. Post 1990, the number sky rocketed to over 70 deployments supporting contingencies. These deployments indicated a need to have trained CCOs ready to deploy on short notice (Luse et al., 2005).



a. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA)

In response to continuing concerns about the DoD's ability to effectively manage its acquisition programs, Congress enacted the *Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Action (DAWIA)* on November 5, 1990 (10 USC 1701), in order to make the DoD acquisition workforce more professional. The act established experience, training, education, and other qualifications for acquisition personnel (GAO, 1993, p. 1).

Each acquisition position throughout the DoD is required to have a designated certification standard. Certification is the process by which DoD agencies determine whether an individual meets all the mandatory standards as they relate to education, experience and training. There are three established career levels within each associated career field, including contracting. The levels listed below identify the career levels as they relate to military acquisition positions (Master, 1995, slide 5).

- Level I (Basic Level) - This level is for individuals typically in grades E-1 through E-5/O-1 through O-3. Basic-level training standards are designed to establish fundamental qualifications and expertise in the individual's job series, functional area, or career field. Development at the basic level lays the foundation for career progression and is designed to prepare qualified, motivated personnel for positions of increased responsibility (Master, 1995, slide 6).
- Level II (Intermediate Level) - This level is typically for individuals in grades E-6 through E-9/O-3 and O-4. At the beginning of the intermediate level, specialization is emphasized. Later, individuals broaden their background towards a more general understanding of the overall process in their career field. An individual's experience in his/her primary career field should optimally be followed by a lateral movement to a related specialty (Master, 1995, slide 6).
- Level III (Advanced Level) - This level is typically for individuals in grades E-9/O-4 and above. By the time they reach Level III, these individuals should have completed all the mandatory training and education requirements up to that level. Additionally, they should have advanced through a career path that has given them an in-depth



knowledge in their career field and a wide breadth of knowledge across the entire acquisition process (Master, 1995, slide 6).

b. Defense Acquisition University (DAU)

The Defense Acquisition University was established on August 1, 1992. The *DAWIA* initiative allowed for a joint venture between existing Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, and DoD schools. One of their primary functions was to standardize training among the different DoD acquisition communities. Through the DAU consortium, the military service schools would remain separate and distinct institutions, but certain mandatory courses would be managed centrally through DAU. In an effort to expand the reach of many mandatory courses, DAU authorized the use of satellite facilities and internet courses. Many accredited universities and military service schools teach acquisition courses whereby students earn *DAWIA* certification through DAU equivalency courses (Luse et al., 2005, p. 47). According to the most recent DAU *Strategic Plan* (DAU, 2009, p. 5) its core competencies include the following: multi-functional, applied, subject-matter expertise, unique curriculum development and rapid response capabilities, knowledge sharing, practitioner training, performance support, applied research, and acquisition career management. However, after reading this entire document and examining all of the transformational efforts going on at DAU, the researcher found three key words were missing from the plan: (1) construction (2) contingency and (3) contracting. This suggests that although there are highly visible transformation efforts underway at DAU, these efforts do not include a strategic focus on training the acquisition workforce in construction elements of contingency contracting (DAU, 2009).

c. Certification

According to the online DAU catalog, the contracting career field includes the positions of contract negotiator, contract specialist, contract termination specialist, contract administrator, procurement analyst, administrative contracting officer, procuring contracting officer, contract price and/or construction analyst, contracting officer, and termination contracting officer (DAU, 2008).



Certification criteria are selected from education, experience, and training categories. Both the experience and training categories are required for certification, while education requirements may be waived. Some acquisition professionals feel that *DAWIA* certification has failed in its intended purpose and has done more to alienate the acquisition communities. Some argue that career certification has created an unintended result: namely, the completion of training programs and other certification requirements becoming an end in itself rather than a means to improve performance (Snider, 1996).

d. Established Courses

It is important that CCOs be provided with the training they need to excel during their assignments. CCOs need to apply sound procurement techniques, understand funding implications, and effectively administer their contracts while demonstrating exemplary integrity and ethics. CCOs help the DoD to accomplish its contingency mission and often funnel much-needed funds into regional economies (DAU, 2009, September 21).

To this end, the DAU has offered CCOs some elective training courses. According to the DAU 2010 Catalog, CON 234 (*Joint Contingency Contracting*) develops skills for contracting support provided to joint forces across the full spectrum of military and disaster-relief operations. Exercises focus on unique aspects of contingency, critical thinking skills, and the execution of appropriate contractual instruments. The course is offered in residence only and lasts for 9 days. The Joint Contingency Contracting course is not currently a requirement for *DAWIA* certification and is not identified as part of the DAU transformation effort; however, it is the most utilized comprehensive resident training course offered in the field of contingency contracting. There is a follow-up online refresher course, CLC 114 (Contingency Contracting Officer Refresher), also identified in the catalog. Both classes are noted as electives for Level II *DAWIA* certification in contracting, although neither is required for any *DAWIA* certification.



According to the SOAL-KA Contingency Cell, USSOCOMs standard operating procedure (SOP) is to only accept CCOs who have attained *DAWIA* Level II contracting certification. Yet, as mentioned above, according to the DAU website (DAU, 2008), neither CON 234 (*Contingency Contracting*) nor CON 244 (*Construction Contracting*) are requirements for Level II certification. However, both courses are specifically identified as being recommended “whenever practical” for those assuming duties in a related environment.

According to a senior USSOCOM policy official, USSOCOM leaders’ preference is to utilize CCOs who have completed both CON 234 and CON 244; however, this is not always possible due to the short-notice nature of taskings and varying degree of priority given to these training programs throughout the military services. Thus, there is no current written policy that CCOs must attend either of these courses in order to be placed in a position in which they may be managing complex construction requirements in a contingency environment.

e. Training Effectiveness

The researcher asked USSOCOM interview informants to rate the effectiveness of all previous pre-deployment CCO training (including DAU courses and unit training) on a scale of one to five, with one being not effective and five being optimally effective. The average response was two, with not one member rating the effectiveness above a three. This suggests that based on the most recent feedback from both USSOCOM staff and CCO experience, the pre-deployment training does not result in optimum effectiveness. Of the USSOCOM CCOs interviewed, all responded that their home station unit (all Air Force in this case) conducted contingency contracting training and addressed construction requirements. However, all respondents noted that such training was inadequate for the challenges faced on their USSOCOM deployment, and that the training did not address USSOCOM-specific procedures.



As discussed in Chapter II, the complexity of contracted goods and services has increased over time; yet, the US armed forces have been engaged in construction in contingency environments since World War I. The training and credentials required by CCOs often place little to no requirement on an understanding of construction fundamentals or how to support construction requirements. According to a senior USSOCOM staff member (in an interview with the researcher), most CCOs have “little to no construction experience and find themselves as the lead CCO for construction projects.” With all the regulations and policies in a joint environment, CCOs also get confused as to which documents they should be following. These inadequacies in contingency and construction concepts, along with the absence of USSOCOM-specific guidance, hinder the CCOs’ ability to be as effective as they would be with clear guidance. They lose valuable execution time while researching the necessary policies and procedures that apply to their situation. The SOAK-K DoP feels that a construction-specific management module that incorporates USSOCOM contingency elements would help to mitigate these inadequacies.

f. Standards

Based on review of AARs and questionnaires of USSOCOM personnel, the researcher found evidence to suggest that CCOs are often confused as to what contract regulation and construction standard they should apply to various situations during their deployments. A senior DCMA liaison officer (LNO) for USSOCOM noted that a CCO may not know which standards apply to which situation. This is a problem with both physical construction standards and contractual regulations and policy. Confusion often exists as to whether JCC-I/A, CENTCOM, or USSOCOM policy prevails in any given contract action. CCOs often have to apply whichever standard the local commander directs, rather than respective prescribed guidance.

Several respondents noted that physical construction standards were the most difficult to understand and apply. One senior DCMA LNO for USSOCOM noted during his interview with the researcher that “electrical codes, standards of living,



and commanders' expectations" vary greatly across the AOR. Both the Army and Air Force have department-wide policies on deployed construction standards. However, these standards are often ignored or unavailable to deployed engineers. CCOs are not required to be experts in construction standards; therefore, they rely on the local subject-matter expert to determine the appropriate standard. This poses a problem when he/she develops the contract. If a contractor is not given a clear standard, it is difficult to enforce when the government goes to accept or reject the work.

The SOAL-KA Division Chief noted during his interview with the researcher that based on his unit inspections, a CCO's biggest shortfalls in following contract standards involve a lack of appropriate clauses within construction contracts, inadequate training of oversight personnel, and a lack of awareness of funding restrictions and the appropriate review thresholds for construction projects. The division chief noted that his experience suggests that the lack of a documented contract standard for these items was the root cause of these shortfalls. The division chief also noted that if CCOs had basic drawings specifications for commonly contracted construction projects (such as water wells and guard towers), they could better support their customers. According to the division chief, a comprehensive management module focused on construction support would effectively mitigate these shortfalls and improve effectiveness of CCOs at all levels of experience. Other interview respondents also noted various items that would be useful in a management module such as: references to current regulations and policies, templates for construction contracts (SOW, IGCE, drawings, specifications, liquidated damages (LD), determinations and findings (D&F), etc.), checklists for construction-specific pre-award, award, and post-award contract administration concerns, construction terminology fundamentals, and how to successfully execute construction contracting with local nationals.

Contract administration is another area in which the standards vary throughout the AOR. DCMA is generally responsible for all post-award



administration; however, throughout the contingency environments of today, DCMA is primarily focused on exclusively supporting the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract and is not manned to provide post-award administration on other requirements (D. Graff, Commander, DCMA International, personal communication, September 2, 2009). A recent IG report noted that the contracting organizations throughout Iraq and Afghanistan have consistently failed to adhere to *FAR* guidance associated with: adequately appointing and training oversight personnel, including appropriate clauses associated with construction contracting, the quality of Statements of Work (SOW), completing viable independent government cost estimates (IGE), and adequately justifying price reasonableness (IG D-2008-119, 2008). According to the researcher's interview with senior USSOCOM staff, the most recent PMRs further document that these issues are also trends throughout the USSOCOM AOR—including issues concerning inadequate drawings with construction projects and several incidences in which funding regulations were violated.

3. Lessons Learned

The changes in war and the joint dynamic of the deployed acquisition workforce have resulted in a vast network of CCOs with deployment experience, across all military services. The lessons learned, rather positive or negative, during these deployments may often serve as a relative gold mine of information for CCOs who have limited deployment experience in a particular theatre or environment such as USSOCOM. Compiling these lessons learned is challenging, but also critical to the future success and focused applicable training of personnel.

a. The Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS)

The joint uniform lessons learned system (JULLS) was developed to facilitate the evaluation of joint exercises. It is also frequently used to collect after-action reports for actual operations and contingencies and is the most commonly used software for this purpose in the DoD. In addition to JULLS, the military services and



major commands often collect and archive additional after-action information and data. For example, *AFFARS* Appendix CC requires all Air Force CCOs to submit AARs to their HCA and to the Air Staff subsequent to each deployment. Similarly, the Army Center for Lessons Learned systematically collects on-site information on all major exercises and operations in which the Army participates (Luse et al., 2005, p. 51).

b. Acquisition Community Connection (ACC)

DAU has now created an online acquisition community connection (ACC)—a database in which AARs from all military services are stored. This user-friendly, interactive website allows for registered users to access all submitted DoD, unclassified AARs prior to, during, or after their deployment (ACC, 2009).

c. USSOCOM Contracting Portal

USSOCOM has a similar model with its USSOCOM contracting portal. This unsecured website is maintained by the SOAL-K organization and includes USSOCOM-specific AARs, SOPs, training documents, samples, and many other items to assist registered CCOs in collaborating lessons learned from their deployments. The researcher found that one area missing from each of these lessons learned databases is comprehensive contingency contracting guidance dealing specifically with construction and the necessary integration of joint forces.

B. (Processes) Contract Management Policy

Once the workforce has been properly trained, processes must be established to provide an effective working environment. This section will describe several elements of contracting policy as it relates to establishing and maintaining appropriate processes for contract management. First, the researcher will explain the importance of integrating contracting into the acquisition planning process.



Then, the policy requirements as a result of the increased number of contractor support on the battlefield will be described. Finally, the researcher will identify oversight policy and the problems faced with executing effective oversight processes.

1. Integration of Contracting into Planning

According to the Gansler Report, “USSOCOM has recognized the importance of expeditionary contracting to the successful completion of its mission” (USA, 2007, p. 40). The SOAL-KCC develops policies and doctrine to facilitate the success of deployed CCOs. KCC also provides review and approval of large-dollar actions to ensure compliance with statutory and regulatory guidance. The real-time involvement of this cell includes: properly collecting and reporting field contracting data, identifying lessons learned and using them to update policies, guidance, and/or developing training as appropriate. This involvement does not constitute perfection in their processes; in fact, it has identified several gaps in the capabilities of CCOs, as discussed (in part) in the section on people earlier in this report. Requesting support from NPS for a management module is an example of the KCC conducting responsible leadership and seeking out continuous improvement. The staff conducts regular visits to units to perform informal audits and PMRs. It was as a result of these PMRs that the SOAL-KA division chief identified the need for additional integration of contracting into the acquisition planning process. Acquisition planning includes: generating a viable requirement description, conducting market research, planning pro-actively versus re-actively, writing an adequate SOW, developing performance measurements, allocating and training qualified oversight personnel adequately.

In addition to meeting with the deployed contracting unit, the KCC staff often maintains open communication with the SOF units the CCOs support. This forum provides a clear opportunity for the staff to discuss shortfall issues directly with the warfighter. The Gansler Report found that “the USSOCOM KCC is a useful example of how to meld the contracting function with the warfighters to ensure the successful



accomplishment of the overall mission (USA, 2007, p. 24). Even with successful accomplishment of the overall mission, there are still areas of improvement that were identified during staff audits and PMRs regarding the integration of contracting into planning. The Gansler Report also noted an overall lack of integration of contracting into planning (USA, 2007, p. 40). The researcher asked one fielded questionnaire respondent (with over 10 years experience in contracting and five CENTCOM AOR deployments) to comment on lessons learned concerning the effectiveness (lack of effectiveness) of acquisition planning. He stated: “Acquisition planning is minimal at best. Acquisitions are typically knee-jerk reactions to requirements and [are] pushed to contracting for immediate action.” When the researcher asked the SOCENT chief of contracting the same question, he stated: “[acquisition planning] is extremely effective when the CCO is included in the planning stages of [the] requirement, but it is only effective when the CCO and/or customer both possess the experience to know how to execute the requirement properly.” This response suggests that simply integrating customers and CCOs is an important part, but that both parties must also be properly trained in their respective roles. The Gansler Report found that “translating a commander’s requirement into a SOW serves as the basis for a binding contract” and that “during expeditionary operations, the focus of the contracting process is on contract award, with [...contract] management being neglected.” (USA, 2008, p. 39). This reference to contract management includes both post-award administration and requirement-generation during pre-award planning. Despite the critical role that contracting plays in expeditionary operations, CCOs are not always brought into the requirement-generation process, nor are commanders trained on how to adequately define their requirements. “The importance of the ability to translate a combatant officer’s requirement into a responsive contract SOW cannot be overstated” (USA, 2008, p. 40). An experienced CCO familiar with the requirement can often help write a basic SOW. However, the inability to generate an effective SOW is due to a lack of trained personnel who can translate their commander’s intent into a requirement that can readily be given to and adopted by the CCO. This deficiency only further



underscores the importance of having a requirements-development process that brings the experts to the table during the planning and post-award periods of a contract. Stated another way, although the Services conduct operational planning, they fail to train on a key component to that planning process—contract-requirements development (USA, 2007).

2. Increased Reliance on Contractor Support

This section provides details outlining the increase over time of contractor support on the battlefield. This is important to managing processes and policies because increased contractors on the battlefield often present cultural sensitivity issues and additional legal considerations for commanders. Contractors are not treated the same as military personnel, nor do commanders have the same authority over contractors as they do over military personnel.

While numbers of contractor and military personnel are ever-changing and are difficult to track exactly, legislation has spurred improved tallying and tracking of contractor personnel. For example, Sections 815 and 854 of the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007* (Public Law 109-364); section 3305 of the *US Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007* (Public Law 110-28); and section 861 of the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008* (Public Law 110-181) have each required the DoD to issue reports detailing the use of contractors operating in-theater and the policies that govern them (as cited in DoD, 2007; 2008).

Contractors play a substantial role in supporting the US in military, reconstruction, and diplomatic operations in Iraq (among other places)—accounting for a significant portion of the manpower and spending for such activities. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), at the request of the Senate Committee on the Budget, studied the use of contractors in theatre to support US activities in Iraq (2009). Under their report, the CBO considered the following areas to be part of the Iraq theater: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United



Arab Emirates. While USSOCOM operates globally, and this report was specifically targeted at the Iraq theatre, this geological classification suggests an overall increased reliance on contractors supporting war efforts over time and helps to quantify the level of current contractor involvement. For this reason, the findings within the CBO report were used as the primary source for analysis in this section. Unless otherwise noted, all information within this section comes from the website containing the aforementioned report (CBO, 2009).

a. Expenditures

From 2003 through 2007, US agencies awarded \$85 billion in contracts for work to be principally performed in the Iraq theater, accounting for almost 20% of funding for operations in Iraq. More than 7% of those awards were for contracts performed within Iraq. The DoD-awarded contracts totaled \$76 billion, while the USAID and the Department of State (DoS) obligated roughly \$5 billion and \$4 billion, respectively, over the same time period.

b. Scope and Magnitude

Although the use of contractors during military operations is well established, most experts agree that the scale of the deployment of contractor personnel in the Iraq theater (relative to the number of military personnel in the country) is unprecedented in US history. Historical data on numbers of contractor personnel in-theater support that conclusion. The current ratio of contractor to military personnel in the Iraq theater is 1 to 1—higher than it has been during any other major US military operation (see Figure 9). In the 1990s, US operations in the Balkans illustrated the potential extent of the successful use of contractors during future conflicts. The ratio of contractor to military personnel in the Balkans was also about 1 to 1, but those operations involved no more than 20,000 US military personnel at any time—about 1/10 of the total in the Iraq theater as of December 2007.



CONFLICT	CONTRACTOR	MILITARY	RATIO OF
Revolutionary War	2	9	1:6
War of 1812	Not Available	38	Not Available
Mexican-American	6	33	1:6
Civil War	200	1,000	1:5
Spanish-American	Not Available	35	Not Available
World War I	85	2,000	1:24
World War II	734	5,400	1:7
Korea	156	393	1:2.5
Gulf War	9	500	1:5
Balkans	20	20	1:1
Iraq Theater: Early	190	200	1:1

Figure 9. Presence of Contractor Personnel during US Military Operations
(CBO, 2009; Epley, 1990, pp. 30-35; Zamparelli, 1999, pp. 10-19;
DoD, 2007, p. 12)

The historically high ratio of contractor personnel to military personnel in the Iraq theater is the result of several factors. In response to reductions in the size of the post-Cold War military, the DoD augmented its force structure by relying more heavily on contractors for support functions—for example, through LOGCAP (CBO, 2005, pp. 16–21). Those contractors perform functions in-theater that would otherwise require the deployment of additional military personnel. The extent of the DoD’s contracting is particularly evident during prolonged, large-scale operations—like those in Iraq—in which there may not be enough military personnel available to provide logistics support.

On the basis of data collected from the DoD, DoS, and USAID, the CBO estimates that at least 190,000 contractor personnel work in the Iraq theater on contracts funded by the United States. The ratio of US-funded contractor employees to members of the US military in the Iraq theater is, therefore, approximately 1 to 1, as stated above. The 190,000 estimate includes personnel who work directly for the



DoD, DoS, and USAID as prime contractors, as well as subcontractor personnel for the DoD. About 20% (38,700) of all contractor personnel working in the Iraq theater are US citizens (see Figure 10). Local nationals account for roughly 40% of the theater's contractor population (70,500 and 81,000, respectively). Figure 10 illustrates these demographics.

	US Citizens	Local Nationals (a)	Third Country Nationals (b)
DoD (c)	36,100	66,300	77,400
DoS	2,300	1,300	3,100
USAID	200	2,900	300
Other agencies (d)	200	100	300
TOTAL	38,700	70,500	81,000

Figure 10. Number of Personnel Working in Iraq Theatre
(CBO, 2009)

NOTES:

- a. *Local Nationals: Citizens of the country in which they are working.*
- b. *Third country nationals: Neither US citizens nor citizens of local nations.*
- c. *DoD data includes prime contractors and subcontractors, including those working of the Army Corps of Engineers. The DoS, USAID, and other agencies do not track subcontractor employees and are, therefore, not included.*
- d. *Other agencies: Includes Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Interior, Justice, Transportation, and Treasury, as well as Broadcasting Board of Governors and the General Services Administration (GSA).*

c. Regulation and Policy

More generally, the US government placed greater emphasis in recent decades on outsourcing activities to the private sector that are not inherently governmental. The government's policy is to subject services identified as commercial to the forces of competition (OMB, 2003). In addition, the current ratio of contractor personnel to military personnel reflects the United States' attempt to reconstruct while military activities are under way, rather than delaying rebuilding until hostilities have ended.



d. Cultural Considerations

The significant number of contract workers in-theatre highlights the critical need for counting, tracking, and maintaining oversight of these workers (CBO, 2009). It also increases the footprint of local/foreign nationals into operations, suggesting that awareness and practice of cultural sensitivity are important to maintaining support from these workers. Representatives at all levels have the responsibility to maintain cultural awareness when dealing with contractors. One interview informant told the researcher that “dealing with foreign nationals is very different than dealing with stateside contractors.” A different culture is one of many differences experienced by CCOs dealing with foreign nationals. According to USSOCOM leadership, these differences should be respected and integrated into how a CCO does business while in a foreign country.

e. Legal Considerations

Contractors on the battlefield present challenges to military leadership in terms of authority and a clear process for managing contractor personnel (CBO, 2009). Regarding legal considerations associated with contractor personnel, the CBO found that Military commanders have less direct authority over the actions of contractor personnel than over their military or civilian government subordinates. Contractors’ duties are set out in their contract, which is managed by a government contracting officer, not the military commander.

The legal status of contractor personnel is uncertain, particularly for those who are armed. Contractor personnel are potentially subject to a number of laws and jurisdictions, including the *Uniform Code of Military Justice*, the *Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000*, the *Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction Act of the United States*, and the *USA Patriot Act*, although very few cases are on record applying these laws (CBO, 2009).

Although military commanders can directly control the actions of military personnel and government civilians, their control over individual contractor



personnel is indirect. Military personnel are subject to criminal punishment if they fail to obey a lawful order from their military commanders. On the other hand, government civilians may fall under the control of military commanders either permanently or temporarily during a conflict, but only under extraordinary circumstances would they be subject to administrative actions, such as suspension or termination, if they failed to obey an order. Military commanders may change the daily tasks and duties of military and civilian DoD employees within the usual military chain of command, subject broadly to the laws and regulations of the United States. The commander can only give orders that are consistent with US laws and regulations (*USC*, 2008). The commander and employees may also be subject to local laws, depending on the content of treaties and status-of-forces agreements. In practice, that authority enables the military commander to allocate the personnel under his or her command among any number of tasks those personnel are able and trained to do. The military commander may also request that additional personnel be reassigned from other parts of the government if necessary. By contrast, the duties of contractor personnel are set out in a fixed, written contract (DoD, 2005, section 6.1.4; Vernon, 2004, p. 369) and are not subject to military commander directives. Contracts are governed by statutes, case law, the *FAR* and its supplements (GAO, 2008).

3. Oversight

The CCO is the official designee of the head of the agency for binding the government on matters related to a particular contract (DoD, 2005, section 6.3.3; GSA, 2009, 48 C.F.R. 1.602). However, the CCO may not have access to the place of performance if that place is remote or dangerous or if it covers a large geographic area (GAO, 2008). Instead, he or she may rely on a technical representative, usually a military member of the unit being supported and collocated with the contractor. *DFARS* 201.602-2 notes that the technical representative interacts frequently, sometimes daily, with the contractor and is generally responsible for



oversight performance but is not an authority for adjusting the scope or size of the contract (GSA, 2009).

“The inability (of the government) to monitor contractor performance and enforce contracts is a critical problem in an expeditionary environment” (USA, 2007, p. 15). The researcher found overwhelming evidence to suggest there is clearly a trend throughout the contingency contracting environment of problems associated with inadequate oversight of contractor performance. The majority of all literature reviewed noted this problem (with no sources showing positive trends in this area); every individual interviewed brought up this concern; and, every questionnaire fielded included multiple responses identifying oversight as being one the most challenging problems to address in a contingency environment. In addition, the researcher found that every USSOCOM AAR reviewed dating back to 2001 noted this as a concern.

The documented failures ranged from lack of adequate documentation of appointment and training of oversight personnel to the government’s inability to even provide oversight personnel. These failures could potentially lead to unfulfilled responsibilities on the part of the government. If the government cannot perform the oversight identified in the contract terms and conditions, it often has a direct affect on a CCO’s ability to enforce contractor performance terms. Contractors in expeditionary environments often perform at levels different from those conformed to by military personnel. Without oversight and occasional guidance, contractors could make early mistakes in judgment or performance that could be easily avoidable if the government representative is performing prudent due diligence in regards to the contract. One USSOCOM CCCO, a senior NCO with five deployments to his credit, noted that construction requirements often have “minimal oversight due to continuous stress on other career fields and a lack of manning.” This CCO noted that typically the SME cannot be present; therefore, the customer sends an under-qualified person to conduct oversight. This ad-hoc oversight by the government, based on the CCO’s experience, causes unauthorized changes and/or sub-par



acceptance. Oversight is conducted by a CCO through responsible contract management and by the CCO's appointed representative through delegated authorities of on-site inspections and acceptance.

a. Contract Management

“Contract management is the essential post-award contracting function to ensure mission accomplishment and to ensure that the Government obtains the required work on time and at the quality level called for by the contract” (USA, 2007, p. 27). It is also an important control over fraud, waste, and abuse. A CCO is responsible for contract management. The CCO ensures that both the government and contractor fulfill their respective roles outlined in the terms and conditions of the contract. This can involve monitoring progress schedules, documenting government acceptance of goods and services, reviewing material submittals from the contractor, approving invoice payments, etc. The CCO must establish and oversee the contract management processes. This process includes but is not limited to: in-scope change-order management procedures (what to do if the customers needs to change the requirement after award), steps to ensure proper funding is available and properly certified for contract actions that will obligate money, routine (weekly, monthly, etc.) meetings between contractor personnel and government personnel to discuss schedules and other concerns with the contract, having a process in place for government personnel to approve material submittals provided by contractors, and having appropriate personnel trained and appointed for performance oversight. There are reported cases in which there were no personnel trained to monitor and ensure that the contractor was performing or providing the contracted requirement needed by the warfighter. This neglect can cause difficulties; for instance, a CCO would not know whether a contractor had actually performed the requirements established in the contract (USA, 2007).



b. Delegated Authorities

In expeditionary contracting, there are several designations for personnel other than the CCO responsible for oversight on contracts in the contingency environment. The particular term used for oversight personnel varies across the military services, with contracting officer representatives (COR) being the most common for USSOCOM operations. Other names include: contracting officers technical representative (COTR), or quality assurance personnel/evaluator (QAP/E) (used most often to refer to oversight of services contracts). A customer is responsible for nominating a subject-matter expert (SME) for the CCO to train and appoint as the COR (or designated term for the AOR) to a particular contract. This SME is then assigned to perform oversight responsibilities throughout the life of the contract. The SME is also given the authority for final acceptance of goods and services; however, this individual is not given the authority to obligate funds on behalf of the government. In special cases, there are SME personnel assigned for construction projects in which a CCO may delegate obligation authority up to \$25,000. These SMEs are known as Project Planning Officers (PPO). A PPO can be used in environments in which SOF units are isolated from the contacting office. If the SOF unit has a qualified engineer attached to it, that engineer may be appointed as a PPO with the proper training and delegation provided by a warranted CCO.

An essential link in construction projects is the COR (also called COTR). This person is the on-site SME who should be viewing the contractor's performance frequently enough to remedy any perceived problems with performance before they compromise the overall project. The COR should have clear and open communication with both the contractor and the CCO. The COR should also clearly understand the contract terms and conditions, including the SOW. The delegated authority to CORs allows for them to direct the contractor within those terms and conditions. The COR is a valuable asset to the acquisition team because of his/her expected knowledge of the requirement contracted for and for his/her ability to be



on-site with the contractor much more frequently than a CCO could be. CCOs often have numerous projects in multiple locations and could not possibly manage or oversee the daily performance by the contractor, nor are they experts in construction. Based on regulatory guidance within *DFARS 201.602-2* and *DoD Directive 550.7R*, a COR is intended to be a qualified individual appointed by the CCO to assist in the technical monitoring or administration of a contract. This guidance is not specific in what exact qualifications are needed. As mentioned above, the customer is responsible for nominating a qualified SME to best represent the needs of the requesting unit. When a CCO appoints the nominated COR, the CCO documents in the appointed letter that contract oversight should be a priority in the individual's daily duty. However, this position is often assigned as an additional duty and often requires no formal experience. Those who fill it are often young service members with little to no training, simply tasked from a functional unit who owns the requirement. The turnover is high among CORs, leaving many gaps in contract coverage (USA, 2007). Likewise, a fragmented and conflicted chain of command exists with delegated oversight personnel. According to the AARs the researcher reviewed, CORs and other oversight personnel often have higher priority mission objectives other than their COR additional duty. Although CORs are formally appointed by the CCO, these positions do not fall under the CCO's command. CCOs often provide documentation of appointment and training at the onset of contract award to one person, and then have to continually track that person down or adjust when the functional unit commander re-prioritizes projects and/or personnel. "The communication trail and oversight control is complex in (the deployed) theatre. Mission success or failure is often dependent on effective oversight of contracts. Construction is at the top of the list of core competencies that need to be developed in order for SMEs to be available to fill COR slots" (CDR David Graff, Commander-DCMA International, personal communication, July 29, 2009). "If the government can't abide by and enforce its own terms and conditions of a contract, it's hard to legally enforce the performance terms required by the contractor" (E.C. Yoder, personnel communication, July 29, 2009).



USSOCOM staff members also noted CORs and other oversight areas as a concern throughout their AOR. One senior member stated: “PPOs and CORs from the engineer units are often put in charge of construction requirement generation and oversight with little to no training on the type of construction on contract.” The examples respondents used frequently included the use of bridge demolition experts for oversight on building living facilities and the use of paving experts on electrical and plumbing projects. When these individuals are the last link in making a determination if a contractor has performed IAW the contract terms and conditions, inadequate work is often accepted. Based on feedback from USSOCOM personnel interviews and field questionnaires, the researcher has found that this generally “causes a great deal of re-work and frustration on the part of both the commanders and the CCOs” (according to an interview with the researcher). According to the SOAL-KCC Division Chief, a standardized document showing the roles and responsibilities of oversight personnel is needed. CCOs on the ground also expressed a need for functional units to assign personnel for contract oversight duties prior to deployment, then send them through a comprehensive training program directed by their chain of command.

C. (Platform) Synergistic Approach

1. Cross-service

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) brought organizational changes to the execution of contingency contracting between the military services in a truly joint environment that may potentially improve future support. One of the most intriguing observations is the integration of contingency contracting personnel between the military services at the tactical level, which is common at the strategic and operational levels, but not very common at the tactical level (Luse et al., 2005).

Today, the contracting workforce is based on the application of rules established in statutes, case law, the *FAR* and its supplements, when operational tempo demands that CCOs must operate within an environment filled with



exceptions to the rules. These exceptions are applied differently in different environments. Not only do the military services apply the *FAR* differently, but these diverse organizations (such as CENTCOM service AORs, JCC I/A, Army Corps of Engineers, and USSOCOM) often differ on how particular regulatory requirements are applied (USA, 2007). That is the challenge for CCOs who support multi-service and multi-organizations during their careers—adaptation to changing regulations across different organizations is essential to streamlining operations and maintaining compliance with legal and regulatory requirements.

The *FAR* system was established for codification and publication of uniform policies and procedures for federal acquisition at all executive agencies. The problem is there is not uniform application of these policies and procedures across agencies; each agency has a degree of latitude and flexibility to adapt the regulation for its respective operational needs. For example, the DoD military services have multiple levels of exceptions and restrictions for contracting outside of the CONUS. A CCO may often be trained and experienced in one agency or department, yet deploy under USSOCOM, which has its own variation of regulations within the *Special Operations Command Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (SOFARS)*. *SOFARS* provides minimum essential implementation of the *Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)*, and *Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS)*. The *SOFARS* applies to all CCOs that receive contracting authority from USSOCOM.

USSOCOM has a very reliable and aggressive set of internal control procedures IAW *DoD Instruction 5010.40*. These procedures enforce basic *FAR* compliance” (USA, 2007, p. 7). However, there isn’t a USSOCOM CCO policy to bring together and clarify the various layers of regulations and (exceptions to those regulations) in which USSOCOM CCOs must operate. Per USSOCOM staff officers, this leaves the CCOs to operate in an ad-hoc manner in terms of navigating through the thousands of pages of regulations. Contracting is a compliance-based process and profession (R.G. Rendon, personal communication, March 2, 2009). Contracting personnel need a clearly articulated and non-conflicting set of



acquisition rules that can be immediately referenced and applied to exceptional contracting requirements and special provisions of expeditionary operations (USA, 2007).

2. Cross-functional

When the SOAL-K DoP was interviewed for this project, he specifically noted the importance that USSOCOM CCOs interact and facilitate a synergistic relationship with other functional areas such as finance and engineering. These stakeholders each have different interests, policies and procedures through which contracting professionals must navigate in order to facilitate a successful acquisition cycle.

a. Finance

During the researcher's interview with the SOAL-K staff, the DoP specifically identified funding as an item in which his CCOs need better cross-functional involvement and awareness, and as an area that he would like to see included in the management module. The DoP noted that this can be a very daunting area for CCOs, as there are numerous financial regulations and agency policies associated with the appropriate use of funding. The application of these may or may not be clear in a given situation.

(1) MPF-11.

As mentioned in Chapter III, the *National Defense Authorization Act of 1986* established the concept of USSOCOM. A year later, the *1987 Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Act* formally created USSOCOM and established the military service-component support roles, while providing substantial autonomy for SOF—including unique budget and procurement authority. This authority sets USSOCOM apart from traditional COCOMs. The authority builds in speed and flexibility for CCOs, though it also poses a challenge to them as they try to ensure the proper execution of these special funds. Similar to the authorities granted to each military service, Title 10 *USC*, Section 167, grants the USSOCOM



commander the responsibility and authority to develop and acquire SOF-peculiar equipment, the authority to exercise the functions of the head of agency, and the authority to execute funds. USSOCOM uses special appropriation funding known as major force program-11 (MFP-11). The USSOCOM CCO warrants only provide authority to spend MFP-11 funds on SOF-peculiar requirements. In his interview with the researcher, the USSOCOM staff legal advocate stated that this is an area in which CCOs must be careful. Other functional areas often come to USSOCOM CCOs for contracting support, knowing that the MFP-11 funding rules are less restrictive in terms of speed, review thresholds, and approval. Based on his experience, the staff legal advocate told the researcher that personnel in other functional areas may put pressure on USSOCOM CCOs to procure goods and services not actually specific to the USSOCOM mission. Spending MFP-11 funds for non-USSOCOM missions is a clear misuse of the funding authority and is prohibited by the *SOFFARS*. In addition, this special funding has subordinate categories of spend for specific uses and must be allocated accordingly.

(2) “Money as a Weapon System”

All appropriated funds are subject to three basic fiscal constraints: time, purpose, and amount. Failure to execute funding within these constraints could result in breach of the *Bona-Fide Need Rule*, *Mis-Appropriations Act*, or the *Anti-Deficiency Act* respectively (AFLMA, 2008, p. 56). On the other hand, there are several specifics within the various funding regulations that allow for flexibility and exceptions to standard procedures. The most comprehensive overview of these regulations was compiled by the Comptroller for the Multi-National Command-Iraq in 2005, with his smart book briefing entitled *Money as a Weapon System* (MAAWS), to which USSOCOM Staff often refer CCOs for clarification on funding policies (Aaron, 2005). In this briefing, the comptroller stated that:

... effective application of all available resources is vital to the success of our mission. The concept of Money as a Weapon System (MAAWS) is simple: think about resources as a critical enabler of everything done



on the battlefield, apply and employ money as a non-lethal weapon system to maximize operational effects at minimal cost. (Aaron, 2005)

While the primary responsibility for funding concerns falls within the finance functional area, evidence suggests that contracting and CCOs play a critical part in overseeing the application of funding on contractual obligations; therefore, CCOs need to be apprised of the regulations and policies associated with funding.

Contracts throughout Iraq and Afghanistan have been incrementally funded unnecessarily, causing increased contracting workload and inefficient operations. The Gansler Report found that people in the field identified this as a major problem hampering their efforts to support the warfighter (USA, 2007). If there were a more efficient and reliable funding stream, CCOs might be able to negotiate better deals with contractors. Even though that the over-burdening of contracting personnel is currently documented, incremental funding is occurring at monthly or, in some cases, shorter intervals. This leads to an unnecessary increase in workload for the CCOs because modifications to the contract must be processed and additional administration steps must be taken each time funding is applied to the contract. One solution recommended by the Gansler Report was to use an approach similar to what was used in the Balkans, known as the “Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund.” This essentially is a pot of money adequately resourced up-front without usage or fiscal year limitations (USA, 2007, p. 25).

(3) Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB)

The first layer of defense in accurately certifying funding for appropriate use is the joint acquisition review board (JARB). This is a J4 board that validates O&M funding requirements estimated at \$200,000 or more. The JARB validates requirements less than \$200,000 in specific areas including (but not limited to) engineer equipment, facilities, and LOGCAP (Aaron, 2005). At larger expeditionary bases, contracting personnel have a seat on this board; however, in smaller, more austere locations, a CCO may receive a requirement that was either validated through a JARB at a regional location, or simply certified by the on-scene finance



representative. Per the AARs on file with USSOCOM, CCOs operating within an AOR with a functioning JARB had less incidences of misused funds.

b. Engineering

For construction taking place on or around DoD installations in an expeditionary environment, the Engineering Corps is critical. The engineers are the planners, designers, and overseers of construction projects and operate side by side with CCOs. Below is a summary of the key decision bodies per the MAAWS briefing (Aaron, 2005).⁷

(1) Joint Facility Utilization Board (JFUB)

This is a J7 board that oversees requirements for construction and base camp development, including MILCON, minor construction using OMA, real estate actions, and other engineering requirements.

(2) Facilities Engineering Team (FET)

After review/validation by the JFUB, the requirement is approved by the facilities engineering team (FET) members, who determine which contracting agency is appropriate for the work: SFO CCOs, local RCC, DCMA, USACE, USAID, or another organization. (IG report, 2008)

(3) Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board (JCMEB)

The JCMEB validates CERP requirements greater than \$500,000. The JCMEB also recommends approval or disapproval to the appropriate approval authority for a respective AOR.

Per the USSOCOM Staff, depending on how robust the SOF presence is in the AOR, the USSOCOM CCO may or may not be required to utilize some or all of these review channels. However, in more sustained areas—in which SOF are more integrated with large installations—the USSOCOM CCO is bound by these policies. Neither the existence of nor attendance to the above engineering activities and



review boards are adequately documented in past AARs. Interviews with respondents suggested that CCOs currently react to these activities in an ad-hoc manner based on the Chief of Contracting directives at each office location.

3. Agency Interoperability

In addition to cross-functional cooperation, interoperability between USSOCOM CCOs and agencies such as DCMA, JCC I/A, and other cooperative agencies conducting contingency contracting in its AOR was noted as a top concern for the SOAL-K DoP. In his interview with the researcher, the director specifically expressed concern for CCOs being able to meet mission objectives in the most effective manner while exercising synergy with these other agencies.

a. Splintered Responsibility

The Gansler Report addressed the importance of synergy and documented numerous problems with splintered responsibilities in theater between key players such as AMC, LOGCAP, Army Corps of Engineers, JCC I/A, DCMA, CENTCOM, USAID, Department of State and many more (USA, 2007). Furthermore, the report noted that after examining the entire landscape of acquisition issues in Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the members of the commission found that the problems experienced in an expeditionary environment are not due to one particular problem nor an individual failure to perform (USA, 2007). Rather, multiple agencies and departments having failed to fully recognize or comprehensively address the significance of the shifting challenges from the post-Cold War environment to one in which state militaries find themselves fighting non-state opponents (USA, 2007; Barbaris & Callanan, 2008).

b. Multiple Stakeholders

Contracting involves multiple stakeholders, including the warfighter, financial management, contracting, engineering, and contractor(s). Combined, these stakeholders' actions contribute to a successful acquisition. No single person can



cover all the various contracting processes nor provide the necessary deliverables—which include a defined requirement, statement of need, funding certification, a contract, contract modifications, award management, oversight of performance, and acceptance documentation (USA, 2007). These actions take place during pre-award, award, and post-award phases of contracting. The stakeholders play an integral role due to the inability of a CCO to be an expert in every subject area needing contract support.

D. Filling the Gaps

This report found that some of the biggest effectiveness gaps that arise when CCOs are executing construction requirements include: inadequate training of personnel, confusing contract management policies and construction management standards, non-compliant contracts (e.g., a failure to include the appropriate clauses and drawings), deficient acquisition planning and integration of contracting into operational planning, insufficient oversight of work and poor interaction between units.

A Construction Management Module focused on fulfilling these gaps while integrating the joint-force environment will allow even a relatively inexperienced CCO to better manage his/her environment and more effectively support SOF.

This project fulfilled two primary goals:

- (1) Examined the contingency contracting environment concerning expeditionary construction requirements.
- (2) Provided recommendations to address problems in the field. Among these recommendations was the development of a prototype tactical training handbook for CCOs to better manage the contingency contracting process for construction requirements. This training handbook is known as the USSOCOM Construction Management Module (CM²), discussed earlier in this report.



The existing operational environment was analyzed in order to answer the following research questions:

- 1. What are the Gaps in the Effectiveness of Contingency Contracting with Respect to Executing Construction Requirements?**
 - a. The Gaps in “People”**

This research suggests there are systemic problems with the training of personnel assigned to execute construction requirements. These personnel include both the acquisition workforce and operational units tasked with developing and overseeing this workforce’s requirements. Recent changes in the acquisition workforce and overall manning shortages among operational and support units have left a void in the priority and availability of adequate training. Personnel associated with executing construction requirements in a contingency environment lack the appropriate certification and training in fundamental construction contracting policy and basic construction standards. The researcher discovered that most USSOCOM CCOs have little to no construction experience and yet find themselves as the lead CCO for construction requirements. In addition, the contingency environment presents numerous conflicting regulations and policies for which a uniform standard for USSOCOM does not exist. This lack of uniformity exists in both contracting policies and construction standards.

Several respondents to fielded questionnaires noted that physical construction standards were the most difficult to understand and apply. While the application of construction standards is the responsibility of the engineer, CCOs play a vital role in ensuring that those standards are adequately reflected in the contract terms and conditions. If a contractor is not given a clear standard to follow, it is difficult to enforce that standard when the government proceeds to accept or reject the work.



USSOCOM staff inspections suggested that a CCO's biggest shortfalls in following contract standards involve lack of the appropriate clauses in construction contracts, inadequate training of oversight personnel, and a lack of awareness of funding restrictions and review thresholds for construction projects. Questionnaire respondents and interviewed informants further identified other shortfall areas: failure to reference current regulations, lack of templates for assisting in design and development of SOWs and IGEs, absence of checklists for phases of construction contracting, and a lack of understanding of basic construction terminology used by end-users and contractors. Finally, contingency contracting lessons learned are compiled at various levels of command. These lessons learned often reflect recurring problems throughout the same locations over time. This research suggests a failure to adequately integrate these lessons learned into current training programs.

b. The Gaps in “Processes”

This research suggests that the way in which contract management policy is handled throughout the contingency environment is inadequate for achieving optimum effectiveness. To begin with, contracting has been historically left out of the planning process in terms of acquisition and operational planning. This inadequacy has lead CCOs to a re-active approach to executing contract management policies and processes.

The failure to integrate contracting was magnified when the DoD increasingly relied on contractors to support battlefield objectives. Over the last ten years, this reliance has increased in expenditure, scope, and magnitude. This increase has brought new cultural and legal ramifications for our commanders on the ground as they operate and manage their contracts. An increase in the contractors on the battlefield leads to an increase in the importance of cultural sensitivity, an increase in the administration burden on CCOs and their representatives, and a decrease in the command-and-control abilities of commanders. The increase in contractors has also increased the distance and number of locations in which contracts are performed.



CCOs are often not physically at the location where a contract is performed. This leads to increased numbers of CORs to oversee the work and coordinate with contractors. The documented failures in oversight ranged from lack of adequate appointment documentation and of oversight personnel training to the government's inability to provide oversight personnel. Contractors in a contingency environment often perform at levels different from those conformed to by military personnel or stateside contractors. Without oversight and occasional guidance, contractors could make early mistakes in judgment or performance that could be easily avoidable if the government had performed due diligence in regards to oversight. This research suggests that oversight control is complex in a contingency theatre, yet mission success or failure is often dependent on effective oversight of contracts. With conflicting guidance and policy in the area of oversight, CCOs and their delegated representatives often behave in an ad-hoc fashion in terms of how they develop and execute the contract oversight process.

c. The Gaps in “Platform”

This research suggests that an overall lack of a synergistic approach to joint operations has hindered a CCO's ability to effectively perform in a contingency environment. Personnel tasked as CCOs for USSOCOM come from all military services. Each military service has particular guidance and regulations concerning contingency contracting operations. This cross-service diversity can be leveraged for best practices; however, current regulations are convoluted and difficult to follow for USSOCOM CCOs. CCOs also operate in an environment that demands support, coordination, and expertise of cross-functional capabilities such as finance and engineering. Furthermore, deployed USSOCOM CCOs are under the OPCON of other agencies and commands within the AOR.

One critical area that is split in command is the funding authority afforded to USSOCOM CCOs. USSOCOM uses a special appropriation funding known as MFP-11. This authority is given through Title 10 *USC*, Section 167, similar to the authority given to military services. The authority is allowed only when CCOs are



procuring items/services (including construction) for SOF units. The rules for this special funding are less restrictive than funding provided to the military services in terms of speed, review thresholds, and approval requirements. This allows a level of expediency in a CCO's ability to execute contracts; however, it can also be dangerous. Other functional units operating near the CCOs have been found trying to misuse this funding authority by trying to get the CCOs to procure items/services for units other than SOF.

This research has shown that USSOCOM CCOs are located in both austere environments and larger, more sustained military installations. The level of interaction and coordination necessary to receive and execute requirements varies. Regardless of this fact, a CCO will need to have a close relationship with finance and engineering units in order to execute construction requirements. This research has shown that gaps exist in a CCO's understanding of both financial and engineering elements such as funding restrictions and requirement-review boards. Research has also shown that current contingency operations display failures in interoperability. These failures suggest splintered responsibilities between agencies and a lack of effective interaction between multiple stakeholders. These failures leave CCOs confused and frustrated.

There are extensive capability gaps addressed within the three categories above. The researcher used these gaps as the catalyst for developing the learning objectives for the CM² prototype. To best compare these gaps with the appropriate learning objectives, the researcher created a coding system. Table 5 is a coded depiction of the gaps found within each respective people, processes, and platforms category



apX = people	bpX = processes	cpC = platforms
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Table 5. Categorized Capability Gaps

CODE	IDENTIFIED GAPS IN EFFECTIVENESS
<i>ap1</i>	Inadequate training of personnel associated with executing construction requirements (CCOs, CORs, SMEs, end-users, requirements-generators)
<i>ap2</i>	Changes in the acquisition workforce (more work, less people)
<i>ap3</i>	Manning shortages across multiple career fields
<i>ap4</i>	Lack of appropriate contracting certification prior to deployment (Appropriate <i>DAWIA</i> levels)
<i>ap5</i>	Lack of professional training in construction contracting prior to deployment (DAU courses)
<i>ap6</i>	USSOCOM CCOs have little to no experience in construction contracting
<i>ap7</i>	Conflicting regulations and policy for contingency contracting (FAR, DFARS, SOFARS, AFFARS, vs. COCOM)
<i>ap8</i>	Conflicting and confusing standards for construction contracting in a contingency environment
<i>ap9</i>	Inadequate training of oversight personnel (CORs, COTRs.)
<i>ap10</i>	Inadequate application of existing contracting regulation and policy (lack of appropriate clauses, SOW, IGEs, review thresholds, etc.).
<i>ap11</i>	Inappropriate use of funding authorities.
<i>ap12</i>	Lack of understanding by CCO of basic construction terminology.
<i>bp1</i>	Contracting left out of planning process (acquisition and operational).
<i>bp2</i>	CCO behaving in a re-active way rather than a pro-active way.
<i>bp3</i>	Increasing expenditures, scope, and magnitude of contractors supporting the force on the battlefield.
<i>bp5</i>	Increased cultural sensitivity concerns.
<i>bp5</i>	Increased legal ramifications for commanders' ability to command and control personnel in their battlespace.
<i>bp6</i>	Increased distance from CCO that contracts are being performed.
<i>bp7</i>	Increased number of oversight personnel (personnel pulled from primary mission more often).
<i>bp8</i>	Lack of adequate training of oversight personnel.
<i>bp9</i>	Lack of documentation of appointment and training of oversight personnel.
<i>bp10</i>	Ad-hoc development and execution of the contract-oversight process.
<i>cp1</i>	Lack of synergistic approach to integrating joint operations (lack of integration between military services doctrine, training, skill sets).
<i>cp2</i>	Lack of coordination between cross-functional areas (finance, engineering, legal, contracting, end-user).
<i>cp3</i>	Misuse of MFP-11 funding authority by CCOs.
<i>cp4</i>	Lack of awareness of cross-functional requirement review boards.
<i>cp5</i>	Inadequate interoperability between agencies (DCMA, JCC, USAID).



2 Can a Comprehensive Training Module be Developed to Effectively Mitigate These Gaps?

This research suggest that there are extensive areas of concern with the gaps in people, processes, and platforms associated with contingency contracting construction requirements. CCOs need a structured management process to bridge the gap between their respective military services' training doctrine, their individual skills, and the expectations of commanders on the ground. USSOCOM leadership has expressly articulated a need and desire for a management module mitigating these gaps. Furthermore, this research has discovered that current training opportunities (both informal and formal) do not adequately cover dynamic skill sets required for effective management of construction requirements.

A tactical Construction Management Module (CM²) is one method of mitigating the gaps discussed. However, these gaps have strategic implications and, thus, also require strategic involvement from USSOCOM staff. Strategic recommendations addressed in Chapter VI include: adapting to the changes in the workforce, establishing mandatory training requirements, revisiting lessons learned, effectively integrating contracting into planning, developing aggressive oversight measures, capitalizing on cross-functional capabilities, and building synergy in joint operations. To adequately fulfill the gaps outlined within this report, both tactical level CCOs and strategic level staff members at USSOCOM will need to implement and, in time, evaluate the recommendations provided.

The greatest areas of concern documented in government reports and feedback associated with this research included: a lack of integration of contracting into all levels of planning (including acquisition and operational planning), inadequate requirements-generation procedures, insufficient oversight of work, and a failure to use the appropriate funding and clauses in construction contracts. The CM² entails guidance and examples to mitigate these concerns. The CM² provides this training through a breakdown of the following themes: operational framework,



strategic alignment, pre-award, award, post-award. In the module, each of these themes will encompass a chapter.

Table 5 below is a breakdown of the learning objectives within each chapter of the CM² and how they relate to mitigating the listed gaps above.

Table 6. Learning Objectives of CM²

GAP CODE	CM² LEARNING OBJECTIVES (BY CHAPTER)
	OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
ap1, ap2, ap4, bp1, bp2	1. Know the responsibilities of a USSOCOM CCO.
ap6, ap7, ap8, ap12, bp2	2. Know where to find additional DoD construction-related guidance.
ap6, ap7, ap10, ap11, bp2, cp1, cp2, cp3	3. Comprehend and apply the special funding authority to USSOCOM.
ap7, cp1, cp2, cp5	4. Comprehend the unique command structure and authority in which USSOCOM operates around the globe.
cp4, bp2	5. Comprehend the key joint staff functional elements within CFSOCC.
ap9, ap10, bp6, bp7, bp8, bp8, bp10	6. Know where to find and when to apply current approval levels of authority for CCOS and Field Operating Officers (FOOs).
ap6, ap10, bp2	7. Know when theatre business clearance is applicable for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
ap10, bp2	8. Know current USSOCM policy for MILCON requirements.
ap11, bp2, cp3, cp5	9. Comprehend funding concerns within contingency contracting operations.
ap11, bp2, cp3, cp5	10. Comprehend CERP guidelines and limitations.
ap1, ap7, ap9, bp2, bp6, bp7, bp8, bp9, bp10	11. Comprehend responsibilities and limitations with CCO-delegated authorities.
	STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT
ap1, bp1, bp2, cp4, cp5	12. Know initial step in preparing a requirement and accurately certifying funding.
ap1, bp1, bp2, cp4,	13. Comprehend the common engineering elements with which a CCO should be concerned.



cp5	
ap1, ap2, ap3, ap7	15. Synthesize why CCOs should focus on interoperability with other agencies.
cp1, cp2, cp5	16. Synthesize leadership role in strategic alignment.
	PRE-AWARD
ap1, ap4, ap5, ap6, bp6	17. Know the key contracting considerations during acquisition planning.
ap1, ap4, ap5, ap6, bp6, bp7	18. Know what two items a CCO should clearly understand in regard to requirement definition.
ap1, ap5, ap8	19. Know the two primary clauses associated with oversight of construction contracts.
ap1, ap5, ap8	20. Comprehend the key construction clauses to include in solicitations and the use for each.
ap1, ap5, ap8, bp1, bp2	21. Comprehend recommended elements of a pre-construction conference.
ap1, ap4, ap5, ap8, bp1, bp2, bp3	22. Comprehend the three main elements in establishing evaluation procedures.
	AWARD
ap4, ap7, ap10, bp2	23. Know where to find references for source-selection procedures and policy.
ap1, ap4, ap6, ap7, ap10, bp2	24. Know what determinations and findings are required for construction contracts.
ap4, ap6, ap10, cp1, cp5	25. Analyze security considerations in distribution and notification elements within a contingency environment.
	POST-AWARD
ap4, ap6, ap7, ap10, bp6	26. Analyze and apply four main remedies for changed under construction contracts.
ap1, ap4, ap6, ap7, ap10, bp6	27. Know the clause for payments under a fixed-price construction contract.
ap1, ap4, ap6, ap7, ap10, bp6	28. Know where to find the USSOCOM regulation and policy on terminations.
ap1, ap4, ap10, bp6	29. Know six final actions with which a CCO should be concerned during post-award.



E. Summary

This chapter analyzed the three overarching pillars of joint contingency contracting operations. First, the pillar of “people” was broken down to reflect the acquisition workforce environment and the training and certification elements of contingency contracting personnel. The changing workforce dynamic and manning shortages resulted in increases to the acquisition workforce and the creation of a new Army Contracting Command. These changes suggest an increase in the number of Army personnel tasked to support contingency contracting—a field in which the Army is the lead agent for the two largest active theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan. Evidence suggests that the current training of construction contract standards and construction terminology is inadequate for USSOCOM CCOs. Contract standards such as clauses, SOWs, IGEs, and funding restrictions have been misused by CCOs. There is currently confusion as to which agency regulation or policy a USSOCOM CCO should apply. In addition, CCOs are not currently trained in construction terminology, which makes their job more difficult in communicating and coordinating with engineers working on construction requirements.

Second, the researcher analyzed the pillar of “processes” to determine how contract management policies were effecting USSOCOM CCOs. The failure to integrate contracting into the acquisition planning processes is a global concern that has caused fragmented, reactive behavior on the part of CCOs and their customers. Evidence suggests that CCOs and their customers can be more effective if they integrate their planning efforts early. The researcher also analyzed the affect of increasing numbers of contractor support on the battlefield. The increase in contractors has complicated both cultural and legal considerations for military commanders. These complications have affected the military commanders’ ability to create and execute processes and policies within their theaters. CCOs must be aware of these considerations and be prepared to bridge the expectations of commanders with legal and statutory contractual requirements. Most likely a result



of these manning shortages, training failures, and increased contractor footprint within the AOR, the oversight of contractor performing contract requirements has suffered. CCOs have had difficulty in establishing contract management procedures that effectively monitor and enforce terms and conditions. There is evidence to suggest that SMEs nominated by the end-users as CORs are often unqualified and ill-equipped to perform adequate contract oversight. This has presented a problem as CCOs strive to enforce delegated oversight authorities and, in turn, has increased the difficulty for a CCO to enforce the terms and conditions of the contract.

The final pillar of operations the researcher reviewed was the “platforms” in which personnel have been able to execute a synergistic approach to joint operations. This section began by breaking down the diverse cross-service regulatory environment in which a CCO operates. This environment needs established contracting standards if CCOs are to integrate the skill set and doctrine of individual military services. The cross-functional environment was then analyzed, finding that a CCO must lead the acquisition team through various boards and regulations in order to achieve success for all stakeholders. These stakeholders include personnel from various functional areas such as finance, legal, engineering, and the operational warfighter. The CCO must also navigate within an environment of splintered responsibilities between various agencies, such as the DCMA, JCC-I/A, Army Corp of Engineers, USAID, etc. These splintered responsibilities among stakeholders have resulted in inefficiencies, delays, and frustrations.

Through the recommendations provided in Chapter VI, the researcher will attempt to mitigate these concerns and provide solutions to problems documented throughout this analysis of the data. These recommendations include training policy adjustments, structural integration considerations, and the CM² for CCOs discussed above.



VI. Recommendations

A. Strategic-Leadership Considerations

1. (People) Training of Personnel

a. Adapt to the Changes in the Workforce

With the unique nature of the special operations mission, there are often concerns with utilizing civilians to fill necessary positions. Yet, there are opportunities supporting more sustained operations—such as those at larger bases in both Iraq and Afghanistan—at which CCOs could be augmented by a civilian workforce. Decision-makers should explore this supplementation of personnel to remove a portion of the burden from over-tasked military CCOs. Depending on the deployment arrangement of the civilian positions, this arrangement could also provide additional layers of continuity in some locations.

This report has shown that there is currently a shortfall in both training and manning of CCOs across the military services. Currently, USSOCOM is receiving more than 2/3 of its CCOs from the Air Force, although the Army is the lead agent for the ongoing major contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. USSOCOM is a joint organization, and while utilizing the best trained and equipped personnel to accomplish its mission is critical, bringing in other military services will provide the US with a stronger, more effective force in the long-term. Currently, data shows that the Air Force is the best trained and equipped military service for developing effective CCOs; however, the Army has made great strides in this area with the creation of the Army Contracting Command. In addition, both the Navy and Marine Corps are improving the training and experience of their personnel. The researcher recommends that USSOCOM take an aggressive approach in requesting additional personnel from the Army to fill USSOCOM taskings in Iraq and Afghanistan, since the Army is the lead agency for contingency contracting in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This may involve tasking less experienced CCOs to more



sustained locations and deploying them to locations with higher numbers of experienced CCOs to provide on-site assistance as necessary. Contingency Contracting is a learning-intensive field; however, it also demands a great deal of flexibility and adaptability from its members. This flexibility and adaptability can't be learned in a classroom; thus, deploying CCOs into the battlefield environment is the most opportune way to build their experience.

b. Establish Mandatory Training Requirements

Current USSOCOM SOPs require CCOs to have completed both *DAWIA* Level II contracting certification and the DAU *Construction Contracting (CON 244)* course prior to filling a USSOCOM tasking. These requirements are sometimes waived due to the high operations tempo and priority of taskings. This researcher recommends that the mission of USSOCOM contracting will be better achieved by enforcing a firm policy for CCOs to be level II contracting certified, to have completed DAU courses *Contingency Contracting (CON 234)* and *Construction Contracting (CON 244)* and to review the CM² prior to being assigned to a USSOCOM tasking. This limitation could hinder filling taskings in the short-run. A way to mitigate shortfalls in this area is to effectively communicate to the military Services that in order for personnel to fill a USSOCOM tasking, they must have such training. By funding such training, decision-makers would ensure more personnel will obtain it in a timely manner. In addition, a cross-command or cross-services Memorandum of Understanding would also help ensure this new requirement is met.

The researcher recommends USSOCOM extend the current single day pre-deployment training to at least three days, and provide it before CCOs deploy for their respective AORs. A more robust in-house training would provide ample time to review USSOCOM-specific regulations and procedures and would help better prepare CCOs for the dynamic missions on which they are about to embark. This extended time would be a great opportunity to reinforce those areas in which CCOs may be either inexperienced or not current regarding the most recent AOR issues.



c. Revisit Lessons Learned

Currently, all CCOs are required to complete and submit AARs at the end of their deployments. This is a worthy policy; however, there is no policy officially addressing what is to be done with those reports. The researcher recommends having newly tasked CCOs review the AARs posted on USSOCOM contracting portal and submit a one-page summary of common trends noted in the filled AARs for their respective AOR. In addition, the CCOs should provide their recommended solutions to recurrent problems prior to departure from pre-deployment training. This policy will ensure that new CCOs have reviewed conditions within their respective AORs and will yield additional solution sets for USSOCOM leadership to consider.

2. (Processes) Contract Management Policy

a. Better Integration of Contracting Into Planning

Integration of contracting into planning can be completed at all levels. Contracting leadership can discuss logistical movements and operational objectives with other functional leaders. These discussions can provide the contracting leadership (CoCO, CCO, or staff member) an opportunity to recommend sound business advice and an acquisition plan to support those movements and objectives. In communicating with contracting leadership, strategic-level planners can help the individual CCO to better prepare for and execute new requirements. A pro-active approach to engaging contracting has benefits at all stages of the acquisition. A process of early engagement also provides an opportunity to appoint and train qualified CORs. The appointment of a COR at the beginning of the acquisition cycle can increase his/her commitment and ensure the COR has time to become familiar with the requirement. This policy change is only effective if both contracting and end-user leadership agree that only qualified CORs will be nominated by the end-user and accepted by the CCO. The strategic importance of contracting must be aggressively stressed to foster a pro-active engagement of operational leaders with contracting leadership. This engagement is critical if the tactical-level CCO is to



effectively enforce his/her authority. When a CCO must react to the ad-hoc behavior of customers, it presents an environment in which sound business advice and responsible contract management is more difficult to achieve. The researcher recommends the Yoder Three Tier model (Figure 11) as a direct and comprehensive approach to achieving integration. “Several notable requests for better planning, coordination and integration of contracting operations with broader theater-support elements [...] have been postulated” (Yoder, 2004, p. 13). Prominent calls for better planning and integration include, but are not limited to: Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 entitled *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*; the RAND Report on Civil and Military Cooperation, and NPS publications (Yoder, 2004; Coombs, 2004; Anderson & Flaherty, 2003).

PDD 56 was issued by President Clinton in 1997. This directive determines the integration of planning and execution among Federal agencies called to support in contingencies. The problem with PDD 56 is two-fold (Yoder, 2004). First, PDD 56 is not embraced by the current administration. Second, PDD 56 does not apply to combat operations. A 1998 RAND Report authored by Pirnie, *Civilians and Soldiers—Achieving Better Coordination*, proposed greater integration, and identification of stakeholders in contingency operations. In addition, “The Yoder three-tier model maximizes effectiveness and efficiency of theatre contingency contracting operations, and directly links operations to COCOM broad objectives through integrative planning and execution” (Yoder, 2004, p. 14). Each tier of the model performs unique functions and requires specific education, developed skill sets, and unique personnel and manpower characteristics. The principle elements of the Yoder Three Tier model are broken down below and summarized in Figure 11:

(1) Ordering Officer Model

The most basic and simplistic level is the “ordering officer” model. This is the most rudimentary level of contracting support, which includes functions such as placing orders against existing theater contracts. By nature, this requires little



interactive engagement with experienced personnel in the environment and is best suited for warranted junior officers and junior enlisted personnel.

(2) Leveraging Contracting Officer Model

The next higher level is the “leveraging contracting officer” model. This level includes the basic ordering functions of the ordering officer model, but includes leveraging the capacities and capabilities of the local and regional economies in the contingent theater. The practitioner in the leveraging model will be engaged in interfacing with local and regional businesses, creating business processes, and potentially coordinating with higher military, Non-governmental Organizations and Private Volunteer Organizations (NGO/PVO) and political organizations. Thus, only higher-level, more qualified and capable practitioners should perform in the leverage model. A shortfall of this model is that the CCO may or may not be integrated with the broader goals of national and theater objectives. In the worst case, some of the tactical execution may actually be counter to those higher-level goals.

(3) The Integrated Planner and Executor Model

The highest level is the “Integrated Planner and Executor” (IPE) model. This model takes the leveraging contracting officer function one giant step forward. In this model, well-educated and qualified CCOs are integrated into the operational-planning phases of contingencies—often before actual troop deployment; they then make the transition to operations. The hallmark of this model is that contingency contracting operations may be planned and subsequently executed to meet National Strategic and theater objectives. Additionally, the myriad NGOs and PVOs—which, in many cases, are essential to the overall efficiency, effectiveness, and success of operations—can be integrated into the planning and execution of contingency operations. While this integration requirement may seem obvious, the integrated planning and execution among warfighters, CCOs, and the NGOs and PVOs is not; such integration does not occur on a regular basis (Anderson & Flaherty, 2003).



Through this model, the IPE CCO can be utilized in a broader planning-and-execution role. The CCO, with higher-level certification, education and experience, should be integrated within the J-4 and J-5 logistics and planning/operations and exercise organization structure. Integration is essential to achieve desired synergies between the myriad organizations operating in contingency environments. Operational planners can also leverage integration of all theater players (military, NGOs/PVOs, and contractors) to achieve harmony between National Security Strategy (NSS), Combatant Commander (COCOM), and significant NGOs' and PVOs' objectives. This integrated planning, exercising, and execution may: help in eliminating competing (and often conflicting) demands of the participants, closely marry acquisition support with stated objectives, allow for the creation of robust contingency contract support plans, and integrate such plans into broader operational plans in support of theater operations. The higher-order IPE calls for the most highly educated and seasoned planners and operational/theater-level planners (Yoder, 2004).

The Yoder Three Tier Model can be implemented in a contingency theatre regardless of the military service being employed and is perfect for utilization within the USSOCOM concept of operations. The Yoder Three Tier Model will allow for better acquisition planning and coordination of tactical, operational, and theater objective support to the warfighter. The successful utilization of this conceptual model involves several functional areas; therefore, the broadest dissemination and integration of the model is recommended. A representation of the model is found in Figure 11 below.



YODER THREE TIER MODEL		
Model Tier Level & Model Title	Functions/Education/Rank	Highlights and Drawbacks
Ordering Officer—Tier One	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • basic ordering • some simplified acquisitions • training: DAU CON 234 • DAWIA Certified CON Level I or II • junior to mid-enlisted, junior officers, GS-7 to GS-9; 1102 series civilians 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • simple buys • little integration • no operational planning • no broad liaison functions
Leveraging Contracting Officer—Tier Two	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • leverages to local economy • reduces “pushed” material support • training/education: DAU CON 234, recommended higher education • DAWIA Certified CON Level II-III • senior enlisted, junior to mid-grade officers, GS-11+ 1102 series civilians 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • better local operational planning • some integration • more capability for the operational commander • no planned theater integration • no broad liaison functions • may perform to optimize local operations at the detriment to theater ops
Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE)—Tier Three	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • highest level of planning and integration—joint • linked/integrated with J-4/ J-5 • creates and executes OPLAN CCO strategy • provides direction to tier two and one • links operations strategically to theater objectives of COCOM • education: Master’s degree or higher and, JPME Phase I and II • DAWIA Certified CON Level III, and other DAWIA disciplines (LOG, ACQ, FIN, etc) • senior officers (O-6+), senior civilians, GS-13+, SES 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • performs operational and theater analysis, integrates results into OPLAN • links between COCOM and OPLAN to theater contracting operations • coordinates theater objectives with best approach to contracted support • can achieve broader national security goals through effective distribution of national assets • includes planning, communication, coordination, and exercising with NGO and PVO in theater

Figure 11. Yoder Three Tier Model
(Yoder, 2004, p. 17)

b. Stress Ethical and Cultural Considerations

Based on the data collected, USSOCOM is doing very well dealing with the increased number of contractors on the battlefield. The researcher recommends that this area be noted as a best practice for USSOCOM contracting operations and that it continue to be stressed in pre-deployment training and all leadership engagements.



c. Develop Aggressive Oversight Measures

Oversight of contracts is critical to the success of military operations (USA, 2007). This oversight not only involves contracting personnel, but other functional areas—most notably the end-user for the respective requirements. The researcher recommends USSOCOM develop an aggressive policy that builds commitment and accountability from both CCOs and the end-users in the field. A contract is only as good as the outcome it provides. If a CCO does everything right in developing the contract document and subsequent statement of work, yet the government provides insufficient oversight and coordination during the performance of the contract, the efforts in planning and development of the contract may be weakened. This policy should include the integration of current and future COR training and appointment procedures. The current practice of CORs as an additional duty presents a problem ensuring accountability of the CCOs delegated authority. CCOs and their leadership must engage with operational units to stress the importance of oversight and accountability. The researcher recommends that, in addition to building a robust training program for CORs, that CCOs actively and aggressively enforce the authorities (and lack of authorities) delegated to the CORs (or similarly titled oversight professional, SME, COTR, etc.). If CORs do not fulfill their duties, the researcher suggests there must be a process in place to hold them accountable or, if necessary, to replace them with another COR. This is likely to increase tension among CCOs and end-users; however, with adequate top cover from leadership, this practice will provide more effective oversight in time.

3. (Platform) Synergistic Approach

a. Capitalize on Cross-Functional Capabilities

This report outlined the various functional capabilities that make up joint support operations. There are many dynamic conditions that warrant coordination and execution across all functional areas. USSOCOM has an opportunity to capitalize on these capabilities. The researcher recommends that USSOCOM staff



develop a clear and agreed-upon definition for the roles and responsibilities of each of these functions. This may mean extracting definitions already delineated in existing regulations. By including these roles in a clear policy document, decision-makers will provide a backdrop to increased accountability and understanding in the future.

The researcher recommends the use of bulk funding requirements in certain AORs. Finance, engineering, and contracting personnel should be able to consolidate and leverage certain requirements that can be easily forecasted. This consolidation leads to decreased lead times of supplies and can reduce the procurement lead time needed to execute contract awards for such requirements. Bulk funding also minimizes the number of accounting line options and, in turn, minimizes errors or violations in the use of those various accounting lines.

This report detailed the number of cross-service authority and regulation concerns that a CCO must juggle in the expeditionary environment. Since changing exceptions, policies, and procedures are the norm, the researcher recommends a certain degree of standardization. USSOCOM has a vast array of policy letters, reach-back opportunities, and published self-help-type items to assist CCOs with navigating the cross-functional and cross-service world. The researcher recommends the development of a snapshot view of the major items that differ between military services and how those differences are enacted within USSOCOM operations. Where feasible, these items should be standardized and indoctrinated into USSOCOM published policy and training documents.

b. Build Synergy in Joint Operations

The researcher recommends that USSOCOM leadership set an operational mindset of utilizing all resources available to a CCO in his or her execution of contingency contracting requirements. Nowhere else is this synergy more important than in the construction requirement arena. A basic construction requirement touches almost every functional area on an installation or within an AOR. The



security forces need to be concerned with pass, identification, and security concerns of workers accessing the base. Military intelligence needs to be concerned with problems associated with the possible access to information while on the base, as well as any intelligence information they may be able to learn from the contracted workers. Finance leaders need to be concerned with the structure of payments for the job, be it incremental at progress points, cash pick-up, or electronic based payments. Engineering leaders need to be concerned with the layout, design, stability, and footprint of the supported infrastructure. Contracting leaders need to be concerned with the accountability and stewardship of taxpayers' money and with the socio-economic implications of a project. The base commander needs to be concerned with command and control of personnel within his AOR, including contract workers on the base. Medical personnel need to be aware of conditions of disease or injury associated with workers on the base and their responsibilities if construction workers off base are injured while associated with supported projects in the local area.

These functional areas are made up of joint service personnel with varying degrees of objectives, priorities, and command structures that have contract management concerns. By bringing the key personnel within these functional areas to the table and ensuring support to contract-related concerns, decision-makers can better prepare all personnel to not only handle unplanned events, but to provide for a more effective operation in which communication and integration of personnel is fluid. An example of this would be the close coordination of finance and contracting in paying activities. Finance may have certain requirements for contractors to get paid in cash—including face-to-face secure transactions or established bank accounts in a particular region. If contracting leadership is aware of these requirements, it can communicate them to the contractor and better prepare the contractor at the time of award to ensure establishment of the necessary accounts or to help facilitate a secure location for face-to-face payments.



B. Tactical-Construction Management Module (CM²)

The researcher recommends developing and distributing the CM² IAW the following chapter structure. A pilot version of this module, developed as part of this recommendation, can be found in the Construction Management Handbook, NPS-CM-10-010.

1. Operational Framework

- A. OVERVIEW
- B. CONTRACTING OFFICER RESPONSIBILITIES
- C. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
 - 1. USSOCOM PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY
 - 2. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING CELL
 - 3. COMMAND STRUCTURE
- D. CONTRACT REVIEW
 - 1. REVIEW POLICY
 - 2. THEATRE BUSINESS CLEARANCE
 - a. POLICY
 - b. CONTENTS FOR REVIEW PACKAGES
- E. FUNDING
 - 1. USSOCOM MILCON POLICY
 - 2. FISCAL CONTROLS
 - a. PURPOSE
 - b. TIME
 - c. AMOUNT
 - 3. FUNDING SOURCES
 - 4. ECONOMY ACT
 - a. CONTRACT OFF-LOADING
 - b. DETERMINATION AND FINDINGS
 - c. CONTRACTING SUPPORT
 - 5. MILITARY INTERDEPARTMENTAL PR
 - a. ACCEPTANCE
 - b. CCO ROLE
 - 6. BULK FUNDING
 - 7. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE FUNDS



- a. EMERGENCY & EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSE
- b. OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION FUNDS
- c. CINC INITIATIVE FUNDS
- d. HUMANITARIAN CIVIC ASSISTANCE
- 8. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
 - a. DAMAGED OR DESTROYED FACILITIES
 - b. CONTINGENCY AUTHORITY
 - (1) Declaration of War or national emergency
 - (2) Emergency construction
 - (3) Contingency construction
- 9. CERP
 - a. PURPOSE
 - b. USES
 - c. LIMITATIONS
 - g. GUIDELINES
 - e. KEY TAKE-AWAYS
- F. DELEGATED CONTRACTING AUTHORITY
 - 1. CONTRACTING OFFICER REPRESENTATIVES (COR)
 - 2. CONTRACTING OFFICER'S TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE
 - a. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY (COR & COTR)
 - b. LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITY (COR & COTR)
 - c. APPOINTMENT AND TRAINING
 - 3. FIELD ORDERING OFFICE (FOO)
 - a. GOVERING REGULATION
 - b. PURPOSE
 - c. POLICY
 - d. GUIDELINES
 - e. KEY TAKE-AWAYS
 - 4. PROVISIONAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (PRT)
 - a. PURPOSE
 - b. POLICY
 - 5. PROJECT PURCHASING OFFICER (PPO)
 - a. PURPOSE
 - b. POLICY



2. Strategic Alignment

- A. SYNERGISTIC APPROACH
 - 1. JOINT ACQUISITION REVIEW BOARD (JARB)
 - 2. ENGINEERING
 - a. JOINT FACILITY UTILIZATION BOARD (JFUB)
 - b. FACILITIES ENGINEERING TEAM (FET)
 - c. JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY ENGINEERING BOARD
- B. INTRA-AGENCY COORDINATION
- C. OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP

3. Pre-Award

- A. ACQUISITION PLANNING
- B. ESTABLISHING ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
- C. REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION
- D. OVERSIGHT PROGRAM
- E. SOLICIATION DOCUMENTS
- F. KEY CONSTRUCTION CLAUSES
- G. DRAWINGS
- H. EVALUATION PROCEDURES

4. Award

- A. SOURCE SELECTION
- B. DOCUMENTATION
 - 1. TECHNICAL EVALUATIONS
 - 2. ABSTRACT
 - 3. PRICE REASONABLENESS
 - 4. DETERMINATION AND FINDING
 - 5. PROFESS SCHEDULE
 - 6. NOTICE TO PROCEED
- C. DISTRIBUTION

5. Post-Award

- A. SAFETY
- B. SITE VISITS
- C. REMEDIES FOR CHANGES



1. CHANGES CLAUSE
2. DIFFERING SITE CONDITIONS
3. CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE
4. FIELD CHANGE
- D. PROGRESS MONITORING
 1. TYPES OF DELAYS
 2. DOCUMENTATION
- E. INVOICES
 1. PAYMENTS UNDER FIXED PRICE CONSTRUCTION
 2. REASONS FOR WITHHOLDING
- F. TERMINATIONS
- G. FINAL ACTIONS
- H. CONCLUSION

C. Summary

This chapter outlined the recommendations as a result of this research. These ten recommendations provide strategic implications with the people, processes, and platforms of USSOCOM Contracting. The specific strategic recommendations include the following: (People) adapt to the changing workforce, establish mandatory training requirements, and revisit lessons learned; (Processes) better integrate contracting into the planning process using the Yoder Three Tier model, stress ethical and cultural considerations, and develop aggressive oversight measures; (Platforms) capitalize on cross-functional capabilities and build synergy in joint operations. By implementing these recommendations, decision-makers will provide for more effective CCO operations while supporting the objectives of commander in the field. The researcher's tactical recommendation is simply to implement and evaluate the CM² within the USSOCOM AOR. This recommendation will increase CCO effectiveness and provide a useful tool for CCOs across all levels of experience. Chapter VII will conclude this research report by addressing the research questions, stating the limitations to study, and identifying areas of future research.



VII. Conclusion

A. Summary

Through the NPS Acquisition Research Program, USSOCOM leadership expressed a need for a management module enabling its CCOs to better execute construction requirements in a contingency theatre of operations. In order to appropriately craft such a module, the researcher analyzed the existing operational environment to determine the appropriate content and focus areas to include in the module. This report began by introducing the background of contingency contracting and how it relates to USSOCOM. As a leader in front-line asymmetric threat operations, USSOCOM has increased its presence around the world in support of the GWOT. Its mission demands flexibility and adaptability at the highest extent allowable under the law. CCOs supporting this mission are often looked upon as logistics facilitators, business advisors, resource managers, and general tactical experts in achieving contractual requirements and arrangements supporting the USSOCOM mission. As key enablers of this mission, CCOs are often asked to fulfill construction contract requirements in austere locations with little or no training in construction terminology and concepts. This lack of expertise poses a problem for the command. In addition, construction requirements often are dynamic and complex and demand integration between engineering, legal, finance, contracting and operations units.

CCOs supporting USSOCOM missions are often in austere conditions, with little or no contact with the larger regional or theatre-wide contracting centers. They are also under OPCON of other agencies and commands within the AOR. This situation presents a unique dynamic in which a CCO must use specific regulations and contract warrant authority of one command, while supporting the operational objectives of a particular geographical combatant commander on the ground. A cross-functional and joint-force environment further compounds this problem because different military services and functional areas are accustomed to their own



regulations, procedures, doctrines, and objectives. The interaction of these various forces can be combined to create an effect greater than the sum of their individual effects. In other words, cooperative interaction among the individual cross-functional and joint-force members can create enhanced effectiveness greater than the sum of their individual effectiveness. This process is commonly known as synergy. A more synergistic approach to how CCOs manage requirements is needed to effectively integrate the capabilities of both the joint-force environment and cross-functional areas of the acquisition team (such as finance, engineering, legal, logistics, and the operational unit requesting contractual support). Creating this synergy is not easy; CCOs need a structured management process to bridge the gaps between their respective military services' training doctrine and their individual skills, as well as the expectations of commanders on the ground.

1. The Gaps in “People”

This research suggests that there are systemic problems with the training personnel assigned to execute construction requirements. These personnel include both the acquisition workforce and operational units tasked with developing and overseeing their requirements. The researcher discovered during this research that most USSOCOM CCOs have little to no construction experience and yet find themselves as the lead CCO for construction requirements. In addition, the contingency environment presents numerous conflicting regulations and policies for which a uniform standard for USSOCOM does not exist. This lack of uniformity exists in both contracting policies and construction standards.

USSOCOM staff inspections suggested that CCOs' biggest shortfalls in following contract standards involve: lack of the appropriate clauses in construction contracts, inadequate training of oversight personnel, and a lack of awareness of funding restrictions and review thresholds for construction projects. Questionnaire respondents and interviewed informants further identified other shortfall areas, including: failure to reference current regulations, lack of templates for assisting in design and development of SOWs and IGEs, absence of checklists for phases of



construction contracting, and a lack of understanding of basic construction terminology used by end-users and contractors. Finally, contingency contracting lessons learned are compiled at various levels of command. These lessons learned often reflect recurring problems throughout the same locations over time. This research suggests a failure to adequately integrate these lessons learned in current training programs.

2. The Gaps in “Processes”

This research suggests that the way in which contract management policy is handled throughout the contingency environment is inadequate for achieving optimum effectiveness. To begin with, contracting has been historically left out of the planning process in terms of acquisition and operational planning. This inadequacy has lead CCOs to a reactive approach to executing contract management policies and processes.

The failure to integrate contracting was magnified when the DoD increasingly relied on contractors to support battlefield objectives. Over the last ten years, this reliance has increased in expenditure, scope, and magnitude. CCOs are often not physically at the location where a contract is performed. This leads to increased numbers of CORs to oversee the work and coordinate with contractors. The documented failures in oversight discovered by the researcher ranged from a lack of adequate appointment documentation and of oversight personnel training to the government’s inability to provided oversight personnel. This research suggests that oversight control is complex in a contingency theatre; yet, mission success or failure is often dependent on effective oversight of contracts. With conflicting guidance and policy in the area of oversight, CCOs and their delegated representatives often behave in an ad-hoc fashion in terms of how they develop and execute the contract oversight process.



3.. The Gaps in “Platform”

This research suggests that the lack of a synergistic approach to joint operations has hindered CCOs' ability to effectively perform in a contingency environment. Personnel tasked with the role of a CCO for USSOCOM come from all military services. Each military service has particular guidance and regulation concerning contingency contracting operations. This cross-service diversity can be leveraged for best practices; however, current regulations are convoluted and difficult to follow for USSOCOM CCOs. CCOs also operate in an environment that demands support, coordination, and expertise of cross-functional capabilities such as finance and engineering. One critical area that exhibits this split-in-command structure is in the funding authority afforded to USSOCOM CCOs. USSOCOM uses a special appropriation funding known as MFP-11. This authority is given through Title 10 *USC*, Section 167, and is similar to the authority given to military services. The authority is allowed only when CCOs are procuring items/services (including construction) for SOF units. Other functional units operating near the CCOs have been found trying to misuse this funding authority by trying to get the CCOs to procure items/services for units other than SOF.

This research has shown that gaps exist in CCOs' understanding of both financial and engineering elements such as: funding restrictions and requirement review boards. Research has also shown that current contingency operations display failures in interoperability. These failures suggest splintered responsibilities between agencies and a lack of effective interaction between multiple stakeholders. These failures leave CCOs confused and frustrated.

B. Limitations/Validity of Study

1. Access to Data

The biggest challenge to research associated with this project was communicating effectively with the appropriate personnel to gain the most insight and experience into current USSOCOM operations. All USSOCOM personnel were



extremely accommodating. However, due to mission constraints and operations tempo, it was often hard for the researcher to track down to right person for the right data. Specifically, it was difficult for the researcher to track down SOF end-users and the CENTCOM theater Chief of Contracting for interviews. However, the study was augmented by USSOCOM leadership's aggressive support through access to personnel and documentation. Another concern of the research was avoiding classified discussion that did not relate to the objectives of the report. In order to access information relating to USSOCOM deployments, there is a certain degree of risk in discussing and disclosing classified information. The researcher's security clearance information had to be transferred between NPS and USSOCOM security personnel prior to any access to information. This was a relatively smooth process that paid dividends during travel for on-site interviews.

2. Limitations in Recording Interviews

The security procedures and lack of computer access in SOCOM facilities posed a minor challenge during the on-site interviews due to the policy of no removable electronic data storage devices (flash drives), no digital records, and no e-mail access. This challenge was mitigated by written documentation of interviews and follow-up e-mail/phone communication prior to inclusion of data within the report.

3. Qualitative Methods is Inherently Interpretive

The information obtained within this research was used to suggest behavior of outcomes as a result of literature review or informant testimony. Much of this information is subjective in nature and cannot be tied to an objective qualitative interpretation measure.

4. Inability to Test the Effectiveness of Recommendations

Although the ADDIE method includes an evaluation phase, a true evaluation of the recommendations as provided in this research is not possible at



this time. Future research could go back and evaluate the strategic and tactical recommendations, to include the CM².

C. Recommendations for Future Research

1. Test the Effectiveness of the Recommended CM².

Time constraints do not allow the researcher to follow a subsequent USSOCOM implementation plan for the CM². Thus, the researcher did not have time to adequately test the effectiveness of the fielded module. Future researchers could continue to execute the ADDIE model by analyzing the implementation of the module and evaluating its effectiveness once fielded to CCOs. Future researchers could also explore evaluation methods in the *Four Levels of Evaluation*, by Donald Kirkpatrick (Kirkpatrick, 1994). The method referred to in this book is more of a standalone evaluation protocol in which the researcher would test the reaction, learning, transfer of knowledge, and results of training in terms of return on investment (time or money).

2. Should a DoD-Wide Joint Regulation Established For Contingency Contracting Operation?

This research suggests that DoD contingency contracting operations are conducted around the world. Currently, each military service has different regulations and policies. Many subordinate commands within those services have additional or adjusted regulations and policies that differ with the region, command, or assignment in which the CCO operates. There are increasing joint regulations that deal with contingency operations of all forces, as well as informal guidance in the *Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook* developed by AFLMA (2008). Future research could analyze the feasibility of developing a DoD-wide joint regulation specifically for contingency contracting.



3. Are There Systemic Ethical Failures in CCO Behavior?

The researcher did not find (nor this study discuss) any potential significant cases of fraud or failure of CCOs to display ethical behavior in the contingency environment. In the past, there have been documented cases of such behavior, predominately among Army CCOs (USA, 2007). Future research could examine the change in culture and behavior among Army CCOs since published accounts such as the Gansler Report.

4. Should a USSOCOM Contingency Contracting Battalion be Established?

Through discussions with USSOCOM policy and staff officers, the researcher learned there has been informal debate over whether or not a Contingency Contracting Battalion should be established at USSOSOM to focus more attention on contingency contracting operations within its AOR. The establishment of a new Contingency Contracting Battalion could potentially result in changes to the JMD and to the tasking of CCO deployments for USSOCOM operations. Future research could explore the feasibility and effect of establishing such a battalion.

5. Should more USSOCOM Pre-deployment CCO Training be Conducted?

This report found serious and systematic shortfalls in training through the acquisition and contracting field. The researcher asked USSOCOM personnel during interviews and subsequent questionnaires if additional pre-deployment CCO training should be conducted at USSOCOM Headquarters. Currently, CCOs spend one day onsite with SOAL-KCC personnel reviewing the policies and background information associated with their deployment. The feedback was split on the benefit of extending this training to one week. Additional research could be conducted to determine the feasibility of such training, what exactly it should entail, and how it should be executed.



6. Should Current USSOCOM Procurement Authority be Re-evaluated?

The USSOCOM commander has unique procurement authorities and responsibilities over that of COCOMs. Similar to the authorities granted to each military service, Title 10 *USC*, Section 167 grants the USSOCOM commander the responsibility and authority to develop and acquire special operations-peculiar equipment, the authority to exercise the functions of the head of agency, and the authority to execute funds. USSOCOM uses special appropriation funding known as Major Force Program-11 (MFP-11) to support the development, acquisition, and sustainment activities for USSOCOM. This authority is delegated down to the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive (SOAE), Mr. James W. Cluck, as the Senior Procurement Executive for the command. He leads the Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics Center (SOAL) in executing USSOCOM funding authority (Cluck, 2009). Since actual OPCON over CCOs is provided by the commands in which they operate, there is debate that the procurement authority should fall within the responsibility and accountability of those commands. Further research could be accomplished to evaluate options associated with maintaining CONUS acquisition procurement authority versus delegating CCO procurement authority to the theatre.



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Appendix 1. CCO Questionnaire

PURPOSE: This questionnaire was developed for Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) who have (or are currently) deployed under a United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) billet with experience dealing with infrastructure requirements (all construction requirements and those services in direct support of infrastructure activities such as gravel deliveries/concrete batch plant operations, etc.). The purpose is to explore challenges associated with a CCO's ability to support infrastructure requirements in expeditionary environments. This information is being gathered in conjunction with other research concerning the development of an infrastructure handbook for USSOCOM CCOs. Your input is critical to crafting an effective, viable product. All responses will remain confidential between the informant and the researcher.

INSTRUCTIONS: Please review the information below and answer each question by bolding (electronically) and/or providing feedback as appropriate. Answer questions ONLY from the perspective of your experience deployed under USSOCOM. Only UNCLASSIFIED information should be included in your responses. This questionnaire will be conducted without any form of retribution at any level of command. Please feel free to comment at the conclusion of the questionnaire on any additional related themes not covered herein. This questionnaire will include a follow-up interview/conversation (approx. 30 minutes) with the researcher to discuss evolving themes and to clarify or elaborate on ideas presented.

RETURN COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE TO CMHEARL@NPS.EDU

NO LATER THAN 15 JUL 09.



2. Rate the effectiveness of (all combined) previous CCO training (CON 234, Unit Level, Pre-deployment, etc).

1 2 3 4 5 [1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness]

3. Does your unit have recurring CCO training at your home station? If so, how often?

YES NO

WEEKLY MONTHLY ANNUALLY OTHER _____

4. Did your recurring CCO training address infrastructure issues in a deployed environment (construction, services, quality assurance, oversight, joint challenges, real property/engineering topics, etc.)?

YES NO N/A

5. Did you receive CCO training within 90 days prior to departure on your last deployment?

YES NO

If so, was it helpful? _____ Please explain why/why not below:

6. Would you find a one-week, comprehensive CCO training with all other CCOs deploying into your theatre useful immediately prior to arrival into the AOR on your next deployment?

YES NO

If so, what areas do you feel need to be addressed?

7. Would you find a training handbook useful to prepare for and/or execute future deployments?

YES NO

8. When supporting infrastructure requirements, what capabilities do you think CCOs need improvement on in order to better support their customers and the overall mission? In other words, what do you think CCOs need to be able to do better? For each improvement, please explain why you think it is important.



9. Do you think a comprehensive handbook focused on infrastructure support would effectively mitigate these shortfalls in capability?

YES NO

If so, what items do you feel it should entail? (Specifically)

10. What templates would be beneficial for such a training handbook? (For instance, specific SOW/SOOs, drawings, source-selection plans, termination documents, evaluation criteria framework, technical evaluation checklist, etc.)

INTEGRATION:

11. Rate the effectiveness of acquisition planning prior to your receipt of funded construction requirements from your customer. In other words, have/does your customer typically work with you to conduct adequate acquisition planning prior to the funded requirement being presented to you? Is there coordination that takes place between the engineers or applicable end-user and the CCO to facilitate an effective solicitation/award?

Acquisition planning: Defined as the generation of a viable requirement description, market research, pro-active vs. re-active planning, writing an adequate statement of objectives/statement of work, development of performance measurements, adequately allocated and trained quality assurance evaluators/construction inspectors, discussing the need for and development of a quality assurance plan, etc.

1 2 3 4 5 [1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness]

Please discuss or comment on any success stories/lessons learned, do not include names of those involved. However, use of positions/organizations/rank is acceptable. For each lesson learned, please identify the root cause(s).

12. Rate the level of post-award oversight of contract requirements by your customer.

Oversight = Coordination with subject-matter experts, timely inspection and acceptance of work IAW contract schedule, compliance of government (end-user) responsibilities, communication with CCO after award, pro-active monitoring of expiration dates, timely submittal of new SOW for follow-on contracts, etc.



1 2 3 4 5 [1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness]

Please discuss or comment on any success stories/lessons learned, please do not include names of those involved, use of positions/organizations/rank is acceptable. For each lesson learned, please identify the root cause(s).

Please feel free to provide any additional comments that you feel would be helpful to better position our CCO workforce to enable the warfighter through effective execution of infrastructure requirements. Continue on next page if applicable.

**FOR QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS: CONTACT CHRIS M. HEARL, CAPT, USAF AT
CMHEARL@NPS.EDU**

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND SUPPORT IN THIS EFFORT



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Appendix 2. Staff Questionnaire

PURPOSE: *This questionnaire was developed for **Contracting Policy and Staff Officers who have exposure to or support from Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO) deployments under United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) billets with experience dealing with infrastructure acquisition requirements (all construction and those services in direct support of infrastructure activities such as gravel deliveries/concrete batch plant operations, etc.). The purpose is to explore challenges associated with a CCO's ability to support infrastructure requirements in expeditionary environments. This information is being gathered in conjunction with other research concerning the development of an infrastructure handbook for USSOCOM CCOs. Your input is critical to crafting an effective, viable product. All responses will remain confidential between the informant and the researcher.***

INSTRUCTIONS: *Please review the information below and answer each question by bolding (electronically) and/or providing feedback as appropriate. Answer questions ONLY from the perspective of your experience under USSOCOM. Only UNCLASSIFIED information should be included in your responses. This questionnaire will be conducted without any form of retribution at any level of command. Please feel free to comment at the conclusion of the questionnaire on any additional related themes not covered herein. This questionnaire will include a follow-up interview/conversation (approx. 30 minutes) with the researcher to discuss evolving themes and to clarify or elaborate on ideas presented.*

RETURN COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE TO CMHEARL@NPS.EDU

NO LATER THAN 15 JUL 09.



CAPABILITIES:

1. What are all of the required capabilities for executing infrastructure requirements for a CCO on a USSOCOM deployment?
2. When supporting infrastructure requirements, what capabilities do you think CCOs need to improve in order to better support their customers and the overall mission? For each improvement, what evidence suggests an improvement is necessary?
3. Do you feel a comprehensive training handbook focused on infrastructure support would effectively mitigate these shortfalls in capability?

YES NO If so, what items do you feel it should entail? (Please be specific.)

4. What templates would be beneficial for such a training handbook (specific SOWs, drawings, checklists, etc.)?

TRAINING:

5. Are you aware of any infrastructure-centric training initiatives for CCOs deploying to a USSOCOM billet?

YES NO If not, what initiatives do you feel would benefit CCOs dealing with infrastructure requirements?

6. How would you rate the effectiveness of (all combined) CCO training (CON 234, Unit Level, Pre-deployment, etc)?

1 2 3 4 5 [1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness]

7. Do you feel CCO training within 90 days prior to departure for a deployment would benefit CCOs?



YES NO

If so, what topics need to be addressed? Why do you believe such training would be helpful?

8. Do you feel a one-week, comprehensive CCO training immediately prior to departure into their respective AOR would benefit USSOCOM CCOs?

YES NO

If so, what areas do you feel need to be addressed? Why do you believe such training would be helpful?

INTEGRATION:

9. Please discuss any policy/staff initiatives to integrate pre-deployment coordination between CCOs and their deployed end-users; this includes memorandums of agreement with other units/agencies, tasking coordination, cross-functional training, etc.
10. Please discuss any leadership initiatives to provide top cover, logistical support, and contracting reach-back opportunities for CCOs deploying in support of SOF objectives.

Please feel free to provide any additional comments you feel would be helpful to better position our CCO workforce to enable the warfighter through effective execution of infrastructure requirements. Continue on next page if applicable.

**FOR QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS: CONTACT CHRIS M. HEARL, CAPT, USAF AT
CMHEARL@NPS.EDU**

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND EFFORT



Appendix 3. Customer Questionnaire

PURPOSE: *This questionnaire was developed for **Customers and End-users of Contracting support from Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO) deployments under United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) billets with experience dealing with infrastructure acquisition requirements (all construction and those services in direct support of infrastructure activities such as gravel deliveries/concrete batch plant operations, etc.).** The purpose is to explore challenges associated with a CCO's ability to support infrastructure requirements in expeditionary environments. This information is being gathered in conjunction with other research concerning the development of an infrastructure handbook for USSOCOM CCOs. Your input is critical to crafting an effective, viable product. All responses will remain confidential between the informant and the researcher.*

INSTRUCTIONS: *Please review the information below and answer each question by bolding (electronically) and/or providing feedback as appropriate. Answer questions ONLY from the perspective of your experience deployed under USSOCOM. Only UNCLASSIFIED information should be included in your responses. This questionnaire will be conducted without any form of retribution at any level of command. Please feel free to comment at the conclusion of the questionnaire on any additional related themes not covered herein. This questionnaire will include a follow-up interview/conversation (approx. 30 minutes) with the researcher to discuss evolving themes and to clarify or elaborate on ideas presented.*

RETURN COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE TO CMHEARL@NPS.EDU

NO LATER THAN 15 JUL 09.



CAPABILITIES:

1. Please rate the effectiveness of support you received from CCOs for your infrastructure requirements.

1 2 3 4 5 [1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness]

2. Do you feel CCOs supporting you on your SOCOM deployment(s) were competent?

YES NO If not, what evidence suggested the CCO was less than competent?

3. Have/do you receive sufficient timely contracting support from CCOs?

YES NO If not, what were the circumstances surrounding this lack of support?

4. During your SOCOM deployment(s), did you get consistent support no matter which CCO you worked with, or did you detect significant differences between individual CCOs? Please explain:

YES NO Either way, please explain:

5. Did you get the impression that CCOs were making up the rules as they went along?

YES NO

6. What capabilities (areas of knowledge and/or abilities to execute) do you need from a CCO in terms of infrastructure requirements?



7. In your experience, what areas have CCOs consistently done well to support your requirements?

8. Please explain how CCOs have failed to meet your needs. Vivid experiences will be very helpful.

INTEGRATION:

9. While deployed, has/does your unit leadership have frequent communication with Contracting leadership? (Includes informal coordination and formal established meetings)

YES NO DON'T KNOW

IF SO, HOW OFTEN? WEEKLY MONTHLY ANNUALLY
OTHER _____

10. Do you feel CCOs typically understand your mission?

YES NO

11. Has/does your deployed unit ever coordinate with the Contracting Office to bring CCOs to the applicable training courses or otherwise integrate Contracting personnel into cross-functional teams to better integrate them into your immediate mission needs?

YES NO DON'T KNOW

12. Does your home station unit ever coordinate with the local Contracting Office to bring CCOs to the applicable training courses or otherwise integrate Contracting personnel into cross-functional teams at home stations?

YES NO DON'T KNOW

13. What opportunities related to the above do you see CCOs benefiting from that your office could facilitate?



14. Rate the effectiveness of acquisition planning prior to your submittal of a funded requirements to Contracting.

In other words, do you typically work with Contracting to conduct adequate acquisition planning prior to submitting the paperwork for your requirement? Is there pro-active coordination that takes place between you and the CCO to facilitate an effective solicitation/award?

Acquisition planning: Defined as the generation of a viable requirement description, market research, pro-active vs. re-active planning, writing an adequate statement of objectives/statement of work, development of performance measurements, adequately allocated and trained quality assurance evaluators/construction inspectors, discussing the need for and development of a quality assurance plan, etc.

1 2 3 4 5 [1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness]

Please discuss or comment on any success stories/lessons learned. Please do not include names of those involved, though the use of positions/organizations/rank is acceptable. For each lesson learned, please identify the root cause(s).

15. Rate the level of post-award (after contract has been signed and contractor begins work) oversight of contract requirements by you/your office.

Oversight = Coordination with subject-matter experts, timely inspection and acceptance of work IAW contract schedule, compliance of government (end-user) responsibilities, communication with CCO after award, pro-active monitoring of expiration dates, timely submittal of new SOW for follow-on contracts, etc.

1 2 3 4 5 [1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness]

Please discuss or comment on any success stories/lessons learned. Please do not include names of those involved, though the use of positions/organizations/rank is acceptable. For each lesson learned, please identify the root cause(s).



16. Do you feel Contracting and your (deployed) organization have capitalized on opportunities to work together to better support your operational needs?

YES NO Either way, please explain:

17. Do you feel Contracting and your (deployed) organization have capitalized on opportunities to work together to better put in place effective contractor support that facilitates successful performance of the requirement(s)?

YES NO Either way, please explain:

Please feel free to provide any additional comments that you feel would be helpful to better position our CCO workforce to enable the warfighter through effective execution of infrastructure requirements. Continue on next page, if applicable.

FOR QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS: CONTACT CHRIS M. HEARL, CAPT, USAF AT
CMHEARL@NPS.EDU

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND SUPPORT IN THIS EFFORT



Appendix 4. Support Letter from Soal-K



UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

7701 TAMPA POINT BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5323


SOAL-K

1 June 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR Captain Christopher M. Hearl, USAF, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

SUBJECT: Support for Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Research, Contingency Construction Operations

1. USSOCOM's Directorate of Procurement (DoP) provides contracting and acquisition support for acquiring Special Operations Forces (SOF) peculiar weapon systems, equipment, and services in direct support of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). To meet this challenge, the DoP utilizes the most innovative, streamlined, and expedited acquisition practices available, while maintaining strict compliance with required statutes and regulations.
2. As you know, to more effectively execute this mission, the DoP requested support from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School to assist us in researching policies, procedures, and techniques concerning construction requirements in our contingency contracting operations. NPS selected you to assist us in researching construction requirements. To support your research, I request you contact applicable USSOCOM, SOCCENT, and other personnel. If you need assistance in gaining timely responses, please inform LTC Smallwood or Mr. Chris Rollins.
3. Questions or comments regarding this matter should be directed to SOAL-KA Division Chief, LTC Phil Smallwood at DSN 299-6552 or phillip.smallwood@socom.mil.


JOHN E. CANNADAY
Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Director of Procurement



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- Managing the Services Supply Chain
- MOSA Contracting Implications
- Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO
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- Spiral Development
- Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research
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- Contracting Government Procurement Functions
- Contractors in 21st-century Combat Zone
- Joint Contingency Contracting
- Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting, Planning and Execution
- Navy Contract Writing Guide
- Past Performance in Source Selection
- Strategic Contingency Contracting
- Transforming DoD Contract Closeout
- USAF Energy Savings Performance Contracts
- USAF IT Commodity Council
- USMC Contingency Contracting



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- PPPs and Government Financing
- ROI of Information Warfare Systems
- Special Termination Liability in MDAPs
- Strategic Sourcing
- Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to Improve Cost Estimates

Human Resources

- Indefinite Reenlistment
- Individual Augmentation
- Learning Management Systems
- Moral Conduct Waivers and First-tem Attrition
- Retention
- The Navy's Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Management System
- Tuition Assistance

Logistics Management

- Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance
- Army LOG MOD
- ASDS Product Support Analysis
- Cold-chain Logistics
- Contractors Supporting Military Operations
- Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation
- Evolutionary Acquisition
- Lean Six Sigma to Reduce Costs and Improve Readiness



- Naval Aviation Maintenance and Process Improvement (2)
- Optimizing CIWS Lifecycle Support (LCS)
- Outsourcing the Pearl Harbor MK-48 Intermediate Maintenance Activity
- Pallet Management System
- PBL (4)
- Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI
- RFID (6)
- Risk Analysis for Performance-based Logistics
- R-TOC AEGIS Microwave Power Tubes
- Sense-and-Respond Logistics Network
- Strategic Sourcing

Program Management

- Building Collaborative Capacity
- Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module Acquisition
- Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence
- Contractor vs. Organic Support
- Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs
- KVA Applied to AEGIS and SSDS
- Managing the Service Supply Chain
- Measuring Uncertainty in Earned Value
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