



ACQUISITION RESEARCH PROGRAM SPONSORED REPORT SERIES

Marine Corps Officer Talent Management for the 21st Century

December 2018

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ABSTRACT

Marine Corps unrestricted officers are required to follow a pre-determined career roadmap that makes them more competitive for promotion and O-5 level command. The purpose of this thesis project was to research the post-entry level education system for unrestricted officers. The project aimed at determining if a more focused career path is both attainable and beneficial to the Marine Corps and what would this model look like. The research utilized unrestricted ground supply officers as the test subjects. The sample population was composed of officers O-2 through O-6. Additionally, this thesis project undertook a multi-step approach with specific emphasis on the following data to obtain a decision point: current educational career progression system, survey analysis and promotion data for colonels with ground supply officer background. This thesis project's survey identified that 62% of the ground supply officer would choose to become a domain expert rather than following the current command career path, while the same sample indicated highly in a Likert scale the need for post-entry level education. The result indicated that some communities in the Marine Corps already follow a domain expert career path similar to the one proposed. This thesis project recommended that each occupational community in the Marine Corps look at the proposed career path model and shape it to fit the needs for domain expertise.



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Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy position of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the federal government.



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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AO	Approving Official
AMOS	Additional MOS
BAH	Basic Allowance for Housing
CCLEB	Commandant's Career Level Education Board
CNA	Center for Naval Analyses
CORT	Contracting Officer Representative Tool
CPIB	Commandant's Professional Education Intermediate Board
CPIM	Certified in Production and Inventory Management
CPSM	Certified Professional in Supply Management
DASC	Department of the Army Systems Coordinator
DAU	Defense Acquisition University
DAWIA	Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
DL	Distance Learning
DoD	Department of Defense
DOPMA	Defense Officer Personnel Management Act
DTS	Defense Travel System
EDA	Electronic Document Access
eMIPR	Electronic Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request
EWS	Expeditionary Warfare School
FIAR	Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness
FM	Financial Management
FSMAO	Field Supply and Maintenance Analysis Office
FY	Fiscal Year
GCPC	Government Commercial Procurement Card
GCSS-MC	Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps
GSOC	Ground Supply Officer Course
HASC	House Armed Service Committee
HQMC	Headquarters Marine Corps
IEL	Introduction to Expeditionary Logistics
IMLOC	Intermediate MAGTF Logistics Operations Course



IRB	Individual Review Boards
I&L	Installations and Logistics
LCCC	Logistics Captain Career Course
MAGTF	Marine Air Ground Task Force
MARADMIN	Marine Corps Administration
MARSOF	Marine Corps Special Operations Force
MBA	Master in Business Administration
MCO	Marine Corps Order
MCTFS	Marine Corps Total Force System
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MOS	Military Occupational Specialties
MPA	Marine Corps Manpower Studies and Analysis Branch
MS	Master of Science
MSC	Major Subordinate Command
M&RA	Manpower and Reserve Affairs
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NLI	Navy Logistics Integration
OCCFLD	Occupational Field
OFA	Officer Personnel Act
OJT	On-the-Job Training
OM&S	Operating Materials and Supplies
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PIEE	Procurement Integrated Enterprise Environment
PME	Professional Military Education
PMOS	Primary Military Occupational Specialty
PR Builder	Purchase Request Builder
SABRS	Standard Accounting, Budgeting, and Reporting System
SMARTS	SABRS Management Analysis Retrieval System
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SODHC	Supply Officer Department Head Course
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure



SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats
T&R	Training and Readiness
ULO	Unliquidated Obligation
USAF	United States Air Force
USN	United States Navy
USMC	United States Marine Corps
WAWF	Wide Area Workflow



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

After the implementation of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) in 1980, Marine Corps unrestricted officers are required to follow a pre-determined career roadmap that makes them competitive for promotion and O-5 level command. However, the Marine Corps' command model creates inefficiencies in technical fields. The purpose of this thesis project was to research the efficiency of the command model in fields that require domain experts. The thesis project aimed at determining if a more focused career path is both attainable and beneficial to the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps' single talent management model inefficiently allocates tax dollars. A recently published Financial Performance Metrics and Indicator Report from Headquarters Marine Corps, Programs and Resource Department, identifies that over a five-year period, the Marine Corps accumulated \$631 million of losses in Unliquidated Obligations (Headquarters Marine Corps [HQMC], 2018). The research utilized unrestricted ground supply officers as the test subjects. The sample population was composed of 287 unrestricted ground supply officers O-2 through O-6. Out of the total population surveyed, 62% of ground supply officers chose to become domain experts rather than following the current command career path. The survey results indicate that there is a demand for a dual career model for unrestricted ground supply officers.

Despite the evolution of the military profession, the Marine Corps' talent management model remains fixed to the one-size-fits-all commander model. This model lacks the flexibility necessary to adequately manage the multitude of skills our officers bring to the fight. Our current and future operating environment requires domain expertise that extends past the current entry-level training and education offered in most military occupational specialties (MOSs). The lack of flexibility is detrimental because there is a competitive percentage of officers who are better equipped to focus on their technical primary military occupational specialty (PMOS) throughout their careers. These officers are eventually pushed out of their PMOS to gain experience in non-PMOS billets throughout the Marine Corps. During this time, the officers undergo skills atrophy from their valuable PMOS skills to focus on the new generalist jobs and the success of the



organization. The problem is exacerbated when they return to their PMOS only to face a steep learning curve to relearn the skills they have forgotten.

The Supply Officer and Financial Management communities perpetuate the skill atrophy problem by incurring additional losses to the Marine Corps in the form of unliquidated obligations (ULOs); the costly acquired skills these officers attain are not protected from the commander talent management model, which results in these losses. A ULO displays an amount of funding in our accounting system allocated to pay for supplies and services requested throughout a fiscal year (FY). Since 2013, the Marine Corps has not accurately closed out a fiscal year. We attribute the failure to properly manage funds on the lack of advanced-level education in the Supply and Financial Management Officer communities and on the skill atrophy suffered by these communities pursuing the commander career path. If the Marine Corps could reduce even 10% of ULOs by creating a domain expert career path that assigns certified officers to higher headquarter billets, the Marine Corps could ultimately recoup \$63 million or more out of the \$631 million. Instead of losing this funding, we can increase our lethality by reallocating it to the warfighter via unit training and improving equipment readiness.

Additional data obtained from HQMC also indicated that some communities in the Marine Corps already follow a domain expert career path similar to the one proposed. After removing these communities from the analysis, only 2.7% of Marine colonels were promoted to their current rank without holding a command billet as a lieutenant colonel. This low selection rate is a strong indicator that the command career path is the selection board's preferred path and that officers that took a more unconventional path are at a disadvantage regardless of what experience and education background they can offer. This thesis project recommended that each occupational community in the Marine Corps look at the proposed career path model and shape it to fit their need for domain expertise among the unrestricted officer's ranks.

The thesis project proposed domain expert talent management model consists of a three-tiered certification process that recognizes both education and experience as prerequisites for domain expert certification. Domain experts are Marines with exceptional knowledge in their PMOS and civilian sector best practices equivalent of professionals



Certified in Production and Inventory Management (CPIM) or Certified Professional in Supply Management (CPSM). Domain experts' goals are to improve efficiency within their units and to make recommendations for changes in current Marine Corps policies and regulations within their field. Upon attaining the domain expert additional military occupational specialty (AMOS), candidates will be required to complete a utilization tour in a PMOS-specific unit. Subsequent tours will also require PMOS-specific tours in more challenging billets where MOS-centric expertise is necessary.

In conclusion, the analysis conducted in this thesis project indicates that the Marine Corps has the potential to save millions of dollars by implementing domain experts in the officer ranks. We further conclude that domain expertise is already in existence. Therefore, we recommend that the Marine Corps endorse expertise as an acceptable career path to bring specialization to our talent management structure and create the efficiencies necessary to operate the organization effectively.

Reference

Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC). (2018). *Performance metrics & indicators report*. Retrieved from https://ehqmc.usmc.mil/org/pr/fiscalops/accounting/ar/Abnormal%20Transactions/Abnormal%20Condition%20Management/Abnormal%20Conditions%20KPI%20Reports/AB_EXEC_KPI_Current.pdf



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I. INTRODUCTION

The talent management system currently used in the United States Marine Corps (USMC) is designed for the sole purpose of creating lieutenant colonels who possess a broad array of experiences, generalizing their careers to better prepare them for command. The Marine Corps accomplishes this by assigning officers to a variety of “key billets” throughout an officer’s career. Although useful for aspiring commanders, the promotion system lacks the necessary flexibility to accommodate the proposed domain expert model in this research from the Marine Corps’ more technical Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) who can benefit from an alternative career path. Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) recently addressed this issue with the financial management community, an MOS whose promotions and retention were detrimentally affected by the Marine Corps’ one-size-fits-all career path. Although helpful for one community, it did not address the problem for all technical MOSs in our organization, where expertise should be valued over generalization. As we discuss in this thesis project, accommodation for officers who possess unique acquired skills where expertise should be valued overgeneralization is only one of many problem areas created by the USMC commander talent management model. For the purpose of our research, this thesis project focused only on unrestricted officers, since restricted officers are considered specialists and do not require a career path that promotes specialization.

The Marine Corps single talent management model inefficiently allocates tax dollars. The Marine Corps is allocating a disproportional sum of funding toward attaining specific skills in its technical officer MOSs to maintain a competitive edge over our military competitors. Despite this allocation of funds, USMC’s talent management system inadvertently dismisses the benefits achieved by officers who attain these unique skills. Instead, it places a higher emphasis on generalization and overlooks the cost to the organization in acquiring those unique skills. The problem is perpetuated when promotion boards fail to promote or retain an officer who did not have sufficient time while acquiring these unique skills to return to the operating forces to generalize by filling non-Primary Military Occupational Specialty (PMOS) “key billets.” This problem could be mitigated



through the implementation of this research recommended by domain experts and their talent management career path.

A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

The objective of this research is to determine whether the Marine Corps can benefit from creating an alternate career path for domain experts. This career path advocates for PMOS expertise in communities where technical knowledge outweighs broader organizational exposure. Specifically, our research provides a detailed analysis of financial losses the Marine Corps is incurring, misallocation of Professional Military Education (PME) resources, supply officer survey results, Field Supply Maintenance Analysis Office (FSMAO) results, and a manpower data analysis. Furthermore, our research provides recommendations on how to implement domain experts within the officer ranks.

B. SCOPE

The foundation of our research stems from our Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) analysis of the current talent management model. For this thesis project, we conduct a detailed literature review encompassing Financial Performance Metrics Indicator information, Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) review, House Armed Service Committee and Department of the Army Systems Coordinator review of PME, survey results, and Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) manpower promotion data to expand on the main points from the SWOT analysis quadrants.

The SWOT analysis, shown in Figure 1, acts as a focal point to keep the research focused on recognizing the benefits of the current system, while simultaneously identifying the many areas where improvements may exist. It describes the Marine Corps' current talent management strengths and weaknesses, and it subsequently displays the external threats and opportunities the model may encounter. The strengths portion of the SWOT consists of beneficial components that exist in our current talent management model. Our research recognizes the simplicity of the one-size-fits-all model and how it facilitates the management of a multitude of careers in our large organization. The weaknesses portion of the analysis displays how the current model lacks the flexibility and talent recognition



necessary to capitalize on the unique skills our officers possess. The threats quadrant analyzes external threats based on the opportunities available to our officers in both the private sector and our sister services. Lastly, the external opportunities provide examples of how the Marine Corps can benefit by capitalizing on Congress' recent permission to divert from the 1980 "up and out" legislation known as DOPMA.




Figure 1. SWOT Analysis

C. METHODOLOGY

The research for this thesis project is quantitative, as most of our data were retrieved from a recent ground supply officer survey and from the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS) depository. The survey data obtained for this thesis project provided ample information on whether the supply officer community could benefit from an alternate career path. It subsequently provided information on the need for an advanced MOS school to better suit this technical community. The data attained from MCTFS provided information on the 647 active-duty colonels. We used the data to determine if domain experts already existed within our colonel ranks, which was true in 52 cases. The

information we attained refined our SWOT analysis, which assisted with the recommendations we provided on how to revolutionize our talent management processes.

D. PREVIEW OF THE RESULTS

The survey indicated that ground supply officers spend more time in supply billets as company grade officers than as field grade officers. The results of the survey also indicated that only a small percentage of ground supply officers are attending follow-on schools post their entry-level ground supply officer training. Ground supply officers showed interest in creating an advanced ground supply officer course via resident education or distant learning. The survey also indicated that 62% of ground supply officers would opt for a domain expert career path rather than continuing focusing their assignments to make them more competitive for O-5 command. Company grade officers favored the domain expert career path while field grade officers favored the current command career path.

E. CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter provided a brief overview of our thesis project topic and the multitude of methods utilized for research. In particular, it provided a summary of the current initiatives of M&RA to assist a specific community with detrimental retention and promotion issues caused by our sole commander talent management model. It then provided a glimpse of the financial losses endured by our commander model followed by the scope of our research comprised of a SWOT analysis and the literature review. We concluded with the quantitative research methodology where the survey and MCTFS data were introduced.



II. BACKGROUND

This chapter provides a history of how the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980 restructured officer promotions and the subsequent impact on the Marine Corps talent management model. The purpose of DOPMA is to “maintain a high-quality, numerically sufficient officer corps [that] provided career opportunity that would attract and retain the numbers of high-caliber officers needed, and provide reasonably consistent career opportunity among the services” (Rostker, Thie, Lacy, Kawata, & Purnell, 1993). After the passage of DOPMA, the Marine Corps adjusted its promotion and talent management models to adhere to the standards set by Congress.

A. STRUCTURE AND MISSION

The commander talent management platform was created after DOPMA and is still in use by the Marine Corps to promote officers to the rank of colonel, which is primarily based on successfully commanding as a lieutenant colonel. More specifically, this research shows that 92% of USMC colonels currently on active duty held a successful lieutenant colonel command. This one-size-fits-all model encourages every officer to fill key billets—which include executive officer, operations officer, or any managerial/leadership demanding position—to position their resumes for success before a Lieutenant Colonel Command Board. The structure currently in place fails to advocate for talents outside of commanding. This lack of flexibility results in a disproportionate amount of resources allocated to creating commanders. It further fails to capitalize on the resources allocated to attain technical skills when officer assignments value key billets over PMOS assignments.

B. CONGRESSIONAL REFORMS

Congressional control of the budget provides our civilian leadership with control over the military. This control is demonstrated through congressional law or budgetary law, one of the two practical methods for Congress to exercise control over the military. Since 1948, the military has experienced multiple interventions by Congress to reduce its officer strength. Unfortunately, these reforms were made effective during decades where technical skills were not as prevalent as tactical skills. As technological changes began occurring,



our system to regulate promotions left a group of officers behind in comparison to their tactical-centric peers.

1. Officer Personnel Act of 1947

At the completion of World War II, General Dwight Eisenhower became concerned about the 380,000 officers on active duty, notably, the number of senior officers who remained in the service for an overly extended period. This concern resulted in the Officer Personnel Act (OFA) of 1947, which imposed tight controls on permanent promotions. Unfortunately, the OFA did not regulate the number of temporary promotions, and new legislation was needed to correct this deficiency.

2. Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954

In 1953 and 1954, Congress passed the Officer Grade Limitation Act, which indicated the number of officers who could serve as majors and above through amendments in the yearly budget (Rostker et al., 1993). This temporary fix required a permanent resolution, and from 1960 to 1980, multiple unsuccessful attempts were made to restructure officer promotions (Rostker et al., 1993). Finally, in 1980, a compromise was reached between the Department of Defense (DoD), the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the House Armed Services Committee to pass the revolutionary “up or out” DOPMA law (Rostker et al., 1993).

3. Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980

The DOPMA was implemented in 1981 and immediately began shaping the officer ranks. One of the vital components of the DOPMA was the grade controls to limit the size of the military by setting promotions limits. As shown in Figure 2, promotion goals for all branches were not to exceed 96%, 80%, 70%, and 50% for captains, majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels respectively (Rostker et al., 1993). These limitations resolved the issue for combat-related military fields but fell short of providing the flexibility necessary for technical skills necessary to compete in today’s 21st century. Adding all MOSs to one pool made it more difficult for non-combat-centric officers to compete against their combat MOS peers with the DOPMA promotion restrictions.



Table 2.2
DOPMA Up-or-Out Promotion System for “Due-Course” Officer

Officer Pay Grade	Promotion Opportunity (percentage promoted from surviving cohort)	Promotion Timing (primary zone years of service)	Career Expectation	Career Pattern (cumulative probability to grade from original cohort less attrition)
O-2	100% if fully qualified	2.0	2X nonselect & separation	96%
O-3	95%	3.5/4	2X nonselect & separation or may be allowed to stay on active duty until retirement at 20 YOS	82%
O-4	80%	10±1	2X nonselect & separation or may be allowed to stay until 24 YOS; normal retirement at 20 YOS	66%
O-5	70%	16±1	30% of 2X nonselectees can be retired before normal (28 YOS) retirement	41%
O-6	50%	22±1	Normal retirement at 30 YOS, but 30% early retirement possible after 4 years in grade ^a	18%

^aBoth O-5 and O-6 could experience a more than 30 percent early retirement if considered more than once prior to reaching mandatory retirement.

Figure 2. DOPMA Up-or-Out. Source: Rostker et al. (1993).

4. National Defense Authorization Act of 2019

To correct some of the shortcomings the services have faced retaining officers with special skills, Congress has recently built new authorities in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2019 to modernize officer personnel talent management. In particular, officers with specialized skills will be given more opportunities for promotion than the two-and-out option afforded under DOPMA.

C. TALENT MANAGEMENT DEFICIENCIES

The Marine Corps currently selects 17% of lieutenant colonels to command annually,¹ as shown in Figure 3. The total population of eligible lieutenant colonels screened for command is further broken down into officers who fell into the following categories: primaries, alternates, non-selectees, and request by removal (RBR), as shown

¹ Marine Corps selects on average 15% of LtCol Ground Supply Officers for command. APPENDIX D offers the detail analysis of supply officers LtCol command selections for the past four years.



in Figure 4. RBR consisted of officers who requested to have their names removed from the command screening board (Manpower Management Officer Assignments, 2018). During our thesis analysis, we identified that the 17% of officers selected for command later become 92% of colonels on active duty. Although a competitive group, this single source of prior-command colonels fails to provide the Marine Corps with the vast array of talent necessary to continue sustaining peer-to-peer superiority. Also, it does not provide the flexibility necessary to promote officers who have acquired costly skills in comparison to their tactical peers. The lack of flexibility is detrimental because there is a competitive percentage of officers who are better equipped to focus on their technical PMOS throughout their careers. These officers are eventually pushed out of their PMOS to gain experience in non-PMOS billets throughout the Marine Corps. During this time, the officers undergo skill atrophy from their valuable PMOS skills to focus on the new generalist jobs and the success of the organization. The problem is exacerbated when they return to their PMOS only to face a steep learning curve to relearn the skills they have forgotten.




Figure 3. FY19 MMOA Roadshow Brief, Career Progression. Source: Manpower Management Officer Assignments (2018).




Figure 4. FY19 MMOA Roadshow Brief, Lieutenant Colonel Command Opportunity. Source: Manpower Management Officer Assignments (2018).

Despite the evolution of the military profession, the Marine Corps talent management model remains fixed to the one-size-fits-all commander model. This model lacks the flexibility necessary to adequately manage the multitude of skills our officers bring to the fight. Further exacerbating the problem, a disproportionately large amount of resources is allocated toward Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS) and Command and Staff College to support our commander-focused talent management system, while some MOSs, such as the Supply, still lack an officer advanced school. Our current and future operating environment requires domain expertise that extends past the current entry-level training and education offered in most MOSs.

The Supply Officer and Financial Management communities perpetuate the skill atrophy problem by incurring additional losses to the Marine Corps in the form of Unliquidated Obligations (ULOs); the costly acquired skills these officers attain are not protected from the commander talent management model, which results in these losses. A recently published Financial Performance Metrics and Indicator Report from HQMC, Programs and Resource Department, identifies that over a five-year period, the Marine Corps accumulated \$631 million of losses in ULOs in 1106 Operations and Maintenance

funding alone (Headquarters Marine Corps [HQMC], 2018). A ULO displays an amount of funding in our accounting system allocated to pay for supplies and services requested throughout a fiscal year (FY). Unfortunately, a portion of the supplies go unreceived and some services unrendered. Further intensifying the problem, our fiscal laws expire funds and result in ULOs becoming lost obligations at the end of a fiscal year. While scenarios exist where supplies and services are received, and a ULO was nothing more than an accounting error, the fact remains that, for the past five years, the Marine Corps has not accurately closed out a fiscal year. We attribute the failure to properly manage funds to the lack of advanced-level education in the Supply and Financial Management Officer communities and to the skill atrophy suffered by these communities pursuing the commander career path. If the Marine Corps could reduce even 10% of ULOs by creating a domain expert career path that assigns certified officers to higher headquarter billets, the Marine Corps could ultimately recoup \$63 million or more out of the \$631 million. Instead of losing this funding, we can increase our lethality by reallocating it to the warfighter via unit training and equipment readiness. Additionally, we can create an advanced MOS school for supply officers to receive education on how to manage the increasing financial audit regulations they are currently learning to comply with without any formal guidance.

D. CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter provides historical background information explaining how the Marine Corps adopted the current talent management model. Although useful in drawing down the forces and keeping an influx of young officers flowing upward through the ranks, DOPMA fell short of accommodating technical officers. The multitude of initiatives over the decades has resulted in a rigid system designed to promote all officers under one promotion umbrella. This promotion model detrimentally affects officers who possess technically acquired skills by not providing them in a separate talent management platform better suited to their skills.

Current financial losses and the disproportionately expanded educational resources are resulting in monetary losses that could be reallocated to the warfighter if the Marine Corps efficiently expends its resources on an advanced supply officers course. Additional financial details are explained in Chapters III and V of this thesis project.



III. LITERATURE REVIEW

A comprehensive literature review of the research related to Marine ground supply officer community training serves as a critical foundation for this project, as we study possible weaknesses of the current single command model and the potential benefits of creating an alternate career path for domain experts. Although this review focuses on this single officer community, the lack of domain knowledge can serve as a model for similar communities. The literature review is broken down into a systematic analysis of directives, reports, and studies about the fields of logistics, fiscal execution, and supply chain.

A. MISSION DIRECTIVES AND DOCTRINE

1. NAVMC 3500.64 A-C: Ground Supply Training and Readiness Manual

The *Ground Supply Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual* (Department of the Navy [DoN], 2017a) establishes the required training standards for supply Marines in order to accomplish the Marine Corps Mission Essential Tasks Lists (METLs). However, these training standards fail to teach critical thinking or prove competency in the field and leave a substantial knowledge gap. As shown in Figure 5 there are nine levels of T&R codes from 1000 through 9000, with levels 1000 and 2000 being the core skills required to accomplish METLs.

Individual Training Entry-Level Formal School Training (Core Skills)	Individual Training Skills Progression MOJT, Advanced Level Schools (Core Plus Skills)	Collective Training Crew/Team
1000-level	2000-level	3000-level
Collective Training Squad/Section	Collective Training Platoon	Collective Training Company
4000-level	5000-level	6000-level
Collective Training Battalion/Squadron	Collective Training Regiment/Group	Collective Training Command Element
7000-level	8000-level	9000-level

Figure 5. T&R Levels. Source: DoN (2017a).

Formal schools are required to teach only to level-1000 requirements, and level-2000 requirements fall under the responsibility of Major Subordinate Command (MSC) as part of informal continued education via On-the-Job Training (OJT) and mentorship programs. Chapters IV and V of the T&R manual provide the 12 level-1000 training requirements for new Ground Supply Officer Course (GSOC) graduates. The focus of the T&R program is to ensure the Marine Corps continues to improve its combat readiness. However, these level-1000 requirements neglect to set the competency for new graduates to meet proper accountability, auditability, and transparency set by the Marine Corps logistics governing body, Installations and Logistics (I&L). In the past few years, as shown in Figure 6, there has been a decline or consolidation in the number of training standards. The most significant decline was in the informal continued education, OJT and mentorship, programs by MSC. Currently, new graduates of the GSOC do not possess the core skills required to pass other Marine Corps requirements like FSMAO or Congress's new Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) inspections upon graduating from the basic schools. New GSOC graduates have to use the NAVMC 4000.5C Supply Officer's Internal Controls Handbook as a guideline to learn these new skills. Additionally, ground supply officers are responsible for enforcing the levels of 3000–4000 T&R codes without the core skills. As shown in Figure 6 the historical changes to the 3002 training standards have declined.






Figure 6. Historical Changes to the 3002 Training Standards

2. Marine Corps Order 4400.201, Change 1: Management of Property in the Possession of the Marine Corps, Vol. 1–17

The 17 volumes and 1,133 pages of the Marine Corps Order (MCO) 4400.201 comprise an in-depth policy meant to guide supply operations (DoN, 2017b). The MCO establishes the overarching policy and procedures to ensure complete and accurate accountability, auditability, and valuation of property in possession of the Marine Corps. This policy is where ground supply officers bridge the knowledge gap of the daily operations of supply, and it requires extensive time to be mastered. Those that master this policy are considered Subject Matter Expert (SME) in the Marine Corps Supply Chain Management procedures. Although this policy is extensive, it still leaves out many of the fiscal requirements.

3. Marine Corps Order 7300.21B: Marine Corps Financial Management Standard Operating Procedure Manual

This MCO is the introduction to Marine Corps financial management and offers the initial guidance for ground supply officers with standard operating procedures (SOPs) to fulfill their Fund Managers (FM) and Approving Officials (AO) roles. This assists comptrollers with the preparation, recording, reconciling, reporting, and maintenance of

financial records through all stages of funds management. Ground supply officers typically receive this initial training from their MSC when they are assigned to a supply account with funds authority (DoN, 2015). Ground supply officers have to learn and master over 10 different Marine Corps accounting systems and tools to fulfill the fund's management roles, along with 16 volumes of the DoD's Financial Management Regulation (DoD FMR). The list of systems includes the following:

- (1) USMC and Navy primary accounting system
 - Standard Accounting, Budgeting, and Reporting System (SABRS)
- (2) Feeder systems to SABRS
 - Purchase Request (PR) Builder (*Funding documents*)
 - Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) (*repair parts and purchase of cataloged items*)
 - Government Commercial Procurement Card (GCPC) Manager (*contracts under the micro-purchase threshold of less than \$5,000*)
 - Procurement Integrated Enterprise Environment (PIEE)
 - Wide Area Workflow (WAWF)
 - Electronic Document Access (EDA)
 - Contracting Officer Representative Tool (CORT)
 - Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (eMIPR)
 - SABRS Management Analysis Retrieval System (SMARTS)
 - Defense Travel System (DTS) (*as reviewing official to validate funds*)
 - Other local financial systems (e.g., systems for fuels and transport requests only used in that base).

All these systems and tools have their additional manuals, and they require a certain level of knowledge and experience in order to ensure proper tracking and execution of money. All these systems will often have glitches in communication with the Marine Corps' main accounting system—SABRS—and ultimately require detailed investigation, research, and timely corrections as part of the duties of a Supply Officer Triennial Review.



4. NAVMC 4000.5C: Supply Officer's Internal Controls Handbook

Given the complexity of the supply officer job and in an attempt to improve property control standards and knowledge gap not covered in the T&R standards, I&L developed the *Supply Officer's Internal Controls Handbook* to help junior ground supply officers and their commanders improve supply readiness across the Marine Corps (DoN, 2017c). This handbook includes a checklist that every ground supply officer must utilize semi-annually as part of their internal control procedures. The checklist provides guidance, procedures, and methods for implementing supply internal controls reviews in accordance with all related references. I&L reviews the handbook annually and implement changes as required.

5. Marine Corps Order 1300.8: Marine Corps Personnel Assignment Policy

The MCO 1300.8 sets the instructions for both officers and enlisted assignment personnel to perform their duties (DoN, 2014). Marine Corps officer monitors follow the priorities outlined on this order to move or retain officers at certain duty stations. This order gives the assignment monitors flexibility to enable them to create the best model possible for career progression and cross-pollination.

6. Human Resource Management and the Specialist/Generalist Issue, *Journal of Managerial Psychology*

Dual career track has been used as a concept by the civilian sector for years. Cesare and Thornton (1993) analyze the development and retention of professional specialists in organizations that fail to recognize their talent in comparison to their corporate counterparts. The research argues that different strategies should be incorporated to attract, develop, and retain this niche group of employees. In contrast to their managerial co-workers, specialists are motivated by other factors such as mastering their craft and skill utilization than a career in management. They tend to focus in narrow lanes that require an extensive amount of experience and training to comprehend fully. A generalist, on the other hand, is more inclined to focus on macro-organizational issues that require more extensive problem-solving skills than the narrower view of the specialist. The Marine Corps recognizes all officers as generalists bundled into a single generalist/managerial group



while not recognizing that a small uniquely talented percentage of competitive Marine officers both desire and are a better fit as a specialist within their technically challenging communities. Unfortunately, the Marine Corps neither acknowledges this path or permits a career ladder that diverts from the commander model in place. It may be a result of Marine Corps recruiting motto, which places leadership on the forefront, but data reveals that 52 of 647 colonels currently on active duty were promoted despite never commanding. This suggests that the Marine Corps should promote domain experts who may already currently reside within its ranks. The argument made in this article on the importance for organizations to create a “dual career ladder” may be applicable and more importantly, beneficial to the Marine Corps (Cesare & Thornton, 1993).

The Hay Group study that consisted of 1,200 organizations and 250,000 employees in 1993 despite an unemployment rate of 6.9% found that 55% of specialists planned to leave their current place of employment due to job dissatisfaction (Cesare & Thornton, 1993). The study suggests that, for organizations to avoid this detrimental impact, they must improve their talent recognition with a specialist by focusing on the following four factors:

1. The nature of the specialist’s job itself
2. Organization processes, including how technical work is allocated and evaluated
3. The career paths and development opportunities to which specialists aspire
4. How specialists are rewarded, including both financial and non-financial, vis-à-vis recognition, service awards, etc. (Cesare & Thornton, 1993, p. 32)

The Marine Corps is not addressing these factors in the unrestricted officer ranks, since experts/specialists are viewed as less valuable and have a small chance of promotion to colonel, given the unwritten expectation for command experience. Furthermore, a sole career path effect makes it harder for retention efforts as aspiring Marine officers join other organizations where professional skill learning in a particular field is valued over management opportunities. Cesare and Thornton mentioned the following as initiatives for a specialist that organizations can focus on to assist recruiting efforts:



1. **Autonomy:** The degree to which the job provides substantial freedom, independence, and discretion to the employee in scheduling the work and in determining the procedures to be used in carrying it out.
2. **Skill variety:** The degree to which a job requires a variety of different activities in carrying out the work, which involves the use of a number of different skills and talents of the person.
3. **Task identity:** The degree to which the job requires completion of a “whole” and identifiable piece of work, whether in the immediate organization or in the external environment.
4. **Task significance:** The degree to which the job has a substantial impact on the lives or work of other people, whether in the immediate organization or in the external environment.
5. **Feedback:** The degree to which carrying out the work activities required by the job results in the individual’s obtaining direct and clear information about the effectiveness. (Cesare & Thornton, 1993, p. 32)

The Marine Corps addresses these issues while Marines are serving in their assigned billets, but it fails to prioritize skillsets attained during one’s tour. This results in aspiring officers joining other services or civilian organizations where they can grow professionally apart from the managerial opportunities offered by the Marine Corps. For example, Texas Instruments lowered its necessary 10-year time with the company required for opting into a specialized career ladder to only four years. This change assisted in recruiting a newly hired specialist to enter the specialized career path earlier in their careers, which simultaneously improved retention. In other cases, IBM began a \$25 million-dollar program in material sciences to attract more engineers to its company. The dual career ladder system has been used in the civilian sector for years with success to address recruitment, development, motivation, and the retention of special skills required in the future wars.

A subsequent concern mentioned by Cesare and Thornton (1993) is that specialists do not receive formal training in managing people. Marine Corps officers are not necessarily affected by this issue as every officer undergoes a six-month formal training at The Basic School in Quantico, VA. While at the school, every officer leaves with the leadership training necessary to act as a provisional rifle platoon commander in the operating forces. Unfortunately, as officers in technical MOSs progress through their



careers, they are constantly reminded of the need to embark on new experiences outside of their PMOS. This talent management model results in failure from officers who have no intentions of filling managerial positions.

Skill obsolescence, skill atrophy, and overspecialization are mentioned by Cesare and Thornton (1993). The research is a by-product of inefficiently managing the careers of a specialist within an organization. The lack of employee development is at the root of all of these skill-related issues. It is important to note that generalists/managers and specialists do not work mutually exclusively. It is management's responsibility to develop the skills of a specialist for organizational improvement. Unfortunately, management may interfere with skill development by inadvertently specifying the means and ends to a project, removing the autonomy and skill variety mentioned earlier that a specialist requires for professional development. Cesare and Thornton note that specialists view themselves as craftsmen who focus on refining their current skill by learning about their trade to skill obsolescence, an effect that may arise if they fall behind on their profession's most recent practices. This development permits a specialist to achieve excellence in their trade, which acts as a reinforcement to their self-image and reputation.

One of the most influential motivation factors within the place of employment is the job challenge within one's discipline. These challenges provide the specialist with the opportunity to learn, and although money and rank are significant, learning continues to be the leading factor. Regarding access to higher education, the article stated that "many successful organizations have generous tuition reimbursement programmes and respect the value of self-improvement through formal education. As an aid to professional development, this is invaluable to specialists" (Cesare & Thornton, 1993, p. 7).

In addition to educational and upward career-enhancing opportunities, Cesare and Thornton (1993) suggested that professional affiliations and contributions constitute additional motivating factors for specialists. Membership within a particular professional group will inevitably return organizational benefits as specialists contribute new technical knowledge and efficient practices to their profession. Most importantly, it permits employees to become leaders within their fields, which should be rewarded by management for the organizational benefits attained. In the Marine Corps, officer professional



affiliations or journals within one's community do not exist—we are all viewed as generalists. An adoption of specialization in the officer ranks may result in a cyber or supply journal that publishes private industry and organizational best practices for individual communities to emulate.

The dual career ladder explained by the authors provides both beneficial and detrimental effects if not properly implemented. If implemented correctly, the dual career ladder improves recruitment, development, and the motivation of the specialist. The ideal method for implementation mirrors a y-shaped design where both specialist and generalist advancement hierarchies are parallel. Upward progression in the specialist path provides more autonomy, learning opportunities, job challenges, career advancement, and similar professional prestige as the managerial ladder. The Marine Corps will have to entertain the following necessary conditions to implement an effective specialist career path properly:

- **Management support:** Management must view the specialist career path as a legitimate avenue of career advancement and recognize the importance of specialists to the organization's mission.
- **Ladder structure:** The dual career ladder must be well articulated in terms of functional definitions. Each specific job position must be clearly defined: job description, title, qualification criteria, performance standards, compensation levels, and accountabilities. This will facilitate identifying distinguishable levels of work and the promotional steps (i.e., rungs). Most ladders have between five and eight job steps.
- **Achievable paths:** The career paths must represent reachable positions and not be attainable only on paper. Specialists must see their superiors achieve high positions on the technical path for it to have an incentive effect on their performance.
- **Equity:** As previously discussed, equity must be maintained for the dual career ladder to be motivating and effective. The notion of equity must begin in the design stage of the dual career ladder and be incorporated throughout the system (e.g., rewards, advancement and prestige).
- **Rewards:** Performance rewards should be financial as well as non-financial (e.g., recognition from top management). Furthermore, the rewards should represent sufficient incentive and promote equity. In other words, compensation packages across career paths should be identical at each of the career steps.
- **Performance appraisal:** The organization's performance appraisal system must accurately reflect both career paths. Typically, the



performance appraisal system focuses solely on managerial skills and thus does not accurately measure the specialist's contributions.

- **Review committee:** To ensure that specialist promotions are based on functional performance—and not tenure—a review committee should oversee promotions on that career path.
- **Decision-making:** High-level specialists must have equal decision-making authority as their peers on the managerial ladder. This factor will contribute to the credibility of the dual career ladder and the morale of the specialists on it.
- **Communication:** The dual career ladder must be clearly presented to employees early in their careers, thus facilitating career planning. Employees should be made aware of both long- and short-term opportunities and job requirements, so they can take an active role in their career development.
- **Evaluation:** The dual career ladder must be constantly monitored and rigorously evaluated on a regular basis. Evaluation of the dual career ladder will not only identify problem areas but also demonstrate management's commitment to the project. (Cesare & Thornton, 1993, p. 38)

Management's improper implementation of the specialist career path may result in detrimental organizational effects. The researchers suggest that typically improper implementation is a result of management's inability to understand unique professional terms, job responsibilities, rewards, and hierarchy. The authors further state the following as detrimental effects result from improper implementation:

- **Dumping ground:** The specialist career path is typically used as a dumping ground for incompetent, excess or tenured managers who lack managerial ability. The quickest way to devalue the whole system is to fill it with inappropriate and unqualified people. In an effort to prevent this, the job criteria for each rung on the specialist path must be as rigorous as those on the managerial path.
- **Short specialist path:** The specialist path usually has fewer rungs and thus less advancement opportunity than the managerial path. In terms of equity and legitimacy, both career paths must be approximately equal to facilitate the credibility of the dual career ladder as well as the incentive for the specialists.
- **Isolation:** Placement on the specialist path means job autonomy, not organizational rejection. The specialist's input must be valued by the organization.



- **Insufficient rewards:** The lack of equity between the career paths in terms of rewards will prevent the effectiveness of the dual career ladder. Rewards, whether they be financial, job title, or supervisory responsibility, must be straightforward and respected.
- **Wrong purpose:** The specialist path often serves as a reward for past performance when it should be used to develop one's future potential. The dual career ladder is not only a reward for past performance, it should also be publicized—and carried out—as a method of future development and motivation.
- **Misperception:** Organization members typically view assignment to the specialist path as proof that he/she is an inadequate manager. Management can rectify this misperception by formally supporting the specialist's career path and by noting the value of the specialists' contributions to the organization.
- **Lack of security:** Specialist positions tend to be less secure than those on the managerial ladder, because the productivity of the specialist is more easily assessed.
- **Publicity:** Dual career ladders are often poorly publicized within organizations. Consequently, employees may not be aware of the options available to them or the advancement patterns associated with each career path. (Cesare & Thornton, 1993, pp. 38–39)

The research from Cesare and Thornton (1993) provides detailed concepts necessary for the Marine Corps to implement a specialist career path for officers. Furthermore, the benefits outlined in the article provide ample justification for the Marine Corps to adopt a domain-expert career path. Our technical PMOSs require a talent management model that advocates for specialization. This will improve our warfighting abilities and assist our organization with sustaining our superiority over our competitors.

B. AUDITS AND METRICS REPORTS

The Marines Corps has several audits and reports that measure the efficiency and integrity of supply and fiscal procedures, and they all show similar trends of lack of efficiency due to training. Abnormal financial transactions and conditions create unnecessary financial risks for the Marine Corps. In the Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps: Performance Metrics & Indicators Report supply officers are directly responsible for the proper execution of funds coded 1106 for Operating Materials and Supplies (OM&S) funding. The current lack of financial training and mentorship in the supply officer



community has led the Marine Corps to have approximately \$631 million of ULOs in 1106 OM&S funding over the past five fiscal years (2012–2017). Collectively the Marine Corps has had over \$800 million of ULOs in the past five years, as shown in Figure 7.




Figure 7. Abnormal Budget Execution Status Report. Source: HQMC (2018).

ULO are stale transactions without any actions over 120 days that a supply officer cannot certify as complete. ULOs could be viewed as lost opportunities to execute the full budget. ULOs can be reduced by having financially trained ground supply Marines that have experience and training on how to properly operate the financial accounting systems. Figure 8 shows the process of the correct transactions and Figure 9 shows an example of an ULO.



Figure 8. Normal Fiscal Cycle



Figure 9. Unliquidated Obligation Cycle, 120 Days (OBL > LIQ)

C. CHAPTER SUMMARY

In order to stay competitive for command, supply officers tend to move away from their core competencies after their first supply account, leaving the next generation of lieutenants and captains without the proper mentorship on valuable lessons learned. The current model forces all generations to repeat past mistakes. As the Marine Corps will be required to improve its internal control procedures due to new FIAR requirements, supply officers will need extra training and experience to push the agency to the next level.

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IV. SURVEY DESIGN AND RESULTS

A. SURVEY DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

The survey was designed to answer two research questions: (1) Are there any training and education shortfalls, and (2) if given a choice between command and domain expertise, which would a Marine officer choose? The survey's population was composed of 571 ground supply officers (3002),² ranks first lieutenant through colonel. The survey was limited to Marine officers with the primary MOS designators of ground supply officers and aimed to capture the current state of this community and act as a pilot study for other communities to emulate. The survey contained 13 multiple-choice questions and one open-ended question where the participants had the opportunity to provide feedback. A copy of the survey can be found in Appendix A. Each survey question was designed to capture data that would help answer one of the two research questions.

1. Survey Process

The survey was disseminated through Lime Survey. Lime Survey is the online survey tool used by the Marine Corps. The target population was extracted from the Marine Corps Manpower Studies and Analysis Branch (MPA), M&RA. The respondents were contacted via official e-mail, and reminders were sent via their alternate e-mails on file on a bi-weekly basis. The survey remained open for 75 days. The Institutional Review Boards (IRB) under the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and Headquarters Marine Corps approved the dissemination of the survey under the conditions of anonymity and voluntarism. Subjects were expected to take no longer than 15 minutes to complete the survey. On average, the subjects took 12 minutes to complete the survey. The targeted population consisted of 571 ground supply officers, which were distributed into 119 first lieutenants, 222 captains, 135 majors, 75 lieutenant colonels, and 20 colonels. 287 responses were received out of the 571, which accounted for 50.3%. Figure 10 provides a graphic visualization of the supply officer population response distribution by billet.

²Table 2 offers the list of MOS designators code.






Figure 10. Supply Officer Population Distribution

2. Survey Results

Question 1. What is your current rank?

The purpose of Question 1 was to gather rank demographics as they related to survey respondents. The response distribution by rank was the following: 51 first lieutenants or 18% of respondents, 123 captains or 43%, 67 majors or 23%, 36 lieutenant colonels or 13%, and 10 colonels or 3%. The response rate among all ranks was within 5% of their sample size, which explains why captains have the highest response rate of all ranks. Figure 11 provides a graphical visualization of the response distribution by rank.




Figure 11. Question 1 Response: Distribution by Rank

Question 2. What is your current billet?

Question 2 aims at identifying current ground supply officers' billets. These data were essential to determine whether a domain-expert career path already existed based on current assignments. Initially, this was an open-ended question. However, the data were reorganized and coded to fit within one of the following categories: ground supply officer,

company command, commanding officer, student, and b-billet. All billets that were not categorized as ground supply officer, company command, commanding officer or student were merged into b-billets. The distribution by billets was as follows: 149 respondents were serving as ground supply officers (52%), 11 were attending resident schools and serving as students (4%), six were serving as company commanders (2%), five were serving as commanding officers (2%), and 116 were serving on other billets or b-billets (40%). Figure 12 gives a visual representation of what types of billets ground supply officers are currently assigned to.




Figure 12. Question 2 Response: Distribution by Billet

Figure 13 presents the billet distribution by rank aimed at identifying what billets ground supply officers are filling at each rank. Most officers are assigned a ground supply officer billets following their completion of the GSOC. 7.8% of all first lieutenants are assigned to b-billets, while 92.2% are in ground supply officer billets. 23.2% of all captains are assigned to b-billets, while 65% are in ground supply officer billets, 4.9% are company commanders, and 4.9% are full-time students. 65.7% of all majors are assigned to b-billets, while 29.9% are in ground supply officer billets, and 4.5% are full-time students. 77.8% of all lieutenant colonels are assigned to b-billets, while 5.6% are in ground supply officer billets, 5.5% are full-time students, and 11.1% are commanding officers. 90% of all colonels are assigned to b-billets, while 10% are commanding officers.




Figure 13. Question 2: Billet Distribution by Rank

Question 3. Total number of years in Supply Officer Billets. No 8006, Operations Officer, Executive Officer, or Commanding Officer billets.

Question 3 aimed to determine whether time in the MOS influenced the subjects' decision on whether to become a domain expert or to seek a command career path. The results suggested that years of experience in the MOS had a direct relationship with the indication of training and education shortfalls in the supply community. The data also support the statement that as Marine officers are promoted; they are assigned less often to ground supply officer billets. The separation from the MOS becomes larger as the Marine is promoted through the ranks. A colonel would have spent almost half of his career following a generalist career path rather than focusing on domain expertise. Figure 14 shows a graphical representation on how many years ground supply officers spend performing supply functions throughout their career.




Figure 14. Question 3: Comparison between Time in Service and Time in Supply Billets

Question 4. What Major Subordinate Command (MSC) are you a part of?

Question 4 aimed at determining whether specific MSCs offered more training and education programs than others. It also tried to answer whether there were any correlations between duty stations and the subject's decision to become a domain expert to choose a command career path. This question was formulated during early phases of the research and was not included on any analysis.

Question 5. Have you attended any of the following Schools? (Logistics Captain Career Course (LCCC), Intermediate Logistics Officer's Course (IMLOC), Navy Supply Officer School, Navy Logistics Integration (NLI), Pennsylvania State University Executive Courses)

Question 5 aimed at answering whether there are training and education shortfalls in the Marine Corps by having the respondents indicate whether they had attended any of the schools listed. The results, as shown in figure 15, reveal that 41% of the population sample has never attended any official school post-GSOC. Further research is needed to determine the reason so many officers are not taking advantage of these training and education opportunities. In addition, 11% attended the LCCC, 11% attended the IMLOC, 3% attended Navy Supply School, 4% received NLI Training, 8% attended Pennsylvania State University Executive courses, and 22% attended other supply-related schools. Appendix B list the course description for each of these schools. See Figure 15 for a graphical representation.






Figure 15. Percentage of Supply Officers That Attended Additional Schools

Question 6. What kind of training, if any, have you received from your Major Subordinate Command, currently and in the past?

Question 6 focuses on answering if there are training and education shortfalls. As shown in Figure 16, 13.9% of the subjects reported receiving “no training” from their MSC, in addition to 6.3% that responded that MSC training was not applicable to them. 38.7% received requisition management training, 40.8% received property accountability training, 57.1% received fiscal training, 23.3% received intermediate supply support training, 18.1% received expeditionary supply support training, 23.7% received acquisitions and contracts training, 31.7% received internal controls training, 39.4% received Lean Six Sigma training, 41.1% received MEF Readiness Training Center (MRTC) training, and 17.1% received other training not listed in the survey.




Figure 16. Training Received by MSC

Question 7. Are you or were you responsible for Fiscal in your most current supply officer billet?

Question 7 aims at answering whether there are training and education shortfalls and if there are shortfalls, where these gaps are located. Ground supply officers often fill the billet of the unit's fiscal officer. In recent years, Congress has passed legislation that requires government organizations, especially the DoD, to become financially audit-ready. 83% of the Marine Corps' ground supply officers were responsible for the financial reporting for their units as shown in Figure 17. The Marine Corps' financial management officers already created a domain-expert career path, and while our research does not support ground supply officers following their structure, it appears that there are benefits in following a domain expertise structure similar to the financial management community.




Figure 17. Question 7: Unit's Fiscal Officer

Question 8. How much Operational & Maintenance (plus exercise) money do you or did you manage during your most recent supply billet?

Question 8 aimed at answering whether the amount of money managed by ground supply officers affected their decision to follow a domain-expert career path. The mean budget for ground supply officers is \$6,700,348; the median is \$4,000,000; and the mode is \$2,000,000, as shown in Figure 18. 21% of the ground supply officers had a budget between \$0–1 million, while 25% were at \$1–3 million, 16% at \$3–5 million, 10% at \$5–8 million, 6% at \$8–11 million, 5% at \$11–15 million, 5% at \$15–20 million, 13% at greater than \$20 million and 1% did not manage a budget.




Figure 18. Question 8: Budget Size

Question 9. While filling a supply officer billet, have you received fiscal training taught by supply or comptroller personnel?

This question aims at answering whether there are training and education shortfalls in the Marine Corps and how much training and education ground supply officers received in fiscal. Training and education in fiscal was chosen because of the fiscal law requirements imposed by Congress. There are many different systems and platforms used to manage and execute government funding. Marine ground supply officers are not formally trained on any of these systems. The percentage of ground supply officers that received fiscal systems, as shown in Figure 19, training were as follows: SABRS 43.3%, SMARTS 36.24%, PR-BUILDER 57.84%, iRAPT 37.28%, DTS 55.4%, SERVMART 29.62%, fuel 21.95%, appropriations law 56.79%, fiscal law 64.11%, budget execution 53.23%, not applicable 4.88%.




Figure 19. Question 9: Fiscal Training Received

Question 10. Do you believe that you would benefit from a resident advanced supply officer's course?

This question was structured in a way that the subjects are required to rate on a Likert scale from 1 to 10 whether they believe that an advanced supply officer's course would be beneficial with 1 for least likely and 10 for most beneficial. There are advanced courses in other communities in the Marine Corps. The Army also provides their captains with an education that applies to their MOS. The Army's courses are available to unrestricted Marine officers, and the Marines who attend those courses are considered to be PME-complete for their grade. However, the percentage of Marines who attend these courses is small. The mean score this question achieved was 8.73, which suggests that the community believes that the Marine Corps would strongly benefit from a resident advance ground supply officer's course.

Question 11. Do you believe that you would benefit from an advanced supply officer's course online, similar to EWS distance learning?

Question 11 is similar to the previous question in intent, but it expands the context to long-distance learning. The mean score this question achieved was 5.16, which indicated that the subjects did not believe that distance learning is an appropriate channel to convey this type of knowledge.

Question 12. What areas of supply would you benefit from the most if an advanced supply officer's course was implemented?

The respondents indicated in Question 10 that they require more resident training in their MOS. Question 12 was able to identify key performance areas that need improvement. Ground supply officers indicated that they would benefit from more training and education in almost all function areas listed on the survey. Acquisitions and Contract Management led the way with almost 75% of the respondents indicating that they need more training in this area. Ground supply officers do not receive any formal training in this area during the GSOC. Expeditionary Supply Support was a second topic that should highlight the importance of subject matter expertise. This area is vital as the Marine Corps does not train to fight wars in the U.S. territory—we bring the fight to the enemy. The Marine Corps is expeditionary; however, 68% of ground supply officers are indicating that



they need more training in this area. Ground supply officers must understand how they are integrated into the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and how they can better support the combatant commander in an expeditionary environment. Fiscal (66.9%), Intermediate Level of Supply (64.1%), Requisition Management (53%), Internal Controls (51.9%), and GCSS-MC (50.2%) also had a high percentage of respondents that indicated the need for further training. Least important to the respondents were property accountability (29.6%), defense travel system (28.2%), personal effects (24%), and other non-specific ground supply training (21.3%). As shown in Figure 20 for a graphical representation.





Figure 20. What Areas of Supply Would You Benefit From the Most if an Advanced Supply Officer's Course Was Implemented?

Question 13. If you were given a choice to become a domain expert in supply, would you select that career path?

This is the final questions on the survey. This question intended to answer whether there was interest in the ground supply officer community to follow a domain-expert career path in lieu of the current command career path. Although domain expertise and command

career path are not mutually exclusive, this question aims at identifying the respondent’s preference. The intent is to get the subjects’ opinions on which choice they would make. Currently, Marine officers are assigned billets that make them more competitive for command; however, the command data extracted from the United States Marine Corps Command Selection Boards indicate that a significant percentage of the lieutenant colonels being screened request not to be considered, giving reasons such as “not ready,” “family,” “retiring,” “medical,” and others. This question could be used to identify these individuals earlier in their career and therefore shape their path in a way that would improve the Corps’ lethality through informed decisions and subject matter expertise. The data show that senior officers are content with the current system while the junior officers lean more towards becoming an expert. As shown in Figure 21, the total results show that 62% of the sample would opt for a domain expert career path if given a choice.



N = 287

Figure 21. Question 13: Command vs. Domain Expert



3. Survey Results Regression

Our research used regression analysis to forecast a Marine officer's choice on whether he/she would choose to follow a command or a domain expert career path. The choice between command and domain expert was the dependent variable. The independent variables for the regression include rank (Y1), time in supply billet (Y2), whether the subject served as a fiscal officer (Y3), size of budget managed (Y4), recommendation on implementation of a resident advanced ground supply officer's course (Y5), and recommendation on implementation of a long-distance advanced ground supply officer's course (Y6). The regression data is shown in Table 1, while the model is depicted below:

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 Y1 + \beta_2 Y2 + \beta_3 Y3 + \beta_4 Y4 + \beta_5 Y5 + \beta_6 Y6$$

Table 1. Choice of Domain Expert Career Path Model

	<i>Domain Expert Career Path</i>
Constant	337.522 (158.544)
Y1***	-16.456 (3.440)
Y2*	14.442 (7.898)
Y3	69.270 (71.538)
Y4	-5.372 (3.821)
Y5***	78.412 (11.895)
Y6	5.403 (9.308)
R ²	0.219
No. Observations	287

Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively.



a. Rank (Y1)

The data demonstrated that senior officers leaned more towards the traditional career path for command. For the purpose of the regression, ranks were valued as follows: O-2 = 20, O-3 = 30, O-4 = 40, O-5 = 50, and O-6 = 60. Our research did not analyze the responses independently, but we can make educated assumptions that senior officers are choosing to continue with the traditional career path for one of these reasons:

- Their experience enables them to look at the big picture and see that the value of the traditional career path outweighs a domain-expert career path.
- This is how they were brought up, and to change now is not an option.
- They do not see the benefits of an alternate domain-expert career path.

b. Years in Supply (Y2)

Ground supply officers that spent more time working in the supply field favored a domain expert career path over a command career path. Years in supply was used as an independent variable in the regression equation.

c. Fiscal Officers (Y3)

Ground supply officers that have served as fiscal officers in a battalion, squadron, regiment, group favored the domain expert career path over a command career path. Ground supply officers that served as fiscal officers received a score of 1, while those who did not receive a score of 0.

d. Budget Size (Y4)

Ground supply officers that were responsible for large budgets favored a command career path over a domain expert career path. The numbers used in the equation are calculated in millions of dollars.

e. Advanced Supply Officer Course Recommendation

The correlation between the recommendation for an advanced MOS and a domain-expert career path is due to the subjects' choice for domain expertise. The data shows that subjects who chose to take a domain-expert career path valued technical education higher than those who want to retain the traditional command career route. Resident ASCO (Y5)



and DL ASOC (Y6) were used on the analysis, however only ASCO had a statistical significance on the Marine officer's career path choice.



V. MANPOWER DATA AND RESULTS

A. MANPOWER DATA ANALYSIS

In addition to the survey, data were also gathered from HQMC relating to command selection and officer promotion for Marine colonels. The research analyzed fitness report data to determine what combination of billet assignments enabled the officers to become more competitive for promotion. During the research, we chose to expand our population to all Marine colonels, which enabled us to identify that in most MOSs, a Marine officer that is not selected for O-5 command will have his/her chances for promotion drastically decreased. The data was formatted to ensure that colonels with multiple MOS designators would not be counted more than once. These colonels were listed with their primary MOS, and any other additional MOSs were disregarded unless they had moved into the acquisition field. The data show that 8.19% of all Marine colonels were selected without O-5 command. As shown in Figure 22, around 17% of lieutenant colonels were selected for command. The 92% selection rate for colonels comes from the 17% that held a command assignment as a lieutenant colonel. The 8.19% that did not have command, includes the colonels who have transferred into the acquisition field, where there are not many command opportunities. Our research also ran the scenario by removing judge advocates and financial management officers and acquisition colonels. The selection rate for colonels without O-5 command dropped to 2.16%. The conclusion is that as it stands today, choosing a career path that does not include O-5 command jeopardizes a Marine officer's future in the Marine Corps. Table 2 lists the number of colonels selected with and without command for every officer MOS in the Marine Corps.



Table 2. Percentage of Colonels without Command

MOS Designator	MOS Description	Colonels with Command	Colonels without Command	% Selected without CMD
0102	Manpower Officer	6	0	0%
0202	Intelligence Officer	36	2	5%
0302	Infantry Officer	141	4	3%
0402	Logistics Officer	50	2	4%
0602	Communications Officer	24	1	4%
0802	Field Artillery Officer	42	0	0%
1302	Combat Engineer Officer	26	0	0%
1702	Cyberspace Officer	0	0	0%
1802	Tank Officer	13	0	0%
1803	Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) Officer	9	1	10%
3002	Ground Supply Officer	21	1	5%
3404	Financial Management Officer	6	3	33%
4502	Communication Strategy and Operations Officer	3	0	0%
4402	Judge Advocate	13	14	52%
5505	Director/Assistant Director, The President's Own	1	0	0%
5803	Military Police Officer	2	1	33%
6002	Aircraft Maintenance Officer	10	0	0%
6602	Aviation Supply Officer	11	0	0%
7202	Air Command and Control Officer	19	0	0%
7509	Pilot VMA AV-8B Qualified	18	1	5%
7523	F/A-18 Pilot	20	0	0%
7525	Naval Flight Officer (NFO) Qualified F/A-18D WSO	8	0	0%
7532	Pilot VMM V-22	17	0	0%
7543	Pilot VMAQ EA-6B	1	0	0%
7557	Pilot VMGR KC-130	7	0	0%
7562	Pilot HMH/ML/A CH-46	22	0	0%
7563	Pilot HMLA UH-1Y	6	1	14%
7564	Pilot HMH CH-53D	3	0	0%
7565	Pilot HMLA AH-1	27	0	0%
7566	Pilot HMH CH-53E	19	0	0%
7588	Naval Flight Officer (NFO) Qualified EA-6B	6	0	0%
8059/61	Marine Acquisition Officer	7	22	76%
All		594	53	8.19%
Domain Expert MOS 8059/61, 3404, 4402		26	39	60.00%
Total not including DE MOS'		582	14	2.16%






Figure 22. Breakdown of Chances for Selection to the Rank of Marine Colonel. Source: Manpower Management Officer Assignments (2018).

B. CHAPTER SUMMARY

The analysis shows that there is enough interest in the ground supply community to follow a domain expert career path. The domain expert career path will solve the problems with talent management or lack thereof in the Marine Corps by placing the right officer at the right billet at the right time. Domain expertise may become the foundation for implementing efficient and effective changes that will impact the future of warfighting while maintaining technical superiority over our adversaries. In addition, the analysis shows the impact of our current command culture, in which only 2.4% of colonels in fields that do not have a domain-expert career path were promoted without holding a lieutenant colonel command. There is no requirement that states that to be promoted to colonel one must assume command, but the data reinforces the theory that command is the preferable career path in the Marine Corps.

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VI. RECOMMENDATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

A. INTRODUCTION TO DOMAIN EXPERT IMPLEMENTATION MODEL

Based on the interest revealed during the survey, the proposed domain expert talent management model in Figure 23 is to provide a template for M&RA to refine and adapt for broader implementation. The model consists of a three-tiered certification process that recognizes both education and experience as prerequisites for domain expert certification. Considering our thesis project group consists of supply officers, we based the proposed model on our familiarity with the supply officer community. Of note, due to its community-specific design, this model will not apply to every officer and should not be viewed as a one-size-fits-all model for every community. We recommend that every community that may benefit from domain experts create its own three-tiered certification model with the education and experience that applies to its officers. It is imperative for every community to fit their model under our proposed domain expert three-tiered design to have a single source that manages the careers of every domain expert. To efficiently manage all MOS careers under the domain expert umbrella, we further recommend that the Additional Military Occupational Specialty (AMOS) level I (AMOS 8301), level II (AMOS 8302) and level III (8303) remains consistent for every community. Figure 23 provides a visual example of how to implement our proposed domain expert talent management model in the supply officer community.






Figure 23. Domain Expert Model³

1. Domain Expert Selection via Commandant’s Career Level Education Board (CCLEB) & Commandant’s Professional Education Intermediate Board (CPIB)

We recommend that the selection for domain experts take place on both the yearly CCLEB and CPIB to utilize an existing platform for competitive selection. The occupational field sponsor will ultimately be responsible for the quality control of selection. This will allow for the creation of a cadre of officers who have proven experience in their communities and are passionate about engaging in a PMOS-focused career path. Candidates who are interested in becoming domain experts will inform the CCLEB and CPIB board through their questionnaires. This will allow candidates to express their interest directly to board members without facing stigma from their direct supervisors who may perceive the domain-expert career path as a less-than-desirable path compared to the commander path. Domain expert selection requirements and utilization information will be

³ APPENDIX C has the detailed list of recommended billets for the MOS 3002.

outlined on an initial Marine Administration (MARADMIN) introducing the program, and a following summary will be published on every CCLEB & CPIB board announcement.

2. Self-Directed Study

Interested candidates who do not make CCLEB or CPIB selection are offered a self-directed study via the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) or NPS distance learning. Upon completion of the Logistics Level I, II, and III domain expert, candidates will submit a package to the Domain Expert Occupational Field (OCCFLD) sponsor to receive the additional AMOS.

3. Utilization

Upon attaining the domain expert AMOS, candidates will be required to complete a utilization tour in a PMOS-specific unit. Subsequent tours will also require PMOS-specific tours in more challenging billets where MOS-centric expertise is necessary.

B. LEVEL I

Domain experts are Marines with exceptional knowledge on their PMOS and civilian sector best practices equivalent of personnel Certified in Production and Inventory Management (CPIM) or Certified Professional in Supply Management (CPSM). Domain experts' goals are to improve efficiency within their units and to make recommendations for changes in the current Marine Corps policies and regulations within their field. The domain-expert candidates will fill an HQMC questionnaire during their first look for CCLEB volunteering for the domain-expert route. CWO2s and CWO3s with a bachelor's degree can submit a package and be selected via the self-directed route. Upon completion of all requirements for Level I, the domain expert will receive the AMOS of 8301 and be required to fill a utilization tour within their PMOS with the following units:

- Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) (*11,13,15, 22, 24, 26, 31*)
- Cyber Command
- Marine Information Groups
- Marine Raider Battalions
- Marine Support Raider Battalions



- Radio Battalions
- Communication Battalions
- Combat Logistics Battalions in direct support to a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (11,13,15, 22, 24, 26, 31)

1. Direct Route for Level I

a. Experience

Domain-expert candidates will need three years of successful tour within their PMOS. The qualification for a successful tour is passing FSMAO inspections with a medium and below finding (waiver for questionable scores may be submitted to occupational field sponsor for a final decision).

b. Training

The CCLEB will serve as the initial gateway for selection to the domain-expert career path via the directed route by courses at NPS or other logistics schools, as shown in Figure 24. One of the following schools will fulfill the education requirement:

(1) NPS Curricula

- 814 Curriculum: Master in Business Administration (MBA) with a focus in Transportation Management;
- 819 Curriculum: MBA with a focus in Supply Chain Management;
- 827 Curriculum: MBA with a focus in Material Logistics Support.
- 837 Curriculum: MBA with a focus in Financial Management.

(2) Logistics Captains Career Course (LCCC)

Additionally, we recommend the following courses:

- Supply Officer Department Head Course (SODHC), United States Navy (USN)
- Introduction to Expeditionary Logistics (IEL), USN
- Non-Standard Logistics Course, Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
- MARSOF Logistics Course, SOCOM



- LOG 399, Strategic Logistics Management, United States Air Force (USAF)

c. Cost

This model uses current education and training systems already being employed by the Marine Corps, and a cost analysis was beyond the scope of this research.

2. Self-Directed Route Level I

Marines not selected by the CCLEB board can pursue domain expert via the self-directed route.

a. Experience

Domain-expert candidates will need three years of successful tour within their PMOS. The qualification for a successful tour is passing FSMAO inspections with a medium and below finding (waiver for questionable scores may be submitted to occupational field sponsor for a final decision).

b. Training

Marines will pursue training via DAU for Life Cycle Logistics Level I or NPS distance learning, as shown in Figure 24.

(1) NPS Distance Learning Curricula

- 805* Curriculum: Executive MBA

** Rank waiver may be required.*

- 835 Curriculum: Master of Science (MS) with a focus in Contract Management;
- 836 Curriculum: MS with a focus in Program Management;

OR



- (2) Civilian sector supply chain management or business-related master's degree.

And

- (1) The following courses are required for the education standards for DAU Life Cycle Logistics Level I:
 - ACQ 101 Fundamentals of Systems Acquisition Management
 - ENG 101 Fundamentals of Systems Engineering
 - LOG 100 Life Cycle Logistics Fundamentals
 - LOG 102 Fundamentals of System Sustainment Management
 - LOG 103 Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM)
 - CLL 008 Designing for Supportability in DoD Systems
 - CLL 011 Performance Based Logistics (PBL)

Additionally, the following courses are recommended:

- Supply Officer Department Head Course (SODHC), USN
- Introduction to Expeditionary Logistics (IEL), USN
- Non-Standard Logistics Course, SOCOM
- MARSOF Logistics Course, SOCOM
- LOG 399, Strategic Logistics Management, USAF

c. Cost

This model uses current education and training systems already being employed by the Marine Corps, and a cost analysis was beyond the scope of this research.



- (1) NPS distance learning will cost \$38,000 per curriculum.
- (2) DAU courses are distance learning for Level I.




Figure 24. Level I Career Path Summary

C. LEVEL II

Domain Experts Level II goals are to improve efficiency within their commands and serve as official mentors to their subordinate commands. They will also make recommendations to change the current Marine Corps policies and regulations within their field. The domain expert Level II candidates will fill the HQMC questionnaire during their CPIB volunteering for domain expert route Level II. CWO3s and CWO4s with a master's degree can submit a package and be selected via the self-directed route. Upon completion of all requirements for Level II, the domain expert will receive the AMOS of 8302 and be required to fill a utilization tour within their PMOS with the following units:

- Marine Expeditionary Force G4
- Major Subordinate Command Supply Officer and Logistics Officers
- Supply Management Units Officer in Charge

- Operation Officers for Supply Battalions
- Operation Officers for Storage Battalions
- Operation Officers for Maintenance Battalions
- Operation Officers for Combat Logistics Battalions not direct support to a MEU.

1. Direct Route for Level II

a. Experience

Domain-expert candidates will need six years of successful tour within their PMOS. The qualification for a successful tour is passing FSMAO inspections with a medium and below finding (waiver for questionable scores may be submitted to occupational field sponsor for a final decision).

b. Training

CPIB will continue the selection for the domain expert Level II via the directed route by courses at NPS, if not previously selected or via another logistic school, as shown in Figure 25. One of the following schools will fulfill the education:

(1) NPS Curricula

- 814 Curriculum: Master in Business Administration (MBA) with a focus in Transportation Management;
- 819 Curriculum: MBA with a focus in Supply Chain Management;
- 827 Curriculum: MBA with a focus in Material Logistics Support.
- 837 Curriculum: MBA with a focus in Financial Management.

OR

(2) Logistics Fellowship, Penn State University

Additional recommended courses and certifications include the following:

- Intermediate MAGTF Logistics Operations Course, USMC
- Supply Officer Department Head Course (SODHC), USN
- Introduction to Expeditionary Logistics (IEL), USN



- Non-Standard Logistics Course, SOCOM
- MARSOF Logistics Course, SOCOM
- LOG 399, Strategic Logistics Management, USAF
- LOG 420, Enterprise Logistics Course, USAF
- **Certification:** Cost Estimating and Analysis, 289 certification, NPS
- **Certification:** Lean Six Sigma Green Belt
- **Certification:** Lean Six Sigma Black Belt
- **Certification:** Certified Professional in Supply Management (CPSM), Institute for Supply Management (ISM). (*old title, Certified Purchasing Manager (CPM)*)
- **Certification:** Certified Supply Chain Professional (CSCP), American Production and Inventory Control Society (APICS)
- **Certification:** Certified in Logistics, Transportation and Distribution (CLTD), APICS
- **Certification:** Certified Federal Contract Manager (CFCM), National Contract Management Association (NCMA)
- **Certification:** Certified Professional Contract Manager (CPCM), NCMA

c. Cost

This model uses current education and training systems already being employed by the Marine Corps, and a cost analysis was beyond the scope of this research.

2. Self-Directed Route Level II

Marines not selected by the CCLEB board can pursue domain expert via the self-directed route.

a. Experience

Domain-expert candidates will need six years of successful tour within their PMOS. The qualification for a successful tour is passing FSMAO inspections with a medium and below finding (waiver for questionable scores may be submitted to occupational field sponsor for final decision).



b. Training

Marines will pursue training via DAU for Life Cycle Logistics Level II or NPS distance learning, as shown in Figure 25.

(1) NPS Distance Learning Curricula

- 805* Curriculum: Executive Master of Business Administration.

** Rank waiver may be required.*

- 835 Curriculum: MS with a focus in Contract Management;
- 836 Curriculum: MS with a focus in Program Management;

OR

(2) Civilian sector supply chain management or business-related master's degree.

AND

(3) The following courses are required for the education standards for DAU Life Cycle Logistics Level II:

- ACQ 202 Intermediate Systems Acquisition, Part A
- ACQ 203 Intermediate Systems Acquisition, Part B (**Resident, TAD required**)
- CLE 068 Intellectual Property and Data Rights
- LOG 200 Product Support Strategy Development, Part A
- LOG 201 Product Support Strategy Development, Part B (**Resident, TAD required**)
- LOG 206 Intermediate Systems Sustainment Management
- LOG 235 Performance-Based Logistics
- CLC 011 Contracting for the Rest of Us
- CLL 001 Life Cycle Management & Sustainment Metrics
- CLL 012 Supportability Analysis
- AND one of the following five course options must also be chosen:



- EVM 101 Fundamentals of Earned Value Management
- LOG 204 Configuration Management
- LOG 215 Technical Data Management
- RQM 110 Core Concepts for Requirements Management
- Option 5 includes all three of the following CON courses:
 - CON 121 Contract Planning
 - CON 124 Contract Execution
 - CON 127 Contract Management

c. Cost

This model uses current education and training systems already being employed by the Marine Corps, and a cost analysis was beyond the scope of this research.




Figure 25. Level II Career Path Summary

D. LEVEL III

Domain Expert Level III is the executive-level knowledge with goals to improve current Marine Corps policies and regulations within their field. The domain-expert Level III candidates will fill an HQMC questionnaire during their top-level school volunteering for domain expert route Level III. CWO4s and CWO5s with the correct certifications can submit a package and be selected via the self-directed route. Upon completion of all requirements for Level III, the domain expert will receive the AMOS of 8303 and be required to fill a utilization tour within their PMOS with the following units:

- HQMC Marine Systems Command
- Occupational Field Sponsor
- Marine Expeditionary Force G4
- DLA units

1. Direct Route for Level III

a. Experience

Domain-expert candidates will need nine years of successful tour within their PMOS.

b. Training

Top Level School will continue the selection for the domain expert Level III via the directed route by courses at NPS, if not previously selected or via other logistics school, as shown in Figure 26. One of the following schools will fulfill the education requirement:

1. The Eisenhower School (Formerly Industrial College of the Armed Forces [ICAF])
 - Defense, Strategy, Acquisition, and Resourcing (DSAR)
 - or
2. Logistics Fellowship, Penn State University



c. Certification

In order to full fill the executive-level requirement from Level III, one of the following schools will fulfill the certification requirement:

1. **Certification:** Cost Estimating and Analysis, 289 certification, NPS
2. **Certification:** Lean Six Sigma Black Belt
3. **Certification:** Certified Professional in Supply Management (CPSM), Institute for Supply Management (ISM). (*old title, Certified Purchasing Manager [CPM]*)
4. **Certification:** Certified Supply Chain Professional (CSCP), American Production and Inventory Control Society (APICS)
5. **Certification:** Certified in Logistics, Transportation and Distribution (CLTD), APICS
6. **Certification:** Certified Federal Contract Manager (CFCM), National Contract Management Association (NCMA)
7. **Certification:** Certified Professional Contract Manager (CPCM), NCMA

d. Cost

This model uses current education and training systems already being employed by the Marine Corps, and a cost analysis was beyond the scope of this research.

2. Self-Directed Route Level III

Marines not selected by the Top-Level Schools board can pursue domain expert via the self-directed route.

a. Experience

Domain-expert candidates will need nine years of successful tour within their PMOS.



b. Training

Marines will pursue training via Defense Acquisition University (DAU) for Life Cycle Logistics Level III, as shown in Figure 26.

1. The following courses are required for the education standards for DAU Life Cycle Logistics Level III:
 - LOG 340 Life Cycle Product Support (**Resident, TAD required**)
 - LOG 350 Enterprise Life Cycle Logistics Management (**Resident, TAD required**)
 - CLL 005 Developing a Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP)
 - CLL 015 Product Support Business Case Analysis (BCA)
 - CLL 020 Independent Logistics Assessments

And one of the following options should also be chosen:

- ACQ 265 Mission-Focused Services Acquisition (R)
- ACQ 315 Understanding Industry (Business Acumen) (R)
- BCF 215 Operating and Support Cost Analysis (R)
- LOG 211 Supportability Analysis (R)

c. Certification

In order to fulfill the executive-level requirement from Level III, **one** of the following schools will fulfill the certification requirement:

1. **Certification:** Cost Estimating and Analysis, 289 certification, NPS
2. **Certification:** Lean Six Sigma Black Belt
3. **Certification:** Certified Professional in Supply Management (CPSM), Institute for Supply Management (ISM). (*old title, Certified Purchasing Manager [CPM]*)
4. **Certification:** Certified Supply Chain Professional (CSCP), American Production and Inventory Control Society (APICS)



5. **Certification:** Certified in Logistics, Transportation and Distribution (CLTD), APICS
6. **Certification:** Certified Federal Contract Manager (CFCM), National Contract Management Association (NCMA)
7. **Certification:** Certified Professional Contract Manager (CPCM), NCMA

d. Cost

This model uses current education and training systems already being employed by the Marine Corps, and a cost analysis was beyond the scope of this research.

1. DAU two courses are the resident course for Level III and an average of three weeks of TAD will be required. All other courses are distance learning, and no extra cost will be incurred.




Figure 26. Level III Career Path Summary

E. CHAPTER SUMMARY

This model uses current education and training systems already being employed by the Marine Corps. This model is merely formalizing a path that reduces the learning curve on technical MOSs and creating a career path for the Marine Officers that want to stay in their PMOS to improve their domains. Of note, due to its community-specific design, this model will not apply to every officer and should not be viewed as a one-size-fits-all model for every community. APPENDIX C has a detailed list of supply officers, 3002, Domain Expert Recommended Billets.



VII. CONCLUSION

A. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH

This research is solely focused on the prospects of implementing domain expertise into the supply officer field. To achieve brevity and to avoid convoluting the findings in the supply officer MOS with the specific technical complexities of other officer MOSs, many other communities were not analyzed. This does not suggest that only the supply officer MOS is ideal for implementation. It is quite the opposite; our thesis project views other technical MOSs that may benefit from domain expertise as an area of consideration beyond the scope of this research. Therefore, future research utilizing this thesis project as a template for analysis is recommended in the following communities: Manpower (0102), Intelligence (0202), Logistics (0402), Communications (0602), Combat Engineers (1302), Cyberspace (1702), Financial Management (3404), Communications Strategy and Operations (4502), Judge Advocates (4402), Military Police (5803), Aircraft Maintenance (6002), Aviation Supply (6602), Air Command and Control (7202), Pilots, and other combat arms communities interested. The fields with specific MOSs identified were selected because of the technical background necessary to effectively perform the tasks required within those fields. This makes these ideal communities fields for domain expert implementation. The pilot and other combat arms are only suggestions, but the extensive analysis is necessary since these communities heavily rely on generalists and command for officer promotions.

B. CONCLUSION

The objective of this thesis project was to introduce and analyze a new concept to Marine Corps officer talent management. It further provides a background explaining how our current structure came into existence followed by a thorough and relevant literature review that introduces positive effects of dual-track careers in the private sector. A data analysis from our manpower systems was also provided to identify whether force structure exists for domain experts, but it most importantly identified that domain expertise already exists with our organization. The data chapter is supplemented with an analysis of a supply officer survey conducted to assist this research. Lastly, the thesis project provides a



recommendation and implementation plan providing a pathway to creating domain experts in the supply officer community.

In conclusion, the analysis conducted in this thesis project indicates that the Marine Corps has the potential to save millions of dollars by implementing domain experts in the officer ranks. We further conclude that domain expertise is already in existence. Therefore, we recommend that the Marine Corps endorses expertise as an acceptable career path to bring specialization to our talent management structure and create the efficiencies necessary to operate the organization effectively.



APPENDIX A. SURVEY

Supply Officer Education Continuum Survey

Note. Exclude any training and education received at the Ground Supply Officer's Course (GSOC) when answering the questions below:

1. Supply Officer Information

- Current Rank
- Lieutenant
- Captain
- Major
- Lieutenant Colonel
- Colonel

2. Current Billet Title

3. Total time in a Supply Officer Billets? *No 8006, OpsO, XO, or CO billets.*

4. What Major Subordinate Command (MSC) are you part of?

- Division
- MLG
- MAW
- MEF
- MFR
- TECOM
- INSTALLATIONS
- MARSOC



- Other

5. Have you attended any of the following Schools? Check all that apply

- Logistics Captains' Career Course (LCCC)
- Intermediate MAGTF Logistics Operations Course (IMLOC)
- Navy Supply Schools
- Naval Logistics Integration (NLI) course
- Penn State Fellowship/Executive Program
- Other additional supply or logistics schools

6. What kind of training, if any, have you received from your Major Subordinate Command? Currently and in the past. Check all the apply.

- Requisition Management
- Property Accountability
- Fiscal
- Intermediate Level of Supply (SMU)
- Expeditionary Supply Support (NLI)
- Acquisition & Contracts
- Internal Controls
- Lean Six Sigma
- No Training Program is established
- Not applicable, you are the MSC
- MEF Readiness Training Center (MRTC)
- Other Supply Related Functions

Please list any good experience here.

7. Are you or were you responsible for fiscal in your most current Supply Officer billet?



- Yes
- No

8. How much O&M (plus exercises) money do you or did you manage during the most current Supply Billet? Drop down.

- \$0-1 Million
- \$1-3 Million
- \$3-5 Million
- \$5-8 Million
- \$8-11 Million
- \$11-15 Million
- \$15-20 Million
- \$20-< Million

9. While filling a Supply Officer billet, have you received Fiscal Training? *Taught by supply or comptroller personnel.* Check all that apply:

- Standard Accounting Budgeting and Reporting System (SABRS)
- SABRS Management Analysis Retrieval System (SMARTS)
- Procurement Request (PR)-Builder
- Invoicing, Receipt, Acceptance, and Property Transfer (iRAPT), (formerly Wide Area Work Flow).
- Defense Travel System (DTS) for Supply Officer/Fiscal Roles.
- SERVMART
- FUEL purchases
- Appropriation Law
- Fiscal Law
- Budget Execution



- Other, please list _____
- Not applicable

10. Do you believe that you would benefit from an Advanced Supply Officer's course?

Not at all	Somewhat	Extremely
1	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	9 10

11. Do you believe that you would benefit from an Advanced Supply Officer's course online? Similar to EWS distance learning

Not at all	Somewhat	Extremely
1	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	9 10

Extra comments

12. What areas of supply would you benefit from the most if an Advanced Supply Officer's course was implemented?

- Requisition Management
- Property Accountability
- Fiscal
- Intermediate Level of Supply (SMU)
- Expeditionary Supply Support
- Acquisition & Contracts
- Internal Controls
- GCSS-MC
- DTS
- Personal Effects Trends
- Other Supply Related Functions

13. If you were given a choice to become a domain expert in supply, would you select that career path?



Domain Expert definition. You will receive advance supply training at the Advance Supply Officer School, serve a second tour in Supply Account (MEU, MARSOC, CYBERCOM, INTEL). Later, compete for an MBA in supply chain management via the Commandants Professional Intermediate-Level Education Board (CPIB) to serve and mentor young supply officer in crucial Supply Billets (MEFs DIV, MLG, WING G4s) and later in vital billets (SMU, DLA, LOGCOM).

Pros	Cons
-Advance Supply School	-No resident LCCC or EWS
-MBA	-Smaller chance for selection to O5 Command
-Only Supply Billets	-No B-Billets

Yes, I would want to be a Domain Expert

No, I only joined to be a Commander or MAGTF Officer

14. Do you have any recommendations that will benefit this research?



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APPENDIX B. SCHOOL DESCRIPTION

Intermediate MAGTF Logistics Operations Course (IMLOC)—“The IMLOC program of instruction advances student knowledge on the Marine Corps Planning Process, focusing on logistics, managing unit training and readiness, conducting operational planning and execution, and exercise design. The course produces expeditionary logistics instructors (ELIs) (AMOS: 0477)” (Marine Corps Logistics Operations Group, 2018).

Logistics Captains’ Career Course (LCCC)—“Located at Fort Lee, VA, the resident portion of LCCC is 20 weeks and divided into two phases. LCCC provides company grade officers an advanced learning environment focused on staff officer planning, company command, multifunctional logistics at the tactical and operational levels and exposure to Unified Action Partners (UAP)” (Army Logistics University, 2018).

Naval Logistics Integration (NLI)—Training that relates to the Maritime Strategy, Naval Operations Concept, and warfighting capabilities. It focuses on Navy/Marine Corps integration during expeditionary operations.

Navy Supply Schools, The Supply Officer Department Head Course (SODHC)—“The SODHC is a four-week course that prepares Ensigns through Lieutenant Commanders to assume the duties of the Supply Officer on a ship or submarine. SODHC includes training in Supply Management, Food Service, Retail Operations, Disbursing Management and Postal Operations” (Navy Supply Schools, n.d.).

Penn State Fellowship/Executive Program—Provides an understanding of the key functions within supply chain management. While a holistic perspective is important, functional knowledge has to be grasped first. Programs are ideal for individuals who are new to supply chain responsibilities or those wanting to learn about the specific issues in each key supply chain function.



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APPENDIX C. 3002 DOMAIN EXPERT RECOMMENDED BILLETS

GRADE	PRIMARY MOS	BILLET MOS	UNIT NAME	UNIT UIC	UNIT MCC	UNIT RUC
O3	3002	8301	1ST MAR SPEC OPS BN MSOR	L001MU	1MU	20901
O3	3002	8301	1ST RAD BN I MEF	M21571	174	21580
O3	3002	8301	2D MAR SPEC OPS BN MSOR	L001MR	1MR	20903
O3	3002	8301	2D RAD BN II MEF	M21591	175	21590
O3	3002	8301	2D SUP BN CLR 25 2D MLG	M27110	15J	27110
O3	3002	8301	3D MAR SPEC OPS BN MSOR	L001MX	1MX	20908
O3	3002	8301	3D RAD BN III MEF	M21541	1LB	21540
O3	3002	8301	7TH COMM BN III MEF	M21635	1G7	21635
O3	3002	8301	8TH COMM BN II MEF	M21640	1G8	21640
O3	3002	8301	9TH COMM BN I MEF	M21670	1G9	21670
O3	3002	8301	CE 11TH MEU I MEF	M20161	1ET	20177
O3	3002	8301	CE 13TH MEU I MEF	M20173	1ES	20173
O3	3002	8301	CE 15TH MEU I MEF	M20310	1FR	20310
O3	3002	8301	CE 22D MEU II MEF	M18032	1FT	20179
O3	3002	8301	CE 24TH MEU II MEF	M18045	1ER	20180
O3	3002	8301	CE 26TH MEU II MEF	M18038	1FS	20181
O3	3002	8301	CE 31ST MEU III MEF	M20175	1EP	20175
O3	3002	8301	CE MHG I MEF	L001F5	1F5	20372
O3	3002	8301	CE MHG II MEF	M20360	1F2	20361
O3	3002	8301	CE MHG III MEF	M20381	1F6	20381
O3	3002	8301	CLB 11 (11TH MEU) 1ST MLG	M20195	167	28390
O3	3002	8301	CLB 13 (13TH MEU) 1ST MLG	L28391	1UR	28391
O3	3002	8301	CLB 15 15TH MEU 1ST MLG	M28392	1US	28392
O3	3002	8301	CLB 22 (22D MEU) 2D MLG	M20197	152	20197
O3	3002	8301	CLB 24 (24TH MEU) CLR 27 2D MLG	M20199	1UV	20199
O3	3002	8301	CLB 26 (26TH MEU) CLR 27 2D MLG	M20198	1UW	20198
O3	3002	8301	CLB 31 (31ST MEU) CLR 37 3D MLG	M29048	1EN	29048
O3	3002	8301	HQTRS MAR SPEC OPS SCOL MARFORSOC	M20911	1MS	20904
O3	3002	8301	INTEL BN SPEC OPS SPTGRP	M20985	1MZ	20909
O3	3002	8301	LOGISTICS BATTALION MSOSG MARFORSOC	M20975	1MY	27380
O3	3002	8301	MARCOR EMBASSY SECURITY COMMAND HQTRS	L00R01	R00	54050
O3	3002	8301	MARFORCYBERCOM	L001RA	1RA	20390
O3	3002	8301	SPT BN MSOSG MARFORSOC	L001ML	1ML	20920
O4	3002	8302	1ST SUP BN CLR 15 1ST MLG	M28310	1Y9	28310
O4	3002	8302	1ST SUP BN CLR 15 1ST MLG	M28310	1Y9	28310
O4	3002	8302	2D MAINT BN CLR 25 2D MLG	M27121	15H	27121
O4	3002	8302	2D SUP BN CLR 25 2D MLG	M27110	15J	27110
O4	3002	8302	2D SUP BN CLR 25 2D MLG	M27110	15J	27110
O4	3002	8302	CE MHG I MEF	L001F5	1F5	20372
O4	3002	8302	CE MHG II MEF	M20360	1F2	20361



O4	3002	8302	CE MHG III MEF	M20381	1F6	20381
O4	3002	8302	GRD SUPP SCHOOL MCCSSS TRNG CMD PERM PERS	L02J15	J15	31316
O4	3002	8302	GRD SUPP SCHOOL MCCSSS TRNG CMD PERM PERS	L02J15	J15	31316
O4	3002	8302	HQBN 1STMARDIV	L00121	121	11001
O4	3002	8302	HQBN 2DMARDIV	L00122	122	12001
O4	3002	8302	HQBN 3DMARDIV	L00124	124	13001
O4	3002	8302	HQMC DC I&L	L00QAM	QAM	54008
O4	3002	8302	HQMC DC I&L	L00QAM	QAM	54008
O4	3002	8302	MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS COMMAND MARINE SPECIAL OPERATIONS REGIMENT	M38001	063	38440
O4	3002	8302	MARINE SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT GROUP	L001S8	1S8	20905
O4	3002	8302	MLG HQTRS 1ST MLG	L001MT	1MT	20902
O4	3002	8302	MLG HQTRS 3D MLG	M28315	1Y1	28305
O4	3002	8302	MLG HQTRS 4TH MLG	M29017	1CE	29005
O4	3002	8302	MLG HQTRS 4TH MLG	M29054	SR2	20016
O4	3002	8302	CE 5TH MEB MARFOR CENTCOM	L001DX	1DX	20130
O4	3002	8303	HQMC DC I&L	L00QAM	QAM	54008
O5	3002	8303	CE I MEF	M20146	1C0	20371
O5	3002	8303	CE II MEF	M20133	1F1	20361
O5	3002	8303	CE III MEF	M20129	1C1	20381
O5	3002	8303	HQBN 1STMARDIV	L00121	121	11001
O5	3002	8303	HQBN 2DMARDIV	L00122	122	12001
O5	3002	8303	HQBN 3DMARDIV	L00124	124	13001
O5	3002	8303	HQMC DC I&L	L00QAM	QAM	54008
O5	3002	8303	HQMC DC I&L	L00QAM	QAM	54008
O5	3002	8303	HQMC DC I&L	L00QAM	QAM	54008
O4	3002	8303	LOGISTICS MODERNIZATION TEAM (LMT) EAST	L00U87	U87	31001
O4	3002	8303	LOGISTICS MODERNIZATION TEAM (LMT) EAST	L00U87	U87	31001
O5	3002	8303	LOGISTICS MODERNIZATION TEAM (LMT) EAST	L00U87	U87	31001
O4	3002	8303	LOGISTICS MODERNIZATION TEAM (LMT) WEST	L00W04	W04	33060
O5	3002	8303	LOGISTICS MODERNIZATION TEAM (LMT) WEST	L00W04	W04	33060
O4	3002	8303	LOGISTICS MODERNIZATION TEAM (LMT) WESTPAC	L00U76	U76	20230
O4	3002	8303	LOGISTICS MODERNIZATION TEAM (LMT) WESTPAC	L00U76	U76	20230
O5	3002	8303	MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS COMMAND	M38001	063	38440

830X Billets 3002 ASR
73 419 17%

BILLET MOS	Total
8301	33
8302	22
8303	18
Grand Total	73



APPENDIX D. 3002 LTCOL COMMAND OPPORTUNITY

BOARD	MOS	ELIGIBLE POPULATION	Removed by Request (RBR)	RBR %	CONSIDERED POPULATION	SELECTED	SEL % FROM CONSIDERED	SEL % FROM ELIGIBLE POP
FY15_LTCOL_All	ALL	989	343	35%	646	137	21%	14%
FY15_LTCOL_3002	3002s	41	10	24%	31	5	16%	12%
FY16_LTCOL_All	ALL	855	309	36%	546	154	28%	18%
FY16_LTCOL_3002	3002s	38	9	24%	29	7	24%	18%
FY17_LTCOL_All	ALL	853	292	34%	561	142	25%	17%
FY17_LTCOL_3002	3002s	31	8	26%	23	5	22%	16%
FY18_LTCOL_All	ALL	859	299	35%	565	168	30%	20%
FY18_LTCOL_3002	3002s	33	11	33%	22	4	18%	12%
Average for all LtCols=	ALL	889	311	35%	580	150	26%	17%
Average for 3002s=	3002s	36	10	27%	26	5	20%	15%
							Selection Opportunity	Selection Eligibility



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