Contracting in Complex Operations: Toward Developing a Contracting Framework for Security Sector Reconstruction and Reform

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Abstract

Scholarship on private military and security companies largely focuses on their regulation and oversight as security and reconstruction service providers. It gives scant attention, however, to their role as *institutional reformers, advisors, and trainers*. This report presents findings of an in-depth case study on the challenges of procuring advising and training services in Afghanistan. The study is grounded in the analysis of 77 confidential, semi-structured interviews with elite and mid-level officials embedded within the Afghan defense and interior ministries, national army, and national and local polices forces and further supported by 261 Afghanistan training and advising contract documents obtained via Freedom of Information Act request. We evaluate an existing contracting framework for the purchase and integration of complex products with this data and find that rules, relationship strategies, governance mechanisms, and mutual understanding are critical in security sector reform (SSR) training and advising contracts. However, reliance on the private sector to provide these services will likely remain high, thus, a sharper focus is necessary on mutually beneficial outcomes that retain flexibility and accountability over the long run. To achieve these outcomes, greater attention is needed to hiring the right people, contract design must balance requirements specificity with flexibility, and contract management activities must seek to bridge gaps among the critical actors involved with respect to roles, responsibilities, and critical capabilities. Successful outcomes will ultimately depend on hiring the right people, continuous communication and coordination, clearer metrics of performance, and greater accountability for fulfilling core mission goals.

Key words: contingency contracting; private military and security contractors; security sector reform; security assistance; military advisors; Afghanistan

Acknowledgments

About the Authors

Nicholas J. Armstrong is the senior director for research and policy at Syracuse University's Institute for Veterans and Military Families (IVMF). Dr. Armstrong's research focuses on the public management and civil-military relations aspects of US defense and veterans affairs policy, to include topics such as security assistance and reform, government contracting, collective impact organizations, and public–private partnerships. Before joining the IVMF, he was a research fellow with the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT), an interdisciplinary center co-sponsored by Syracuse University's College of Law and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. Dr. Armstrong is also a non-resident fellow with the Centre for Security Governance, a non-profit think tank dedicated to the study of security transitions in fragile, failed, and conflict-affected states.

A US Army veteran and former artilleryman (2000-2008), Dr. Armstrong served for two and a half years deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Bosnia. Armstrong held leadership positions at the platoon and battery levels and staff positions at the infantry battalion and division levels. He also served as speechwriter to the 10th Mountain Division commanding general and, previously, aide-de-camp to the division's deputy commanding general. Armstrong's awards and decorations include two Bronze Star Medals, the Combat Action Badge, and the Ranger Tab.

Dr. Armstrong is a graduate of the US Military Academy at West Point (B.S.) and the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University (Ph.D., M.P.A.).

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Dr. Van Slyke's research focuses on government contracting, public–private partnerships, strategic management, government–business relations, and policy instruments. Specifically, he focuses on contract design, management, and monitoring, and on contract workforce and capacity issues. His 2013 book, *Complex Contracting: Government Purchasing in the Wake of the US Coast Guard's Deepwater Program,* with Professors Trevor Brown and Matthew Potoski, is published by Cambridge University Press and received the American Society for Public Administration's Best Book Award (2014). His other publications have appeared in well-

known journals such as *Public Administration Review*; the *Journal of Public Administration, Research and Theory*; and *Organization Science.*

Dr. Van Slyke is an elected Fellow (2010) of the National Academy of Public Administration, a recipient of the Birkhead-Burkhead Professorship for Teaching Excellence Award (2006-2010 & 2014-2018), the Beryl Radin Award (2007) for Best Article published in the *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, and the Best Article Award (2002) and the Best Conference Paper Award (1999) from the Academy of Management's Public-Nonprofit Division. He is a co-editor of the *Journal of Public Administration, Research and Theory* and the *Journal of Strategic Contracting and Negotiation.*

Prior to becoming an academic, Dr. Van Slyke worked in the private sector as a project manager in the commercial infrastructure field, then worked in state government, and then for a national nonprofit organization. He holds a Ph.D.in public administration and policy from The Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy at the University at Albany.

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Work Accomplished

The research team for this project was Nicholas J. Armstrong and David M. Van Slyke of Syracuse University. A stratified, purposive sample of 77 military and civilian elites (28 ministerial advisors, 29 embedded field advisors and commanders, and 20 experts and external observers) participated in confidential, semi-structured interviews. In addition, 261 official documents related to Afghanistan training advising contracts were obtained via Freedom of Information Act request.

For this study, the authors conducted extensive primary qualitative research, analyzed secondary data and reports (unclassified and restricted), and developed an analytical approach for considering how to maximize mission outcomes in contracting relationships between host national, military, and civilian personnel, and private security contractors. The findings focus specifically on three key elements: Trainer-adviser selection; contract design for specialized human resources; and accessing and leveraging thin labor markets for expert personnel.

Summary of Findings

This paper presents preliminary findings on perspectives gained from 77 ethnographic interviews with diverse stakeholders involved in Afghan security ministry and security force (ANSF) development and official training and advising contract records obtained via FOIA. Our findings suggest that rules, relationship strategies, governance mechanisms, and mutual understanding are critical to using contracts to purchase complex services for foreign military advising and security sector reconstruction and reform (SSR). Drawing on private military security contractors for training and advising services and leveraging their expertise and resources in a complementary and coordinated form with uniformed and civilian personnel is critical for building effective indigenous governance capacity in fragile and weak states. This remains true as the US and its partners enter a new phase of working with indigenous forces in Iraq and Syria to combat ISIS. Consequently, the US government needs a contracting framework that deliberately considers the multifactorial challenges of SSR training and advising in complex environments.

Work Disseminated

This project was disseminated in two conference presentations and one paper has been submitted for peer-reviewed publication.

Presentations

Armstrong, N. J., D. M. Van Slyke, D. M. (2014, May 13-15). "Contracting for Reform: The Challenges of Procuring Security Training and Advisory Services in Fragile Environments" Presented at AFCEA Acquisitions Research Symposium, US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

Armstrong, N. J., and D. M. Van Slyke. (2013, June 20-22). "Contracting in Complex Operations: Developing a Contracting Framework for Security Sector Reconstruction and Reform." Presented at Public Management Research Association Conference, Madison, WI.

Project Narrative

Over the last two decades, the international community has invested enormously in reforming defense and internal security institutions in fragile states. Security sector reform (SSR)[1] is an established security assistance model that is based on improving the effectiveness and democratic governance—e.g., civilian control and accountability—of a state's security forces (Hänggi, 2009; OECD-DAC, 2007). Yet, these programs have produced mixed outcomes at best despite an extensive commitment of financial and human resources (Brzoska & Law, 2007; Scheye & Peake, 2005; Sedra, 2010). Failures and setbacks have led some experts to conclude that internationally led SSR—and postwar statebuilding more broadly—are simply overambitious, if not misguided, given the historical record (Andersen, 2011; Egnell & Haldén, 2009; Herbst, 2004). Others argue that mixed results suggest that the international community should renew its commitments but implement SSR programs more judiciously (Call & Wyeth, 2008; Paris & Sisk, 2009; Scheye, 2010).

A key element of smarter security assistance programming involves improving the use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) as training, advising, and mentoring service providers to host national security institutions. In conflict prone states especially, embedded advising has become central to internationally led attempts to build human capital and administrative capacity and infuse democratic substance into state institutions. Its emergence as a core activity and deeper, more interpersonal form of technical assistance "represents a paradigmatic shift in post-/in-conflict statebuilding" (Rosén, 2011, 152).

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[1] SSR is a multinational policy tool aimed at transforming the security architecture (military, intelligence, and law enforcement services; defense and interior bureaucracies; legislative oversight committees; and special courts) in transitioning and postconflict countries into more effective, professional, and democratically accountable state institutions. The term "security sector" typically applies to this set of core state actors, but it also can include civil society and non-state armed groups, such as local militia, NGO watchdog groups, and the media. (Hänggi, 2009; OECD-DAC, 2007)

However, the relative lack of attention on the private sector's role in providing these services over the last decade is remarkable (Schwartz & Church, 2013). Even now, given the rapid and brutal rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the US is poised to take swift action to send military trainers and advisors back into Iraq. However, given popular aversion to sending ground troops to engage in yet another conflict, private contractors are likely to pick up a substantial share of the task, with a relatively smaller number of US military providing specialized support and oversight. Notably, the US Army Contracting Command posted a new solicitation in August 2014 for "Security Assistance Mentors and Advisors (SAMA) services in Iraq,"[2] which was followed shortly thereafter with a $500 million White House request to Congress for appropriations to train and equip pro-Western forces in Syria and Iraq (Lake, 2014; Newmyer, 2014; Robson, 2014).

The shifting trend toward using contractors to advise and assist foreign ministries and security forces is clear. Yet, the literature on PMSCs focuses almost exclusively on contractors' (defined in the broadest sense) legal status, regulation, and oversight as providers of physical security, logistics, and reconstruction services (Avant, 2005; Chesterman & Lehnardt, 2007; de Nevers, 2010; Singer, 2008). With rare exception (Ebo, 2008; Mancini, 2005), most research presumes that contractors are simply "objects of [security reform] … [and] bodies to be regulated" (Cusumano, 2010, 4) rather than reformers and change agents of foreign governments who influence local development, build capacity, and implement foreign policy in conflict-prone states. Instead, research on this theme is limited to explaining why states outsource foreign military and police training so often (Cusumano, 2010; Kinsey & Patterson, 2012; Martin & Wilson, 2011),

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[2] See US Army Contracting Command solicitation number: W560MY-14-R-0004. Available at: https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=2eec28ef1768665f2a6310916c50dff9&tab=core&_cview=0

highlighting calls for stronger government regulation and oversight of human rights and rule of law promotion, and recommending stronger analysis of whether privatization of training services saves money (Avant, 2002).

Avant's recommendation still holds true more than a decade later. The United States has appropriated more than $104 billion for Afghanistan's reconstruction through mid-2014 (SIGAR, 2014). Of this, more than $5.5 billion has been awarded to contracting firms, namely DynCorp, L3/MPRI (now Engility), and Blackwater (now Academi)—to provide such training and advising services (Appendix C). Five and a half billion dollars is hardly an insignificant figure. And now, given the White House's half-billion dollar *initial* request to reinitiate training and advising in Iraq and expand training efforts to Syria, using PMSCs as military trainers and advisors remains an important, yet understudied topic.

This study contributes a deeper understanding of the challenges procuring training and advising services through an in-depth case analysis of training and advising efforts in Afghanistan from 2009-2014. While some work has been done on contracting for complex products, there is a dearth of scholarship that examines the complex acquisition of products in contingency environments. In this paper, we focus on the work that contractors do in contingency environments. Specifically, we examine PMSCs that work with allied militaries, government civilians, donor government representatives, and host national leaders in the Afghan ministries of defense and interior. The work scope in question is advising senior Afghan ministerial leaders and training host nation forces that have responsibilities to enforce the law and maintain security. As noted, few other empirical studies have actually reviewed a broad range of contract documents and drawn on substantive qualitative interviews with subject matter elites specifically with respect to the people that execute these contract requirements for advising and training services. Our findings offer

perspectives gained from 77 ethnographic interviews with diverse stakeholders involved in Afghan security ministry and national security force (ANSF) development. The findings suggest that better rules, relationship strategies, governance mechanisms, and mutual understanding are necessary to ensure positive outcomes when contracting for training and advising services.

The Complexity of Procuring SSR Training and Advisory Services

In recent decades, private contractors have played a predominant role in international statebuilding and security sector reform. The scale of reform activities (OECD-DAC, 2007; UN, 2008) and the demand for human and financial capital for capacity and statebuilding efforts in these settings far exceed the capabilities of any one donor[3] government's expeditionary capacity—the United States included. Consequently, donor states rely on a security network of governmental (civilian and military), non-governmental, and private sector organizations to conduct these missions (Cusumano, 2010, 8). Coordination among these myraid actors alone presents significant challenges to implementation and oversight.

General challenges aside, hiring private contractors to provide technical assistance and strategic advice on institution building in fragile and postwar states has its own unique set of complications.

First, the demand for training and advisory services varies widely over time and space due to evolving mission requirements. Uncertainty is one of few sureties in fragile and postwar states. Priorities change often with the existing political climate and security environment. Consequently, it is difficult to write contracts with the necessary flexibility that simultaneously promotes relationship continuity between advisors and their host nation counterparts and facilitates the reallocation of available and new talent based on changing requirements. There are also significant contextual differences (e.g., ministerial development, basic entry training) and varying functions (e.g., military operations, law enforcement) with corresponding capacity and skill needs. Accordingly, foreign trainers and advisors' skills and expertise required across these different

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[3] We use the term donor state throughout this paper to represent nations providing financial, material, or human resources in support of SSR programs in fragile states.

settings vary too. For example, military and police trainers providing basic training instruction to new military or police recruits typically follow a set program of instruction (POI) with little discretion for deviation. Alternatively, embedded field or ministerial advisor positions vary widely in their daily tasks and interactions depending on the operational context (strategic vs. tactical). This variation is most prevalent at the ministerial level, which demands a careful mix of expert advisors—military officers, defense and law enforcement civil servants, and contract advisors— to develop enterprise-level capabilities[4] (Gerspacher, 2012; NTM-A, 2011; Panarelli, 2009; author interviews, Appendix A[5]).

Second, there is a significant challenge in identifying truly qualified trainers and advisors across the board. This is most acute during large-scale operations. There is great reliance on the private sector and other coalition partners, especially for police training (Perito, 2004). Training and advising foreign security forces requires professionals with a unique combination of traits including extensive technical or subject matter expertise; advanced cultural and language training; and distinct personality attributes associated with the ability to influence and resolve conflicts in austere foreign environments (Bayley and Perito, 2010, 120-124, 149-150; Gerspacher, 2012, 2; NTM-A, 2011; Panarelli, 2009, 3). These highly specialized and desirable experts are in limited supply and difficult to identify without a robust personal network in the military or law enforcement communities. For example, the most qualified US military individuals for these positions are retired military officers and non-commissioned officers with extensive strategic planning, special operations, or logistics backgrounds. Likewise, top candidates from the law

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[4] For example, human resources, logistics, and acquisitions, as well as more specialized policy and functional capabilities, such as strategic planning, intelligence collection, counternarcotics, and internal affairs.

[5] This was also confirmed in several interviews with NATO advisors to the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Note: we granted all interview participants confidentiality for this study due to the sensitive nature of topics discussed. We provide a full listing of participants' rank, position, and related details in Appendix A.

enforcement community typically have experience in federal (e.g., the Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Marshals, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program), state, or metropolitan law enforcement (e.g., New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston) agencies with specialized investigation, anti-gang, counternarcotic, and counterterrorism subunits.

Moreover, the United States' federal system complicates its ability to provide consistent rule of law and police training abroad. The United States lacks a national constabulary force— similar to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, French Gendarmerie, or Italian Carabinieri—with a fixed set of national policing standards. Consequently, the pool of available US police trainers and advisors varies significantly in experience, education, and exposure to different state and local policing traditions and criminal procedures, which may result in uneven or inconsistent advice and knowledge transfer.

Third, mission goals and outcomes—often highly subjective—are difficult to specify and measure in training and advising service contracts. In fragile states mired in conflict, the need to generate security forces quickly at the expense of quality has significant implications for contract design. Contracts, standards of performance (SOP), and programs of instruction (POIs) are designed for expedience, are mainly focused on basic individual tasks, and are assessed primarily by easily quantifiable input, activity, and output metrics, as opposed to outcome-oriented and quality-based measures. For example, NATO's police training model in Afghanistan is an eight-week long introductory training course, designed to rapidly develop uniformed police. By comparison, most Western police training programs require a minimum of six months in a classroom setting and another minimum of six months of probationary supervision in the field. Given limitations in a combat zone, including widespread illiteracy among recruits, NATO and

US soldiers and civilian contractors are left to evaluate, often in an ad-hoc fashion, what they can—e.g., graduation and attrition rates, marksmanship scores, and basic tasks such as wearing a uniform correctly and extending common courtesies (author interviews, Appendix A). These metrics say little, however, about larger institutional trends of professional development and whether these efforts are tied to longer-term goals of security, stability, and sustainability.

Consequently, contracting for these types of complex services produces highly specialized investments in recruiting, selecting, training, and retaining qualified contract personnel. As Williamson notes (1979, 243), the need for specialized types of human capital represents more "idiosyncratic investments." These investments often demand robust oversight structures to govern the activities of human assets providing complex services in a limited labor market. The contracts governing these types of exchanges are often with monopsonistic buyers. They are also typically incomplete, lacking fully predetermined requirements due to the need for flexibility to address unforeseen contingencies. This incompleteness produces higher transaction costs for the internal provision of the service—the make—of the buyer. Moreover, like any sunk cost, buyers cannot easily recover investments in human assets engaged in a complex service if the relationship with the seller later expires.

Designing contracts for training and advising services also demands a degree of task specificity and certainty that seldom exists. Writing rules into formal and complete contracts for contract personnel that possess the right range of skills, capabilities, and experiences is also difficult to standardize in a legal document. Professional qualities—e.g., the appropriate exercise of discretion and cultural savvy on sensitive policy issues with senior officials—are difficult to specify and standardize. Over-writing the contract can constrain labor flexibility, yet too little

specificity on uncontractible needs or individual qualities risks a failure of common understanding about what personnel attributes are needed.

Donor governments contract for the building of host nation capacities in a limited pool of advisors and trainers. This limited labor market poses a significant contract design and management challenge because the assets are neither firm specific, easily recovered, nor readily evaluated due to the lack of measurable individual output as it contributes to changes in host-nation outcomes. In part, to be a smart buyer of these services, the government needs to have its own in-house expertise to assess capabilities and performance adequately. Given the types of capacity gaps in the government's acquisition workforce (DoD and DoS IG, 2011; GAO, 2012b; SIGAR, 2009), the buyers design contracts that measure performance on the input side and leave sellers accountable only for meeting initial staffing thresholds and initial outputs (i.e., number of personnel trained). As a result, the contracts often lack measurable indicators that hold specific individuals, units, or organizations accountable for long-term training and advising outcomes (particularly the foreign security force's performance), especially once the training or advising services conclude.

Donor governments hiring private contractors for capacity building also risk placing contracted personnel in a divided principal scenario (Cusumano, 2010, 27). This is a dilemma in which contractors work under conditions of conflicting interests between their donor government clients and the host nation partners with whom they seek cooperation and influence. Successful SSR requires that host-nation actors to adopt—i.e., "locally own" (Donais, 2008)—any specific reform measures or programs. Worst-case scenarios, while extreme, are still plausible under such arrangements, for example, a contractor may withhold information or collude with either the host nation partner or donor state client, or both, to protect his long-term interests (Avant, 2005, 125).

Like other complex investments, the human assets described in this paper offer services that are highly asset specific, not easily observed or measured, and occur in highly uncertain and discontinuous environments. The reputation of sellers and the trust established between buyers and sellers is essential to successful contractual relationships (Williamson 1981, 561-566).[6] Therefore, within the organizational ecology of security sector reform services in fragile states, donor and host nation principals should jointly develop contracted governance structures that align with mutual goals and provide opportunity for frequent interaction and exchange. However, given the conditions and the uncertainty associated with providing complex services in fragile states, it is difficult to design a contract that spells out governance mechanisms for frequent interaction to build mutual understanding and trust while also preserving flexibility and discretion and minimizing the risks of long-term lock-in.

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[6] This is a point we address in our findings as the original contract between DOD and MPRI changed when DynCorp won the contract in 2010, leaving the US government, donor governments, and the Afghan Ministry of Defense to reestablish working relationships with new contractor personnel.

Case Overview

This section briefly introduces NATO's organization of training and advising efforts across the Afghan security ministries and national security forces from 2009-2014 (the focus of this case study). Readers should note, however, that civilian contractors provided direct training and advising support to Afghanistan security force development on all levels since 2004. Accordingly, the latter half of this section provides a historical overview of how NATO used contracts to support these efforts throughout the Afghanistan conflict.

Organization of NATO-ISAF's Training and Advising Efforts

Since 2009, the NATO-ISAF command structure has consisted of three major organizations: the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A); ISAF Joint Command (IJC); and a NATO Special Operations Element. The NTM-A was established November 21, 2009, as a comprehensive, multi-national effort to develop the capabilities of the Afghan Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which includes both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and National Police (ANP) forces.[7] By 2012, NTM-A grew to approximately 6,000 trainers and advisors from 38 contributing countries located in Kabul and at 82 sites across Afghanistan (Farrage, 2012). Roughly, half of these personnel were Americans; approximately 1,000 of them were civilian contractors (Farrage, 2012; GAO, 2012b). Within the Afghan ministries of defense and interior, NTM-A assigned teams of military officers, government civilians, and civilian contractors to advise Afghan ministerial officials and staff on developing enterprise level leadership and organizational capacity necessary to generate and

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[7] NTM-A "supports the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in generating and sustaining the ANSF, develops leaders, and establishes enduring institutional capacity to enable accountable, Afghan-led security" (NTM-A, 2011b).

sustain the uniformed ANSF—for example, human resources; recruiting; operations and planning; intelligence; logistics and acquisitions; and communications and public relations. The bulk of ministerial advisors to the most senior Afghan ministerial positions were military officers, though civilian contractors and government civilians also served as direct advisors to senior Afghan officials. By mid-2012, 306 ministerial advisors (of all types) were working with the MoD and ANA General Staff officers, while 206 ministerial advisors were working with the MoI (Farrage, 2012). This figure also included 60 US DoD government civilians who were members of the Ministry of Defense Advisors[8] (MoDA) program (DoD, 2011). Outside of the Afghan ministries, NTM-A served the role of a training organization for the Afghan security forces. Over time, as the Afghan forces developed their own internal training centers and academies, NTM-A trainers' roles evolved from providing direct instruction to new Afghan military and police recruits to advising, assisting, and providing quality assurance over Afghan instructors who lead the basic training.

NTM-A was not the only NATO organization that interacted with Afghan forces, however.[9] The ISAF Joint Command (IJC) comprised the bulk of armed international security forces conducting counterinsurgency operations in support of the Afghan government. This organization spans across six operational regions of Afghanistan: capital, north, east, west, south, and southwest. Each regional command (RC) aligned (e.g., "partnered") with Afghan security forces in the field. Relationships between NATO and Afghan units are diverse and evolving

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[8] The MoDA program is a partnership between DoD and the US Institute of Peace to provide civilian expertise in executive-level defense and police management functions such as policy development, financial management, human resources, acquisitions, and logistics (Garamone, 2011). By employing DoD civil servants as ministerial advisors, the MoDA program also served an ancillary function of exposing Afghan ministerial leaders (nearly all former military officers or militia leaders serving in *de jure* civilian positions) and their staff to democratic security governance norms, namely civilianization and civilian control (Schear, Caldwell & Digiovanni, 2011, 138).
[9] Several other government agencies from the United States and NATO coalition member states have provided advisors to the Afghan government and security sector. For example, the US Departments of State and Justice provide advisors to the Afghan Ministry of Interior to assist in the development of rule of law, corrections, and other specialized law enforcement functions.

although, generally, NATO units conduct combined, partnered unit operations with Afghan security forces.[10]

In addition to partnered unit operations, IJC embedded small teams of NATO advisors, both military and civilian contractors (mostly former law enforcement professionals), within Afghan units on multiple levels to provide additional support in developing the Afghan security force capabilities and professionalism. Names for these teams have evolved considerably over time—Embedded Training Team (ETT), Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT), Security Force Advisory and Assistance Team (SFAAT)—though their basic function has remained largely constant from inception. As Afghan units matured and developed capabilities to plan and lead operations independently, both NATO's embedded advisors and operational units gradually reduced, or transitioned, their support to allow the Afghan forces to assume greater responsibility for local security. Notably, NATO's various special operations forces also conducted both operational partnering and embedded advising roles.

Contracting Support to Afghan Security Force and Ministry Development

Through July 2014, the United States has appropriated $104.1 billion to Afghanistan's reconstruction since late 2001 (SIGAR, 2014, 70). It holds a dubious record of effectively programming this flood of security assistance. The Congressional enactment of the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC); the establishment of the Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR); and the numerous audits and investigations into fraud, waste, abuse, and contract mismanagement are no surprise, given the massive resource

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[10] An example would be a US infantry platoon conducting a combined security patrol with an Afghan army infantry platoon. In theory, both units plan and execute operations as one team. Naturally, this requires the units to develop cooperative relationships, especially between unit leaders.

commitment, challenging environment, and myriad actors involved. More concerning, however, is the CWC's finding that between $31 billion and $61 billion of US taxpayer funds were lost to fraud and abuse. Congress's decision to seal hearing records until 2031 is remarkable (Hodge, 2011).

Nearly two-thirds of the total figure spent in Afghanistan (more than $57.33 billion) has been directed toward the development of the ANSF through the establishment of the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), intended to pay for its training, equipping, operations, and sustainment. After examining the contracts, we conservatively estimate that the Unites States has spent at least $5.5 billion since 2004 on the procurement of trainers and advisors to Afghan security forces—just over 5 percent of the total funds allocated for Afghanistan's reconstruction (Figure 1). Using US government spending records, we constructed a table of these major contracts and task orders, broken down by recipient firms, US government purchasing agencies, Afghan partner institutions, and total obligations (Appendix C, Table C2).

Figure 1. Training and Advising Contracts as a Proportion of Overall US Reconstruction Spending in Afghanistan.

Training and Advising Contracts as a Proportion of Overall U.S. Reconstruction Spending in Afghanistan ($ Billions)
(October 2001 to July 2014)

Total U.S. Reconstruction Spending ($104.1 B)[1]

Afghan Security Force Fund Activities ($57.3 B)[2]

$46.77

$57.33

$51.83

$5.51 [3]

Est. Fraud/Abuse Losses: $31-61 B[4]

Non-Security Reconstruction Activities

Other ANSF Support and Development Activities

ANSF Training and Advising Contracts

Sources:
1. SIGAR.
2. SIGAR.
3. www.usaspending.gov
4. CWC.

Sources: (CWC, 2011; US SIGAR, 2014; www.usaspending.gov)

Five and a half billion dollars is no small figure for such a highly asset-specific investment whose impact is difficult to ascertain. Training and advising foreign security forces is a boutique service and often more difficult to measure and evaluate compared to the larger and more easily evaluated services for logistics support; engineering and construction projects; and procurement of weapons, equipment, and other material goods. For example, the US Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP IV) is a 10-year, $150-billion contract spread across four companies: DynCorp, KBR, Fluor, and SERCO. Contrast that with the US Army's ongoing

Afghan training and advising contract with DynCorp worth $232 million over two years and *three orders of magnitude* smaller.

Over the past decade, three firms—DynCorp, International; Engility (formerly L3/Military Professional Resources, Inc.); and Academi (formerly Xe and Blackwater USA)—have been the leading PMSCs providing training and advising services to the Afghan army, national police forces, and the Afghan Defense and Interior ministries (Figure 2). From 2004 to 2010, DynCorp was the leading provider of police trainers and law enforcement advisors, although Academi provided some specialized support to the Afghan Border Police. Likewise, MPRI was the leading provider of trainers and advisors for the Afghan Army and Ministry of Defense. Following a contested rebidding process in 2010, DynCorp took over as the lead training and advising service provider across the Afghan security forces. Contract oversight responsibility for the Afghan army and police training programs fell between the DoD and the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). In 2009, the DoD assumed full control of contract oversight and administration for all training and mentoring services provided to the ANSF, including both the ministries of defense and interior and the Afghan military and police.

Figure 2. Timeline of Afghan Training and Advising Contracts/Task Orders, 2004-Present.
Source: http://www.usaspending.gov

Case Analysis and Discussion

Research Method

This in depth case study on contracting support to Afghan security force development is supported by data collected between March 2012 and May 2014. Primary data consists of 77 confidential, semi-structured interviews (Creswell, 2009, 179) with military and civilian elite stakeholders.[11] Participants represent a stratified-purposive sample (Teddlie & Yu, 2007, 79-80)

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[11] The average length of interviews is 71 minutes. All participants provided written consent to the confidential interview and audio recording following an approved protocol.

of individuals who have served directly in an advisory, training, or partnered capacity with Afghan security forces; who have directly observed NATO-ANSF partnered or partnering activities; or who have been involved in the evaluation or program management of such activities. Exploring their interactions and observations of others' interactions with Afghan security forces during their period, or periods, of service in Afghanistan was critically important.[12] To maximize representativeness, participants were recruited based on four overarching, nested strata: level of analysis; alignment with core Afghan security institutions; type of partnering engagements; and participant attributes (Figure 3).[13] External observers of NATO partnering efforts and subject matter experts were recruited to enhance validity through triangulation.

Interviews consisted of a core set of open-ended questions on the participants' background, interactions with and observations of Afghan security forces and ministry officials, influencing approaches, and observations of contractor support to the training and advising mission (Appendix B). The authors interpreted interviews by content analysis (Krippendorf, 2004) through the use of codes that link raw data to broader analytical concepts and theories (Saldaña, 2013, 3-5). Coding of the data related to contractor support to Afghan security force training and development, references to civilian contractor trainer and advisor employment, collaboration, performance, and

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[12] Stratified-purposive sampling was necessary due to the multilayered vertical and horizontal alignment of NATO personnel with the Afghan National Security Forces. Random sampling was both impractical and unhelpful due to the time required to build trust and credibility with this population and the research need for candor and contextual richness.

[13] The stratified sample of participants is quite diverse and largely reflects the NATO-ISAF command structure, where the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan focuses on institutional development of the ANSF (i.e., recruiting, training, equipping, and ministerial advising) while the International Joint Command focuses on operations with Afghan army and police units in the field, including providing embedded advisor teams and ground forces to conduct combined operations.. It includes individuals who have personally advised Afghan officials, from Afghan ministers and deputy ministers down to the lowest Afghan Army platoon leader or district police chief. Consideration was given to participants' time and location of service in Afghanistan to ensure a primary analytical focus on the period from 2008 to 2013 (e.g., the Afghanistan surge) when NATO's focus on ANSF partnership and development was at its greatest. Notably, several participants served on multiple tours in Afghanistan, with experience dating back to 2003. Participant location also is an important factor, to ensure adequate variation of experiences among tactical level participants.

oversight with coded segments varying from individual sentences to whole paragraph responses (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Code labels were then organized into a hierarchy of thematic categories for further analysis.

In addition to these interviews, we collected a substantial number of supporting documents. These documents were obtained through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the US Departments of Defense and State. In total, we obtained 261 contract documents (more than 5369 total pages) related to five primary Afghan security sector training and advising contracts with DynCorp, International and L3/MPRI. Notably, contract statements of work and quarterly/weekly progress reports are included among this data (see Appendix D, Table D1 for a complete listing). Although significant portion of this data is redacted due to security, privacy, and proprietary reasons, the data nevertheless provides important insight into the level of specificity on selection criteria, roles and duties of contracted advisors and trainers, and types of periodic information and reporting requirements.

We also collected more than two dozen official Afghan national security related documents and ministerial policies and unclassified NATO materials related to the Afghan training and advising mission. Examples of these additional documents are provided in Appendix E.

Figure 3. Stratified Sampling Tree Map.

1. Level of Analysis	Strategic		Tactical	
2. Afghan Core Security Institutions	Afghan Ministry of Defense Afghan Ministry of Interior		Afghan National Army Afghan National Police Afghan Local Police	
3. Type of Partnering Engagement		Ministerial Advising	Embedded Training, Mentoring, and Advising	Partnered Field Operations
4. Participant Attributes		Senior Ministerial Advisors - Military - DoD Civilians - Civilian Contractors	Embedded Trainers, Mentors, Advisors - Active Duty - National Guard - Military Police - Civilian Contractors	NATO Ground Forces - Battalion Leaders - Company Leaders - U.S. Army Special Forces (ODA)
5. External Observers and Subject Matter Experts	NATO Training Mission-Afg. Staff Ofc. of the Sec. of Defense-Policy U.S. Institute of Peace DynCorp		NATO-ISAF Cdr's COIN Advise & Assist Team U.S. Army Human Terrain Teams RAND Corp. DynCorp	

Findings

The data reveal a range of contract design and oversight issues associated with ministerial advising, tactical training and advising, contractor individual characteristics, and performance. We highlight three key issues for this report: the selection processes for trainers and advisers; contract design implications of a highly asset specific investment in human intelligence and capability requirements; and labor market issues in terms of availability of contracted personnel to fulfill the operational requirements associated with ministerial advising and training. Note that these issues are not mutually exclusive. There is interdependence among them, especially in how participants articulate them in operational terms.

Trainer-Advisor Selection

There is significant need for more robust screening of personnel to serve as trainers and advisors, especially at the ministerial level. This need is difficult to meet because there is no "Yellow Pages" list of personnel to search from of individuals with the training, socio-cultural-political skills, and defense and security policy backgrounds to enter a fragile state setting and build relationships with host nationals in the highest positions of influence and authority.

For PMSC firms responding to request for proposals (RFPs), there is often a statement of work (SOW) or standards of performance (SOP) document that outlines key provisions of what contracted personnel are expected to do, but most of these are technical elements associated with development of: protocols, processes, and metrics for collection and reporting of information; training doctrine and plans; and quality assurance mechanisms. Appendix D provides snapshots of five separate contract statements of work for advisors working in the Afghan Ministry of Defense and Interior. These SOWs and their fit with the relative needs of ministerial officials in conflict-prone environments such as Afghanistan are often misaligned because the contracting officials working for the sponsoring donor governments, such as federal civilian acquisition officials in the DoD, lack expertise in the capabilities and requirements needed to fulfill the mission, goals, and meet the performance targets. The two excerpts provided below indicate only a slight degree of increased attention to advisor selection from none at all in 2005 (Figure 4) to some in 2010 (Figure 5). Still, having bachelor's degree and "ten or more years of work experience in the subject matter area at the appropriate level" is far from a stringent set of selection criteria.

Figure 4. Least prescriptive screening requirements: Excerpt of L3/MPRI Statement of Work, Contract W91CRB-05-D-0014, 2005, p. 5.

> The Contractor shall support OMC-A by providing a team of highly qualified experts capable of satisfying deliverables and tasks as required. Contractor shall have personnel on station in Kabul, Afghanistan not later than 30 days after contract award.

Figure 5. Most prescriptive screening requirements: Excerpt of DynCorp Statement of Work, Contract W91CRB-10-C-0030, 2005, p. 3.

4. <u>PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS</u>. The general qualifications for most positions are listed below while detailed qualifications or exemptions are provided within the detailed position description:

4.1. Bachelors Degree desired for most positions in a related field from an accredited college or university;

4.2. Ten or more years of work experience in the subject matter area at the appropriate level for the position assigned;

4.3. Possess computer skills in Microsoft Office Suite (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and Outlook);

4.4. Possess strong communication and interpersonal skills;

4.5. Possess strong organizational and analytical skills;

4.6. Ability to effectively communicate, advise, and train others in principles of the associated duties ranging from military staff through operational functions; or specific areas of expertise.

4.7. There at five (5) skill levels required (additional qualifications listed below):

4.7.1. Senior Mentor

4.7.1.1. Senior Mentors assist in the development of senior MoD officials by providing leadership training, and coaching assisting their Afghan counterpart in completing requirements for the Afghan National Army. Equivalent experience of a 05-06 Battalion or Brigade commander.

4.7.1.2. Senior Mentors may lead or participate on a team of international and Afghan advisors providing technical assistance (advice and guidance, training, organizational development and other capacity building services) to counterparts within the MoD.

Having institutional policy-making experience in a defense ministry is an important skill set to possess, but many of the contractors who are hired are former military officers who reached the rank of lieutenant colonel (O-5) or colonel (O-6) because of their field level tactical experience. In the majority of cases, most of these individuals' prior military experience was not spent working in a political-bureaucratic environment such as the Pentagon, or in a Secretary of Defense or service Secretary's staff posting, serving in a joint liaison role with other service branches, or interacting with elected or appointed policy makers.

A consequential tradeoff follows. Selecting by rank and grade may provide a degree of field-level legitimacy with both uniformed colleagues and host-nation officials with prior military service, and perhaps some degree of subject matter expertise. However, this does not guarantee that these individuals have both the relationship-building skills necessary to develop trust and credibility and begin to influence the thinking and actions of their host-nation counterparts especially on policy and public administration issues. As one contracting officer readily admitted:

> *Okay, so the contracts were a bit of a mess and that's in multiple ways. The whole office CONUS [in the US] didn't seem to have a very good handle how many people they had in theater. They also did not always hire people that fit the duty description for that particular trainer or advisee. … We try to use flexible language. That gives us some leverage so we can interchange people and such. But at the same time some of that flexible language gives too much leniency to a contractor to actually hire a person to fill that position because they'll go to the wrong end of the spectrum [of advisor skills]"* (author interview).

While the case could be made for being more selective of the personnel hired to fill positions, in the end, PMSCs must meet the performance objectives outlined in the contract. If a contract calls for 85 personnel with certain types of skills, the contractor is going to be held more accountable for whether they hired 85 personnel to fill those positions and less so for whether the personnel were the most qualified, best experienced, or had other relevant advising skills.

Our interviews reveal a range of outcomes associated on the selection issue, with some

asserting that the contracted personnel were qualified and others stating that their work experiences

with contractors were less successful. As one interviewee said in a response representative of the

majority of our interviews:

> *You have some that were very good at working with their Afghan counterparts, guys that would sort of work that soft approach. And then you would have those other guys who would sort of try to force things through. It goes back to selection of who you're hiring and their experience and how they approach things. This goes to I think a contradiction with the Army because they like to do things quickly. They like to hire en masse. If you want mass, you're probably going to get a whole lot of folks you don't really need.* (author interview)

Hiring the *right* advisers is challenging work. Having a successful military record or

reputation at the tactical level does not necessarily translate to the ability to train, advise, and teach.

Surely, demanding advisor selection based on quality, is important, but if contracting award

officials have no more information than those who wrote the RFPs and SOWs, then quality

becomes an ephemeral and ambiguous criterion. Beyond "expertise," advisers must also

understand local context and be able to socialize an idea to influence policy incrementally, at the

margins, and over time in a way that avoids threatening their Afghan counterparts.

Because the contracts were to advise and train in the Afghan Ministry of Defense and the

Ministry of Interior, the PMSCs had a range of contract personnel they were responsible for hiring.

On the issue of police training, one of our interviewees offered a representative perspective that

highlights points above:

> *You need a police officer, so you hire one and stick him in the job. Are you going to train him to become a trainer? No! You're going to stick him in that job. That's a huge mistake because a police officer knows how to practice policing. They know how to arrest someone, how to investigate, how to patrol, they know the practice of policing in the United States. How do they build someone else's capacity? Just mentoring and saying to a police officer in Afghanistan 'this is how I do things at home,' is useless because they're not going to do it this way over there. So, there's a belief in Washington, and in the West in general or the donor community I should say [that when it comes to] providing troops or police officers*

or any capacity builders that we just grab somebody who has that expertise back at home and then we don't transform them in to an adviser or mentor. We just stick them in a situation, in a different country, having to do completely different things with no authority, and we hope that they'll just build the capacity of someone. It's a huge problem! (author interview)

In the Afghan defense ministry, this situation was best illustrated by a participant who offered a representative perspective about a contractor's past training and experience as a guide for their work as an adviser:

> *I was slightly underwhelmed with the performance of several contractors in terms of not only how they were doing the advising mission but also their credentials for doing so. ... We're talking about building a Ministry of State at the highest levels of a sovereign nation and several of the contractors that I worked with had never ever worked at an institutional level above division. Some had never been above brigade. Several of them have never worked at a headquarters staff, or in the Pentagon, or in any kind of civilian governance institution that they were either principally in charge of or in a very senior assisting role— it just struck me as increasingly odd. Not that some of them weren't good people, not that that some of them didn't have great combat records, or military backgrounds, but they simply did not have the depth of experience or perspective to do their jobs at the level of, or [at the] remuneration that we're paying them.* (author interview).

Selecting the right people is an investment in quality and success, but this mindset was absent. The GAO's mantra is that $1 of audit saves $10 on implementation. One interviewee offered a similar perspective:

> *I think if anybody wanted to spend one more dollar adding a little more scrutiny to the preparation of advisors and screening of advisors, I would think that would be worth probably $10 in savings of having the wrong people out there—not only the wrong people, but people that create systems and problems that cause more problems in the long run.* (author interview)

This call for an investment in preparing individuals to serve as advisors was echoed in quite different ways across the respondents. The issue of differentiating successful advisers from those perceived to be less successful is well illustrated by the following interviewee:

> *I actually believe that the key to all good advising is based on three things: relationships, relationships, relationships. Everybody places, in my opinion, far too much reliance on this subject matter expert business. I learned a long time ago that just because you're a*

subject matter expert or just because you have an eagle [Colonel's rank] on your collar does not make you an expert in everything, and when it comes to building relationships, a lot of people are just not cut out for that. Without the relationship I do not believe you can have the difficult, sometimes even contentious, discussions required to effect real meaningful change. I think one error we make across the board, not just in MoDA [Ministry of Defense Advisors program], is just throwing people into advisory jobs, calling them advisors, and they're in many cases more detrimental than they are effective. So I think there has to be a real hard selection process to pick the right people. In fact, I've told [a General], for example, if he were putting together a team of let's say 10 guys to go to—I'll pick a country—Guatemala, I wouldn't care what the other nine were like, but I would want the team leader to be the Zen master relationship builder because with that you can bring in subject matter experts all day long, but if you don't have the relationship, a subject matter expert is a waste of time. They just come in and talk and the host may be deferential or he may just totally ignore you. (author interview)

This point is contrasted by, although it does not necessarily dispute, the important role that subject matter experts and experience do play for advisors. This "pro/con reflection" on the value of subject matter experts is a recurring narrative illustrated among our respondents, each with his or her version of the story. This example captures the narrative well:

Just because you wore a badge doesn't mean you could be a good police advisor. I got a guy who's a deputy sheriff in Norman, Oklahoma in a two-car police force. He knew how to give out tickets, he knew how to break up a bar fight, but as far as being a police professional to advise a country on how to set up their police force, no. I mean I had another guy that was a retired inspector—that is a special advisor to the police commissioner of the city of New York, okay? Contractors didn't want to touch him but he was probably the best qualified guy to be an advisor, to be a police advisor. They didn't want to touch him. It scared the daylights out of them. He knew too much. If he knew too much then he's liable to fix it and then we're liable to go home and the gravy train's gone. So he ended up getting frustrated. He ended up going home and going back to work for the Police Commissioner of New York City. (author interview).

A point made in this narrative, is that the New York City inspector made the other contractors nervous because they were afraid that if he fixed the problems, they would be out of jobs. This attitude is illustrative of the interdependent relationship between contract design and selection. We turn next to the difficulty of contract design. Following that discussion, we will look at the labor market issue for a more refined understanding of why advisor selection is so challenging when using PMSCs.

Contract Design Implications

The data suggest a central challenge to contracting for training and advising services is that quality is not given serious consideration and that weakly specified hiring requirements—in terms of personnel experience, skill sets, training, and education—seemed to almost perpetuate the contractor's role in service provision. As one of our respondents put it, if performance were seriously considered and "if people went over there knowing that they had to stay until it was finished, I guarantee you it wouldn't be 10 years" (author interview).

For many of the reasons we cite above, there is a balance, when contracting for training and ministerial advising within the MoI and MoD, between rigidly trying to specify every contingency and leaving the contract incomplete to ensure flexibility and discretion in how a contractor provides services. However, what we found in reviewing the documents and from the interviews is a consistently inconsistent process. Selecting and placing advisors in their first, best use starts with a thorough definition of the overall requirement. One contractor remarked how important it was for organizations to carefully specify their requirements at the outset because "that gives you the ability to choose people who check multiples boxes or it gives you the ability to say, 'We just want somebody who checks this one box because that's all we need'" (author interview). Another contractor noted how "there's a lot that's being left to interpretation … that's problematic because you don't necessarily have a standardized service that you provide in these countries" (author interview). Yet, one US military participant familiar with the Afghan training and advising contracts noted that requirements for advisors, "…like, 'I need two people to advise the Minister of Defense. I need three people to advise this type of person and they have to have this skill set, yada, yada, yada. Those were not written well" (author interview). Another US contracting official

noted in NTM-A's defense that the organization (and overall mission) was simply not organized in a way to provide robust oversight on complex service contracts like training and advising.

> *Something as big as all the advisors, that would be like moving a ship. You can't just turn on a dime with these kind of requirements, so the best tool was having an educated contracting officer's representative, which requires training, requires somebody that's dedicated to the unit…but those unit's don't have somebody that's a contracting officer's representative. [Rather, the individual assigned by the field unit to contracting officer representative duties is really] also a gunner or they're a, you know, a cook or they are something else, but they were going on out on the battlefield to do a combat mission and they're also being told they're going to monitor a contract" (author interview).*

As a result, respondents mostly described their frustration with input- and output-based performance metrics that focused on filling slots over finding the right people. As we noted in the preceding section, selection of the right people as operationalized in clear contract requirements can often pose a challenge for any contracting officer. Given how performance is evaluated and penalties are assessed, some firms may respond to the structural incentives in place and hire personnel who meet the letter of the requirement, but perhaps not the spirit of the intent.

On the other hand, military and civilian personnel serving in trainer and advisor roles spoke of contractors with vast institutional knowledge, experience, and capabilities who could serve in additional roles and create value, but who complied with the letter of the law in their contracts and refused to provide information or become involved in certain training activities because that's "not what their contracts incentivized" (author interviews). Depending on how the contract is written and with performance measures that were more often than not ambiguously defined and with little monitoring taking place, some contractors with the necessary skills and capabilities simply complied with the contract requirements but did not go above and beyond those specific statement of work requirements.

One participant expressed frustration with contracted personnel whose duties changed from being trainers to strictly evaluators—"We're only evaluators, not trainers. Our job isn't to train them on these skills, it's to evaluate the training and say whether it's good or not" (author interview). In this interview, what frustrated the army officer was the absence of a team approach to fulfilling the mission goals. This individual noted that the contractors in most cases had more experience, had been on the ground longer, possessed more institutional memory and capacity, but were only going to do what their contract required them to do. There was no goal alignment; just separate rice bowls, a reference to individual parties with their own incentives to maximize the level of resources they could secure. Specifying, requiring, measuring, incentivizing, and penalizing mission performance is difficult to write in a contract. As a result, stories like these are obstacles to success. Contracting for a collaborative team approach to problem solving is actually difficult in ways that Williamson and other contract theorists note (Battigalli and Giovanni 2002, Hart and Moore 2008, Williamson 1996).

This is not a normative case of contractors being effective or not. It is about how to align the overlapping goals, actions, and preferences of military, civilian government, and contractor personnel. This was simply missing in much of the contract requirements and the manner in which each of the parties in the conflict environment were socialized to working with one another. To be fair, other respondents, when discussing contractors, noted, "We couldn't live without them. We couldn't do our jobs without them" (author interview).

The role and responsibilities of contractors spanned the continuum of respondent perspectives. Most significantly, this centered on the question of whether contractors were performing inherently governmental roles and responsibilities. Some respondents made clear that "the contractors don't speak for the government" (author interview). Other respondents argued

that contractors were more effectively embedded into mid-level institutional relationships with their host nation counterparts and that while ultimate policy decision-making does not take place at that level, implementation most certainly does. While policy-making may ultimately be decided at the top of ministries, proposals, ideas, and their eventual implementation certainly emanated from middle-rank officials who were receiving guidance and feedback from contractors. Lack of recognition in the formal contracts of this effort frustrated numbers of active-duty military and government civilian personnel. In many of the contracts not only were there not individual performance accountability standards and agreements but also there were few, if any, clear mechanisms for rewarding effective personnel and addressing or dismissing ineffective personnel.

Therefore, the contracts and SOPs of trainers and advisers—covering a small yet important role that PMSCs play in rebuilding governance capacity in the Afghan MoD and MoI—were viewed as rigid and incomplete, highly specified on input and output metrics, and divorced from meaningful measurement of outcomes and mission attainment. Respondents were clear that there is insufficient contract management and oversight capacity within the government. Quality is not written into the contracts (author interviews; SOP, Appendix D). This suggests an evaluation and accountability problem and that on-the-ground performance expectations are unrealistic.

On this last point, respondents pointed to DynCorp's work developing a national police force. As we heard repeatedly, context matters. For instance, the starting points are completely different between the US and Afghanistan in terms of defense policy, homeland security, border patrol, and law enforcement. Yet training programs were developed for Afghan personnel who were illiterate, who had no prior law enforcement experience, and who were nevertheless expected to receive a "Basic Eight" week training course and then go out and competently police their communities. Viewed narrowly in terms of the contract, this program is effective and the

contractor met his targets. From an implementation and sustainability perspective, this program is neither likely to be operational long-term nor lead to meaningful changes in policing and culture.

Thin Labor Market

When government decides to contract rather than produce or provide a service internally and with its own employees, the fundamental decision is often influenced by the degree of market competition that it can harness and leverage for its own goals, whether that is cost, quality, effectiveness, or simply scale of provision. However, in contracting for ministerial advisors and tactical trainers in Afghanistan, several issues shaped the degree of competition and available supply. As we noted above, advisors and trainers are complex human assets because of the investments that have often been made in their skill sets, experiences, training, and education. Indeed, it is fair to characterize the advisers needed to develop, shape, influence, implement, and evaluate institutional capacity building in the MoD and MoI as specialized investments and not as assets that are commercially available or that fall into the government-furnished categories often associated with other forms of acquisition and procurement. Evident in the timeline we provide above, the PMSC landscape is thin in terms of the number of firms responding to RFPs and competing for contract opportunities.

As the Afghan mission grew, the pool of qualified trainers diminished and, consequently, so did the overall skills of the workforce (author interviews). This diminution of a skilled workforce has several causes.

First, there was a change in the war's strategic focus, and as a consequence of this re-focus, the original mentoring contract held by MPRI was rebid. MPRI had been in Afghanistan working with the MoD and Afghan National Army since April 2005 on training and advising

issues, while DynCorp had been working with the Ministry of Interior since 2004 on police training, opium poppy eradication, and building the training and advising capacities of the MoI. The only other PMSC was Academi (formerly Xe and Blackwater), and it was engaged in training and advising the Afghan Border Police. In 2010, MPRI's contracts ended and DynCorp won the competition to provide services not only to MoI but also to the MoD. This contract significantly changed the market of available contract personnel. Moreover, substantial controversy encircled this set of RFPs and awards, including bid protests to the GAO (GAO, 2010). In the end, MPRI largely transitioned out of contracted relationships with the MoD and considerable time was lost, almost two years by most accounts, between the departure of MPRI and its personnel and DynCorp's arrival and standup of its own personnel.

Second, lost during this contract transition period were institutionalized relationships and extensive, often well-qualified, manpower. A number of MPRI personnel were offered an opportunity to apply for positions with DynCorp and did so, but according to the interview respondents—and verified in the secondary contract documentation—the new contract was less financially generous and had more performance targets on the input and output side, with clearer financial penalties for failing to meet the indicators. As a result, respondents universally observed a tradeoff between selection quality and fit relative to scale. For example, a story we heard repeatedly was that one benefit of the contract competition was that poor performers were going to be "sent packing." However, under the new contract, there was a stated need for 2,000 personnel to assume various positions. Near the end of DynCorp's fielding process they only received 1,200 qualified applicants. But with clear performance penalties of $10,000 per day for failing to have 2,000 personnel in place, we were told of a feverish effort to find another 800 people to fill the slots. So, as one respondent noted, "they left under bad terms and now they're bringing them back"

(author interview) while another respondent suggested that because the contract was designed wrongly in terms of the SOPs, but included penalties, the contractor was "fielding people that shouldn't be fielded, but they have to or they will be fined so many tens of thousands per day" (author interview).

This challenge was later accommodated slightly in 2012 by force reductions within NATO following the Afghan troop surge, specifically within the NATO Training Mission (NTM-A) command where all ministerial advisors (military, government civilians, and contractors) were assigned. The majority of ministerial advisors were US military officers, typically the rank of colonel. The NTM-A drawdown and reorganization significantly reduced the total number of ministerial advisors, leaving a number of lower ranking individuals and contractors to pick up the remaining slack: "I've never seen so many [Colonels] in my life. But what's happening now with that draw down is they're getting pulled and they're going away and lower ranks are coming in" (author interview). Noted by a range of respondents, many of these very individuals were those with laudable combat records, but "underwhelming" credentials or institutional experience for ministerial advising.

The respondent quotes reflect and the documentation confirms that there was a high degree of contractor personnel within the PMSCs as a result of contracts being rebid; that the quality of the personnel was proportionally less than the demand and what the contract SOPs stated; and that an emphasis on holding the contractor accountable, an important component in any contract, gave way to penalties being applied on the input side of the equation. As a result, the need to fill slots was viewed as more important than selecting quality personnel relative to the performance penalties assigned. It is unclear whether there was any consideration at the time of rebidding and changing the PMSC to the negative externalities and compromises that might result, in terms of

institutional knowledge and of established ministerial advising relationships, ground level trust, and legitimacy between donor-funded PMSCs and host-national ministerial officials. Our respondents suggest that this issue was not on the radar of contracting officials, and results, as best these authors can ascertain, appear to confirm this.

A Clear Need for a SSR Training and Advising Contracting Framework

In general, the need for a contracting framework increases as governments around the world, especially the United States, enter into longer-term contractual relationships for the procurement of complex services and products. Such contracts are often expensive, controversial, and viewed as high-risk. Brown, et al. (2010) developed such a framework for the procurement of complex products. In this study, we draw upon their framework and apply it to the procurement of advising and training services, a complex *service*, in Afghanistan. In applying this framework, we evaluate its utility relative to the manner in which SSR services are contracted and the corresponding successes and limitations in a conflict-prone environment.

We also draw upon transaction cost economics to understand complex services that are developed and implemented by human capital assets—themselves often the products of substantial investments in training, education, capabilities, and experiences—in a market that tends to be monopsonistic on the buyer side and is limited on the supply side because of the largely symmetric interdependence between buyers (donor states) and sellers (contractors). While Brown, et al. also use a transaction cost approach, their focus is more on a complex product—an integrated system of ships, aviation, information technology, and logistics—as opposed to centering on individuals as complex assets. However, in both the procurement of complex products and services, ensuring

goal alignment with a focus on win-win outcomes, accountable performance, and cost effectiveness is critical.

In the case of Afghanistan, what the Brown, et al. framework might recommend is consistent with what participants in this study perceived as necessary for managing such a complex contracting relationship. Interview and documentation suggest the existing governance structure is insufficient, if not absent. Managing a complex contracting relationship, in other words, requires governing to solve a collective action problem and guiding each side's incentives away from pursuing their own self-interest at the expense of win-win cooperation. Developing the right governance mechanisms—ones that give rise to coordination and information exchange while promoting flexibility and accountability—are important for creating value in challenging environments that require complex service investments.

Both complex services and products have multiple components integrated into a system that addresses various missions and that frequently consists of highly uncertain design specifications. In this regard, donor states and contractors (buyers and sellers) often have high uncertainty about the service or product, its production costs, quality tradeoffs, and the value of its capabilities. This is consistent with our preliminary findings of ministerial advising and training in Afghanistan. While SOPs exist and contracts over time, from 2003-2013, have become increasingly formalized with clearer metrics of performance, it is also true that there remains high uncertainty about what capabilities are needed, how they are to be used, and what indicators should be incorporated to evaluate performance and hold the respective parties accountable. In the case of Afghanistan, those results are the degree to which (1) the Afghan army, police, and defense and interior ministries are being effectively trained and developed; and (2) the manner in which

institutional policy is being crafted and implemented in concert with Afghan counterparts. This high uncertainty leads to two important consequences for contract design and management.

First, contract negotiation requires reducing uncertainty so that the product can be specified at contractible levels. Investments in reducing uncertainty are largely asset specific in that they have negligible value outside the contract, resulting in the classic "hold up" problem (Williamson, 1996). For the buyer, the hold-up risk is that once a seller has been selected, no other potential sellers have made the necessary investments, so the advantaged seller may look to change the contract in its favor (David, 1985). Likewise, because the seller has only one buyer for its products, the buyer may also look to change the contract in its favor. These conditions are consistent with the interviews and secondary documentation gathered in this study that highlight mission creep—and contraction—as well as evolving objectives, for which the existing contract provides little flexibility, rapid response, or adaptability. Yet, adaptability in a dynamic environment is one of the factors that can contribute to mission success versus failure.

There appears to be agreement on several levels that SOPs and performance must be more clearly stated, agreed upon, monitored, measured, and evaluated against expected benchmarks or redressed through joint mediation and arbitration processes. However, the specificity of the SOPs and performance measures should not be confused with the capabilities required to achieve important mission goals. The authority to structure work tasks and evaluate performance can become more complicated when government civilians, military, and contractors from a range of countries are supposed to work together in a coordinated and supportive way, especially when control, discretion, and accountability have not been well specified in advance. Given the high degree of turnover among these groups, participants noted instances where the individuals with the most expertise and institutional memory were contractors, but for whom authority over more

macro, mission-oriented responsibilities had not been explicitly delegated. However, a dual-, or even in some cases triple-, hatted military officer may have had little time, knowledge, or interest in some elements of the contract support functions and, thus, delegated tacit authority to a contractor. This scenario presents contract management and oversight challenges in terms of role requirements, work performance, and accountability. Such instances were not found to be rare and isolated, but rather signaled a need to create mechanisms in which parties would work more effectively with one another.

As we note earlier, the specificity and rigidity of SOPs and position requirements and qualifications increased exponentially over time and because of SIGAR, GAO, and CWC investigations and reports. But, this often took place at the expense of positional fit, quality, and the softer and often more uncontractible elements associated with hiring the right people to advise, mentor, and train. As a result, our interviewees suggested that firms aligned their behavior and actions with the manner in which incentives, performance measures, and sanctions were structured. It is perhaps unsurprising then that contractor firms needed to meet their numbers, get bodies into positions, and consumed themselves less with whether they had the right people and capabilities for achieving mission goals—i.e., having relationship builders in place that could effectively work both horizontally across units and divisions and vertically within respective ministries.

It still very much appears, however, the parties recognize that each needs the other. What is much less clear is the extent of PMSC integration into the day-to-day work of providing training and advising services alongside military and government civilian personnel. To our knowledge, there are few, if any, formal statements of governance mechanisms associated with control, authority, delegation of responsibilities, or evaluation that strengthens task and system accountability and transparency within the contracts. This is an area of opportunity to engage the

different actors focused on a common set of mission objectives and provide a level of training about how and to what extent they are responsible for supporting one another's actions through information exchange, coordination, cooperation, and ultimately at times through collaboration. The challenge remains of changing contract requirements, culture, and incentives of teamwork in ways that leverage the combined strengths and experiences of contractor, military, and government civilian actors. However, this is an area ripe for further development and integration into pre-deployment training programs.

Second, contracts for complex products are necessarily incomplete. Even after buyers and sellers have made asset-specific investments to reduce uncertainty, it is not practical for either party to define fully the complex service or products' qualities in a contract (Tirole, 1999). Doing so would both drive up the writing costs associated with specifying every possible contingency and constrain the discretion and flexibility necessary to adapt and resolve unforeseen issues. Consequently, the incomplete terms of the contract are negotiated later as the product is produced or service is performed and the exchange is executed. As we have already noted, there is the perception that the contracts are rigid on the one hand and ambiguous on the other. The rigidity comes from timelines associated with filling positions, meeting the overall stated number of formal positions to be filled, and having a certain number of personnel who fill technical and advising capability needs. But, as has also been suggested, this rigidity can and does actually undermine cooperation and fails to incentivize joint efforts.

Again, we offer a caveat that we did hear of positive and successful contractor relationships with military, government civilian, and host nation counterparts. Unfortunately, it would appear that while these examples are not rare, more often than not, participants reported that relationships do not happen in this way. In part, good outcomes occur because of specific, required skills—e.g.,

the professional maturity and confidence to work alongside host nation counterparts, from senior ministry officials to local unit leader-power brokers—to identify and carefully circumvent a host of often unrevealed preferences that may conflict with long-term mission goals. Therefore, the savvy to inform, persuade, coordinate, debate, and propose new or alternative solutions to policies, doctrine, processes, and procedures across the Afghan security sector is needed. But if this remains rhetoric and simply another policy goal—absent the necessary leadership that rewards mutual engagement and understanding, vigilant oversight, and sanction of failure to pursue interdependent, mutual goals—then success is likely to remain at the tactical level rather than at the strategic.

The Brown, et al., investigation into contracting for complex products devotes little time to complex services, especially those executed by contractors. While they argue that products is a broad noun used to describe a range of 'things'—goods and services—produced by labor, they primarily look at those products that are principally a combination of human and technical inputs. As a result, while their findings are generalizable to other potential complex products, the authors provide little guidance about how variation in context, institutional policy development, and a country's relative stability and level of economic development might affect the implementation and evaluation of contractors delivering complex services. Additionally, they do not focus on complex services whose success is highly dependent on the quality of their asset-specific human inputs. In this study, our interviews suggest that while individual contractor motivations vary and are not as monolithic as the present literature suggests, individual motives interact highly, and are more often aligned, with those they are serving than with their employers' motives. Questions remain, however, about achieving mission objectives post-2014 that center on minimizing the extent to which the U.S. government is locked-into contract

arrangements given both a thin supply market and the need for highly skilled advisors and trainers.

Implications for US Security Assistance Policy and Future Acquisition Research

This report highlights the complexity of procuring security force training and advising services in fragile states. In these settings, donor states face the incredibly difficult task of designing contracts that, on the one hand, are flexible enough to allow for getting the right people in the job —the "Zen, master relationship builders"—and on the other hand, are governed and incentivized in a way that avoids future lock-in.

This case study is relevant given the United States' commitment to assist Afghanistan through 2024 (though tenuous without a signed bilateral security agreement). As long as the United States' partnership with Afghanistan endures, civilian contractors will be required in Afghanistan into the near future. Furthermore, the case illustration of Afghanistan holds more generalizable application to future security assistance environments with a mix of military, government, and civilian contractors providing training and advising services. Broader application is essential given the current US strategic defense guidance proclaiming, "we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations—including those in Africa and Latin America … [and] we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities" (DoD, 2012, p. 3).

The ephemeral promise of a win-win outcome is the contract ideal. Still, policymakers cannot ignore the high transaction costs and complex principal-agent characteristics associated with overseas contracting. Unlike simple products, the terms of exchange for complex services are

likely to be incomplete and to require high discretion and flexibility. However, they should also delimit clear performance standards and accountability measures. Incentivizing contractors to achieve ambiguous goals is problematic, but to say little about expectations in a manner that is measurable risks the inability to monitor contractor performance and preserve accountability. There are, nevertheless, contract design and management tools to get the right people with the right skills in these positions. Varying compensation vehicles, time periods with entry and exit ramps, compete/non-compete clauses, and award fees and penalties are few examples. Most promising, integrated stakeholder governance teams can help with advisor selection challenges and structure expectations and understanding about what goal alignment means under certain conditions. Moreover, they can provide continuous and fully dedicated monitoring, evaluation, and technical assistance in the design and implementation of these contracts.

The focus on SSR contracting and the significance of developing context-specific contract governance mechanisms can serve as a catalyst for new scholarship and policy practice in an evidence-based framework that considers balancing the challenges of contracting for complex products and services with the need for a more integrated social sciences, law, and management approach. These disciplines can illuminate the range of policy environments in which institutions and individuals interact across a host of political, social, cultural, and legal dimensions in fragile governance ecosystems where incentives, rules, cooperation, and understanding shape effective development and implementation of SSR, a critical policy tool of security and economic development. This study on Afghanistan and the lessons presented offer generalizable lessons and contracting principles applicable to other conflict environments in which SSR is critical to stability.

APPENDIX A. Sample of Participants

Table A–1. Strategic Level Participants. (37 Total)

Rank / Grade	Organization	Duty Title(s)	Time in Afghanistan
Ministry of Defense & Afghan General Staff Advisors (13)			
Colonel	US Army, Infantry	Senior Advisor to Afghan Minister of Defense	10 months
Colonel	Canadian Army, Infantry	Senior Advisor to Afghan Minister of Defense	24 months
GS-15*	OSD-DoD	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Strategy and Policy	12 months
		Asst. Chief of Advisors for Afghan Ministry of Defense Development	
Contractor	MPRI	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Strategy and Policy	24 months
Contractor	MPRI	Advisor to Deputy MoD - Intelligence; ANA GS-G2	>12 months
GS-15	OSD-DoD	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Aquisitions, Technology & Logistics	24 months
GS-14	OSD-DoD	Advisor to Deputy MoD - Installation Management	18 months
Colonel*	US Army, JAG	Senior Advisor to MoD Legal Advisor	12 months
		Senior Advisor to ANA General Staff - Legal	
Colonel	US Army, Infantry	Senior Advisor to Chief of Afghan National Army General Staff	12 months
Colonel*	Canadian Army, Infantry	Chief of Advisors, Afghan Ministry of Defense Development	9 months
		Senior Advisor to Chief of Afghan National Army General Staff	
		Senior Advisor to Vice Chief of ANA General Staff	
Colonel	US Army, Special Forces	Senior Advisor to ANA General Staff G3 - Chief of Operations	12 months
Colonel**	US Air Force	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Strategic Communications	12 months
		Senior Advisor to ANA General Staff G3/5/7	
Captain (USN)**	US Navy	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Communications	11 months
Ministry of Interior Advisors (16)			
SES*	OSD-DoD	Chief of Advisors, Afghan Ministry of Interior Development	12 months
		Advisor to Afghan MoI Chief of Staff	
Colonel	U.S. Army, Infantry	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Administration	12 months
GS-15	OSD-DoD	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Administration	12 months
Contractor*	DynCorp	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Administration	48 months
		Senior Advisor to MoI Chief of Staff	
Colonel	US Army, Infantry	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Strategy and Policy	12 months
Colonel	US Army, Infantry	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Strategy and Policy	12 months
Contractor	Coffey Group	DFID Rule of Law Advisor to Deputy MoI - Strategy and Policy	> 12 months
Contractor	MPRI and Dyncorp	Advisor to Director of Transportation (Deputy MoI - Logistics)	> 12 months
GS-15	OSD-DoD	Advisor & Director, MoI Development & Transition	12 months
Colonel	US Army, Aviation	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Counternarcotics	12 months
Colonel	US Army, Aviation	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Counternarcotics	11 months
Contractor	DynCorp	Advisor to Deputy MoI - Counternarcotics	12 months
Lt. Colonel	US Army, Aviation	Senior Advisor to MoI Chief of Afghan Local Police	12 months
Lt. Commander*	US Navy, JAG	Senior Advisor to Legal Advisor to MoI	12 months
		Senior Advisor to Chief of Legal Affairs, Afghan National Police	
		Senior Advisor to Chief fo Afghan Anti-Crime Police	
Colonel**	US Air Force	Senior Advisor to Director, Afghan Public Protection Force	12 months
		Senior Advisor to Director, Afghan Reintegration Program	
Captain (USN)**	US Navy	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Communications	11 months
Office of Administrative Affairs (Cabinet Secretariat) Advisor (1)			
Lt. Colonel	US Air Force	Advisor to Deputy Director General, OAA	12 months
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan Staff and Third-Party Subject Matter Experts (9)			
Colonel*	US Army	Chief of Staff, NTM-A Deputy Commander of Operations	12 months
		Chief, NTM-A Commander's Advisory Group	
Colonel	US Army	NTM-A Senior Contracting Officer	12 months
Captain (USN)	US Navy	NTM-A Command Historian	12 months
Major	US Army	Strategic Planner, NTM-A Commander's Advisory Group	12 months
Major	US Air Force	NTM-A Contracting Officer	12 months
GS-15	OSD-DoD	Director, OSD MoDA Program	N/A
Civilian	US Institute of Peace	Senior Program Officer	N/A
Sergeant First Class***	US Army, Special Forces	Medical Sergeant, ODA	> 12 mo.
		Special Assistant, CJIATF-Shafafiyat	
GS-15	SIGAR	Program Evaluation Director	N/A

*Advised multiple principals

**Advised principals in both MoD and MoI

***Served on both strategic and tactical levels

Table A–2. Tactical Level Participants. (41 Total)

Rank / Civilian Grade	Organization	Duty Title	Intel	Afghan Army		Afghan Police				Primary Location (Province)
			NDS	ANA	ASOF	ANCOP	AUP	ABP	ALP	
Embedded Advisors and Trainers (15)										
Colonel	USARNG, Infantry	Embedded Advisor Group Leader - Corps Level		X						Balkh
Colonel	US Army, Infantry	Embedded Advisor Group Leader - Brigade Level	X	X			X	X		Herat
Colonel	USARNG, Infantry	Embedded Advisor Group Leader - Brigade Level		X				X		Kabul
Major	US Army, Infantry	Embedded Advisor Team Leader - Brigade Level						X		Konar
Major	US Army, Infantry	Embedded Advisor Team Member - Brigade Level		X						Paktika
Captain	US Army, Engineer	Embedded Advisor Team Leader - Battalion Level		X						Konar
Captain	US Army, Infantry	Embedded Advisor Team Leader - Battalion Level						X		Paktika
Captain	US Army, Infantry	Embedded Advisor Team Leader - Battalion Level		X						Zabul
Lt. Colonel*	US Army, Military Intelligence	Battalion Commander	X	X				X		Kandahar
Lt. Colonel	US Army, Infantry	Battalion Commander; Kabul Military Training Ctr		X			X			Kabul
Lt. Colonel*	US Army, Military Police	Battalion Commander				X	X			Kandahar
Lt. Colonel*	US Marine Corps, Infantry	Battalion Commander		X			X			Helmand
Lt. Colonel*	US Army, Military Police	Battalion Commander					X			Kandahar
Captain	US Army, Infantry	Afghan Uniformed Police Trainer / Advisor to Kabul Military Training Center G1		X		X	X	X		Kabul; Khost
Captain	USAR, Military Intelligence	Advisor to Chief of Intelligence, ANCOP / COMISAF CAAT Advisor	X			X				Country-wide
Partnered Operations, General Purpose Forces (12)										
Lt. Colonel*	US Army, Military Intelligence	Battalion Commander	X	X				X		Kandahar
Lt. Colonel*	US Army, Military Police	Battalion Commander				X	X			Kandahar
Lt. Colonel*	US Marine Corps, Infantry	Battalion Commander		X			X			Helmand
Lt. Colonel*	US Army, Military Police	Battalion Commander					X			Kandahar
Lt. Colonel	US Army, Infantry	Battalion Commander		X		X	X		X	Kandahar
Major	US Army, Infantry	Battalion Executive Officer		X			X			Kandahar
Major**	US Army, Infantry	Battalion S3; Brigade S3; Division G5		X		X	X		X	Kandahar; Uruzgan; Zabul; Daykundi
Captain	US Army, Infantry	Rifle Company Commander		X		X	X		X	Kandahar
Captain	US Army, Infantry	Rifle Company Commander		X			X	X		Paktika
Captain	USARNG, Infantry	Rifle Company Commander					X			Badghis
Civilian Contractor	MPRI and DynCorp	Law Enforcement Professional	X				X			Kandahar
Civilian Contractor	MPRI	Law Enforcement Professional	X				X			Logar

Table A–2. Tactical Level Participants (*page 2 of 2*)

Rank / Civilian Grade	Organization	Duty Title	Intel	Afghan Army		Afghan Police				Primary Location (Province)
			NDS	ANA	ASOF	ANCOP	AUP	ABP	ALP	
Partnered Operations, Special Forces (6)										
Major	US Army, Special Forces	Company Commander, 13x ODA					X		X	Uruzgan
Captain	US Army, Special Forces	Team Commander, ODA			X					Zabul
Major	US Army, Special Forces	Team Commander, ODA		X	X					Helmand
Captain	US Army, Special Forces	Team Commander, ODA							X	Kunar
Captain	US Army, Special Forces	Team Commander, ODA							X	Herat
Sergeant First Class***	U.S. Army, Special Forces	Medical Sergeant, ODA / Special Assistant to CG, CJIATF-Shafafiyat			X		X		X	Zabul, Kabul
Third-Party Observers and Subject Matter Experts (12)										
Colonel	German Army, Infantry	Battalion Commander		X		X	X			Kabul
Major**	US Army, Infantry	Rifle Company Commander / COMISAF CAAT Advisor		X		X	X			Country-wide
Colonel	USARNG, Infantry	Commander, Agri-business Development Team		X			X			Nangarhar
Civilian Contractor	MPRI	LEP Program Manager	X				X			Country-wide
Civilian Contractor	Undisclosed PMSC	Program Manager		X	X					Country-wide
Civilian Contractor	Undisclosed PMSC	COMISAF CAAT Advisor		X					X	Country-wide
Civilian Contractor	US Army HTS	Human Terrain Team Social Scientist		X		X	X		X	Kandahar
Civilian Contractor	US Army HTS	Human Terrain Team Social Scientist		X			X			Paktika; Paktiya; Khost
Program Manager	RAND Corporation	Analyst, CJSOTF-A							X	Country-wide
Program Manager	RAND Corporation	Analyst, CJSOTF-A							X	Country-wide
Civilian Contractor	DynCorp	CIVPOL, Program Manger, DynCorp								Country-wide
Civilian Contractor	DynCorp	VP, Training and Mentoring, DynCorp				X	X	X		Country-wide

Served simultaneously in both embedded advising and partnered tactical operations position

** *Served on multiple training or advising deployments*

*** *Served on both strategic and tactical levels*

Acronym Key

ABP: Afghan Border Police
ALP: Afghan Local Police
ANA: Afghan National Army

ANCOP: Afghan Civil Order Police
ASOF: Afghan Special Operations Forces
AUP: Afghan Uniformed Police

CAAT: COIN Advise and Assist Team
COMISAF: Commander, NATO-ISAF
NDS: Afghan National Directorate of Security

APPENDIX B. Semi-Structured Interview Protocol.

	Advisors / Unit Leaders	Contractors	Third Party Experts
Background Information			
1. When you were deployed (mo/yr)?	X	X	X
2. Describe your job while deployed.	X	X	X
3. How were you selected for this position?	X	X	
NATO-ANSF Interaction Context			
4. Could you please describe your experience with respect to training/advising Afghan security forces?	X	X	X
5. Please describe the violence levels.	X	X	X
Socialization Mechanisms			
6. Please share with me your philosophy on partnering, advising, training. Your unit's?	X	X	X
7. Could you describe for me an instance in which you felt that your strategies in working with your counterparts were effective? What do you attribute that success to?	X	X	X
8. Could you describe for me an instance in which you felt that your strategies in working with your counterparts were unsuccessful? What do you attribute that lack of success to?	X	X	X
9. Did you ever experience any resistance or undermining behavior? If so, please describe.	X	X	X
10. What motivated your Afghan partner(s)? Did their motivation vary across individuals?	X	X	X
Operational Funding			
11. What discretion did you, or your unit, have to leverage funding (ASFF / CERP / FUOP) or major contracts for your Afghan partners? How did you use it?	X	X	X
Monitoring and Evaluation; Institutional/Policy/Norm Transfer			
12. Were you required to monitor capacity or professional development with your ANSF counterpart(s)? How did you do this? Was this standardized in any way?	X	X	X
13. Did you observe any changes in capacity or professionalism? Please describe.	X	X	X
14. Did you every have discussions of 'civilian control', 'superintendence', or what it means to be a professional soldier/police officer?	X	X	X
Contractor Support			
15. Did you work at all with private contractor trainers or advisors? If so, please descibe how they were employed. What monitoring/oversight tools did you have at your disposal?	X		X
Private Contractor Trainers / Advisors			
16. Were your duties and responsibilities ever amended? Why? How often?		X	
17. Did you ever deviate from your task order / statement of work / program of instruction in to complete your job? Why? How often? Did you receive any inquiries from your counterparts?		X	
18. Did you ever face any conflicts or dilemmas between your task order / program of instruction and your relationship with your local partner?		X	
Contract Managers			
19. Who did you report to (or supervise)? What was that interaction like?	X		X
20. How much discretion did you have to amend your contractor's task orders? Was this discretion (or lack thereof) significant toward your mission? What were some of the considerations you would take into account before and after amending task orders?	X		X
Closing			
21. What was your relationship with your counterparts like when you left?	X	X	
22. Do you have one lasting story or memory from your deployment?	X	X	X
23. Is there anything I didn't ask that you think would be valuable to know?	X	X	X

APPENDIX C. Major Afghan Security Force Development Contracts.

Figure C-1. Training and Advising Contracts as a Proportion of Overall US Reconstruction Spending in Afghanistan

Training and Advising Contracts as a Proportion of Overall U.S. Reconstruction Spending in Afghanistan ($ Billions)
(October 2001 to July 2014)

Total U.S. Reconstruction Spending ($104.1 B)[1]

Afghan Security Force Fund Activities ($57.3 B)[2]

$46.77

$57.33

$51.83

$5.51 [3]

■ Non-Security Reconstruction Activities

■ Other ANSF Support and Development Activities

■ ANSF Training and Advising Contracts

Est. Fraud/Abuse Losses: $31-61 B[4]

Sources:
1. SIGAR.
2. SIGAR.
3. www.usaspending.gov
4. CWC.

Table C-2. Contracts for Afghan Security Force Training and Advising Services (as of September 2014).

Afghan Partner Institutions	Contract / Task Order	Recipient	Purchaser	Performance Period (Date signed / Last payment to recipient)		Subtotal	Total Obligated	Purpose	Corresponding Audit Documents
Ministry of Defense & Afghan National Army	W91CRB-05-D-0014	MPRI	DoD	4/20/2005	11/17/2010	$ 472,284,560	$ 757,625,139	MoD/ANA Advisors	Nickerson (MPRI) CWC Testimony 12/18/09, 3
	W91CRB-10-C-0030	DynCorp	DoD	2/12/2010	10/31/2013 (Exp.)	$ 285,340,579		MoD/ANA Advisors	DOD DOS IG Joint Audit July 2011, 10; DOD DOS IG ANP Training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 10
Ministry of Interior & Afghan National Police	S-LMAQM-04-C-0033	DynCorp					$ 4,522,994,896		
	(T.O.) S-AQMPD-04-C-1076		DoS/INL	12/7/2004	5/20/2009[1]	$ 294,393,788		Poppy Eradication/Training	DoS IG AUD/IQO-07-48, August 2007
	(T.O.) S-AQMPD-04-F-0282		DoS/INL	6/22/2004	12/18/2005	$ 23,722,151		Police Training - Unspecified	DoS IG AUD/IQO-07-48, August 2007
	(T.O.) S-AQMPD-04-F-0460		DoS/INL	7/12/2004	3/30/2007[2]	$ 59,235,046		Police Training - Unspecified	DoS IG AUD/IQO-07-48, August 2007
	(T.O.) S-AQMPD-05-F-2522		DoS/INL	3/16/2005	3/1/2006	$ 27,025,878		Police Training - Unspecified	DoS IG AUD/IQO-07-48, August 2007
	(T.O.) S-AQMPD-05-F-1473		DoS/INL	12/15/2004	3/7/2006[3]	$ 82,510,133		ANP Training - Training Centers	DoS IG AUD/IQO-07-48, August 2007
	(T.O.) S-AQMPD-05-F-4305		DoS/INL	8/15/2005	12/3/2008[4]	$ 828,247,044		ANP Training	DOD DOS IG Joint Audit July 2011, 10; DOD DOS IG ANP training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 9
	(T.O.) S-AQMMA-08-F-5375		DoS/INL	7/30/2008	2/7/2013	$ 672,787,198		MoI/ANP Training & Advising	DOD-DOS IG ANP Compliance with Economy Act (August 25, 2011), 9; DOD DOS IG Joint Audit July 2011, 10, 48; DOD DOS IG ANP training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 12
	(T.O.) S-AQMMA-10-F-2708		DoS/INL	9/10/2010	4/18/2011	$ 1,315,134,040		ANP Training	DOD-DOS IG ANP Compliance with Economy Act (August 25, 2011), 9; DOD DOS IG Joint Audit July 2011, 48; DOD DOS IG ANP training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 12
	W91CRB-10-C-0100	MPRI	DoD	4/29/2010	6/15/2012[5]	$ 24,551,733		MoI/ANP Training & Advising	DOD DOS IG ANP training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 13
	W91CRB-11-C-0053	DynCorp	DoD	12/20/2010	5/2/2014	$ 1,195,387,885		MoI/ANP Training & Advising	CWC Interim Report 2-24-2011, 28; SIGAR 2011 October, 71; DOD DOS IG ANP training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 13
Afghan Border Police	W9113M-07-D-0005-0017	Academi (Xe)	DoD	9/29/2008	6/25/2011[6]	$ 225,085,983	$ 225,085,983	ABP Training & Advising	DOD DOS IG ANP training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 13;
					TOTAL		**$ 5,505,706,018**		

Primary Source: http://www.usaspending.gov

Notes:

*This table present data for private sector human technical/training/advising services alone; not for ANSF facility construction, equipment purchases, or operational funds.

1. On 5/20/09, DynCorp received $4,907,908; on 9/21/12, DynCorp gave back $19,043.

2. On 3/30/07, DynCorp received $11,808,807; on 8/24/12, DynCorp gave back $68,946;

3. On 3/7/06, DynCorp received $4,251,662; on 4/18/07, DynCorp gave back $7,226,938.

4. On 12/3/08, DynCorp received $1,710,403; on 8/15/12, DynCorp gave back $5,874,152.

5. 4/29/10 was the only date money was given to MPRI; on 6/15/12, MPRI gave back $7,689,726.

6. On 6/25/11, Xe received $12,000,000; on 8/22/11 they gave back $11,179,153.

APPENDIX D. Training and Advising Contract Documents.

Table D.1. Contracting Documents Obtained via FOIA

| CONTRACTING DOCUMENTS OBTAINED VIA FOIA REQUEST | | | TOTAL PAGES | 5369 |
| | | | TOTAL DOCUMENTS | 261 |

CONTRACT	DOCUMENT	CONTRACTOR	DATE	PAGE COUNT
W91CRB-05-D-0014	**Afghanistan Defense Sector Development and Fielding Program (2005-2009)**			
(7 total documents)	Statement of Work	L3/MPRI	1-May-05	57
	Quarterly Progress Report	L3/MPRI	5-Dec-05	248
	Quarterly Progress Report	L3/MPRI	5-Sep-07	150
	Quarterly Progress Report	L3/MPRI	5-Dec-07	391
	Quarterly Progress Report	L3/MPRI	5-Dec-08	442
	Quarterly Progress Report	L3/MPRI	13-Sep-09	745
	Quarterly Progress Report	L3/MPRI	4-Jun-10	267
W91CRB-08-D-0049	**Law Enforcement Professionals Program**			
(1 document)	Statement of Work	L3/MPRI	11-Dec-10	70
W91CRB-10-C-0100	**NTM-A/CSTC-A Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Afghan National Police (ANP) Program (2010-2011)**			
(1 document)	Statement of Work	L3/MPRI	30-Apr-10	58
W91CRB-10-C-0030	**CSTC-A/NTM-A MoD/ANA Support Program**			
(27 total documents)	Statement of Work	DynCorp	25-Aug-09	52
	Statement of Work	DynCorp	9-Oct-11	221
	Quarterly Report	DynCorp	31-Oct-11	1
	Quarterly Report	DynCorp	30-Apr-12	2
	Monthly Contract Performance Report	DynCorp	30-Aug-11	2
	Monthly Contract Performance Report	DynCorp	30-Apr-12	2
	Amendment P0001	DynCorp	30-Jun-10	2
	Amendment P0002	DynCorp	31-Aug-10	2
	Amendment P0003	DynCorp	13-Dec-10	19
	Amendment P0004	DynCorp	6-Jan-11	3
	Amendment P0005	DynCorp	28-Mar-11	37
	Amendment P0006	DynCorp	26-May-11	25
	Amendment P0007	DynCorp	31-Aug-11	2
	Amendment P0008	DynCorp	21-Sep-11	6
	Amendment P0009	DynCorp	27-Sep-11	7
	Amendment P0010	DynCorp	28-Sep-11	6
	Amendment P0011	DynCorp	21-Feb-12	7
	Amendment P0012	DynCorp	13-Apr-12	7
	Amendment P0013	DynCorp	6-Jun-12	8
	Amendment P0014	DynCorp	31-Aug-12	7
	Amendment P0015	DynCorp	24-Sep-12	4
	Amendment P0016	DynCorp	27-Sep-12	6
	Amendment P0017	DynCorp	28-Sep-12	8
	Amendment P0018	DynCorp	31-Oct-12	8
	Amendment P0019	DynCorp	16-Jan-13	4
	Amendment P0020	DynCorp	29-Mar-13	18
	Amendment P0021	DynCorp	16-May-13	6
W91CRB-11-0053	**Afghanistan National Police / Ministry of Interior Development Program**			
(225 total documents)	Statement of Work	DynCorp	12-Oct-10	64
	Contractor Weekly Report	DynCorp	6-Jun-11	7
	Contractor Weekly Report	DynCorp	13-Jun-11	6
	Contractor Weekly Report	DynCorp	20-Jun-11	8
	Contractor Weekly Report	DynCorp	27-Jun-11	8
	Contractor Weekly Report	DynCorp	1-Apr-12	13
	Contractor Weekly Report	DynCorp	8-Apr-12	14
	Contractor Weekly Report	DynCorp	15-Apr-12	13
	Contractor Weekly Report	DynCorp	22-Apr-12	13
	Contractor Weekly Report	DynCorp	29-Apr-12	14
	Contractor Weekly Report	DynCorp	1-Jun-13	14
	Contractor Weekly Report	DynCorp	8-Jun-13	13
	Contractor Weekly Report	DynCorp	15-Jun-13	14
	MoI Mentoring Weekly Report	DynCorp	7-Jun-11	3
	MoI Mentoring Weekly Report	DynCorp	17-Jun-11	2
	MoI Mentoring Weekly Report	DynCorp	21-Jun-11	2
	MoI Mentoring Weekly Report	DynCorp	28-Jun-11	2
	Monthly Quality Assurance Report	DynCorp	1-May-13	4
	ANP/MoI Afghan Instructor Progress Report	DynCorp	22-Jun-11	4
	Contract Funds Status Report	DynCorp	11-Jun-14	4

Amendment P00001	DynCorp	7-Feb-11	3
Amendment P00002	DynCorp	15-Feb-11	41
Amendment P00003	DynCorp	15-Jun-11	50
Amendment P00004	DynCorp	2-Aug-11	3
Amendment P00005	DynCorp	23-Aug-11	9
Amendment P00006	DynCorp	31-Aug-11	2
Amendment P00007	DynCorp	27-Sep-11	11
Amendment P00008	DynCorp	29-Sep-11	6
Amendment P00009	DynCorp	7-Nov-11	3
Amendment P00010	DynCorp	12-Jan-12	19
Amendment P00011	DynCorp	20-Jan-12	4
Amendment P00012	DynCorp	21-Feb-12	9
Amendment P00013	DynCorp	27-Mar-12	9
Amendment P00014	DynCorp	13-Apr-12	6
Amendment P00015	DynCorp	11-May-12	10
Amendment P00016	DynCorp	15-May-12	4
Amendment P00017	DynCorp	8-Jun-12	9
Amendment P00018	DynCorp	30-Jul-12	6
Amendment P00019	DynCorp	18-Sep-12	9
Amendment P00020	DynCorp	26-Sep-12	10
Amendment P00021	DynCorp	28-Sep-12	6
Amendment P00022	DynCorp	14-Jan-13	8
Amendment P00023	DynCorp	23-Jan-13	6
Amendment P00024	DynCorp	14-Mar-13	5
Amendment P00025	DynCorp	21-Mar-13	8
Amendment P00026	DynCorp	25-Apr-13	9
Amendment P00027	DynCorp	30-Apr-13	16
Amendment P00028	DynCorp	30-Apr-13	8
Institutional Mentors and Trainers Monthly Report	DynCorp	1-May-13	1
Daily Staffing Reports x29 (All Redacted)	DynCorp	1-Apr-12	29
Daily Staffing Reports x23 (All Redacted)	DynCorp	1-Jun-13	23
Combined Perstat x31 (All Redacted)	DynCorp	1-Apr-12	31
Fielded Mentor Map x5 (All Redacted)	DynCorp	1-Apr-12	5
Fielded Mentor Map x5 (All Redacted)	DynCorp	1-Jun-12	5
Daily Location Record x5 (All Redacted)	DynCorp	1-Apr-12	5
Daily Location Record x3 (All Redacted)	DynCorp	1-Jun-13	3
Facility Maintenance Plan x4 (All Redacted)	DynCorp	1-Apr-12	4
DFAC Usage Report x5	DynCorp	1-Apr-12	20
Weekly Security Report x5 (All Redacted)	DynCorp	1-Apr-12	1366
Weekly Security Report x3 (All Redacted)	DynCorp	1-Jun-12	408
Weekly Generator Maintenance Report x5	DynCorp	1-Apr-12	5
Weekly Generator Maintenance Report x2	DynCorp	1-Jun-12	2
Other Redacted Files x51	DynCorp		51

Figure D.1. Excerpt from Statement of Work, DynCorp Contract W91CRB-10-C-0030, Afghan Ministry of Defense Program Support, August 29, 2009.

STATEMENT OF WORK

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Afghanistan Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Afghan National Army (ANA) Program Support

I. SCOPE OF REQUIREMENT. The purpose of the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense (MoD) Program Support is to procure contractor services of qualified personnel to provide dedicated in-depth mentoring, training, subject matter expertise, and programmatic support to CSTC-A staff and the Afghan MoD focused on the missions, functional areas, and tasks listed in the Performance Based Statement of Work (PBSOW). The purpose of this support is to assist the MoD and associated Afghan National Army (ANA) forces in assuming full responsibility for their own security needs. This executive summary for the PBSOW describes senior mentoring, ministerial mentoring, subject matter expertise and training tasks where the tasks and goals are structured and defined. The changing nature of the security environment and the differences in organizational maturity within the MoD makes progress and outcome measurement difficult to attribute to either the contractor, the US Military or NATO. Therefore, this PBSOW is planned as Cost Plus Fixed Fee which enable the most flexibility to the US Government to react to unplanned progress or unforeseen challenges. The precise details for each CSTC-A staff are found in the detailed appendix.

II. BACKGROUND. The goal for CSTC-A support to the MoD is a ministerial development program that synchronizes development of MoD organizations with the development of management and operational systems. Vertical and horizontal integration of systems is achieved through mentor meetings and other functional boards. The CSTC-A staff responsible for mentoring the MoD ranges in functional support from a traditional military staff composed of CJ1, CJ2, CJ3 through CJ8 following traditional U.S. and NATO organizations to special staff established specifically for the MoD such the Combined Training Advisory Group, Detainee Operations, and Task Force Phoenix. The CSTC-A focus is on building organizational capacity and capability. The CSTC-A staff relies on contractor support with prerequisite skills to develop the core management and operational systems essential to enable the ministry to independently plan, program, and manage their army.

III. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS. The objective for this effort is for the contractor to teach and mentor MoD/ANA personnel in developing specific governmental systems. Contractor personnel shall possess and demonstrate mentor qualifications drawn from prior experience across traditional US Army and governmental staff functions and at skill levels of increasing experience.

IV. PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS. The general qualifications for most mentor positions and detailed qualifications are provided as an attachment to the statement of work:

a. Bachelors Degree desired for most mentor positions in a related field from an accredited college or university

b. Ten (10) or more years of work experience in the subject matter area at the appropriate level for the position assigned

c. Possess computer skills in Microsoft Office Suite (word, Excel, PowerPoint, and Outlook)

d. Possess strong communication and interpersonal skills

e. Possess strong organizational and analytical skills

f. Ability to effectively communicate, advise, and train others in principles of the associated staff functions ranging from G1 (administration and personnel) through G2 (intelligence), G3 (operations), G4 (logistics) and so on through medical and engineering staff functions.

g. There at five (5) skill levels required:

- Senior Mentor
- Mentor
- Subject Matter Expert
- Senior Trainer
- Trainer

V. There are numerous functional areas as reflected in the CSTC-A staff organization. 275 Contractor positions are required to support these requirements on a Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) basis across the CSTC-A staff. The estimates follow:

- Combined Training Assessment Group (CTAG)   101   positions
- Detainee Operations Fielding Program (Det Ops)   15   positions
- DCG AD (ANA Development)   18   positions
- CJ1 Personnel   6   positions
- CJ2 Intelligence   17   positions
- CJ3 Operations   5   positions
- CJ4 Logistics   32   positions
- CJ5 Strategy and Policy   5   positions
- CJ6 Signal   6   positions
- CJ7 Force Integration   3   positions
- CJ8 Comptroller and Programs   2   positions
- CJ ENG (Engineering)   3   positions
- CJ SURG (Command Surgeon)   16   positions
- Staff Judge Advocate   1   positions
- Inspector General   2   positions
- Political Military Affairs   2   positions
- Public Affairs Office   2   positions

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Figure D.2. Excerpt from Statement of Work, DynCorp Contract W91CRB-11-C-0030, Afghan Ministry of Defense Program Support, October 9, 2011.

3. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS. The objective for this effort is for the contractor to teach and advise MoD/ANA personnel in developing specific governmental systems. Contractor personnel shall possess and demonstrate mentor qualifications drawn from prior experience across traditional US Army, governmental, and civilian, staff functions and at skill levels.

4. PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS. The general qualifications for most positions are listed below while detailed qualifications or exemptions are provided within the detailed position description:

4.1. Bachelors Degree desired for most positions in a related field from an accredited college or university;

4.2. Ten or more years of work experience in the subject matter area at the appropriate level for the position assigned;

4.3. Possess computer skills in Microsoft Office Suite (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and Outlook);

4.4. Possess strong communication and interpersonal skills;

4.5. Possess strong organizational and analytical skills;

4.6. Ability to effectively communicate, advise, and train others in principles of the associated duties ranging from military staff through operational functions; or specific areas of expertise.

4.7. There at five (5) skill levels required (additional qualifications listed below):

4.7.1. Senior Mentor

4.7.1.1. Senior Mentors assist in the development of senior MoD officials by providing leadership training, and coaching assisting their Afghan counterpart in completing requirements for the Afghan National Army. Equivalent experience of a 05-06 Battalion or Brigade commander.

4.7.1.2. Senior Mentors may lead or participate on a team of international and Afghan advisors providing technical assistance (advice and guidance, training, organizational development and other capacity building services) to counterparts within the MoD.

4.7.1.3. In organizations having more than a few contractor positions, the Senior Mentor shall have the ability to act as the single point of alignment among the various contracted positions ensuring unity of effort between the actions of NTM-A/CSTC-A and the contractor effort.

4.7.2. Mentor

4.7.2.1. Mentors assist in the development Staff, training and doctrine development or other responsibilities in support operations within the ANA. Equivalent experience of a military officer 04-06 or Command Sergeant Major with Battalion, Brigade, or Staff experience as CSM, XO, S3, or S4 like position.

4.7.2.2. Recent operational experience in Afghanistan or Iraq training international forces is highly desired. Experience in professional development and training and working with Middle Eastern or Asian cultures is desired.

4.7.2.3. Graduate of Combined Graduate Staff College (CGSC) or sister service equivalent preferred.

4.7.3. Subject Matter Expert

4.7.3.1. This individual will be part of a workforce providing instruction, coaching and mentoring in their functional area.

4.7.3.2. Bachelors or experiential equivalent required.

4.7.3.3. Experience as a subject matter expert in associated functional area as described in the detailed PBSOW.

4.7.3.4. Former military experience either serving, or working with the military is desired but not required.

4.7.4. Senior Trainer

4.7.4.1. Ability to review relevant U.S. Field Manuals and publications for application to the Afghan National Army; in conjunction with NTM-A/CSTC-A, develops course of instruction and course materials; provides classroom training as required to teach, coach and train Afghan counterparts.

4.7.4.2. Experience in training, operations, or maintenance, equivalent to a company grade officer or senior non-

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Figure D.3. Excerpt from Statement of Work, DynCorp Contract W91CRB-11-C-0053, Afghan Ministry of Interior and National Police Mentoring/Training & Logistics Support Program Support, October 12, 2010.

contract shall be on the GIRoA MoI-approved list and in full compliance with the laws of Afghanistan and the requirements of this contract.

C.2.10.   Contract Data Requirements

Name*	Exhibit
Master Schedule	A
Contractor Weekly Report	B
MoI Mentoring Report	C
Monthly Progress Report	D
Afghan Instructor Progress Report	E
Contract Funds Status Report	F
Accident Report	G
Key Personnel Resumes	H
ACSA Report	I
Orientation Plan	J
Food Service Plan	K
Facility Maintenance Plan	L

*Copies are to be submitted electronically whenever possible.

For details of each Contract Data Requirement, please see pertinent exhibit.

C.3.   PERSONNEL

The Contractor shall provide the necessary personnel with appropriate skills, certificates, and licensing required to perform any and all services identified. There are no nationality restrictions.

a. Staff deploying from the U.S. The Contractor shall select fully-qualified candidates who possess the requisite technical skills, knowledge, and experience for this requirement. If the individual will be in possession of a firearm, this process shall include a one-on-one oral psychological interview, an interview by a management oral review board, a physical fitness assessment, and a medical review.

b. Afghanistan-Based Staff or TCN. The Contractor shall select and nominate fully-qualified candidates who demonstrate an aptitude for providing service in the challenging Afghanistan environment. The Contractor shall establish a selection and assessment process that gauges technical skills, knowledge, experience, and readiness for participation in the Afghanistan mission. Selection shall be based on qualification standards established by the Contractor. The Contractor shall review this selection process and make needed process improvements. The Contractor shall propose a selection process for TCNs and LNs that emulates U.S.-based staff. The Contractor shall be fully aware of insurgency and infiltration and take appropriate steps to prevent internal sabotage or harm to the mission.

c. The Contractor is responsible for ensuring all personnel supporting this requirement comply with the standards of conduct and all applicable contract terms & conditions. The Contractor shall provide the necessary supervision for personnel required to perform this contract.

C.3.1.   Program Manager

The minimum qualifications of the Program Manager are as follows:
- Bachelor's degree in related discipline and a background in the management of projects or organizations of similar size and scope
- Knowledge of operational methods of U.S. civilian law enforcement and U.S. military
- Eight years' experience in a related Government or business field
- Knowledge of operational methods of U.S. civilian police and/or U.S. military
- Excellent communications and interpersonal skills
- Knowledge of various computer programs required (i.e. Excel, Word, and Outlook)

Desired:
- 5 years of law enforcement experience

C.3.2.   Deputy Program Manager

The minimum qualifications of the Deputy Program Manager are as follows:
- Bachelor's degree in related discipline and a background in the management of projects or organizations of similar size and scope
- Eight years' experience in a related Government or business field
- Knowledge of operational methods of U.S. civilian police and U.S. Military
- Excellent communications and interpersonal skills
- Knowledge of various computer programs required (i.e. Excel, Word, and Outlook)

C.3.3.   Security Manager

Minimum qualifications:
- Bachelor's degree in an associated discipline
- Former Public Safety/Police, Military or International Security Operations experience no less than a combined total of 10 years
- Must possess at least three years experience in managing/supervising security guard operations overseas and in a hostile environment
- Able to accurately and concisely write reports of serious incidents and communicate in writing other documents such as Site Security Analyses and Risk Assessments
- Able to develop, amend and describe to others Standard Operating Procedures appropriate for the threat level and force protection level
- Able to communicate verbally with others in a concise and understandable way
- Demonstrates a strong ability to read and understand intelligence reports

Figure D.4. Excerpt from Statement of Work, L3/MPRI Contract W91CRB-08-D-0049, Law Enforcement Professional (LEP) Program Support, December 11, 2010.

OCONUS

The contractor will establish PMO CMT, OCONUS, ISO OCO. The CMT will consist of a Country Manager, Operations Officer and Country Coordinator. Any changes to the CMT structure must be approved by COR/KO. The Country Manager and Operations Officer positions will require a TS/SCI clearance. The Country Coordinator position will require a Secret clearance. The OCONUS offices will interface through the USG in-country Technical Manager (TM) and report to the contractor's CONUS based program management office. The role of the OCONUS office is to undertake theater specific contractual quality control oversight, in theater personnel in processing, ongoing administration and out processing (as required), and periodic unit visits (to ensure deployed LEP personnel are performing their duties IAW the PWS and that they are receiving the appropriate support from the supported unit. The in-country TM will be notified in advance of all unit visits by the CMT or Contractor Representative's within the respective Area of Operations (AO). The in-country management team will perform the following duties (as a minimum):

Support efforts to collect data required by the COR to assess the Program's ongoing effectiveness.

Collect and disseminate Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) and lessons learned to LEP personnel in the field as well as the in-country TM, contractor's CONUS PM office and COR for review and further dissemination as appropriate.

The contractor is required to recruit, train and make available for employment/deployment replacement personnel within sixty (60) days of official notification of resignation, termination or separation from the program for cause. This timeframe excludes DoD pre-deployment training. Contractor will coordinate replacements with the COR to ensure compliance.

Qualifications for LEP Personnel

LEP Personnel assigned to units will be designated as LEP I or LEP II. LEP I will normally be assigned to Brigade/Regiment Level units or higher and may be designated as a program supervisor. LEP II will normally be assigned to Battalion units or below.

General All LEP personnel must possess:

Experience gained as a sworn member of a municipal, county, state or federal LE agency.

Written communication skills to allow the LEP personnel to prepare written reports, information papers and other required correspondence.

Verbal communications skills to allow the LEP personnel to effectively deliver briefings and communicate related training to a diverse audience.

Strong computer literacy skills, focusing on the Microsoft suite of applications.

Physical and mental capacity to operate in austere urban and desert/mountain environments in Iraq or Afghanistan, alongside U.S., Coalition and HNSF for a period of twelve (12) months with little respite. In addition to successfully completing the minimum physical agility entrance assessment, all LEP personnel must be physically qualified to deploy ISO OCO.

All LEP personnel must pass a minimum physical agility entrance assessment consisting of:

Dummy drag (one hundred and fifty (150) pound dummy) twenty-five (25) feet.

Fireman's carry (one hundred and fifty (150) pound dummy) twenty-five (25) feet.

Walk two (2) miles with a thirty-five (35) pound pack carrying a rifle, wearing a ballistic helmet and body armor in sixty (60) minutes or less.

LEP I Personnel

Minimum of 15 years LE experience with at least 10 years of investigative experience.

Specialized investigative experience in the field(s) of gang control/suppression, organized crime, controlled substance organizations, international money laundering, counter terrorism and/or public corruption.

Experience in federal task forces such as Organized Crime/Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF), High Intensity Financial Crimes Areas (HIFCA), High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) or Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) is highly desirable for LEP 1 candidates.

Specialized experience may also have been gained as a certified instructor in fields relating to complex investigations.

Documented experience as supervisors, managers or task force leads in a federal agency, federal task force, state agency or large police department. A large police department is defined as a police department with a minimum of 100 sworn officers.

Suitable for employment in a billet cleared to TS/SCI.

LEP II Personnel

Graduate of a certified Municipal, State or Federal police academy. Certified is defined as meeting the requirements to perform duty as a sworn LE officer in the sponsoring agency.

A solid understanding of traditional criminal network structures, operating methods and behavioral characteristics of organized criminal groups such as gangs, drug organizations, and/or public corruption.

Eight (8) years LE experience reflecting the ability to identify and to investigate structure, methods, and behaviors of organized crime networks, gangs, terrorist organizations, drug organizations, and/or public corruption.

Eight (8) years experience will be supplemented by a combination of other stated attributes including military service, task force assignments, language, bomb technician experience, forensic certification or expertise, and experience in utilization of sophisticated investigative or technical investigative methodologies.

Ability to plan, deliver and lead training on street-level counter-gang investigative TTPs in a major urban environment, including informant/source development, field interview techniques, site exploitation (crime scene investigation), forensics, and biometric analysis to identify criminal network activity.

Suitable for employment in a billet cleared to SECRET.

Specialized LEP Billets (Border Protection, Customs and JEFFs)

Border Protection

Division and above

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Figure D.5. Excerpt from Statement of Work, L3/MPRI Contract W91CRB-05-D-0014, Law Enforcement Professional (LEP) Program Support, May 1, 2005.

Section C - Descriptions and Specifications

STATEMENT OF WORK

Statement of Work

Afghanistan Defense Sector Development and Fielding Program
Period of Performance 1 May 2005 through 30 April 2009

1. Mission. The mission of the Afghanistan Defense Sector Development and Fielding Program is to support the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A) and the U.S. Central Command in assisting the duly constituted Islamic Government of Afghanistan (GoA) in building capable security institutions, policies, programs and procedures to protect its people and territory and to advance its national interests in accordance with established norms and international law.

2. Background. The Defense Sector Development and Fielding Program is based on the premise that none of the post-conflict remnants of the Afghan national security system were suitable for a modern Western military, and therefore the new Afghan Defense Sector had to be re-designed and built from scratch. An evolutionary approach was implemented to build the Defense Sector: design, develop and implement core systems, processes and organizations; recruit, equip, train and field forces. This approach was applied to the three major components of the Afghan Defense Sector: the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and General Staff (GS), the Afghan National Army (ANA) Intermediate Commands and sustaining institutions, and the ANA Regional Corps.

The strategic plan for delivering the Afghan Defense Sector is based upon the individual development and fielding plans for each component, including their timelines to achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and Full Operational Capability (FOC). Because the Defense Sector had to be built from scratch, the first phase of the program (called the Afghan MoD Development Program) completed the conceptual design of the Defense Sector and emphasized the development of the MoD and GS decision-making and other core processes. Consequently, the MoD and General Staff is the most mature component, with a projected IOC date of January 2006, and a projected FOC date of October 2006. The ANA Intermediate Commands and sustaining institutions have been identified and designed, and with the exception of Recruiting Command and Medical Sector, are just in the early stages of development and implementation. The Intermediate Commands and sustaining institutions will receive significantly increased emphasis under this effort, with IOC dates ranging from April 2005 for the Recruiting Command, to a projected date of September 2006 for the Logistics Command. The projected FOC dates for the Intermediate Commands range from June 2005 through November 2007. Finally, the ANA Regional Corps are scheduled to achieve IOC in December 2006 (assuming a 6 Kandak fielding rate) and FOC by the end of calendar year 2008.

3. Scope. This Statement of Work (SOW) covers the remainder of the Afghan Defense Sector Development and Fielding Program. The tasks will continue to emphasize all components of the Defense Sector in their implementation of an effective national security system. Additionally, the level of effort assigned to the MoD/GS-related tasks conducted and/or completed since the beginning of the program will begin to be systematically transitioned toward implementation of the same products (mentoring, doctrine/policy/process development) at the Intermediate Commands and the Afghan National Army Regional Corps in order to fully implement these products at all levels of the Afghan Defense Sector.

In addition to the tasks contained in this Statement of Work, this phase of the Defense Sector Development and Fielding Program may also require the contractor to 1) provide program management support to OMC-A, and 2) provide additional personnel to function as mentors, Embedded Training Team

(ETT) members and/or Mobile Training Team (MTT) members assigned to the MoD and GS, Intermediate Commands and Regional Corps. The need for additional personnel for these tasks cannot be determined until the results of various force management processes (e.g., Joint Manning Document and Request For Forces) have been determined. If required, these options (SOW Section 5, Tasks 2g, 3h, 4b and/or 5f) will be requested as additional tasks with separate SOW and funding.

4. Objectives. The overall goal of the Defense Sector Development and Fielding Program is to reform the Afghan Defense Sector and to demonstrate Initial Operational Capability (IOC) by December 2006 and subsequent Full Operational Capability (FOC) by December 2008 (assuming a sustained Kabul Military Training Center training rate of at least six simultaneous battalions/kandaks). An IOC and/or FOC declaration for the Defense Sector must consider the inclusive capability of the MoD/GS, Intermediate Commands and Regional Corps.

The Contractor shall support OMC-A by providing a team of highly qualified experts capable of satisfying deliverables and tasks as required. Contractor shall have personnel on station in Kabul, Afghanistan not later than 30 days after contract award.

5. Tasks. There are five major tasks necessary to meet the objectives of the Afghanistan Defense Sector Development and Fielding Program: 1) Program and Financial Management Support, 2) MoD/GS Support, 3) Intermediate Commands and Sustaining Institutions Support 4) Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) Support and 5) Regional Corps Support.

Task 1. Program and Financial Management Support

Task 1a: Program Management The Contractor shall provide a Program Management Team. The Program Manager shall exercise overall program management and oversight responsibility for the contractor's planning, programming and execution of the Afghan Defense Sector Development and Fielding Program. The PM shall be responsive to the office of the Chief OMC-A and the Contract Officer Technical Representative (COTR).

Task 1b: Develop an Annual Work Plan The Contractor shall, within 21 calendar days of contract award, develop an Annual Work Plan (AWP) that provides recommendations for the development and corresponding timelines of each task listed in paragraph 5. The AWP shall include and describe a dynamic mentor re-allocation process which distributes the mentorship function in response to requirements to accelerate the ANA and/or based on the maturation and demonstrated capability of the individual Afghan Defense Sector components to minimize the time to achieve IOC and FOC. Within 60 days contract award the Contractor shall submit, as an annex to the AWP, a proposal that shows how an increase in manpower could accelerate any of the tasks in this SOW and subsequently accelerate achieving IOC and FOC for the Defense Sector. The Annual Work Plan shall be submitted to the Chief OMC- A via the COTR, IAW section (6) Deliverables and the Requirements for the Draft and Final Delivery Order Execution Plan (DOEP).

Task 1c: Financial Management The Contractor shall provide financial management, that from either the Kabul and/or Task Force Phoenix Compounds, shall conduct budget development, pay operations, and programming/disbursement of funds, and support the following tasks, including but not limited to:

- Conduct weekly contract reconciliation actions.
- Implement automated requisitioning system PR Web and PD2
- Provide support to foreign military financing case management and control.

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Figure D.5. Excerpt from Statement of Work, L3/MPRI Contract W91CRB-10-C-0100, Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police Program Support, April 30, 2010.

Section C - Descriptions and Specifications

STATEMENT OF WORK

STATEMENT OF WORK

NTM-A/CSTC-A Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Afghan National Police (ANP) Program Support.

I. SCOPE OF REQUIREMENT. The purpose of the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior (MoI) Program Support is to procure contractor services of qualified personnel to provide dedicated in-depth mentoring, training, subject matter expertise and programmatic support to NTM-A/CSTC-A staff and the Afghan MoI focused on the missions, functional areas and tasks listed in the Performance Based Statement of Work (PBSOW). The purpose of this support is to assist the MoD and associated Afghan National Police (ANP) forces in assuming full responsibility for their own security needs. This executive summary for the PBSOW describes the senior mentoring, ministerial mentoring, subject matter expertise and training tasks where the tasks and goals are structured and defined. The changing nature of the security environment and the differences in organizational maturity within the MoI makes progress and outcome measurement difficult to attribute to either the contractor, The US Military or NATO. Therefore, this PBSOW is planned as Cost Plus Fixed Fee which enable the most flexibility to the US Government to react to unplanned progress and unforeseen challenges. The precise details for each NTM-A/CSTC-A staff are found in the detailed appendix.

II. BACKGROUND. The goal for NTM-A/CSTC-a support to the MOI is a ministerial development program that synchronizes development of MoI organizations with the development of management and operational systems. Vertical and horizontal integration of systems is achieved through mentor meetings and other functional boards. The NTM-A/CSTC-A staff responsible for mentoring the MoI ranges in functional support from a traditional military staff composed of CJ1, CJ2, CJ3 through CJ8 following traditional U.S. and NATO organizations to special staff established specifically for the MoI such as the Combined Training Group. The NTM-A/CSTC-A focus is on building organizational capacity and capability. The NTM-A/CSTC-A staff relies on contractor support with prerequisite skills to develop the core management and operational systems essential to enable the ministry to independently plan, program and manage their police force.

III. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS. The objective for this effort is for the contractor to teach and mentor MoI/ANP personnel is developing specific governmental systems. Contractor personnel shall possess and demonstrate mentor qualifications drawn from prior experiences across US Army, Police and governmental staff functions and at skill levels of increasing experience.

IV. PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS. The general qualifications for mentor positions are provided below:

a. Bachelors Degree desired for mentor positions in a related field from an accredited college or university

b. Ten (10) or more years of work experience in the subject matter area at the appropriate level for the position assigned.

c. Possess computer skills in Microsoft Office Suite (word, excel, power point and outlook)

d. Possess strong communication and interpersonal skills

e. Possess strong organizational and analytical skills

f. Ability to effectively communicate, advise and train others in principles of the associated staff functions ranging from the administration and personnel through intelligence, operations, logistics and so on through medical and engineering staff functions.

g. There are five (5) skill levels required

- Senior Mentor
- Mentor
- Subject Matter Expert
- Senior Trainer
- Trainer

V. There are numerous functional areas reflected in the NTM-A/CSTC-A staff organization. 109 Contractor positions are required to support these requirements on a Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) basis across the NTM-A/CTSC-A staff. The estimates follow:

- ACG AP (ANP Development)   16   positions
- CJ ENG (Engineering)   3   positions
- CJ1 Personnel   4   positions
- CJ2 Intel   9   positions
- CJ3 Operations   12   positions
- CJ4 Logistics   36   positions
- CJ5 Strategy and Policy   7   positions
- CJ6 Signal   2   positions
- CJ7 Force Integration   3   positions
- CJ8 Comptroller and Programs   6   positions
- CJ SURG (Command Surgeon)   7   positions
- Inspector General   2   positions
- Public Affairs Office   1   position
- Staff Judge Advocate   1   position

APPENDIX E. Other Official Document Excerpts.

**Figure E-1. NTM-A / CSTC-A Organization, PowerPoint briefing, June 2012**

Figure E-2. Advisor Alignment with the Afghan Defense Ministry, PowerPoint briefing, November 2011

Names/phone numbers blacked out by author.

Figure E-3. Advisor Alignment with the Afghan Interior Ministry, PowerPoint briefing, April 2012

Names/phone numbers blacked out by author.

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