

Will the Twain Ever Meet?


Military Run Requirements vs.

Civilian Run Acquisition

Background

- Senior Navy officials concerned about the split between the requirements and acquisition parts of the Navy
- Current process makes it difficult for line officers to have input to the acquisition process
- Not always that way—what happened?
- Combination of environment, legislation and the law of unintended consequences

"A Perfect Storm"



Congress Criticized Joint Capabilities and Service-DoD Integration

Goldwater


- "Officer corps frequently behaves more like business managers than warriors."
- "functional structure of OSD ...encourages *micromanagement* of Service programs.....it has the tendency to get over-involved in details that could be better managed by the Services."
- "there is the lack of true unity of command, and second, there is *inadequate cooperation among US military Services* when called upon to perform joint operations."


- Nunn

- OSD "is focused exclusively on functional areas, This functional structure serves to inhibit integration of Service capabilities along mission lines"
- "Another ... concern is in the consolidation of the military and civilian staffs in the military departments. The conference agreed to consolidate several functions, such as acquisition, comptroller, inspector general, and legislative liaison, under the Secretaries of the military departments and directed that the service chiefs not set up competing bureaucracies within their staffs. In the conference, I was concerned that we not create an impenetrable wall between the staffs of the service Secretary and the service chief."

External Events Exposed Range of Problems

- Urgent Fury, Hostage Rescue Mission
- Problems cut across many areas
 - Poor unity of command
 - Lack of joint training
 - Lack of scheduling and financial realism
 - Restricted flow of accurate information to decision makers
 - Significant opportunities for fraud and abuse
 - Lack of joint communication
 - Unclear lines of authority
 - Exclusion of several types of planners
 - Overly complex and needlessly compartmented planning
- Resulted in changes in regulation






Implementation Had Other Effects

- Evolved the reporting chain
 - Systems Commanders/ PEOs/ DRPMs (Direct Reporting Program Managers)
 - Changes to financial responsibility
 - Changes in role of OPNAV
- Establishment of NPDM (Navy Program Decision Meeting)
 - Move from CNO Executive Board to NPDM for acquisition decisions
- Reduced line officer presence

Implementation Had Combined and Unintended Effects

- Confluence of Goldwater-Nichols and Acquisition Reform
 - Simultaneous changes affected terms of reference
- Unintended Consequences
 - Force of legal construction leads to rigidity
 - Separation of responsibility (Navy) from authority (DoD Acquisition Executive)
 - Migration of line officers away from acquisition





Current Perspectives

- Gained insight from interviews with:
 - PEOs
 - Systems Commanders
 - Former PMs
 - Senior Civilians
 - Former Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs
 - Former Commander, Army Material Command
- Cross cutting perspectives with DAU practice
- Search for process improvement


Army and Air Force Perspectives on Policy Changes

- Need to re-introduce requirements officers into acquisition function
- Excessive rigidity prevents the employment of line officers in acquisition functions
- •Limited permeability of acquisition and requirements in decision making—particularly during development
- Need to satisfy selected joint duty in joint programs
 - Need to create incentives for senior line officers to hold responsibility in acquisition
- DAU influence limits human capital management flexibility





Current Six-Step Program Still Shows Requirement-Acquisition Split



Recommendations

- Reduce Friction between Acquisition & Requirements Communities
 - Unilateral vs bilateral structure
 - Re-create 5400.15 affirmative statement on CNO involvement
 - Re-engineer PEO/SYSCOM structure
 - Place PEOs back under SYSCOMs
 - Similar to Army & Air Force
- Change Acquisition positions for officers
 - Joint duty?
 - Increase military assignments
 - More limited certification demand
- Improve DAU practice and course structure

House Armed Service Committee Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform

"The Department and Congress should review and clarify the Goldwater-Nichols Act's separation between acquisition and the military service chiefs to allow detailed coordination and interaction between the requirements and acquisitions processes and to encourage enhanced military service chief participation in contract quality assurance."

BACK-UPS

Significant Former Positions of Interviewees


- Army Director of Requirements
- Assistant Commander, Test and Evaluation, Naval Air Systems Command
- Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics, Marine Corps
- Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition Logistics and Technology (Army Acquisition Executive)
- Assistant Secretary of the Army, Research, Development and Acquisition
- Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition
- Chief of Naval Operations
- Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command
- Commander, Aeronautical Systems Division at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
- Commander, Naval Air Systems Command
- Commander, Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division (2)
- Commander, U.S. European Command
- Commanding General, Army Materiel Command
- Commanding General, Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Materiel Acquisition)
- Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics)
- Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations


Significant Former Positions of Interviewees

- Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition
- Deputy Chief, Naval Materiel Command
- Deputy for Systems Management and Horizontal Technology Integration
- Deputy PEO, Tactical Aircraft Programs, NAVAIR
- Director of Air Force Operational Requirements
- Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Electronics)
- Director of Ship Research and Development, Naval Sea Systems Command
- Director of Tactical Programs in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition
- Director, Acquisition Excellence Aeronautical Systems Center
- Director, Army Acquisition Corps (3)
- Director, Aviation Plans and Requirements Division
- Executive Director, Naval Air Systems Command
- Executive in Residence, DAU
- Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (2)
- Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition
- NAVAIR Assistant Commander for Test and Evaluation, and for Shore Installation Management
- Navy Program Executive Officer for Ships (2)
- Navy Program Executive Officer for Submarines

Significant Former Positions of Interviewees

- Principal Deputy General Counsel, Department of Defense
- Principal Deputy General Counsel, Department of the Navy
- Principal Deputy, Assistant Secretary of The Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition
- Program Executive Officer, Air Force
- Program Executive Officer, Army (2)
- Program Executive Officer, Navy (3)
- Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft Programs
- Program Manager, Air Force
- Program Manager, Army
- Program Manager, Navy (5)
- Secretary of the Air Force
- Secretary of the Navy (2)
- Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (2)
- Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff/Chair, Joint Requirements Oversight Council
- Vice Chief of Naval Operations
- Vice Chief of Staff, Air Force
- Vice Chief, Naval Sea Systems Command





DON Requirements/Acquisition Two-Pass/Six-Gate Process with Development of a System Design Specification (illustrated example for program initiation at Milestone A)

