



# ACQUISITION RESEARCH PROGRAM SPONSORED REPORT SERIES

---

## **A Comparative Analysis of Naval Surface Forces Atlantic and Pacific Combat Systems Departments**

June 2023

**William D. Colmenares  
LT Spencer R. Wiltz, USN**

Thesis Advisors: Dr. Edward H. Powley IV, Professor  
Dr. Robert F. Mortlock, Associate Professor

Department of Defense Management

**Naval Postgraduate School**

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943

Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Naval Postgraduate School, US Navy, Department of Defense, or the US government.



The research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Research Program of the Department of Defense Management at the Naval Postgraduate School.

To request defense acquisition research, to become a research sponsor, or to print additional copies of reports, please contact the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) via email, [arp@nps.edu](mailto:arp@nps.edu) or at 831-656-3793.



ACQUISITION RESEARCH PROGRAM  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANAGEMENT  
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

## ABSTRACT

The primary community of the United States Navy is the surface Navy. It is commonly accepted that there are two versions of the surface Navy: the Atlantic Navy and the Pacific Navy. From the viewpoint of combat systems, both should operate in the same manner, using the same guidance, with the same number of personnel, but they do not. Using Nadler and Tushman's congruence model, we completed an analysis of both surface forces: Atlantic Surface Forces and Pacific combat systems. This analysis looked at structure, manning, guidance, and procedures used in order to determine why there is misalignment and what is needed in order to provide congruence and allow efforts to mirror each other across the coasts and to provide symmetry. Recommendations, based on our findings, are provided in order to align and provide congruence. What we have determined, based on manning, structure, and adherence to instructions and procedural compliance, is that Surface Forces Atlantic and Pacific combat systems departments are not aligned, and therefore, there is no congruence among them. Because of our findings, we do not believe both coasts operate in a way that would allow for redundancy should one become sidelined or obsolete. Recommendations for congruence have been provided.



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK



## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

**Mr. William Colmenares** is a 22-year veteran of the United States Navy and a graduate of the University of Toledo. Among his tours were USS CARR where he served as the Anti-Submarine Officer and USS LEYTE GULF where he served as the command Maintenance, Materials and Management Coordinator and Administrative Department Lead Chief Petty Officer. Upon retiring from the Navy, he has worked as the SURFLANT Maintenance, Materials and Management Coordinator project manager, and as the deputy project manager for Ready, Relevant Learning on the Sellers & Associates team. He is currently the Battle Force Tactical Trainer Grooms program manager for Naval Sea Systems Command, Dam Neck.

**LT Spencer Wiltz** is currently an active duty Naval Aviator stationed at the NROTC unit The Citadel and is a graduate of Washington State University. He has conducted two operational tours onboard the USS Nimitz and USS Theodore Roosevelt where he has served as the squadron assistant operations officer and material control officer while attached to HSM-75. Currently LT Wiltz serves as an assistant naval professor at The Citadel and assists with the oversight of undergraduates as they commission to be Ensigns in the US Navy.



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK





# ACQUISITION RESEARCH PROGRAM SPONSORED REPORT SERIES

---

## **A Comparative Analysis of Naval Surface Forces Atlantic and Pacific Combat Systems Departments**

June 2023

**William D. Colmenares**  
**LT Spencer R. Wiltz, USN**

Thesis Advisors: Dr. Edward H. Powley IV, Professor  
Dr. Robert F. Mortlock, Associate Professor

Department of Defense Management

**Naval Postgraduate School**

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943

Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Naval Postgraduate School, US Navy, Department of Defense, or the US government.



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK





# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION .....	1
	A. BACKGROUND .....	1
	B. INTRODUCTION OF NAVAL SURFACE FORCES .....	4
	1. Commander, Naval Surface Forces .....	5
	2. Afloat Training Group .....	6
	3. TCIP .....	7
	C. OBJECTIVES .....	7
	D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .....	8
	E. SUMMARY .....	8
II.	LITERATURE REVIEW .....	9
	A. SURFACE FORCE TRAINING AND READINESS MANUAL .....	9
	B. TCIP INSTRUCTION .....	12
	C. TOTAL SHIP READINESS ASSESSMENT .....	14
	D. CONGRUENCE MODEL .....	14
	E. SUMMARY .....	15
III.	METHODOLOGY .....	17
	A. PROCESSES.....	17
	1. Surface Forces.....	17
	2. TCIP .....	18
	3. Afloat Training Group .....	18
	B. ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENTS.....	18
	1. Surface Forces.....	18
	2. TCIP .....	19
	3. Afloat Training Group .....	19
	4. Overview of the Congruence Model for Analysis .....	19
	C. SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY .....	23
IV.	ANALYSIS AND PROCESSES .....	25
	A. MANNING .....	25
	1. Surface Forces.....	25
	2. Afloat Training Group .....	33
	B. LEADERSHIP .....	35
	1. Surface Forces.....	35
	2. Afloat Training Group .....	37



C.	PROCESSES.....	37
1.	How Does CNSL Operate?.....	37
2.	How Does CNSP Operate?.....	38
3.	Why Does ATG Work for CNSL/CNSP? What Is Their Purpose?.....	38
4.	Interaction between TCIP and ATG.....	39
5.	Nominal Timeline.....	40
D.	APPLICATION OF THE CONGRUENCE MODEL.....	41
1.	Input.....	42
2.	Strategy.....	42
3.	Tasking.....	44
4.	Formal Organization.....	46
5.	Informal Organization.....	47
6.	Individuals.....	48
7.	Output.....	49
E.	SUMMARY.....	50
V.	RESULTS AND CONGRUENCE.....	51
A.	SUMMARY.....	51
B.	FINDINGS.....	51
1.	Overall.....	51
2.	Surface Forces, Atlantic.....	53
3.	Surface Forces, Pacific.....	54
4.	Surface Forces, Atlantic TCIP.....	54
5.	Surface Forces, Pacific TCIP.....	55
6.	Afloat Training Group, Norfolk.....	55
7.	Afloat Training Group, San Diego.....	56
C.	FIT.....	56
D.	SUMMARY.....	59
E.	IMPLICATIONS.....	62
VI.	SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	63
A.	SUMMARY.....	63
B.	FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION.....	63
C.	SURFACE FORCES RECOMMENDATIONS.....	66
1.	Overall.....	66
2.	Surface Forces, Atlantic.....	66
3.	Surface Forces, Pacific.....	67
D.	TCIP RECOMMENDATIONS.....	67
1.	Overall.....	67



2.	Surface Forces, Pacific.....	68
3.	Surface Forces, Atlantic.....	69
E.	ATG RECOMMENDATIONS.....	69
1.	Overall.....	69
2.	ATG Norfolk.....	70
3.	ATG San Diego.....	70
F.	CONCLUSION.....	71
APPENDIX: QUESTIONS .....		73
A.	PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS .....	73
B.	SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	73
LIST OF REFERENCES .....		75



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK



## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Congruence Model. Source: Nadler and Tushman (1980). .....	4
Figure 2.	Nominal Cruiser/Destroyer (CRUDES) Schedule. Source: COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT (2022, p. 56).....	10
Figure 3.	Nominal Amphibious Class Schedule. Source: COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT (2022, p. 57).....	11
Figure 4.	Nominal TCIP Schedule. Source: COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT (2020, p. 7).....	13



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK



## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Side-by-side comparison of the N6 departments. Adapted from SURFPAC/SURFANT (personal communication, May 2, 2023).....	27
Table 2.	Side-by-side comparison of the N7 departments. Adapted from SURFPAC/SURFLANT (personal communication, May 2, 2023).....	30
Table 3.	Side-by-side comparison ATG San Diego and ATG Norfolk. Adapted from ATG (personal communication, May 9, 2023).....	34
Table 4.	Fit chart .....	60



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK





## LIST OF ACRONYMS

3M	Maintenance and Materials Management
AMW	Amphibious Warfare
AS2	Assessment 2
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
ATG	Afloat Training Group
AW	Aviation Warfare
BDOC	Basic Division Officer's Course
BFTT	Battle Force Tactical Trainer
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
C4I SOT	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems Operability Test
C5I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Combat systems, and Intelligence
CDSA	Combat Direction Support Activity
CMTQ	Cruise Missile Tactical Qualification
CNSF	Commander, Naval Surface Forces
CNSL	Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Atlantic
CNSP	Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Pacific
CRUDES	Cruiser/Destroyer
CS	Combat systems
CSLO	Combat systems Light-Off
DH	Department Head
DON	Department of the Navy
ET	Electronic Technician
FC	Fire Controlman, Non-Aegis
FCA	Fire Controlman, Aegis
FTRP	Fleet Response Training Plan
GM	Gunner's Mate
IRB	Institutional Review Board
IT	Information Systems Technician
MILPERSMAN	Military Personnel Manual



NAVSEA	Naval Sea Systems Command
NAVWAR	Navy Information Warfare Command
NSFS	Naval Surface Fire Support
OFRP	Optimized Fleet Response Plan
PESTONI	Personnel, Equipment, Supply, Training, Ordnance, Network, Infrastructure
PICO	Pre-Installation Check Out
SFTM	Surface Force Training and Readiness Manual
SOT	Systems Operability Test
SOVT	System Operation and Verification Tests
STG	Sonar Technician, Surface
STW	Strike Warfare
SW	Surface Warfare
TCIP	Type Commander Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Combat systems, and Intelligence Integration Process
TSRA	Total Ship Readiness Assessment
USN	United States Navy



# I. INTRODUCTION

## A. BACKGROUND

The United States Navy (USN) has multiple communities that combine to form a battle-ready force capable of facing any threat nation. The primary community is the surface fleet. The surface fleet (not including aircraft carriers) consists of an estimated 137,500 sailors in over 275 units, as of 2021 (Faram, 2021). This accounts for nearly 40% of all Navy manning (Military One Source, 2023). The surface Navy should take every opportunity to explore, identify, and correct any misaligned manning, training, and certification processes; particularly in the combat systems warfare areas to truly exist as one Navy.

The current mentality among active-duty personnel, government civilians, and contractors is that there are two different Navies: The East Coast Navy and the West Coast Navy. The idea that there are both East Coast and West Coast Navies cannot continue; these mentalities differ in how ships are manned, trained, certified, and maintained.

The surface fleet is governed by two entities, Commander, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic (CNSL), and Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Pacific (CNSP). CNSL controls the Atlantic Fleet, with major fleet concentration areas that include Norfolk, VA; Mayport, FL; and Rota, Spain. CNSP controls the Pacific Fleet, with major fleet concentrations areas that include San Diego, CA; Pearl Harbor, HI; and Everett, WA.

In order to operate in a fully functional, mission capable manner, the surface fleet must be aligned in all facets including Personnel, Equipment, Supply, Training, Ordnance, Networks, and Infrastructure (PESTONI) (Luster, 2017).

On the outside looking in, it is reasonable to assume that this is a fact of Navy life, and all facets are fully aligned, between CNSL and CNSP, down to how each individual element of PESTONI and the community that enacts it operate. One would be surprised to learn that they are not in fact aligned.



One example is how the community employed in maintenance and materials management (3M) operates. The 3M team employed by CNSL consists of one U.S. Navy Master Chief and two civilian contractors. Until recently, only one contractor was employed, due to budget limitations and contractor salaries. CNSP employs one U.S. Navy Master Chief, one GS-13, two GS-12s, and two civilian contractors that are equivalent to a GS-12. Because there are essentially four employees doing the day-to-day operations of a 3M in CNSP, they are effectively able to split the responsibility for the Pacific Fleet ships into a workload that is 25% – 50% less than what is being done in CNSL. In addition to covering the administrative load, they can visit ships and conduct assistance visits and inspections. Because CNSL is effectively undermanned, there is no way to measure up to that workload.

From the perspective of how the U.S. Navy mans, trains, certifies, and maintains combat systems, many discrepancies exist between both coasts. Most accession-based schools for enlisted Sailors are housed in Great Lakes, IL, after the closure of Naval Training Center, San Diego, in 1997 (Wallace, 1991), but some holdouts still exist. Some examples of A schools not located in Great Lakes are the Master at Arms and Hospital Corpsman schools, which are located at joint service commands in San Antonio, TX, and the Sonar Technician (Surface) A school, which is in San Diego, CA. This closure moved the training of over nearly 40,000 Sailors in over 20 A and C schools out of San Diego (Naval Training Center, 2016; Wallace, 1991). An A school is the foundation for a Sailor's rating and nominally occurs directly after completion of recruit training, while a C school is an advanced school attended later in a Sailor's career as part of accession training (Utt, n.d.). One example of a specialty trained in C school is the Sonar Technician, Surface (STG) rate. Sonar Technicians are responsible for conducting anti-submarine warfare (ASW), that is, detection, classification, tracking, and destruction (as needed in time of war) of any threat submarine, as well as the identification of torpedoes (U.S. Navy, n.d.e).

All required schools that STGs must attend (except the ASW Evaluator Course, which is not in the STG career pipeline) are in San Diego, CA. While the location itself does not present an issue, the factors on how a Sailor can attend differ by coast. The Sonar Supervisor course in an accession course is one of the primary courses required for



STGs to serve onboard a ship. This course is normally attended by STGs after they make First Class Petty Officer (E-6) and prior to reporting to their next ship. If the ship is local to San Diego, the STG may be allowed to attend the course as a Second-Class Petty Officer (E-5) with no cost orders. The STG can gain the requisite knowledge without leaving their homeport and the Navy can save money by not having to pay for a Sailor's lodging, meals, and travel. Additionally, the ship can have a more educated Sailor and manning flexibility, and a San Diego-based Sailor can advance faster than their peers in other fleet concentration areas. It should be noted that there are other courses, mostly minor, such as team trainers, refresher courses, and auxiliary courses offered in most fleet concentration areas; those STGs based in San Diego are at a distinct advantage. Overall, this benefits the Pacific Fleet, because they theoretically should have a better ASW force than any other fleet concentration area.

Conversely, on the east coast, and in proximity to Norfolk, are the Fire Controlman AEGIS (FCA) and Fire Controlman Non-AEGIS (FC) based courses. The purpose of a Navy FCA and FC is to operate, maintain, and control radars while performing operations that include missile launches and 5" gun operations for Surface, Strike, and Aviation-based warfare. These rates are vital to a ship's combat systems operation, as many other ratings depend on some aspect of FC systems to support and operate (U.S. Navy, 2023, b). The FC A Schools are based in Great Lakes, IL. Other accession-level courses are located at Dam Neck (Virginia Beach, VA) and Dahlgren, VA. Theoretically, the proximity of these schools to Norfolk would give an advantage in fire-control-based warfighting efforts to Sailors and ships based out of there.

Electronic Technicians (ET) are the backbone of the entire combat systems department. They are vital in the repair, maintenance and calibration of multiple systems used for guidance, communications, radars, and navigation that combat systems cannot function without. (U.S. Navy, 2023, a)

Other vital combat systems department rates are Gunner's Mate (GM) and Information Systems Technicians (IT). A GM is instrumental for stowing, and securing all weaponry, repair and calibration of defense systems, maintaining guided missile and rocket launchers, as well as maintaining gun mounts and all other ordnance (U.S. Navy,



2023, c); while an IT is vital for keeping networks open, vital data exchange flowing, and communications lines open (U.S. Navy, 2023, d). Combat systems would not be able to function without these rates.

In order to begin the process of aligning combat systems for CNSL and CNSP, all potential areas that are misaligned must be identified. To do so, we must investigate how training is conducted, departments should be manned, certifications are conducted, and what waivers are granted and when. Once all these factors are reviewed, we can then identify how both CNSL and CNSP are aligned and misaligned and attempt to correct these issues using the Congruence Model as set forth by Nadler and Tushman in 1980; see Figure 1.




Figure 1. Congruence Model. Source: Nadler and Tushman (1980).

## B. INTRODUCTION OF NAVAL SURFACE FORCES

The mission and purpose of the United States Navy (USN), also known as the Department of the Navy (DON), is to defend the freedom of the United States and her allies, maintain open seas, and help the United States prosper economically. In order to support this mission, the Navy must have a viable fleet consisting of surface ships, submarines, and aircraft, including personnel that can operate these vehicles and equipment in both peacetime and wartime, and in multiple theaters of operation. While

the submarine and aviation forces are an important component of naval operations and the Navy's mission, the Navy relies on the surface community to operate seamlessly with these other communities in order to effectively meet the missions and fulfill its purpose.

The surface Navy is the oldest community within the Navy, dating back to the Revolutionary War (Naval History and Heritage Command, 2021). The purpose of the surface Navy is controlling the seas, projecting a presence in both domestic and foreign waters, and projecting power. The surface Navy does this by fulfilling multiple mission areas, including surface warfare (SW), aviation warfare (AW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), strike warfare-cruise missile (STW-CMTQ), strike warfare-naval surface fire support (STW-NSFS), ballistic missile defense (BMD), and amphibious warfare (AMW) (Commander, Naval Surface Force Pacific and Commander, Naval Surface Atlantic [COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT], 2022). These mission areas fall under the umbrella of Combat systems (CS).

Within the surface Navy, areas such as supply, engineering, deck operations, and navigation must be fully functional for a ship to be successful and meet its mission while supporting the overall mission of the Navy. While their systems and training are vitally important, there is a uniqueness to combat systems regarding training, maintenance, and operations.

## **1. Commander, Naval Surface Forces**

Operationally, Commander, Naval Surface Forces (CNSF), leads the surface Navy. CNSF is based out of San Diego, CA, and is currently led by Vice Admiral Roy Kitchener. CNSF is tasked with leading both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and all Surface Naval vessels in those operational areas. Commander, Naval Surface Forces, is also the leader of the U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet, and wears two hats as Commander, Naval Surface Forces (CNSF), and Commander, Surface Forces Pacific (CNSP).

Commander, Surface Forces Atlantic (CNSL) “mans, trains, and equips assigned surface forces and shore activities, ensuring a capable force for conducting prompt and sustained operations in support of United States national interests” as their stated mission;



they are charged with taking care of over 70 ships and 34 shore-based commands (SURFLANT, 2023). They are led by Rear Admiral Brendan McLane.

Commander, Surface Forces Pacific (CNSP), has stated that their key missions are to “deliver and sustain full-spectrum naval power that is balanced, affordable and resilient; to lead Surface Warfare policy and standardization issues with a fleet focused perspective; and to develop the professional expertise of our surface warriors” (Commander, Naval Surface Forces, 2023). CNSP oversees 95 ships and 44 shore-based commands. (Of note, these numbers do not include Aircraft Carriers, which are operationally controlled by Naval Air Forces.)

## **2. Afloat Training Group**

Afloat Training Group (ATG) is the training and certification arm of Naval Surface Forces, and they are split between supporting CNSL and CNSP. There are ATG commands located in Norfolk, VA; Mayport, FL; San Diego, CA; Pearl Harbor, HI; and Everett, WA. The intent of an Afloat Training Group is to provide training to every surface combatant ship, certify every ship in their assigned warfare areas, and ensure that these ships are fully deployable and able to execute tasks. As part of their assignment, they verify manning onboard all ships, down to the divisional level to ensure that the required job classifications are properly manned.

The stated mission of ATG Atlantic and Pacific is to:

Provide dynamic, quality afloat training to Navy and Coast Guard Sailors to ensure a combat ready force capable of performing a broad spectrum of maritime missions. Special emphasis is placed on training ships’ training teams, special evolution teams and watch teams to institutionalize the onboard capability to sustain and improve combat readiness throughout an employment cycle. (Afloat Training Group [ATG] Atlantic, 2023; Afloat Training Group Pacific [COMATG PAC], 2023)

ATG Atlantic is the direct oversight for ATG, Norfolk, and ATG, Mayport, while ATG Pacific is the direct oversight for ATG, San Diego, ATG Middle Pacific, and ATG Pacific, Northwest.





### **3. TCIP**

The purpose of the Type Commander Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Combat systems, and Intelligence Integration Process (TCIP) is to verify that all C5I capabilities have been verified as applicable, validated, and proven to work before the end of the maintenance phase and prior to the basic phase. This includes “Pre-Installation Check Out (PICO), Legacy System Assessments, availability execution, Combat systems Light-Off (CSLO), System Operation and Verification Tests (SOVT), TSRA, NAVWAR-led C4I SOT, CDSA ship’s embedded training systems assessment, and Cyber Baseline assist” (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT, 2020, p. 2)

The TCIP office is located in Norfolk, VA, and supports SURFLANT (and satellite commands) in all facets of pre-certification, working with multiple In-Service Engineering Agents (ISEA), Ship’s Force, and multiple support entities to plan a schedule that is laid out in a dashboard, which is then distributed to all stakeholders.

The TCIP office located in San Diego, on Naval Station 32nd Street and not directly near SURFPAC, has a very limited dashboard, and does not interact with the same number of stakeholders, nor does it support all facets of the TCIP process; in fact, it seems to interact in a more reactionary basis, in place of providing planning support. The impact on this thought process is discussed further, when processes are covered.

For this thesis, we viewed the respective N6, N7 and Afloat Training Group and combined them to form a comprehensive picture of both combat systems departments. Further studies should be conducted in order to view the issues over a longer period of time, allowing for more in-depth analysis.

### **C. OBJECTIVES**

The issues and objectives of this thesis are as follows: first, to learn if both SURFLANT and SURFPAC operate in a similar manner regarding manning, adherence to instructions and guidance, and if they are aligned. Second, if misalignment does exist, identify misalignment and correct. Third, to identify how success is measured. What are the criteria used to identify what success looks like? Third, to identify how combat



systems would look if it were working at its best. How would it work? What needs to be changed for alignment between SURFLANT and SURFPAC?

#### **D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

Our primary research questions are as follows:

- Why is there misalignment?
- What is the core mission of SURFLANT/SURFPAC combat systems training and certification?
- What is the strategy to accomplish this?
- What are the organizational components of both commands, and how are they staffed?
- How does the TCIP division fit in?
- How does ATG work with SURFLANT/SURFPAC?
- Is there a procedural difference between both, and why?

To identify the objectives for this thesis, we must consider these questions in depth and conduct interviews with members at each of the commands in order to gain insight of how they operate, what instructions and guidance they use, and why. The scope of this research will be strictly limited to subject matter experts serving at these commands, and we will be limited by availability, time and willingness to participate. The answers will then be compiled and analyzed, and then applied to the congruence model. Once that is completed, we will provide recommendations for alignment and congruence.

#### **E. SUMMARY**

This introductory chapter gave a brief overview of each unit and their responsibilities. Our objectives along with the questions needed to meet these objectives were provided.

In the following chapters, we will conduct a literature review which will give an overview of instructions and guidance, provide our methods for meeting our objectives, and provide our analysis. We will also give our findings and recommendations for alignment and provide a path for congruence.



## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

As part of preparation for this analysis, we reviewed the Surface Force Training and Readiness Manual (SFTM) (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT, 2022), the TCIP Instruction (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT, 2020), and the Total Ship Readiness Assessment (TSRA) Visit Program Instruction (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT, 2017). These instructions are vital for both the preparation and execution of the Surface Fleet’s training and certification process that allows for a ship to be fully mission capable and deployment ready.

We use the congruence model as a framework for diagnosing the misalignment between CNSL and CNSP, assessing the root cause of the misalignment, and providing recommendations for congruency between both coasts.

While these documents are the guiding instructions, it should be noted that delays do occur that keep system installations from being completed on time. This can lead to a ship’s operation and verification testing from being completed on time, which has a cascading effect on all facets of training and certification. If these events are not completed and the schedule does not hold, waivers will be required for ship readiness causing deployment dates to be delayed. Furthermore, these delays can keep other units extended and cause a disruption in the entire fleet’s schedule.

### A. SURFACE FORCE TRAINING AND READINESS MANUAL

The purpose of the *Surface Force Training and Readiness Manual* (SFTM) (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT, 2022) is to provide guidance on what a ship needs to accomplish, how it is to be accomplished by providing “overarching strategy and policy required to generate and sustain surface ship material and operational readiness” (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT, 2022, p.1), and laying out in detail the nominal schedule from start to finish, as displayed in Figure 2 and Figure 3.






Figure 2. Nominal Cruiser/Destroyer (CRUDES) Schedule.  
 Source: COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT (2022, p. 56)






Figure 3. Nominal Amphibious Class Schedule. Source: COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT (2022, p. 57)



Fundamentally, the goal of the SFTM is to train a ship's force, lay out a path toward overall readiness, use all PESTONI pillars as criteria for completion, and provide a simplified reporting process and an approach that follows a logical sequence, while applying consistency in assessment standards (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT, 2022). This is called the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP). All ATGs and support commands have their responsibilities laid out in depth in the SFTM, so there should be no ambiguity on which unit is responsible for which functions. Additionally, all shipboard personnel responsibilities are laid out with instructions on how every watch station, qualification, and replacement should be handled and administered.

## **B. TCIP INSTRUCTION**

The TCIP Instruction's stated purpose is to "publish policy, procedures, and responsibilities for planning and execution of Type Commander (TYCOM) Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Combat systems, and Intelligence (C5I) Integration Process" (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT, 2020, p. 1). This instruction is used to navigate the maintenance phase and ensure that a ship is ready to enter the basic phase; the instruction is a piece of the overall surface force training and readiness plan. The nominal schedule in Figure 4 shows a timeline for when each event should occur.






Figure 4. Nominal TCIP Schedule. Source: COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT (2020, p. 7)



### **C. TOTAL SHIP READINESS ASSESSMENT**

The purpose of the TSRA instruction is “to promulgate policy, procedures, expectations, and responsibilities for the planning and execution of the Total Ship Readiness Assessment (TSRA) Visit Program” (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT, 2017, p. 1) It is used to guide all Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and TYCOM period-based inspections and assessments. This ties into the TCIP instruction, because it deals with the maintenance, repair, documentation, and training for ship maintenance (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT, 2020).

### **D. CONGRUENCE MODEL**

*A Model of Diagnosing Organizational Behavior*, more commonly referred to as “the congruence model” was developed by David Nadler and Michael Tushman in 1980. The purpose of the congruence model is to analyze every part of a team or unit, determine if the team is working as a whole, and find issues or problems that are keeping a team, command, or unit from being aligned, or in congruence.

Often, when a leader comes into an organization, they want to put their stamp on the unit. This occurs for multiple reasons; in this thesis, we will take a viewpoint of a Navy command. Change can be made for change’s sake, because the new leadership want it their way; change can also be made due to underperformance of a command or a specific component of a command. Change can all be forced by higher authority due to incompetence, overall poor performance, or a number of rules violations. The issue is that leaders make changes, relying on what has worked in previous stops, commands, or roles, without understanding how a unit works as a whole.

In order to implement change in any unit, leaders must understand how every piece of the organization works; this allows them to view the organization works at a basic level. For instance, on a ship you have multiple departments that make up the command. Every department has divisions, and every division has multiple work centers. This is where understanding organizational performance, and why things are the way they are, is vital.





Using the congruence model as a roadmap on how to view each part of your unit, and how they work as a whole, or “fit” is essential to understanding what works, what does not, and what needs to be changed in order to have your organization work as a team, or in “congruence.” If your command cannot certify in a warfare area, is the command at fault? Can the issue be broken down to a department, and then further broken down into a single division? Why did they fail to certify? That can be examined by looking at the “fit.” Could they not execute tasking because of guidance? Or is it because of manning? Perhaps, a warfare area cannot pass certification because it relies on another warfare area for support.

A prime example of this, from personal experience, was the Sonar Technicians and torpedo tube maintenance. The Sonar Technicians were preparing for certification onboard my last ship. There were issues with torpedo tube maintenance, which would keep them from certifying. Our Commanding Officer demanded the issues be resolved immediately, and questioned why the Sonar Techs could not fix the issue. Instead of taking time to research the issue, ask the Sonar Techs, or reach out to the appropriate people, he instead decided to yell and threaten to fire people. What he did not realize is though the tubes were considered part of their warfare area, they did not own the tubes; due to a Navy-wide shift almost a decade earlier, they belonged to the Gunner’s Mates. This affected very aspect of fit and contributed to a command suffering from low morale and dissatisfaction with the job and organization.

The input you get from observing, asking questions, and learning how things work, before making rash decisions, can help you implement organizational change; the congruence model, as developed by Nadler and Tushman looks at a unit’s input (environment, resources, history), strategy (core mission, tactics, objectives), tasking, formal and informal organization, the individuals, and the output. The output is taking all the above pieces and looking how they “fit” together. A further breakdown of the congruence model is written under our methodology section.

## **E. SUMMARY**

The Surface Force Training Manual sets the standard for how training and certification is to be conducted in the surface Navy. Both the TCIP and TSRA



instructions are supplemental references to help SURFLANT and SURFPAC achieve their goal of ship readiness and availability to deploy and carry out tasking.

The congruence model provides a vehicle to look at these commands and diagnose any issues and allow for identification of these issues, to provide a path for correction and alignment.



### **III. METHODOLOGY**

In order to complete our research and analysis, we conducted interviews with various members of the Navy surface community. Our targeted participants included members from SURFLANT and SURFPAC combat systems departments, ATG Norfolk and San Diego combat systems members, and TCIP members from SURFLANT and SURFPAC. We set out to determine who the key players are, regarding commands, and personnel at the respective commands. The interviews conducted focused on both the organization and processes used for training and certification, as well as roadblocks faced in attempting to do both.

We also wanted to ascertain what they regarded as success and why an event is successful, how they scheduled events and when they are scheduled, and how they tracked these events. Additionally, we wanted to learn what their overall goals are and what the criterion for certification is. Finally, we wanted to look at how certification was met, how they both progressed towards that milestone and how they used required guidance and instructions to get there.

Once this was done, we applied our findings to the Nadler and Tushman (1980) congruence model and provided recommendations for alignment to reach congruence as a unit.

#### **A. PROCESSES**

In this section, the processes used were investigated and analyzed for alignment and procedural compliance to the instructions.

##### **1. Surface Forces**

For SURFLANT and SURFPAC, to properly analyze the processes, manning, and mission, we asked representatives from both commands what the core mission of SURFLANT/SURFPAC combat systems training and certification is, as well as what their strategy for training and certification is. As a follow up, we also asked what specific performance and output objectives were needed by a unit in order to fully meet certification.



## **2. TCIP**

As a subordinate unit to both SURFLANT and SURFPAC, we asked what the core mission of SURFLANT/SURFPAC TCIP departments is and what the strategies for both respective departments are. Again, we asked what the specific performance and output objectives of SURFLANT/SURFPAC TCIP departments are and how they are measured.

## **3. Afloat Training Group**

SURFOR is directly responsible for the guidance for training and certification to ATG (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT, 2022). As a result of this fact, we also set out to learn how ATG fits into these processes. As an agent of SURFLANT and SURFPAC, ATG is the primary training and certification authority, but who is responsible for oversight? While ATG does report findings to SURFOR, we asked about how it is administered. Is there any support in terms of scheduling from SURFOR? Are there any repercussions for a ship failing to certify? (Of note, ATG Norfolk and ATG San Diego are located in the two highest fleet concentration areas; thus, the focus was on them.)

## **B. ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENTS**

We wanted to learn how these organizations are structured; how they are manned, and whether there are differences between both coasts. Another issue vital to our analysis was learning whether there was a match among positions in terms of military versus civilians in the same roles. Determining the split of officers, enlisted, and civilians in key positions was attempted. The questions asked are as follows:

### **1. Surface Forces**

What are the organizational components of SURFLANT/SURFPAC Combat systems training and certification? How are they manned? What is needed for the following: Task- workflow, knowledge, skills needed; Individual- knowledge, skills, nature, and characteristics looked for; what is the formal organization- structure, processes, methods, procedures; informal organization- implicit and unwritten rules.



## **2. TCIP**

What are the organizational components of SURFLANT/SURFPAC Combat systems training and certification? How are they manned? What is needed for the following: Tasks- workflow, knowledge, skills needed; Individual- knowledge, skills, nature, and characteristics looked for; what is the formal organization- structure, processes, methods, procedures; informal organization- implicit and unwritten rules.

## **3. Afloat Training Group**

What are the organizational components of SURFLANT/SURFPAC Combat systems training and certification? How are they manned? What is needed for the following: Tasks- workflow, knowledge, skills needed; Individual- knowledge, skills, nature, and characteristics looked for; what is the formal organization- structure, processes, methods, procedures; informal organization- implicit and unwritten rules.

## **4. Overview of the Congruence Model for Analysis**

According to Nadler and Tushman (1980), “the congruence between two components is defined as the degree to which the needs, demands, goals, objectives, and/or structures of one component are consistent with the needs, demands, goals, objectives, and/or structures of another component. Congruence, therefore, is a measure of how well pairs of components fit together” ( p. 45).

Using this as a guide, we began to analyze the various components of SURFOR to see how they interact with each other, in order to provide a patch for congruence. Why would we need all units to form congruence? Because “The basic hypothesis of the model, which builds on this total state of congruence, is as follows: Other things being equal, the greater the total degree of congruence or fit between the various components, the more effective will be the organization—effectiveness being defined as the degree to which actual organization outputs at individual, group, and organizational levels are similar to expected outputs, as specified by strategy” (Nadler &Tushman, 1980, p. 45).

In order to assess, we looked at each of the components listed in the congruence model, Figure 1. By assessing the key components of SURFOR as a whole, along with



the fits of every component, we can identify issues and provide recommendations for a way forward.

### (1) Input

Inputs are the factors that are known within a unit, or what they are responsible for working with. Inputs are broken up into three parts: environment, resources, and history.

- Environment is defined as all of the factors that are not part of the unit that have a potential to impact the unit.
- Resources are all the items, such as personnel, funding, guidance, subject matter knowledge, and technology available to the unit.
- History is considered to be the activities, behavior, training, and certification effectiveness that influence how the unit currently operates.

We used input from our interview participants, working knowledge of surface forces, and reviews of the guidance used to look at how all units interacted with, and were influenced by with the current environment is. Real world tasking, funding, a 36-month window are all environmental factors. The primary resource analyzed was manning at each of the commands, which helped us get an overall assessment of how things worked, why and what the manning impact was. With regards to history, the primary factors were training needed to serve at the various commands along with characteristics needed, and what the effectiveness of following guidance was, along with how different versions of guidance influenced events and results.

### (2) Strategy

Strategy is how decisions are made to guide the unit regarding expectations, constraints, and opportunities. Again, it can be broken down further into three aspects, which are: core mission, tactics, and objectives. Strategy will undoubtedly affect tasking and decision making.

Core mission- do the commands know what their core mission is? Are they executing their mission, and if not why?

Tactics- what guidance, rules, instructions and workarounds are they possible using?



Objectives- what do they want to accomplish in relation to their core mission?

Using strategy as a tool for analyzing SURFOR, we wanted to see what each command, and department, viewed their core mission as. Also, while following their core mission, we wanted to see how they were getting there; what instructions are they using? Are they following the same, or are they different? When we got to objectives, we wanted to learn if the surface navy was following the mantra of “one team, one fight” and if they had the same objective, or if the objectives across each command and department were different.

### (3) Tasking

Tasking is simply the work done by the unit as a whole and by subordinate units. This is the first part of the unit’s organizational components. In our analysis, we looked at what work each unit across the commands listed was doing, to see if the tasking across departments was similar in scope, or different. In doing so, we could assess some of the root cause of misalignment.

### (4) Formal Organization

Formal Organization is the structure, guidance or instructions, formal processes methods, and approach used to guide people to conduct their tasking. This is the second part of the unit’s organizational components.

A big part of our analysis of the formal organization was determining what the structure was across commands, and if it was symmetrical. Another piece we wanted to determine was if all instructions were the same, and if they were followed the same.

### (5) Informal Organization

Informal Organization is the unwritten rules or arrangements, structure, affiliations, and informal processes methods used for people in a unit to conduct their tasking. This is the third part of the unit’s organizational components.

With informal organization, we wanted to discover if any unwritten rules existed, if there were any other structural differences, and if guidance was not used, how tasking was completed. (An unwritten rule that was followed during my ATG days, that we



sought to learn if it still existed was the favoritism rule. In one personal instance, an event could not be completed, because the ship I was working on did not have a maintenance check that supported a their newly installed system; when I brought this up at the outbrief, the Commanding Officer of the ship asked me if I knew Bob (my Commanding Officer). The reason this Captain asked was because they were friends, and he wanted me to know that the grade sheet would be dismissed, and the ship would get credit, because they were friends. Sure enough, my input was changed, and the ship certified. Before I could act, this happened in another warfare area, and an investigation took place. Instead of discipline being handed down, the other warfare area was forced to conduct another certification event.)

#### (6) Individuals

Individuals are the personnel assigned to a unit, and the traits/characteristics needed to complete their assigned tasking. This is the fourth and final part of the unit's organizational components.

With this piece, we wanted to know if screening was involved, what schools and experience was needed, and what traits someone needed to serve at these commands.

#### (7) Output

Output is what the unit is expected to produce, what a unit's effectiveness is, and its performance. Outputs should be evaluated in three ways in order to evaluate how an organization performed, and that is by how a unit met its goals, how resources were used, and how it adapted to its environment.

Taking all these components into view, we look at how they "fit" together to form the basics of congruence; the following components determine "fit":

Individual/Organization: this is how a person feels about the unit and asks how their needs are met. We wanted to learn if the sailors and civilians at these commands were satisfied with the command. What is the command climate and morale?





Individual/Task: this is about a person having the skills, knowledge and abilities to complete assigned tasks, and how fulfilling those tasks are. We wanted to determine if there were any requirements to serve at the commands analyzed.

Individual/Informal organization: this asks how a person's needs are filled by the informal organization, and how the informal organization uses personnel to reach informal goals. We wanted to know if sailors and civilians felt as if they were being utilized properly, if it was a career enhancing billet, and if they were being taken care of by the command.

Task/Organization: this asks if the organization is structured to meet assigned tasking, and does the organization motivate personnel to complete the demands of a task. We simply wanted to see if the structures matched, if they had enough personnel assigned to each command, and what each department was tasked with accomplishing.

Task/Informal organization: this asks if the informal organization is structured to allow performance of tasking; does it help or hurt performance? We wanted to learn if the structure allowed for completion of tasking, and if not, why?

Organization/Informal organization: do the goals, the structure alignment, and rewards of both organizations align? Finally, we wanted to use this part to determine if structure, objectives and execution aligned.

The analysis of how these fit, describing the unit's components, and identifying problems that exist in a unit will or will not demonstrate congruence.

## **C. SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY**

For our data collection, we submitted a thorough package to the Naval Postgraduate School's Institutional Review Board (IRB). After several reviews, it was determined that we were exempt from the IRB's oversight, so we began the interview process. We worked with the Human Factors Engineers at both SURFPAC and SURFLANT in order to get Commanding Officer permission to conduct interviews. We reached out to the Commanding Officer of ATG San Diego to receive permission; for ATG Norfolk, several emails and an in-person interview with their Commanding Officer was held to gain permission.



For the interview process, we reached out to 32 individuals across all six commands; 16 people participated in our interviews, which were conducted on Microsoft Teams and over the phone; four separate individuals declined participation due to travel, illness or not feeling knowledgeable enough to participate. Administration at several commands were instrumental in providing manning documents and organizational charts.

The survey questions asked are in the appendix. While a standard list of questions was asked, the interviews led to some questions being removed or additional questions being asked.



## IV. ANALYSIS AND PROCESSES

### A. MANNING

#### 1. Surface Forces

While viewing CNSP and CNSL as an organization, we looked at both the N6 department which oversees material readiness, and N7 which oversees training and personnel readiness. When breaking down the organizational charts provided during interviews, two things were readily apparent.

First, the organization is not as large as CNSP; there are less titled billets and the structures do not line up. Second, not all pieces of the organization are listed on their organizational charts. (i.e., the ready, relevant learning branch has more billets than they have listed.)

The CNSL organizational breakdown is as follows:

At the Officer level in N6, there is one Captain (O-6) as the lead, three Lieutenant Commanders (O-4), and two Lieutenants (O-3). For Enlisted rates there is one Master Chief Petty Officer (E-9) Fire Controlman, Aegis.

There are three government civilians, and contractors are not listed.

At the Officer level, N7 has one Captain (O-6) as the lead, four Lieutenant Commanders (O-4), one Lieutenant Junior Grade, and one Ensign.

For Enlisted rates, there are five Master Chief Petty Officers (E-9) in the following rates: Intelligence Specialist, Operational Specialist (2), Quarter Master and Sonar Technician.

There are six government civilians, and contractors are not listed. In total, there are thirty filled billets listed and filled between N6 and N7 at CNSF, with one vacancy existing. The rank is not listed.

Looking at CNSP, here is the breakdown for N6:

At the Officer level, there is one Captain (O-6), four Lieutenant Commanders (O-4), two United States Marine Captains (O-3).



At the Enlisted level, there are three Master Chief Petty Officers (E-9), one who serves as the Senior Enlisted Leader, in the following rates: Information Systems Technician (2) and Electronics Technician. There are eight Senior Chief Petty Officers (E-8) in the following rates: Cryptologic Technician Maintenance, Cryptologic Technician Technical, Electronic Technician, Information Systems Technician, Fire Controlman Aegis, Fire Controlman Non-Aegis, Gunners Mate, and Sonar Technician. There is one Chief Petty Officer (E-7), one First Class Petty Officer (E-6), three Second Class Petty Officers, and one Third Class Petty Officer (E-4); all are Information Systems Technicians.

In N7, at the Officer level, there are two Captains (O-6), four Lieutenant Commanders (O-4), three Lieutenants (O-3).

In the Enlisted ranks, there are five Master Chief Petty Officers (E-9) in the following rates: Boatswain's Mate, Operation Specialist, Quartermaster, and Sonar Technician (2). There are seven Senior Chief Petty Officers (E-8) in the following rates: Boatswain's Mate, Electronic Technician, Fire Controlman Aegis, Fire Controlman Non-Aegis, and Sonar Technician. There is one First Class Petty Officer (E-6) in the Yeoman rate.

There are seven government civilians and twelve contractors. It should be noted that there are fifteen vacancies: 1 Lieutenant Commander (O-4), 2 Lieutenant (O-3), 2 Senior Chief Petty Officers (E-8), 2 Chief Petty Officers (E-7), 1 First Class Petty Officer (E-6), 1 Government Civilian, 4 Contractors, and 2 undetermined ranks.

In total, CNSP has 120 billets listed, with 105 of those filled. This dwarfs what CNSF has listed, by 89 listed and 75 filled. There are many billets that CNSP has listed, that do not exist at CNSF. For instance, there is no Senior Enlisted Advisor at CNSF N6, while CNSP has a Master Chief serving in that capacity. In CNSP N6, there are 55 billets that are not listed or do not have a direct comparison in CNSL N6; in CNSP N7, there are 46 billets that are not listed or do not have a direct comparison in CNSL N7, however, there are 6 CNSL N6 billets that do not exist in CNSP N7.



Table 1. Side-by-side comparison of the N6 departments. Adapted from SURFPAC/SURFANT (personal communication, May 2, 2023).

SURFPAC N6		SURFLANT N6	
N6 ACOS	O-6	N6 COM SYS READINESS	O-6
N6A DACOS	CIV	N6A DEP ACOS	CIV
N6 SEL	E-9		
WARFIGHTING READ	CTR	N6B TECH ADVISOR/ C5I	CIV
Modernization Policy, Strategy & Execution	CIV		
Cyber / CIO	CIV		
TCIP O	CIV	N68 TCIP O	O-4
TCIP SD	CTR		
TCIP SD	CTR		
TCIP SD	CTR		
TCIP SD	CTR		
TCIP SD	CTR		
TCIP SD	CTR		
TCIP SD	CTR		
TCIP PACNOR	CTR		
TCIP PACNOR	CTR		
N60 Force C5I Modernization	O-4	N61 EMO/CSO	O-3
N60A Dep C5I Modernization	CIV	N61E AEGIS READ	E-9
N60 TSP Corona Rep	CIV		
N60 COTS Radar Support	VAC		
N60 C5I Mod Analyst CRUDES OCONUS/PNW	CIV		
N60 C5I Mod Analyst CRUDES OCONUS/PNW	CIV		



SURFPAC N6		SURFLANT N6	
N60 BISOG Liaison Off Capt USMC	O-3 USMC		
N60 BISOG Planning Off Capt USMC	VAC USMC		
N60 C5I Mod Analyst LCS/MCM/FLEX	CIV		
N60 C5I Mod Analyst Amphibs	CIV		
N62 – Force Information Warfare	O-4	N62 Modern	O-3
N62A Force EW	E-8		
N62B Force Cryptology	E-8		
Current Readiness	CTR		
N63 – Force Electronic Material	O-4	N63 COMMO	O-4
N63A Force ET	E-9		
N63B Force Electronic Tech	E-8		
N63C	CTR		
N64 – Ashore C4	CIV	N64 CIO	CIV
N64A Ashore ISSO	CIV		
NGEN Accounts, ITPR, SMCP, SIPR Tokens	CTR		
VTC, Phones, TV, DISA Support	CTR		
MEDCOI Support	CTR		
ISSM, RMF, CSWF Support	CTR		
NGEN Support Asset Management	CTR		



SURFPAC N6		SURFLANT N6	
N65 – Force Combat systems	O-4	N65 CRY/EW/INTEL	O-4
N65A Deputy Force CSO	CIV		
Aegis CSMM	E-8		
CSMM	E-8		
ASW	E-8		
VLS	E-8		
N66 – Force C4Force C4I Afloat Readiness	O-4		
N66A – Force ITCM	E-9		
C4I Afloat ITCS	E-8		
N661 – Force COMMO	O-4		
Force C4I Processes and Metrics	CIV		
N662 Staff Comms	E-7		
COMM Center LPO	E-6		
COMM CENTER	E-5		
COMM CENTER	E-5		
COMM CENTER	E-5		
Flag IT	E-4		
N69 Cyber Operations and Network Infrastructure	CIV		
Cyber Compliance	CIV		
Cyber Compliance	CIV		
Cyber Compliance	CIV		
Cyber Readiness	CIV		
Cyber Readiness	CIV		



SURFPAC N6		SURFLANT N6	
Cyber Readiness	CIV		
Cyber Readiness	CIV		

Table 2. Side-by-side comparison of the N7 departments. Adapted from SURFPAC/SURFLANT (personal communication, May 2, 2023).

SURPAC N7		SURFLANT N7	
N7 Readiness and Training	O-6	N7 TRAINING AND READINESS	O-6
CNSP DET MON	O-6		
N7 Ad	E-6		
N7A Deputy ACOS Readiness and Training	CIV	N7A DEP ACOS	CIV
N7 XO/ Current Readiness	O-4		
NAV ASSISTANCE TEAM LEAD	VAC	N711 Force QM	E-9
NAV ASSISTANCE TEAM LEAD	E-9	N712 Nav Training and Readiness	O-1
NAV ASSISTANCE TEAM LEAD	E-9		
NAV ASSISTANCE TEAM LEAD	E-9		
NAV ASSISTANCE TEAM LEAD DR	CTR		
N71 FORCE NAV/SWO PROGRAMS	O-4	N71 Force Nav	O-4
N71A SWO	VAC		
N711 OPS ADMIN	VAC		
N712 NAV/Plotting Specialist	VAC		





SURPAC N7		SURFLANT N7	
N72 LCS Training and Readiness	O-4	N74 PC/MCM/LCS T & R Lead	O-4
N72A Asst. LCS Training	VAC	N741 & N742 PC/MCM/LCS T & R	E-9
N721 AT/VBSS Training	VAC		
N73 AMPHIB Training and Readiness	O-4	N73 AMPHI TRAIN AND READ LEAD	O-4
N73A Asst. AMPHIB Training	O-3	N732 AMPHIB TRAIN AND READ	O-1
N731 ENG TRAINING	VAC		
N731 DC TRAINING	VAC		
N74 DDG/CG Training and Readiness	O-4	N72 CRUDES Train and Read Lead	O-4
N74A Asst. DDG/CG Training	O-3	N722 CRUDES TRAIN AND READ	E-7
N74 USW TRAINING	CIV	N721 FORCE STG	E-9
N741A USW	E-9		
N741B USW	E-9		
N742 Radar Systems	VAC		
N743 Air Warfare	E-8		
N744 Strike Warfare	VAC		
TRAINING OFFICER	O-4		
ASSISTANT TRAINING	E-8		
TRM/NTSP	CTR		
FLTMPS Coordinator	VAC		
N75 Ind schools and learning	CIV	N75 RRL Lead	CIV
N75 Ready Relevant Learning	CIV		



SURPAC N7		SURFLANT N7	
N75 Ready Relevant Learning	CIV		
N75 Ready Relevant Learning	CIV		
N75 Ready Relevant Learning	VAC		
N75 Ready Relevant Learning	CIV		
N75 Ready Relevant Learning	E-8		
N75 Ready Relevant Learning	E-8		
N75 Ready Relevant Learning	E-8		
N75 Ready Relevant Learning	E-8		
N75 Ready Relevant Learning	E-8		
N75 Ready Relevant Learning	E-8		
N75 Ready Relevant Learning	CTR		
N75 Ready Relevant Learning	CTR		
N75 Ready Relevant Learning	CTR		
N75 Ready Relevant Learning	CTR		
N75 Ready Relevant Learning	CTR		
N75 Ready Relevant Learning	CTR		
N75 Ready Relevant Learning	CTR		
N75 Admin Assist	VAC		
Management Analyst Senior Analyst PRT Metrics Team	CIV		
Management Analyst Management Analyst	CTR		
Management Analyst Management Analyst	CTR		
Management Analyst Engineering Psychologist	VAC		
PMS 339	VAC		



SURPAC N7		SURFLANT N7	
POM Training/Simulation	VAC		
SWE T-PILLAR	CTR	N76 SWE T-Pillar Lead	CIV
CSCS Tactics/Ranges/LVC	VAC		
		N724 FORCE INTEL	E-9
		N731 FORCE OS	E-9
		N77 FORCE TRAINO	CIV
		N7C PROGAM ANA TRAINING AND METRICS	CIV
		N771 TRAINING INNO	O-2
		N79 AEGIS ASHORE	CIV

## 2. Afloat Training Group

ATG Norfolk: ATG Norfolk has three Officers, 106 Enlisted, and eight contractors within their combat systems department. They are distributed among five departments. A breakdown of the enlisted rates and rank was not provided, but Combat systems is manned at 79%, or 95 out of 120 manned billets.

ATG San Diego has five Officers, 76 Enlisted, and no civilians or contractors. They are distributed across six departments. A breakdown of the enlisted rates and ranks was provided, but because Norfolk did not provide based on rating, an accurate comparison cannot be made. combat systems show a total manning of 42.4% or 76 out of 179 manned billets, which is far below what ATG Norfolk is manned at. In total, Norfolk has 30 more enlisted members, which is a difference of 60.2%. While San Diego has more total billets, there is a massive shortfall in how they are manned.



Table 3. Side-by-side comparison ATG San Diego and ATG Norfolk.  
Adapted from ATG (personal communication, May 9, 2023).

AFLOAT TRAINING GROUP SAN DIEGO		AFLOAT TRAINING GROUP NORFOLK	
N81 CS	LCDR	N81 CS	LCDR (2)
N81 CS	LT	N81 CS	LT
		N81 CS	MCPO
N811 USW	LT	N811 USW	MCPO
N811 USW	SCPO	N811 USW	SCPO (2)
N811 USW	CPO (4)	N811 USW	CPO (6)
N811 USW	FCPO (5)	N811 USW	FCPO (4)
		N811 USW	CTR (3)
		N812 OHSAT	MCPO
		N812 OHSAT	CPO (6)
		N812 OHSAT	FCPO (2)
N812 (AW/SW/BMD)	LT	N813 (AW/SW/BMD)	MCPO (2)
N812 (AW/SW/BMD)	MCPO (3)	N813 (AW/SW/BMD)	SCPO (14)
N812 (AW/SW/BMD)	SCPO (10)	N813 (AW/SW/BMD)	CPO (41)
N812 (AW/SW/BMD)	CPO (20)	N813 (AW/SW/BMD)	FCPO (4)
N812 (AW/SW/BMD)	FCPO (13)	N813 (AW/SW/BMD)	CTR (3)
N812 (AW/SW/BMD)	2ND PO		
N815 MW	SCPO (3)		
N815 MW	CPO (5)		
N816 (STW-CMTQ)	LT	N815 (STW-CMTQ)	SCPO (9)



AFLOAT TRAINING GROUP SAN DIEGO		AFLOAT TRAINING GROUP NORFOLK	
N816 (STW-CMTQ)	CPO (4)	N815 (STW-CMTQ)	CPO (10)
N816 (STW-CMTQ)	FCPO (5)	N815 (STW-CMTQ)	FCPO (2)
		N815 (STW-CMTQ)	CTR (2)
FST	SCPO		
FST	FCPO		
Officers	5	Officers	3
Enlisted	76	Enlisted	106
Enlisted manning as given = 42.4% manned		Enlisted manning as given = 79% manned	

## **B. LEADERSHIP**

### **1. Surface Forces**

CNSL's N6 department serves as the combat systems Readiness branch and is led by a Captain (O-6). The N6B is a civilian, while the N61 is a Lieutenant (O-3) and has a warfare lead Master Chief (E-9). N62 and N65 are led by Lieutenants (O-3), and N63 and N68 are both led by Lieutenant Commanders (O-4); no enlisted warfare leads are listed.

The CNSL N7 department serves and the Manning and Readiness branch and is also led by a Captain (O-6); N71, N72 and N73 are all led by Lieutenant Commanders (O-4) and have Master Chiefs (E-9) serving their rate's respective Force Master Chief. N74 has a Lieutenant Commander (O-4) as the lead, and a Master Chiefs (E-9) as the class warfare lead. N75, N76, N77, N79 and N7C are all civilian led, while N771 is led by a Lieutenant Junior Grade (O-2).

Within CNSP's N6 department, there are many different branches and leads. N6 is the current material readiness branch at SURFPAC. Overall, the department is led by a Commander (O-5); the TCIP, N64 and N69 departments are led by a Civilian, while the N62, N63, N65 and N66 departments are led by Lieutenant Commanders (O-4). The N60



department is billeted for a Lieutenant Commander (O-4), but currently, a Lieutenant (O-3) serves as the lead.

In the TCIP department, there are no military members. N60 has no enlisted, and N62 has two Senior Chiefs (E-8) serving as warfare leads. N63 has a Master Chief (E-9) serving as the warfare lead, while N64 is a completely government civilian and contractor staffed department.

N65 has three Senior Chiefs (E-8) serving in the capacity of warfare leads, with one billet vacant. N66 has a Master Chief (E-9) and the lead, and N69 is completely Civilian staffed.

In the N7 department, which serves as the training and readiness branch, the lead is a Captain (O-6). Navigation is led by a Lieutenant Commander (O-4) with a Master Chief (E-9) as the warfare lead; N71 is led by a Lieutenant Commander (O-4) with no current warfare lead. N72, N73 and N74 are all led by Lieutenant Commanders (O-4); N72 and N73 do not have warfare leads, as billets are currently vacant. N74 has two Master Chiefs (E-9) as leads. Training is also led by a Lieutenant Commander (O-4) and has a Senior Chief (E-8) as the lead. N75 is led by a government civilian and has five Senior Chiefs (E-8) as leads for their rate.

In a comparison between both organizations, CNSP clearly superseded CNSL in the number of bodies working the various missions. There are many jobs that surprisingly do not cross over, and many SURFPAC based billets do not have direct counterparts in SURFLANT. TCIP for example has a government civilian running the program in PAC, while LANT has an active-duty Officer in charge. N codes between PAC and LANT do not match up in most instances, with N code assignments for the same jobs being different, and the same numbering systems not being used across coasts. This is one very identifiable area of misalignment between both organizations, which should be assessed in order to determine how to reorganize.

To further add to the confusion, one organization (CNSL) has a Standard Organization and Regulations Manual, which clearly defines what every person within the command is responsible for, while the other (CNSP) does not, and organizational positions, responsibilities and roles can and have been changed based on who is in



charge. During one interview, it was discovered that a unit in PAC had decided to disregard the instruction they had written and give the responsibility to another department without any consultation or informing that department.

## **2. Afloat Training Group**

ATG Norfolk is divided into four warfare areas; all led by a Lieutenant Commander (O-4). There is another Lieutenant Commander (O-4) and a Lieutenant (O-3) who split duties as division officers for the five areas. In code N811, Undersea Warfare, N812 Ordnance Handling Safety Assist Team, and N813, Air/Surface Warfare and Ballistic Missile Defense, the warfare lead is a Master Chief Petty Officer (E-9). In N815, Strike Warfare/ Cruise Missile Tactical Qualification, the warfare lead is a Senior Chief Petty Officer (E-8).

ATG San Diego is split into five warfare areas and led by a Lieutenant Commander (O-4). Each warfare area has a Lieutenant serving as the division officer; N811 Undersea Warfare, N815 Mine Warfare and Fleet Synthetic events warfare leads are all Senior Chief Petty Officers (E-8). N812 Air/Surface Warfare and Ballistic Missile Defense is led by a Master Chief Petty Officer (E-9); N816 Strike Warfare/ Cruise Missile Tactical Qualification is led by a Chief Petty Officer (E-7).

## **C. PROCESSES**

### **1. How Does CNSL Operate?**

CNSL has an N6 department that is focused on combat systems readiness (and the maintenance phase), and an N7 department that is focused on certification and training. Both departments interact with other command N codes in order to track all aspects of a unit's material condition, certification and readiness for tasking. As a command, they direct and track basic certification events conducted by ATG. As per the TCIP instruction, N6 is directly responsible for scheduling BFTT (Battle Force Tactical Trainer) grooms and SOTs.

The SFTM outlines all of their requirements for a ship, for the basic and advanced phase of training, which they are responsible for. That includes all the reporting requirements for basic phase readiness, basic phase updates. Additionally, there is a



combat systems light off assessment that is conducted, that is thought to be another event that leads to success.

Early in the process, materials discrepancies are identified, and all attempts at correction of these issues are made. The inability to correct these issues can become a hinderance to certification.

To serve there as an officer, the specific skills needed are to be a post department head tour surface warfare officer, deep knowledge of the SFTRM, the optimized fleet response plan, the fleet training continuum, and the cruise missile training and qualification guide. Along with this, the ability to interact with others and brief is desired. As far as a senior enlisted member, a deep knowledge of the respective warfare area, along with the ability to interact with others and brief are needed.

## **2. How Does CNSP Operate?**

CNSP's N6 and N7 departments function in a similar manner as their CNSL counterparts, with the major difference being the number of areas covered, and the number of personnel assigned. It was discovered in our research that not only does the fleet not know what the responsibility and function of the TCIP branch is, there is no direct oversight from the combat systems readiness branch.

To serve there as an officer, the specific skills needed are to be a post department head tour surface warfare officer, deep knowledge of the SFTRM, the optimized fleet response plan, the fleet training continuum, and the cruise missile training and qualification guide. Along with this, the ability to interact with others and brief is desired. As far as a senior enlisted member, a deep knowledge of the respective warfare area, along with the ability to interact with others and brief are needed.

There are weekly standup meetings, as well as informal day-to-day meetings for any relevant issues to be discussed.

## **3. Why Does ATG Work for CNSL/CNSP? What Is Their Purpose?**

Both ATG units serve as the training and certification arm of their respective area of responsibility type commanders. Their mission is to conduct various training events, as





directed by CNSL/CNSP, and post-training, to conduct certification events that have a minimum score of 80% for completion. If a ship fails to complete an event with that score, it is recommended that it be re-done, at CNSL/CNSP's discretion. There are events and circumstances in which waivers are granted.

In addition to the STFM, there is also extensive use of the TORIS program, which is an online program they can all look at that gives a basic snapshot update of any ship. It also allows us CNSL to track other readiness items as defined per the surface warfare training manual, and ship's manning.

It is generally recommended that every ship has a warfare lead from ATG that follows the ship throughout their basic phase, to provide continuity and serve as a subject matter expert for all issues within that's ships areas.

While there is not an official screening to serve at ATG, it is desired that a sailor be a warfare expert and have the ability to train, along with the required schools for their rate and a have basic instructor course completed.

It is generally considered between both coasts that the there is an Assessment 2 (AS2) watch stander Assessment event conducted along with the Pilot Program in Norfolk is a huge boost towards ship success, while overtasking is a detriment to successful training and certification. This affords the LANT based ships an opportunity (along with BFTT grooms) to receive tracks from off ship, in a distributed event, which allows this to be demonstrated and learned before the certification event.

The scheduling is a mix of weekly standup meetings between the warfare leads and the training liaison officers, as well as in office scheduling meets that help deconflict items. The schedulers are responsible only for their warfare areas.

The reporting path is from the warfare leads to the combat systems officer and training liaison officers at Norfolk/ San Diego, and then to the ATG LANT and PAC levels, before being briefed to SURFLANT and SURFPAC respectively.

#### **4. Interaction between TCIP and ATG**

In SURFLANT, the TCIP office is part of the N6 code and works with ATG in a variety of ways; first, they produce dashboards that contain various events that are



considered part of the maintenance phase and include C4I SOT and BFTT system grooms. They also track combat systems installations, system operation verification and testing events, and all events encompassing Readiness 5. The process takes place over three phases: planning, light off and assessment, correction, and demonstration phase.

In SURFPAC, there is virtually no knowledge of the TCIP department and what they do, represent or who they are. The main concern for that branch is SOVT burn downs, and pre-installation check-outs, tracking material discrepancies before the ship's basic phase.

## **5. Nominal Timeline**

As per the SFTM, the training cycle is known as the Fleet Response Training Plan (FRTP), and consists of six phases, over a 36-month period. The six phases are: sustainment, maintenance, shakedown, basic, advanced, and integrated.

Sustainment begins once the ship is certified for deployment and ends when the ship has completed a deployment and is ready to enter the maintenance phase. This usually takes place from the 20 to 36-month mark for AMPHIBS and the 19 to 36-month mark for CRUDES. (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT, 2022, p. 16, 59–62).

After the sustainment phase, the maintenance phase begins. This takes place from the 1 to 7-month mark for AMPHIBS, and 1 to 6-month mark for CRUDES. The purpose of this phase is to take the ship through an availability period, conduct installations, and make repairs. All required schools needed for sailors should be taken and completed during this phase. Once a ship completes all work, they are ready to exit this phase. Readiness 4 should be met at this phase (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT, 2022, p. 16-17, 62–64). One crucial event that takes place during this phase is the engineering light off assessment; the ship cannot move forward until this event is passed, and failure will set back the entire timeline. SURFOR N7 and TCIP are involved in this phase.

The next phase is the “shakedown” phase, which occurs in month 8 for AMPHIBS and months 6 through 7 for CRUDES. The material condition of the ship should be able to support all events required for basic phase at this point, including all



TCIP functions. SURFOR N6 and TCIP is involved in this phase; the ship should be able to light off all combat systems equipment during this phase. Once this phase is completed, the ship can move to their basic phase (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT, 2022, p. 17, 64–68).

The basic phase is when the ship begins their unit training, to certify and become deployment ready. Training in this phase is at the ship level, and ATG is involved in this phase. During this phase, sailors should be familiar with all ship guidance, and become proficient in all warfare areas. This takes place in months 9 through 14 for AMPHIB and 7 through 12 for CRUDES (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT, 2022, p. 17, 68–75).

The advanced phase takes place in month 14 for AMPHIB, and 12 through 13 for CRUDES. During this phase, a ship should be able to fight through advanced scenarios with multiple units. (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT, 2022, p. 17, 75–77).

Finally, the ship is ready for the integrated phase. This takes place in months 15 through 19 (month 19 be pre-overseas movement) for AMPHIB, and 14 through 18 (with month 18 as the pre-overseas movement period) for CRUDES. The purpose of this phase is for multiple ships to function as a group. Final certification will take place here (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT, 2022, p. 17, 77–79). Once this phase is complete, the ship is ready to move back into the sustainment phase and deploy.

#### **D. APPLICATION OF THE CONGRUENCE MODEL**

This section will take the responses compiled from our interviews and apply that data to the congruence model. Doing so will give us a clear picture of how each piece of the model fits together, allowing us to analyze each command and determine whether or not they are working in congruence.

All quotes are modified or have information redacted to keep participants anonymous. They have been edited for grammar. They have been included as highlights of our findings. We conducted 16 interviews over a period of 14 hours with volunteers at various positions at SURFPAC, SURFLANT, ATG Norfolk and ATG San Diego. All participants were E-7 and above at the time the interviews took place.



## **1. Input**

**Environment:** The majority of environmental factors that affect SURFPAC, SURFLANT, ATG San Diego and ATG Norfolk are all common. These factors include real world tasking for the ships, lack of funding for maintenance and materials, and lack of qualified/trained personnel. All of these are considered roadblocks to success and impeded the mission. Another environmental factor is the different guidance used, which affects both afloat training groups and is not organic to their command but was promulgated by higher authority.

**Resources:** resources that affect SURFPAC, SURFLANT ATG San Diego and ATG Norfolk are funding, personnel, and their ability to be assigned to surface ships, and personnel who are required to be subject matter experts in their field while having “people skills” assigned to both commands. Guidance includes the instructions delegated by their leadership, and technology that includes information systems infrastructure and transportation to and from deployed units.

In all, funding has the potential to be a significant constraint on all activities, specifically when budgets are not passed, or funding has not been allocated in time to put resources in place to conduct missions.

**History:** Recent history shows the implementing a pilot program at ATG Norfolk has been a positive for certification; conversely, the combat systems assessment held by SURFPAC has been a help towards having all material condition issues corrected before entering the basic phase. Each coast should implement the other’s processes for these efforts.

## **2. Strategy**

**Core mission:** The overall core mission of the commands analyzed is to train, certify, equip, and ensure every ship in the surface fleet is fully mission capable. This includes all facets of the PESTONI pillars (Luster, 2017).

We are to train surface ships for readiness, train their training teams and verify material readiness for programs and warfare areas. (Anonymous, personal communication, April 26, 2023)



The core mission is to prepare ships through the shipyard period to make sure that they have, you know, complete readiness coming out of the shipyard to be able to support ready 5 events. (Anonymous, personal communication, April 28, 2023)

The core mission is to train ships crews to make sure they're ready to deploy and ATG essentially acts as the as the agent for SURFLANT in that regard. (Anonymous, personal communication, April 25, 2023)

Tactics: Tactics used include the implementation of the SFTM, TSRA and TCIP instructions, verification of shipboard personnel's manning and required training, and completion of all six phases of the FRTP as defined in the STFM. (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT, 2022, p. 16). This includes training onboard ships and in classrooms, use of off ship labs to send tracks for testing, and riding ships to conduct training and certification.

They start by doing administrative reviews early in the basic phase, usually before ships are really ready materially; then they do combat systems light office assessment, which captures the material piece. Once ships demonstrate material readiness for basic phase, they move into training, which is kind of like a a crawl and then assessment which is your walk and then certification. Each division reports events to the command (ATG) who then reports completion to SURFLANT/SURFPAC.

Our immediate superior in charge is ATG Atlantic. So ATG, Norfolk Commanding Officer reports to ATG, Atlantic Commodore, and then he reports directly to SURFLANT. We have staff interactions as well between the various staffs. (Anonymous, personal communication, May 4, 2023)

For example, like a certification validation, while not formally required to be approved by ATG LANT, it only has to be approved by ATG, Norfolk and ATG LANT oversees ATG, Norfolk, the Commodore of ATG LANT wants to be aware of the plan and wake sure he's OK with it as well. (Anonymous, personal communication, April 26, 2023)

AUGM and SFTM are used as guides, and trainers have to request permission to deviate. Ships don't get enough time in basic phase and there's typically no room for error in their schedule, there is a lot of pressure to make sure that they certify at the AS2.

Like the step off point for this whole for the whole basic phase comes down to utilizing the SFTM and then the applicable guidance is for



whatever warfare area and whatever platform, so whatever class tactical manual for that particular ship we're going to utilize to include whatever with OPS are necessary to complete. (Anonymous, personal communication, April 25, 2023)

Objectives: The objective is simply stated as getting ships deployment ready, with the knowledge and ability to sail into harm's way while being able to "fight the ship" and keep the ship sailing. For certification events, the minimum required score to certify is 80%. Success would be completing their certification, meeting all the different events, meeting them to the 80% grading mark, obviously more is better.

Success is being able to mitigate the problems that have arisen. What the system issues, personnel issues, timing issues, being able to and understand just within SW and if we're able to get all work for areas combined in the ship certified and be able to let them move on to the advanced phase. That's how we feel we have done our job, right? That's what we're tasked here to do. So being able to have that ship and meet the criteria is our margin for our success, our measurement. (Anonymous, personal communication, April 25, 2023)

### **3. Tasking**

The task is to verify assigned ships operational capability, material readiness, and to train and certify, while guiding the ship through all six phases of the FRTP.

For ATG, in order to meet operational tasking, trainers must train ships to get to the integrated phase so that they can move forward in order to meet operational tasking in the future. As stated, one of the first things that is done when trainers go to a new ship is familiarize themselves with that ship's battle orders. So they can train to the ship's commanding officer's battle orders. They also need to know the capabilities and limitations for their specific areas. Basically, they need to be experts in their field so that they can train them. Especially right now, there isn't a whole lot of senior leadership on the waterfront. (Anonymous, personal communication, May 3, 2023)

As discussed in ATG interviews, part of the strategy is to leverage subject matter experts. Every AUGM is broken down into AMTAC phases; performance and output is defined by grade sheets. ATG develops basic phase schedule. Certification is success, which is defined 80% minimum on the certification event grade sheets. The goal is to complete within 24 weeks. They have certification exercises that they are beholden to, that's kind of the gauge of how the ship is expected to perform, right. Generally, they



shoot for 80% or better, and 80% or better on the cumulative total of the certification events that they train to. Everything comes down to utilizing the SFTM and then the applicable guidance for whatever warfare area and whatever platform, so whatever class tactical manual for that particular ship they're going to utilize.

It was noted that everybody was supposed to go to the pilot program that they are (SURFLANT) is doing. Didn't happen. For FST, if there are system hiccups or things like that where they can't execute, they're not going to do an event, not going to conduct a first scenario. They try to push through as best they can with the resources that the ship has at their disposal. But some of these piers are old, so it might be a riser issue where they just don't have good connection between the two spots even though if they were on a different pier maybe they would have hang ups like that happen. They just do the best they can with what the ship's configuration looks like. really hard question to answer who does more because there are so many variables that would stop an event from actually kicking off.

For N6, when training and certifying ships for the N6 if there is a casualty or an issue with their system that's impacting their training, then they will step in to help support them to get what they need to get their systems up and running. They all focus on the modernization, and TCIP. The TCIP cell that manages the SOVT's; then they have the modernization group that manages any of the installs prior to a SOVT, coordinating what's going on with ships and gets approval for that. (Anonymous, personal communication, April 26, 2023)

N7 is responsible for manning and ensuring commands are not only manned, but trained with the appropriate schools, but qualified. (Anonymous, personal communication, May 2, 2023)

Confusion as to why the commands are misaligned, but recognizes there is. PAC complete earlier events in odd order. No CSCCES during FST U in PAC. No BMD at Mayport. LANT has a higher standard. BMD is all CIV in San Diego. (Anonymous, personal communication, April 28, 2023)

Ships will not meet minimum material readiness and request events. ATG cannot do event, and has to reschedule, compressing timeline. Leads to overtasking and conflict. NEC verification does not take special, out of rates (3MC, CSMM, etc.) into account. FXPs are outdated/ references superseded, but not updated; temporary standing order put place. SFTM has inaccuracies, but they are forced to use. Trying to build new scenarios that reflect real world issues. Under the impression that Pilot Program in



Norfolk was going away after a year. IA deployments still exist. ATG bodies being pulled to deploy on ships as well, delaying retirement. (Anonymous, personal communication, May 1, 2023)

Mission is to assess, train, certify at basic phase. No knowledge of TCIP. Objective is to ensure ships are materially ready. Skills needed are diverse background and ability to cover multiple areas. Instructions lead to misalignment. N3 schedules. Each ship has a TLO, each warfare area has a scheduler. Roadblocks are manning and equipment. Undermanned and different structure. (Anonymous, personal communication, May 3, 2023)

Sub tasking and schedule shifts can and will vary, depending on the maintenance status, installation of new equipment, real world tasking and location of the ship.

You know, you get engineering casualty, you get a CASREP happening. Stuff happens. So inevitably, I have an underway next week, but you notified me right now that you're skip, this went down and we can't do so enabling operations, so, OK, well, it's under way. We're supposed to be certifying you in that. So unfortunately, we have to kick that can down the road and we'll find the next gap and we'll move it three weeks and we'll do that and whatnot. So it's not common, but I'd say probably 30% of the events that are initially scheduled due end up getting moved. (Anonymous, personal communication, May 2, 2023)

#### **4. Formal Organization**

The formal organization for N6 and N7 at both SURFLANT and SURFPAC, as well as the ATGs have been laid out in tables 1,2, and 3. All guidance relevant to training and certification has been discussed in section II, above. There is confusion between the commands as to what the N codes cross coast equivalent is, why it is laid out the way it is, and who their counterparts are.

I don't know exactly what their code, what their title is over there, but I know you know, speaking to my counterpart over there, that's what he deals with a lot more manning of ships. (Anonymous, personal communication, April 28, 2023)

Leadership, communication, work environment is huge. No cross-coast direct equivalent. Participant served in both coasts, sees major differences. Ships are way overtasked. CSATs are helpful. LANT should adapt. (Anonymous, personal communication, April 27, 2023)

Are you looking at the ATG user guide manual? We have essentially an ATG user guide manual. I think that's what you're looking for. Each warfare area has an appendix essentially, and that appendix, if you're





looking at it, it kind of lays out the AMTAC process that I described. And yes, there is a difference between PAC and LANT. We started a pilot. (Anonymous, personal communication, May 3, 2023)

## **5. Informal Organization**

While no specific informal organization details were given during our research interviews, we were informed by multiple sources that ships are usually not allowed to fail basic phase, and waivers are often granted in order to avoid failure. All interviews detailed strict adherence to instructions and guidance, with the exception of SURFPAC and the lack of a SORM.

Ships use blue and gold teams for watch standing. ASTAC/Air Controllers are still a big issue. Sailors identify issues, notify leadership months in advance, leadership will ignore and keep pushing. Leadership then ignores/gives waivers. No one wants to cost ships a chance at Battle E, so they will NA an events. (Anonymous, personal communication, May 3, 2023)

The only thing I guess I could say this close to that is we are not directed to recommend waivers or even bring them up. However, if the ship does bring up the fact that waivers do exist, we do guide them on how to do them in the sense that we tell them it's in the STRM and who they go through and everything. And I can say that my time here I have never seen a waiver request denied... that's probably the closest thing to bypassing requirements that I that we have. (Anonymous, personal communication, May 2, 2023)

Whatever the ship wants, the ship gets even. If it's not what's best for them; they have the ear of senior leadership and it makes it very difficult for trainers. Basic phase end date will never move, but there is an understanding that there's no accountability in the maintenance community, so they shorten the front end of the time that trainers have. So whatever time they get with the ships is the time that they have and then they're expected to complete events, to get them to certifying grade no matter what circumstance. (Anonymous, personal communication, April 27, 2023)

Not having a command SORM allows senior leadership to choose who they want to complete tasking and gives free reign for interpreting instructions how they see fit, ignoring guidance and using their position to overtask command members.

People are overtasked. SORM needs to be put in place so people can't change other people's roles on a whim and blindside them just because.



Instructions need to be followed. Ship's maintenance seems to fall on back burner. More emphasis needs to be on training. Better success starts with coordination. Move projects to appropriate code. Leadership, communication, and work environment are huge. No cross-coast direct equivalent. Participant served in both coasts, sees major differences. (Anonymous, personal communication, May 1, 2023)

There's not really written rules at this time. SURFPAC is currently working on their SORM, so we don't have, you know, a written job description that tells me what I'm supposed to do and what others are supposed to do so that it's currently in the works; if we work properly, I think we'd have a SORM that outlines who should be doing what and it was well understood." "People are overtasked. SORM needs to be put in place so people can't change other people's roles on a whim and blindside them just because. Instructions need to be followed. Ship's maintenance seems to fall on back burner. More emphasis needs to be on training. Better success starts with coordination. Move projects to appropriate code. Leadership, communication, and work environment are huge. No cross-coast direct equivalent. Participant served in both coasts, sees major differences. (Anonymous, personal communication, May 3, 2023)

Do you believe that there's a misalignment between PAC and LANT in that aspect? Yes, I've seen that the documentation that LANT uses to track their SOVTs and things like that and it's obviously superior. Also, I think there's a leadership problem here. They don't communicate well. (Anonymous, personal communication, May 2, 2023)

People are overtasked. SORM needs to be put in place so people can't change other people's roles on a whim and blindside them just because. Instructions need to be followed. Ship's maintenance seems to fall on back burner. More emphasis needs to be on training. Better success starts with coordination. Move projects to appropriate code. Leadership, communication, and work environment are huge. No cross-coast direct equivalent. Participant served in both coasts, sees major differences. (Anonymous, personal communication, May 1, 2023)

## **6. Individuals**

Manning at all commands is detailed in tables 1,2, and 3. Personnel assigned to all listed billets are required to be subject matter experts in their specific warfare and have served as a warfare lead onboard a surface ship. Also expected is that they have the ability to speak in public, build and conduct briefs, and be comfortable briefing and talking with senior leaders at both the ship and command level.



Looking at what training, qualifications and knowledge is needed at these commands, here are a few findings:

And so taking a look at, you know, it used to be, we went solely by pay grade, right. You're a fire controlman you're an E-7. OK, now it's your time to flow back into here. And what we look at now is like, OK what baseline were they trained on what?, what qualifications do they have? Did they just pick up Chief? Someone who just picked up Chief and somebody who has been a Chief for five years or vastly different. Right. So we started changing the metrics where we look at like the totality of their career. We try to place people in the right spots to make sure the ships have them, you know the most capability possible. So those are the big things where you know the metrics we go by. (Anonymous, personal communication, April 28, 2023)

We have multiple different layers of training required of the different individual ranks of personnel here. So, our khakis are of a certain level, our E-6 or Petty Officer levels are of a certain level. Our junior personnel, we don't have them here, ATG, but they are on individual training as well. So personnel need to be here, they need to be trained to the proper level as well as a clear written instruction. So, the black and white that we have a foundation against in the standards of being held to them, that's giving to us from SURFPAC and essentially tells us what the SURFPAC needs from us. And then a local ATG type instruction or how our chain of command and Commander expects us to know. (Anonymous, personal communication, May 4, 2023)

Along with manning, and the structure, being undermanned was discussed by multiple participants:

We've had we've had occasions where we have, you know mission in Mayport, we have a team out in Rota and then we still have two missions in Norfolk, and we definitely get stretched to support all of those requirements. So, we use a mix of augments and deviations to accomplish those missions. (Anonymous, personal communication, April 28, 2023)

The fleet is undermanned, and so any shore duty command is at a lower priority. I have been told that that the ATG is at their highest priority, shore duty commands so, yeah, that's the reality of it though. There's just not enough people right now. (Anonymous, personal communication, April 28, 2023)

## **7. Output**

The expected output is that all surface ships will successfully complete all six phases in the FRTP and meet the exit criteria that is stated in the SFTM. As far as the



certifying events listed in the SFTM, all mission areas are required to score 80% to pass (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT 3502.7C, 2022, p. 59).

Each certification exercise requires an 80% or better to complete that CE and the warfare area needs each CE completed to certify that warfare area. We're always successful in the completion of basic phase. However, the goal is to complete the basic phase and 24 weeks 24 training weeks, because that is what the what is defined by the ORP of how long they should have to train. (Anonymous, personal communication, April 28, 2023)

We have certification exercises that we're that we are beholden to, right? And that's kind of the gauge of how the ship is going to be expected to perform, right. And generally, we shoot for 80 or better, 80% or better on the cumulative total of the certification events that we train to. And then that we observe and ultimately grade them too. And those, the certification events come from the toolbox, and they're updated annually. (Anonymous, personal communication, April 24, 2023)

#### **E. SUMMARY**

Overall, we learned of the differences in manning, manning shortfalls and the impact they have on training and certification, and the differences in procedures and how they affect the fleet, as a whole. We also learned of the various roadblocks faced, how SURFLANT and SURFPAC intervene on the behalf of ships and the negative impact in can have, and how SURFPAC and SURFLANT, as well as ATG San Diego and ATG Norfolk have different instructions, different interpretations of instructions, and how that affects not only the training and certification of ships, but also other commands not under their umbrellas.

Finally, in looking at the SFTM, AUGMs that were provided and TCIP instructions, we were able to analyze how different instructions, different interpretations of instructions, and availability delays affect surface ship timelines with the 36-month cycle.



## V. RESULTS AND CONGRUENCE

### A. SUMMARY

SURFPAC and SURFLANT are not aligned, and they are not in congruence. There are too many differences between both coasts, from the guidance and instructions used, to the manning, structure, number of personnel and standards followed. While everyone wants to do the right thing, and what they believe is best for the fleet, there are many misunderstandings of what the other command is doing and why.

A top down, long term study should be conducted in order to fully qualify and quantify the misalignment and provide a fully implemented solution that will be followed by all.

### B. FINDINGS

#### 1. Overall

The biggest finding in our research is that ATG Norfolk and ATG San Diego use different versions of guidance to conduct events. This was stated in nearly every interview conducted with ATG personnel; in one instance, a non-warfare lead was not aware that different versions existed and had to be provided copies. While we were not able to assess each version of the afloat training group user's manual used in every warfare area, it was stated multiple times that appendix W (surface warfare), is vastly different between both coasts; there are more events on the east coast, and the number of trainers needed to complete the events per platform is different. This leads to more events being conducted in LANT, because of the recently implemented pilot program. This is the first part of why the coasts are not aligned. We did attempt to review each AUGM, but copies were not easily found, and we did not have access to the websites where they are posted.

Across all N codes, undersea warfare at ATG is the closest in alignment, with the codes, guidance, instructions, methods, and processes being followed by both ATG San Diego and Norfolk. While the strike warfare area believes that their warfare area is aligned, and they hold semi-annual meetings to ensure alignment, slight differences exist.



The N codes do not align, and Norfolk has more personnel, and those personnel are higher ranking. This was revealed when we reviewed the manning documents provided and is detailed in section IV.

The second major finding is that there is little to no alignment between both SURFPAC and SURFLANT in how their N codes (including ATG) are structured. The major issue with this is the response if one unit was to be taken offline, for any number of reasons. Because of manning, reporting and structure, the commands as a whole are asymmetrical, and while there can be ways to exploit that (such as confusion by the enemy when trying to assess the command structure), overall, this is not a good thing. This was also laid out in detail in section IV, broken down by N6, N7 and ATG.

In this research, we tried to determine why the N codes and warfare areas did not line up. We also tried to determine why one command would have a unit that the other did not have. In our follow up questions to participants and general stakeholders, there was no standard or “good” reason why.

The only reasonable answer was that at some point, overall responsibility would rotate between PAC and LANT on a scheduled basis, and that appears to have ended. With this ending, the leadership chose to implement their own structure and the other coast chose to structure their command how they saw fit. (At some point, the SURFOR role rotated, along withstanding down and subsequently reforming commands, such as Second Fleet; this may have led one lead to organize the structure to their thinking, and when operational control ceased to rotate, one unit stood the way they were lined up and the other did a re-structuring.)

Another major finding was that manning at both ATGs are below what is needed; while ATG Norfolk has a higher percentage of manning filled, ATG San Diego has more billets and less overall manning. With that being stated, ATG San Diego routinely has to augment Norfolk (and at times Mayport) because the number of events in LANT is higher. When used as an augment, sailors for their respective ATGs must learn the other coast’s rules and standards and adapt to them. PAC has more ships and more ground to cover, less bodies, but frequently augments, which is a huge moral issue and can keep manning levels down. Again, this is a vital part of why misalignment exists. 9 of 9



participants stated this as fact. The numbers, as provided by both commands and detailed in section IV support these claims.

Commonly agreed upon roadblocks, across all participants included different guidance used by both ATGs; this is a particular hinderance because this blocks alignment and does not allow for the same training to occur for sailors. AUGM W was provided for review by both ATG Norfolk and ATG San Diego. It was determined that Norfolk was using a newer version of the instruction which included the AS2 and different event manning requirements, while ATG San Diego is using an older version.

In every interview that we conducted, we found common responses: Shipboard personnel shortages and lack of qualifications are roadblocks to scheduling and completing training and certification events. Other roadblocks include material and equipment condition and readiness. Included in this are system casualties, system operation verification and testing not being completed, and installations running over the scheduled timeframe. Yard period overruns, and availability periods are also a roadblock to certification and can eventually affect not only the effected ship, but also other units waiting to enter that phase. These statements were echoed in every interview we conducted.

In regard to scheduling, all efforts at SURFLANT and SURFPAC are seemingly aligned, with the exception of SURFPAC's TCIP branch, who does not follow the TCIP instruction and has taken a complete hands-off approach when it comes to certain events, going as far as demanding the stakeholders looking to fix the issue stop using TCIP as part of their dialogue. This was discussed in multiple interviews, as most PAC participants did not know what TCIP was, and members who did know discussed various interpretations of the TCIP instruction.

## **2. Surface Forces, Atlantic**

One major finding not already listed, that affects SURFLANT is that the combat systems port engineers work under N4, which is considered engineering, and not combat systems. This was brought up in one LANT interview, with the view that this effort



should move to N6, so that the correct leadership structure is in place and N6 can be involved with their maintenance effort.

It was also discovered in cross organization interviews that that LANT does not conduct a combat systems assessment, which is a “find-fix-train” event that PAC hosts at Port Hueneme. Because there is not the same knowledge base in LANT as there is specifically in Port Hueneme, it is currently not feasible to replicate. There is talk of this changing in the future.

### **3. Surface Forces, Pacific**

There is no Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM) in place at SURFPAC, and the lack of a SORM was discussed and the impact was described by 3 PAC based participants. This directly affects every person attached to that command, as there is no actual guidance in place outlining every person’s role and responsibility. This is a major issue, as people can be given responsibilities that they should not be assigned, based on senior leadership’s whims. There also seems to be more tasking due to SURFOR, and leadership does not have bandwidth to schedule events as needed. N4 also hosts the combat systems port engineers, which again, should be changed. This is further discussed in Chapter VI, Recommendations.

Another major finding is that SURFPAC, while the lead for all PAC based ships, is not on the main naval base, located at 32<sup>nd</sup> Street in San Diego, but it instead located on a different base, six miles away; two participants listed this as an issue, while one was in favor of the commands being separated. This takes away direct oversight and does not allow for easy face to face interaction between senior leaders and the waterfront.

### **4. Surface Forces, Atlantic TCIP**

SURFLANT’s TCIP is better aligned and follows the TCIP instruction. Their dashboard contains more information and is distributed to more stakeholders and was verified by a dashboard that was provided by both SURFPAC and SURFLANT. It was repeated by multiple participants, on both coasts, that LANT was in line with the instructions, while PAC admitted they were not. The stated goal is to prepare ships for





readiness event 5, and this branch works with regional maintenance center to conduct events such as total ship's readiness assessment.

## **5. Surface Forces, Pacific TCIP**

PAC's TCIP department is in a different building than SURFPAC. They do not fall under N65, combat systems readiness, which puts both units at odds over how guidance should be followed (this was stated in multiple interviews). They do not follow the instruction, which PAC (as SURFOR) is responsible for enforcing, and they believe that SOTs, such as BFTT grooms, are not part of the maintenance phase (based on multiple interviews and personal knowledge). This is a major issue for ships during their basic phase because it keeps them from having a distributed event that provides tracks from off-ship to test their system, and operator training; personnel at both SURFPAC and ATG San Diego stated this was an issue and felt it does not give the PAC based ships a fair shake. This has been somewhat mitigated by PAC funding classroom training, and other units attempting to schedule and conduct grooms, but ship commanding officers are not well versed as to the "why" of SOTs.

Overall, the program is not very well known in the fleet, with no PAC interview subjects, outside of those with direct relation to the program, responding that they knew of the existence of or purpose of the program.

## **6. Afloat Training Group, Norfolk**

As stated previously, ATG Norfolk has a Pilot Program that is not conducted in San Diego and no ships have failed AW/SW since the program was implemented. The Pilot Program is reflected in the provided AUGM W. There is also an in-house scenario where simulated tracks are fed through all combat systems areas as a first look prior to certification. There are more events than San Diego, allowing for more training and the fleet's knowledge base to be built. Fleet Forces tasking can interrupt phases and interfere with certification. As revealed by two participants, COVID affected multiple events, mainly from a contractor and material availability stance. In one stated case, events could not be completed as instructed because the contractor simply did not have the material needed to proceed with testing. It was noted SURFLANT will take advice when a ship



fails to certify, but ultimately disregard and allow for waivers to be granted. While I will not provide direct quotes, nearly every interview with working knowledge of the process agreed with waivers, and how they are seemingly freely granted.

One major reason, outside of the Pilot Program, for the higher number of events is that Norfolk will star events that need a redo and train to that event, while San Diego just renames the event. Every interview with knowledge of the process stated this to be the case.

## **7. Afloat Training Group, San Diego**

The major finding here, not previously discussed, is that ATG is spread out over the base, not within walking distance and therefore, it is not a collective unit. From our participants, it was stated that no combat systems casualty control evolutions are conducted during FST events, which keeps sailors from practicing vital troubleshooting on systems that are eventually assessed during the certification process. There is also no Assessment 2 before certification. AS 2 practices a distributed event and gives the warfighter more practice, and many feel that Norfolk doing this give their ships a better opportunity to certify on time.

It has also been revealed that outdated and irrelevant guidance is still being used; this is something considered “not working” as new references have been put in place that is not used in the drafting of the outdated guidance.

## **C. FIT**

Individual/Organization: most individuals interviewed were generally satisfied with their command, with the exception of not having a SORM at SURFPAC. ATG sailors were not satisfied with the detailer not following or advertising the sea duty rotation rules in the MILPERSMAN 1306–101 (2010, p. 5-6), nor with the lack of personnel available to support the mission. It was specifically stated that the lack of personnel, along with the need to augment has become a morale issue.

Individual/Task: all individuals interviewed meet the requirements to serve in their assigned billets. As far as job satisfaction, the majority of participants are generally satisfied, but feel that the roadblocks and overtasking of ships should be mitigated to the



highest extent possible, and that waivers should not be given out as easily as possible as they are. There was also frustration in how the Pilot Program in LANT was executed, as PAC feels it should be implemented there to help ships.

Individual/Informal organization: When assessing this fit, one glaring discovery, specifically, for SURFPAC, is the lack of a SORM and clearly defined roles. This was a detriment to formal organization and structure, leaving people not knowing what their job would be from day to day, and affected job satisfaction, the sense of career enhancement and morale. TCIP not following the instruction in SURFPAC also falls into this fit; while it was determined that they did not follow the instruction as written, it was revealed that this was not by choice. Higher leadership within the organization directed that it was not their job and directed that SURFPAC N6 members in another branch take on part of their job. This led to overtasking in N6, and under tasking in TCIP, and forces outside entities to overstep their positions in order to make the program work.

Another piece of this fit was not only ATG on both coasts being undermanned, but also augmenting each other when needed and the lack of reward for serving here (the “reward” being the adjustment of the sea-shore rotation, further detailed in VI, under Recommendations). It was stated by multiple participants that this was a tough tour and constantly being away, with the possibility of being sent on an individual augmentation tour to either a ship to fill a gapped billet, or overseas (Middle East) while on a supposed shore tour, leads people to stay away from these billets.

Task/Organization: Manning at ATG San Diego, and the lack of cross-organization counterparts does hinder personnel from completing tasks. Multiple findings affect this fit. First is the manning at ATG San Diego. Again, while ATG Norfolk is undermanned, San Diego is both significantly undermanned and has less bodies that Norfolk, and constantly has to help Norfolk and Mayport conduct training and certification.

Outside of ATG’s Undersea Warfare departments, no N codes fully align, creating a cross coast mismatch. As previously stated, this can become a massive issue if one organization is taken out of commission; efforts cannot easily be duplicated, and the operational chain of command will become murky.



Each department's overall tasking is similar, but the way they meet the objectives (between manning, guidance and reliance on others), and what their smaller organizational tasking is differs, specifically at the N6 and N7 levels.

Task/Informal organization: We learned that part of the informal structure in SUFPAC is a direct result of their lack of a SORM; this breaks down what should be built up as a formal structure and leads to informal tasking that is a hinderance to knowing roles and responsibilities. Participants have stated that they felt blindsided by being assigned jobs that should not be in their realm; this further erodes morale and contributes to overtasking which leads to jobs being put off or not being completed on time.

SURFLANT does have a SORM which delineates all roles, responsibilities and job descriptions, along with a clear chain of command, and this should be used as a basis for drafting one in PAC.

Organization/Informal organization: the goals of PAC and LANT align, but the structure alignment, instructions and adherence to guidance do not. We have laid out what the structure at each command looks like in section IV and determined that there is not alignment between the N6/N7/TCIP or ATG with few exceptions. The impact of this has been discussed, but another aspect is a ship being homeport shifted from one TYCOM to another and not knowing what the reporting structure is and being burdened with different expectations. Examples of this are CSAT, AS2, TCIP SOTs, among others.

Objectives align between all commands, which is to train, certify and produce a ship that is fully mission capable and ready to deploy. The fit issue here is how the commands meet this objective, with differences being what instruction they use and how they interpret these instructions.

Overall, the analysis and subsequent fit do not fully align between SURFPAC and SURFLANT, leading to a lack of congruence at the Surface Force level. These findings are broken down into the following chart, Table 4, which details how each section of fit is affected by our findings. Each finding shows what part of fit it affects. As you can see, some of our findings affect multiple fit parts, showing how one issue can affect multiple



parts of an organization's function and congruence, and keeping the commands from being aligned.

#### **D. SUMMARY**

In order to fully align, and have congruence at the SURFOR level, all aspects of fit need to be resolved and symmetry between both coasts needs to be reached. The first issue that should be addressed, as it affects four fit categories, is SURFPAC not having a SORM. Using SURFLANT's as a guide, one should be drafted, reviewed for alignment and accuracy, and implemented. Other notable fits that should be addressed promptly include N6/N7 alignment between coasts, TCIP oversight in PAC, and ATG N code alignment, as this has the second biggest fit impact. Manning at the ATG commands also needs to be addressed and prioritized by the Bureau of Personnel; not only is morale affected, but the ability to conduct training and certifications is hampered by the lack of available personnel.

Addressing these issues will pave the way for fits to be aligned is vital to correcting functional performance in an SURFLANT, SURFPAC and ATG which will then let these commands work in tandem and be in congruence.



Table 4. Fit chart

Unit		Fit Affected					
SURFPAC Findings	SURFLANT Findings	I/O	I/T	I/IF	T/O	T/IF	O/IF
Generally satisfied with mission, tasking		X	X				
Qualified to serve at unit			X				
Roadblocks exist			X				
More robust N6/N7 structure	N6/N7 Org chart is lacking; a lot of unknowns			X	X		X
N6/N7 have more functions				X	X		X
Does not have a SORM	Has a SORM	X		X		X	X
TCIP does not follow instruction	TCIP follows guidance and schedules as required			X			
TCIP is separate from N65				X		X	X
N codes do not align					X	X	
Goals are the same							X



Unit		Fit Affected					
ATG San Diego Findings	ATG Norfolk Findings	I/O	I/T	I/IF	T/O	T/IF	O/IF
Generally satisfied with mission, tasking, not with detailing		X	X				
Qualified to serve at unit			X				
Roadblocks exist			X				
Instructions are different		X					
42.4% manned	79% manned				X		X
Frequently augments Norfolk, Mayport	Rarely augments PAC				X		X
N codes do not align					X	X	X
Goals are the same							X
I/O= Individual/Organization	I/IF= Individual/Informal organization	T/IF= Task/Informal organization					
I/T= Individual/Task	T/O= Task/Organization	O/IF= Organization/Informal organization					



## E. IMPLICATIONS

All the findings and differences between the coasts ultimately keep the Navy from operating in sync on both sides of the country. Ultimately, the root causes of misalignment are:

1. No congruence in the organizational structures across all commands.
2. Manning differences at both ATG and SURFPAC/SURFLANT N6 and N7.
3. Lack of procedural compliance.
4. Lack of standard procedures and instructions for completing the same certification.
5. Lack of a SORM in PAC.
6. Lack of oversight in PAC at the TCIP branch.
7. Differences in training, such as the AS2 and BFTT grooms in LANT, CSAT in PAC.

Every effort should be made to align and sync efforts and allow for one congruent combat systems team navy wide. Doing this would help avoid confusion in regard to training standards, certifications and structure.





## **VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

In this chapter, we reviewed the core questions that our research addresses and provided answers that illustrate the overall findings from our study. By doing this, we were able to determine the issues that are keeping both coasts from being aligned and provide a path towards congruence. We did so by providing recommendations for each issue found.

### **A. SUMMARY**

The overall summary of our findings is that SURFLANT and SURFPAC as a unite, which combines to make SURFOR, are not in congruence; many factors play into this discovery, including the congruence fit, and while some of the issues are simple fixes, others will take time to change and implement. While we are limited in our time, scope and ability to conduct research and analysis, we recommend that a longer study be conducted in order to find issues we were not able to uncover.

### **B. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION**

After a thorough analysis of our interview responses, instructions and guidance used, along with manning documents and organization charts, we were able to answer the questions we set formulated and used to determine if combat systems, as a unit, was aligned. We analyzed the responses from 16 participants and conducted a few follow up interviews with various participants to gain clarity on issues ranging from the use of, and location of the AUGMs, and if they were available for download or in an accessed controlled repository, verification of a SURFLANT SORM, and many questions regarding manning and organizational charts. Our answers are as follows:

Why the misalignment? There is misalignment due to differences in instructions, interpretation of instructions, lack of a SORM at SURFPAC, and manning.

What organization is more effective at scheduling and certification? While it is difficult to conclude who is more effective at both, the overall conclusion is that the AS2 conducted in SURFLANT is a tremendous boost for their ships to meet certification, but because their pilot program needs more personnel, it is detrimental to SURFPAC. As far



as TCIP goes, SURFLANT is more effective because they follow the instruction as laid out, and do not make an interpretation that removes their responsibility. SURFPAC has ignored the instruction and placed the burden of scheduling BFTT grooms and other SOTs on SURFPAC N65, which leads to a lack of awareness of the program, cancellation of groom events and a lack of support to the fleet. This is a massive roadblock for ships attempting to certify, since the first time getting distributed tracks is when ATG comes onboard to start assessments.

Do they operate as per guidance or freestyle? With the exception of SURFPAC TCIP, they operate as per guidance, but under different instructions.

Why is there a difference in procedural use? There is a difference at ATG because of the Pilot Program; there is a difference at TCIP because there is no SORM and SURFPAC TCIP has been instructed not to follow the instruction.

Are they misaligned? Yes. Why? Manning, structure, and instructions/guidance.

What is the root cause? Manning, structure, and instructions/guidance.

What is LANT doing different from PAC in terms of scheduling? The primary difference is the AUGM's and manning.

What is PAC doing different from LANT in terms of scheduling? The primary difference is the AUGM's and manning. ATG San Diego is forced to augment ATG Norfolk and Mayport due to a lack of personnel.

Describe the role/process/scheduling of Combat systems, ATG, and TCIP in terms of scheduling and certification. N6 is material readiness, N7 is manning and readiness, ATG conducts certification and training and TCIP is supposed to oversee the maintenance phase.

Who is the person that is scheduling the CS or TCIP events? This varies by command; for SURFLANT N6 and N7, and ATG Norfolk/San Diego, there are routine meetings. At ATG, there is a scheduler for each warfare area, and they meet with their respective training liaison officers to schedule events. For TCIP in SURFLANT, there is a dashboard sent out by each TCIP representative and meetings held to schedule events. For SURFPAC's TCIP team, they cover SOVT and installation scheduling. A



combination of SURFPAC N65, ATG San Diego and a BFTT Grooms lead at NAVSEA cover the rest of the SOT events and groom in the maintenance phase.

Does this person work independently, or do they have a support team? Everyone associated with scheduling works as part of a team, but the warfare leads act independently to represent their respective warfare areas.

What requirements is the person using to schedule CS or TCIP events? The schedulers use the SFTM, TCIP instructions, and AUGMS.

What are the roadblocks to scheduling? What are the obstacles keeping them from completion? Roadblocks and obstacles include ships not finishing their availabilities on time, manning not being at the required level (personnel and qualifications) and material readiness of the systems.

What difficulties are they having with following procedures and guidance?

What is working? The Pilot Program is working. TCIP in Norfolk's dashboards are working.

What is not working? Overtasking of personnel at these commands and ships, real world tasking (ignoring the training cycle), and lack of qualified personnel on ships.

How is success measured? What are the criteria used to identify what success looks like? Success is measured by a ship being fully mission capable and ready to deploy.

If Combat systems were working at its best, how would it look? How would it work? All systems would be fully up and integrated, fully manned, trained and ready to deploy in support of tasking.

What needs to be changed for alignment? The instructions need to align and be followed; manning needs to be above minimal levels, and the N code structures need to be mirrored across both coasts.



## **C. SURFACE FORCES RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **1. Overall**

SURFOR as a unit should hold an internal deep dive into their structure, manning and billets. They should also research why the codes do not align, why billets do not match, and seek to learn how things reached this point. If there is a reason for the lack of symmetry, leadership on the divisional level should be made aware.

All billets and N codes should mirror each other across coasts; doing so would provide symmetry and allow for easy identification of who is responsible for each warfare area. This is vitally important, as doing this would provide for a direct point of contact and warfare lead if either command is rendered inoperable or eradicated. Currently, the efforts, N codes and titles are so jumbled, it would be impossible to know who to report to.

### **2. Surface Forces, Atlantic**

Our first recommendation is to have an accurate, fully formed organizational chart in order to properly identify manning and provide points of contact for San Diego counterparts. This will allow for idea sharing and problem solving, creating an open dialogue and identifying who is responsible for what in Norfolk. The organizational chart provided was small scoped and after asking follow up questions, we were informed that it did not accurately list all personnel attached. In comparison, SURFPAC provided intricate organizational charts for both N6 and N7, listing all personnel attached, as well as every vacant billet. This allowed us to get an accurate, in-depth picture of their organization.

Second, all efforts should be made to align codes and provide synergy with SURFPAC. This effort would need to be a joint effort between both commands and led by SUFPAC in their SURFOR role.

Finally, in order to fully maintain situational awareness, all Combat Systems Port and Project Engineers should be moved from the N4 branch into the N6 branch. This would allow for greater situational awareness of material condition, as well as repairs needed and planned. As stated to me, engineering (N4) is not overly concerned with



combat systems, and personnel feel it falls on the back burner. This applies to SURFPAC as well.

### **3. Surface Forces, Pacific**

Our first recommendation for SURFPAC is that they draft and ratify a command SORM that details, verbatim, what every role, job and responsibility exist at the command, and who is responsible for completing each task. This would ensure high ranking government civilians, or department head level Officers know who is assigned what tasks by title, and that members cannot be assigned tasks without their knowledge (or be blindsided by responsibilities they should not have). The purpose of a SORM is detailed in the overall Navy SORM, Office of the Chief of Naval Personnel Instruction 3120.32D:

Reissue regulations and guidance governing the conduct of all members of the U.S. Navy. The regulations and guidance are for the internal operation of the Department of the Navy only and create no right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law against the United States, the Department of Defense, or the Department of the Navy. (2012, p. 2).

Guidance on SORM content should be taken from the SURFLANT SORM, Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic, Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (COMNAVSURFLANT, 2017)

Our second recommendation is to move the TCIP team away from being a separate entity and absorb them into the SURFPAC N6 team. This would allow for better alignment with the N6 department and allow for better tracking of maintenance phase efforts.

Finally, all efforts should be made to align codes and provide synergy with SURFLANT.

## **D. TCIP RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **1. Overall**

We recommend that a position be created for oversight of the program, to supervise the SURFLANT and SURFPAC team and ensure alignment. We recommend



that this billet be supervised by a governing body other than SURFOR, in order to ensure the program is not subject to the whims of the person funding the billet. As part of their duties, this person will hold an annual program review for both coasts to ensure alignment. The TCIP instruction, COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT 4726.1A, is the guiding instruction and it should be followed, without interpretation.

We also recommend that the TCIP instruction be re-written and be done so in a way that leaves no room for interpretation. This would alleviate any inter-unit, cross coast, and cross organization arguments over how the program should be executed. This should also remove the burden outside entities face when trying to schedule events.

## **2. Surface Forces, Pacific**

For our first recommendation, we recommend that the San Diego based team be housed the same building as SURFPAC for oversight, better communications, and direct reporting. This would allow for personal interactions, provide familiarity amongst the team, and remove barriers that exist for both communication and chain of command.

Second, the structure should be similar to that of SURFLANT, where the TCIP Officer falls under C5I readiness, and not under modernization. This is because it is a C5I program; while modernization is involved, it is specific to combat systems and C5I. This again would be aided by the implementation of a SORM, which would specify where they fall in the organization, as well as roles and responsibilities.

Finally, we recommend that they adhere to instructions, acknowledge, and inform stakeholders of who they are and what they do, and finally revamp PAC dashboards to align with SURFLANT. Dashboard guidance is stated on page 4 of the instruction, and is as follows:

Assign TCIP ship coordinators who will be responsible for development and distribution of a TCIP Dashboard to the ISIC, ships maintenance team and availability stakeholders. The TCIP Dashboard will be comprised of equipment light off, SOVT, SOT, other testing requirements, and schedules provided by each participating organization to include SYSCOMS, PEOs, CDSA, RMC, and NAVIFOR. The TCIP ship coordinator will observe all demonstration events and track all results for assigned ship. (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT, 2020)



This would allow for a waterfront presence and program awareness and help alignment efforts between ATG San Diego and Norfolk's Fleet Synthetic Training events and certification events.

### **3. Surface Forces, Atlantic**

We found SURFLANT's TCIP team to be following instructions, and recognized by other entities, with their stakeholders and subordinates informed on status and schedule weekly. We recommend SURFLANT's TCIP team provide training for adherence to standards to SURFPAC and provide SURFPAC with a copy of their dashboard for implementation.

## **E. ATG RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **1. Overall**

As previously discussed, the manning levels at both Norfolk and San Diego are low; while San Diego's percentage is skewed due to the number of billets, they have they ultimately have less bodies than Norfolk. One recommendation is to start an incentive pay program, similar to the one given for special programs, for sailors willing to go to ATG.

The second recommendation is to both advertise and follow the guidance in the Military Personnel Manual (MILPERSMAN) 1306-101CH-33, regarding "Partial Sea Duty Credit Compensation for TEMADD Periods Spent at Sea while Attached to Shore" (Bureau of Personnel, 1306-101, 2010, p. 5-6). There is a day for day calculation of time spent on a ship while attached to ATG, and every 30 days is considered a month of credit. 121 days is the same as 149 days. 1-30 is 1, 31-60 is 2. Any credit you desire to use, must be sent to your detailer prior to the 12 months from PRD date. Allowing sea time credit for your first two years at ATG, you are then able to use your credit in one of two ways; you can apply for a reduction in sea service obligation in your follow-on orders or use it to extend your current shore assignment and rotate to your full sea obligation after completing your credit. Many ATG sailors are unaware of this, and the detailers do not advertise it.



Both of these recommendations will help with manning levels and allow for an easy path to complete training and certification events.

## **2. ATG Norfolk**

Our first ATG Norfolk recommendation is to adapt a standard, align with ATG San Diego, and stick to that standard. As it currently stands, outside of Undersea Warfare, no other area is aligned. In order to align, the same instructions, processes and guidance should be used, and not tailored to a coast or pilot program. This would also help with manning concerns and the need for augments from San Diego.

The second recommendation is to adapt an N code system that aligns with San Diego. Again, outside of Undersea Warfare, nothing aligns.

## **3. ATG San Diego**

For San Diego, we recommend alignment in all areas with Norfolk, to include policy, guidance, manuals, and N code structure.

Secondly, we recommend having open dialogue with the SURFPAC TCIP and N65 to better schedule BFTT (Battle Force Tactical Trainer) Grooms prior to combat systems light off. Doing so would help ships in their basic phase, as they would have had a chance to light off their BFTT, receive training, and verify their system is fully operational.

Third, if at all possible, departments at ATG should relocate to within closer proximity of the main ATG building, to reduce travel time between units and allow for more face-to-face interactions.

Finally, we recommend that the battle lab provide a path to support testing and training by allowing ships to conduct testing and receive tracks from the lab prior to basic phase. Restricting who can receive tracks based on contract funding limitations inhibits a ship's ability to certify, and this has been a hinderance for conducting ship requested training and BFTT groom events at all PAC based ATGs.





## **F. CONCLUSION**

The overall findings are that the two coasts do, indeed work as independent units, that while aligned in some respects, they conduct training, certification, scheduling reporting of manning, and are structured differently. This again is an issue because there is no congruence; the units do not work in tandem with each other, and this can have a detrimental effect in time of war.

Not only can this hurt the Navy on a wide scale if one command is removed from the playing field, but on a small scale, if factions of a unit are rendered obsolete in time of war, a ship or ships from the other coast may not understand operational tasking or procedures in a fight. This will lead to chaos, confusion on what lead to follow, and can cost our nation valuable time, ships, sailors and assets in wartime.



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK



## APPENDIX: QUESTIONS

### A. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Why the misalignment?

What organization is more effective at scheduling and certification?

Do they operate as per guidance or freestyle?

Why is there a difference in procedural use?

Are they misaligned? Why?

What is the root cause?

What is SURFLANT doing different from SURFPAC in terms of scheduling?

What is SURFPAC doing different from SURFLANT in terms of scheduling?

### B. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Describe the role/process/scheduling of Combat systems, ATG, and TCIP in terms of scheduling and certification.

Who is the person that is scheduling the CS or TCIP events?

Does this person work independently, or do they have a support team?

What requirements is the person using to schedule CS or TCIP events?

What processes is the person using to schedule CS or TCIP events?

What else is this person scheduling besides CS or TCIP events?

Who does this person report to, and do they meet/report regularly? What is the expectation of the position?

What is the climate of that meeting? Who will attend that meeting? Is the information being communicated digested and used effectively, or is the meeting more of a check in the box?

How does scheduling/certification occur? What goes on? Who does it?

Does SURFLANT have a dedicated scheduler?

Does SURFPAC have a dedicated scheduler?



What are the roadblocks to scheduling?

What are the obstacles keeping them from completion?

What difficulties are they having with following procedures and guidance?

What is working?

What is not working?

What is SURFLANT doing different from SURFPAC that is more effective in terms of scheduling?

What is SURFLANT doing different from SURFPAC that is more effective in terms of certification events?

What is SURFPAC doing different from SURFLANT that is more effective in terms of scheduling?

What is SURFPAC doing different from SURFLANT that is more effective in terms of certification events?

How is success measured? What are the criteria used to identify what success looks like?

If Combat systems were working at its best, how would it look? How would it work? What needs to be changed for alignment?



## LIST OF REFERENCES

- Commander, Afloat Training Group Pacific. (2023, March 24). Afloat Training Group Pacific (COMATG PAC). <https://www.surfpac.navy.mil/Ships/Afloat-Training-Group-Pacific-COMATG-PAC/About-Us/>
- Commander, Naval Surface Forces. (2023, March 25). Welcome. <https://www.surfpac.navy.mil/About-Us/>
- Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic. (2023, March 23). Afloat Training Group (ATG) Atlantic. <https://www.surflant.usff.navy.mil/atglant/>
- Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic. (2017, March 30). Standard Organization and Regulations Manual. COMNAVSURFLANTINST 5400.3
- Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic. (2023, March 15). SURFLANT mission. <https://www.surflant.usff.navy.mil>: <https://www.surflant.usff.navy.mil/About-Us/Mission/>
- Commander, Naval Surface Pacific and Commander, Naval Surface Atlantic (2022, November 16). *Surface force training and readiness manual* (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT Instruction 3502.7C). COMNAVSURFOR.
- Commander, Naval Surface Pacific and Commander, Naval Surface Atlantic (2020, November 30). Type commander C5I integration process (COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT Instruction 4726.1A). Commander, Naval Surface Force.
- COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT. (2017, January 23). *Total ship readiness assessment visit program*. COMNAVSURFPACINST 4700.1B/COMNAVSURFLANTINST 4700.1B. San Diego, CA, USA: COMNAVSURFOR.
- Faram, M. D. (2021, January 14). Fleet manning is now the highest since 2015-CNP tells Surface Navy Association symposium. <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2472329/fleet-manning-is-now-the-highest-since-2015-cnp-tells-surface-navy-association/>
- Luster, L. T. (2017, May 17). NAVSUP and the surface warfare enterprise supporting the customer. Navy Supply Corps Newsletter. <https://scnewsltr.dodlive.mil/Latest-Issue/Article-Display/Article/2612855/navsup-and-the-surface-warfare-enterprise-supporting-the-customer/>



- Military One Source. (2023, March 17). Retrieved from <https://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Infographic/2019-demographics-active-duty-navy-members.pdf>
- MILPERSMAN. (2010, November 5). *Enlisted assignment system*. (MILPERSMAN 1306–101 CH-33)
- Nadler, D. A., & Tushman, M. L. (1980). *A model for diagnosing organizational behavior*. *Organizational Dynamics*, Autumn, 35–51.
- Naval History and Heritage Command. (2021, July 21). Surface navy. <https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/communities/surface.html>
- OPNAVISNT. (2012, July 16). Standard Organization and Regulations Manual of the United States Navy. OPNAVISNT 3120.32D
- San Diego Historical Association. (2016, February 8). *Naval Training Center*. Military Museum <https://www.militarymuseum.org/NTCSanDiego.html>
- U.S. Navy. (n.d.a.). Electronic Technician. Retrieved March 4, 2023, from <https://www.navy.com/careers/electronics>
- U.S. Navy. (n.d.b). Fire controlman. Retrieved March 4, 2023, from <https://www.navy.com/careers/fire-controlman>
- U.S. Navy. (n.d.c). Gunner’s mate. Retrieved March 4, 2023, from <https://www.navy.com/careers/gunners-mate>
- U.S. Navy. (n.d.d). Information systems technician. Retrieved March 4, 2023, from <https://www.navy.com/careers/information-systems-technician>
- U.S. Navy. (n.d.e). Sonar technician. Retrieved March 4, 2023, from <https://www.navy.com/careers/sonar-technician>
- Utt, N. (n.d.). Navy A School: What happens after Navy boot camp. Retrieved March 4, 2023, from Military.com. <https://www.military.com/join-armed-forces/military-jobs/recruitment-navy-rating-training.html>
- Wallace, A. (1991, June 1). Officials to fight idea of closing military sites. *Los Angeles Times*. <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-06-01-me-2310-story.html>







ACQUISITION RESEARCH PROGRAM  
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
555 DYER ROAD, INGERSOLL HALL  
MONTEREY, CA 93943

[WWW.ACQUISITIONRESEARCH.NET](http://WWW.ACQUISITIONRESEARCH.NET)