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An Analysis of the Impact of OCS Planning Doctrine in Operation Allies Welcome: Implications for Future Contingencies

June 2023

SFC Gus W. Wessels, USA

Thesis Advisors: E. Cory Yoder, Senior Lecturer
Dr. Ryan S. Sullivan, Associate Professor

Department of Defense Management

Naval Postgraduate School

Prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943.

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

ABSTRACT

The Department of Defense's (DOD) response to contingencies relies heavily on Operational Contracting Support (OCS) and its associated planning doctrine. This research study aims to validate the effectiveness of the current OCS planning doctrine by analyzing parts of the drawdown in Afghanistan and Operation Allies Welcome (OAW), a Joint Humanitarian Effort resulting from the drawdown. The study primarily focuses on whether OCS planning principles are utilized and effective in real-world contingency environments. It also explores the broader impact of adhering to or deviating from doctrine. Furthermore, the research investigates whether the existing guidance is too influenced by Middle Eastern conflict or if it provides a comprehensive framework for all contingencies. The project's methodology involves an interview with a senior official of OAW, an analysis of lessons learned from OAW, and the author's firsthand experience in Afghanistan and OAW. Given the contingency's size, location, complexity, and duration, it serves as an ideal case for validating the effectiveness of the OCS planning doctrine. The author intends to extract significant insights from this contemporary and intricate mission to aid future contingency responses.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am genuinely humbled by the remarkable support and encouragement of my esteemed professors, my incredible family, and my loving circle of friends. Each one of you has played an indispensable role in my personal and academic growth, and for that I am forever grateful.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	After Action Review
ACC	Army Contracting Command
ACO	Administrative Contracting Officer
ADRP	Army doctrine reference publication
AI	Artificial Intelligence
ARNORTH	U.S. Army North
ARSOUTH	U.S. Army South
BG	Brigadier General
BOG	Boots on the Ground
CAAF	contractors authorized to accompany the force
CAP	Civil Augmentation Program
CARB	Contract Acquisition Review Board
CCAS	Contingency Contracting Administrative Services
CCDR	Combatant Commander
CCMD	Combatant Command
CCO	Contingency Contracting Officer
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CM	Contract Monitor
CONPLAN	Contracting Plan
CONUS	Continental United States
COR	Contracting Officer Representative
CORS	Contracting Officer Representatives
COVID	Coronavirus
CS	Civil Support
CSIP	Contract Support Integration Plan
CT	Contracting Team
DCMA	Defense Contract Management Agency

DFARS	Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DoDI	Department of Defense Instruction
DODIG	Department of Defense Inspector General
DOS	Department of State
DSCA	Defense Support of Civil Authorities
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FM	field manual
FY	fiscal year
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GCC	geographic combatant command (or commander)
GPC	government purchase card
GWOT	global war on terrorism
HCA	head of the contracting activity
HD	homeland defense
JCASO	Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office
JFC	joint force commander
JFLCC	joint force land component commander
JLLIS	Joint Lessons Learned Information System
JLLP	Joint Lessons Learned Program
JOA	joint operations area
JP	joint publication
JRRB	Joint Requirement review board
LGA	Lead Government Agency
LNO	liaison officer
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
LSC	logistics support charge

MEDCOM	U.S. Army Medical Command
MOA	memorandum of agreement
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NGO	nongovernment organization
NORTHCOM	U.S. Northern Command (unified combatant command)
NRF	National Response Framework
OAW	Operation Allies Welcome
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
OCS	operational contract support
OCSIC	functional contract support integration cell
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid
OPLAN	operation plan
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
QA	quality assurance
SCO	Senior Contracting Official
SME	subject matter expert
SPOT	Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker
TF	task force
TIPS	three integrative pillars for success
TTM	three-tier model
USAHCA	United States Army Health Contracting Activity
USC	United States Code
USG	U.S. Government
YTTM	Yoder Three-Tier Model

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I.   INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the historic withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the world watched as a complex and dynamic operation unfolded before their eyes. The withdrawal not only marked the end of a decades-long military presence but also highlighted the immense challenges faced when conducting complex operations. As a result of the hasty withdrawal, a new chapter unfolded, revealing the vast challenges and urgent humanitarian needs left in its wake. Transitioning from a military operation to a humanitarian crisis response required a swift shift in focus and resources. The change from bustling bases in Afghanistan to humanitarian aid and support primarily on U.S. soil was a significant move for even the most senior military officials. While the location changed, the concept of contracted support remained the same. In this transitional phase, operational contract support (OCS) played a pivotal role in enabling a swift and effective response to the urgent needs of the Afghan people. This chapter delves into the critical role of OCS during this transition period, highlighting the key strategies, coordination efforts, and lessons learned that shaped the humanitarian crisis response. From securing essential supplies to establishing temporary shelters, OCS emerged as a vital component in addressing the pressing needs of the affected population. Through exploring the challenges, successes, and critical insights gained through the application of OCS in the aftermath of the Afghan withdrawal, we aim to illuminate the importance of adaptability and effective contract management when it matters most.

The conclusion of any war is often accompanied by a mix of emotions, and the war's end in Afghanistan is no exception. While the finality brings a sense of relief and closure, it is tinged with a bittersweet realization of the immense sacrifices made and the lives lost. However, among the complexities and hardships of war, there emerges a silver lining—the body of knowledge and doctrine developed over the course of the conflict. The lessons learned, experiences gained, and the evolution of military practices and policies have laid a foundation for future operations. The war in Afghanistan has served as a crucible for refining strategies, tactics, and procedures. The purpose of this research is to analyze doctrine cultivated during this war and ensure its efficacy extends beyond wartime

environments. In this regard, one such framework that encapsulates the collective lessons derived from operations in the middle east is the doctrine covering OCS. This research aims to delve into the intricacies of this doctrine, scrutinize its relevance in various operational contexts, and identify opportunities for its continued refinement and application in future engagement.

A.   BACKGROUND

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in Iraq and Afghanistan brought to light the critical importance of Operational Contract Support (OCS) planning, revealing numerous shortcomings and an overall lack of clear policy in the beginning stages of the war. On December 29, 2011, Congress codified this importance with federal regulation 32 part 158, mandating that the Department of Defense (DOD) conduct OCS to rectify issues as it relates to OCS (Operational Contract Support, 2011). This law created the official document for OCS planning in a joint environment throughout the DOD, Joint Publication (JP) 4–10, Operational Contract Support. Though it was developed and subsequently updated for relevance, criticism persists among analysts who claim that the DOD's inadequate recognition of the significance of OCS prevents them from fully exploiting its potential (Doll, 2017).

The Department of Defense (DOD) has acknowledged the importance of OCS as a core defense capability since 2014, but it is still not a widely recognized critical readiness component across all of DOD (Defense Science Board, 2014). Another challenge the DOD faces is that the joint doctrine was primarily developed during stability operations during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and should be continuously monitored, particularly in post-Afghanistan operations. Further complications exist in that, Phase 0, which will be further discussed in a later chapter, was adopted in 2010 as part of Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations. This was several years after a "Phase 0" would even have occurred for Iraq or Afghanistan. The humanitarian mission following the withdrawal from Afghanistan was significant in many ways. The complexities as it relates to speed, logistics, the sheer volume of support, and the planning required make it a great case study to analyze the application of the doctrine. As with any policy, improvements happen over time, but

significant improvements are often tied to an event. The humanitarian mission was a paradigm shift for many forces that actively fought in this long-standing war and might warrant the awareness OCS needs while cultivating change in current doctrine and policy.

B. AREA OF RESEARCH

This research is focused on Operational Contracting Support (OCS) and the relevant planning doctrine that accompanies it, primarily JP 4-10. OCS is a fundamental planning effort in likely all current and future operations for the DOD. For the principle to remain relevant and practical, it is essential to harvest the lessons learned from new and challenging missions. This study analyzes current doctrine through the lens of Operation Allied Welcome (OAW), a Joint Humanitarian Effort that took place from August 2021 – March 2022. The author will use this mission and portions of the drawdown to validate the current OCS planning doctrine, JP 4-10. The research is not intended to validate the drawdown and subsequent humanitarian mission itself but to use its complications to validate current doctrine against a complex mission area.

C. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- The primary research question asks, "Do we use OCS planning principles when it matters, and how does it work in real-world contingency environments?"

- The secondary questions ask, "Is OCS policy too rooted in the wars in the middle east or OCONUS in general?" and "What generally happens when doctrine is followed or not followed?"

D. METHODOLOGY

The project primarily focuses on a case study analysis of OAW, reviewing After Action Reviews (AAR) from various agencies, senior planning official interviews, and the author's experience in OAW. The uniqueness of a humanitarian mission on U.S. soil is the perfect case study to ensure our doctrine fundamentally works for any task. The size, location, complexity, and length of this contingency make it an interesting case to quantify

doctrine further. Leaders have hung mainly their hats on the sustainment phase of the war in Afghanistan, in which significant levels of OCS planning are not necessarily as important as Phase 0 and Phase IV of an operation (Doll, 2017). The author's point is that leaders and Joint staff can be flat-footed when faced with contingencies that require robust planning early and late in the operational phases.

The research will conduct a thorough literature review of current and past policies, scholarly foundations of knowledge, and the main joint doctrine associated with OCS. When applying the doctrine to this specific mission, data will be collected from a senior-level planning official through interview questions. While the interview will serve as the strategic level of doctrine application, data will also be collected and analyzed from Army Lessons Learned, After Action Reviews (AARs). The research is designed to include both strategic level planning perspectives, both within the interviews and the boots-on-ground (BOG) perspective from the author. The data collected will help analyze the doctrine's overall effectiveness and outline potential recommendations based on mission and other factors.

E.   LIMITATIONS

While the research does analyze a joint response, the analysis primarily focuses on interviews with senior members of the Army and the author's own experience. It's also important to outline that the Army issued three of the six after-action reports analyzed. While heavily Army-focused, they are still the primary joint contracting service that responds to contingency events, particularly in recent major operations. The interview response also presents limitations as only one interviewer was garnered for this specific analysis. To mitigate these limitations and ensure a more comprehensive analysis, future research could strive to include a broader range of perspectives from all services and agencies involved in the joint response. Incorporating this methodology would result in a more equitable and all-encompassing comprehension of the lessons learned, consequently amplifying the practicality of the research findings within joint operational contexts.

F.   CONCLUSION

This chapter gives a fundamental overview of the research to be conducted and the operation through which it will be analyzed. This project aims to offer a detailed examination of how Joint doctrine has integrated into OCS but still warrants strategic and operational leaders' buy-in. In the upcoming chapter, we will briefly explore the past practices and operational phases related to OCS to formulate a comprehensive framework for the reader. Beginning with an outline of the background of Operation Allies Welcome (OAW) as a mission, we discuss the challenges leading up to the mission and the extensive support required for humanitarian endeavors of such a size. By exploring the operational background, we will establish the historical context for analyzing JP 4-10 while also examining key academic frameworks that have shaped OCS policy, practice, and application. Additionally, we will analyze the oversight and observations from both the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and lessons learned from varying agencies that supported OAW. The background provided in the next chapter will also aid in the discussion analysis in later chapters.

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II. OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter aims to offer readers a comprehensive overview of the background, OCS process, its directives, and the current implementation strategies and doctrine associated with operational contracting in contingency environments. The review begins with an overall background of OAW and how it came to light, the importance of planning for it, and its overall impact. Next, the chapter will analyze Joint Pub 4–10 Operational Contract Support, which outlines how Joint Force Commanders should plan and integrate OCS. It is followed by a review of some of the academic bodies of research in OCS planning, which play a significant role in OCS doctrine development.

The chapter also briefly analyzes some of the recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports involving system problems as they relate to OCS, and application of lessons learned in OCS, and the implications for future conflict or contingency. Next, we look at some of the recommendations by GAO in reviewing lessons learned from varying agencies and echelons that took part in OAW. Another element to consider is the fabric on which this doctrine is predicated. The long-standing wars played a large role in fashioning the doctrine into what it is today. A detailed contracting plan was not part of the OPLAN for the initial operation in Iraqi Freedom, which left contingency contracting support personnel without clear guidance or a coherent understanding of the operation itself (Anderson & Flaherty, 2003). The OPLAN aimed to protect allies, destroy terrorist networks, gather intelligence, detain terrorists and war criminals, and support international efforts for stability in Iraq and the region – not plan for contracted support (Anderson & Flaherty, 2003). While the beginning and end of a contingency are arguably the most important part to plan for, the end of a tenured war can lend itself to the planning for a whole new mission of humanitarian support. Through an examination of the background and guidance presented in this chapter, readers can enhance their understanding of how OCS has been applied and the significant role it plays in various operations.

A. BACKGROUND

The U.S. government planned to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan by July 31, 2021 and intended to evacuate U.S. citizens and at-risk (Center for Army Lessons Learned [CALL], 2022). However, the report also outlines how the Taliban's rapid advances significantly reduced the amount of time available for evacuations, and the lack of available housing for refugees slowed the processing and resettlement efforts. The Department of State (DOS) was the lead federal agency (LFA) for resettlement, with the DOD assigned to support them. To accommodate the growing number of refugees, the DOD established a processing center at Fort Lee and assigned seven other bases (eventually eight) to house and support the resettlement efforts (US Army North [ARNORTH], 2022). The bases are depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1.   Operation Allies Welcome Base Laydown. Source: ARNORTH (2022).

In August 2021, President Biden issued a directive to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to take over from the Department of State (DOS) and spearhead the ongoing collaborative initiatives of the federal government in providing assistance to Afghans in need (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2023). Per the President's directive, the Secretary of Homeland Security worked with representatives from different government departments to ensure a coordinated response and unity of effort.

The Department of Defense (DOD) assigned eight military bases to accommodate Afghan nationals and assist federal agencies in processing and resettling them through logistical support (Center for Army Lessons Learned [CALL], 2022). The primary means for base life support for these Afghans was through DOD contracted support. The implications for each base drew significant logistical constraints. Each base was dealing with its unique circumstances regarding support for refugees and their families. Afghan Nationals were identified by different titles and categorizations, such as Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants, Afghan special immigrants (ASIs), and "guests," which varied based on their nationality and specific circumstance. For this analysis, they will be referred to as "refugees." The main line of effort as far as logistical support goes was decided to be via contract, particularly a Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract with each base having its own Task Order (US Army North [ARNORTH], 2022). Given the time constraints and geographic separation of the bases, the boots-on-ground contracting personnel played a significant role in not only the execution of contracts and surveillance but business advisement due to the limitations in personnel at each location.

The military installations involved in facilitating Operation Allies Refuge (OAR) and Operation Allies Welcome (OAW) encountered significantly inadequate information concerning the number of Afghan evacuees they were tasked with accommodating. Notably, Ramstein Air Base and Rhine Ordnance Barracks, both situated in Germany, were provided a mere 48 hour notice before the initial arrival of evacuees (US Army North [ARNORTH], 2022). Despite this short notice, DoDIG reports indicate they provided housing for over 34,900 Afghan evacuees until the last of them departed in October 2021 (Department of Defense Inspector General [DoDIG], 2022). The ARNORTH report continues, noting that the eight installations located within the continental United States received advance spanning

from 3 days to two weeks in advance. These eight installations provided temporary shelter for a total of 73,878 Afghan evacuees before their support of OAW was completed in February 2022 (DoDIG,2022). Table 1 outlines several important planning factors task forces and contractors had to consider when supporting evacuees.

Table 1.   A Number of Days' Notice Received and Total Evacuees at Each Installation. Source: DODIG (2023)

Installation and Task Force (TF)	Date of Installation Notification	Date of First Afghan Evacuee Arrival	Number of Days' Notice	Total Number of Afghan Evacuees	Date of Final Afghan Evacuee Departure
1. Ramstein Air Base, Germany (Ramstein Air Base personnel)	August 18, 2021	August 20, 2021	2	22,900	October 30, 2021
2. Rhine Ordnance Barracks, Germany (ROB personnel)	August 18, 2021	August 20, 2021	2	12,000	October 9, 2021
3. Fort Lee, Virginia (TF Eagle)	July 15, 2021	July 30, 2021	15	3,108	November 17, 2021
4. MCB Quantico, Virginia (TF Quantico)	August 24, 2021	August 29, 2021	5	5,081	December 22, 2021
5. Fort Bliss, Texas (TF Bliss)	August 13, 2021	August 21, 2021	8	11,472	December 30, 2021
6. Camp Atterbury, Indiana (TF CAIN)	August 31, 2021	September 3, 2021	3	7,192	January 25, 2022
7. Holloman AFB, New Mexico (TF Holloman)	August 24, 2021	August 31, 2021	7	7,324	January 26, 2022
8. Fort Pickett, Virginia (TF Pickett)	August 25, 2021	August 28, 2021	3	10,492	February 1, 2022
9. Fort McCoy, Wisconsin (TF McCoy)	August 16, 2021	August 22, 2021	6	12,706	February 15, 2022
10. JB MDL, New Jersey (TF Liberty)	August 21, 2021	August 25, 2021	4	16,503	February 19, 2022
Total Afghan Evacuees housed and sustained at Ramstein Air Base and ROB Total Afghan Evacuees housed and sustained at the eight CONUS Installations				34,900[1] 73,878[2]	

B. JOINT PUBLICATION 4-10

1. OCS Planning Framework and Phases

Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support (OCS), was developed in response to legal requirements outlined in Title 10, United States Code, Section 2333, and Department of Defense Instruction 3020.41 (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2019). These directives mandate that combatant commanders must include OCS planning in all military operations. JP 4-10 utilizes a systems approach to planning, which is based on the principles outlined in Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*. Such an approach empowers the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) and its subordinate Joint Force Command (JFC) to harmoniously synchronize and strategize the three fundamental operations of OCS: Contract Support Integration (CSI), Contracting Support (CS), and Contractor Management (CM) (JCS, 2019). The underlying principle of OCS is its inherent value as a resource that outlines supporting doctrine effectively. By emphasizing the impact of Phase 0 across all operational stages, OCS underscores the criticality for all services to be prepared in OCS functions and phases.

a. Contingency Contracting and Operational Contract Support Defined

It's important to define the terms before discussing the overlying framework, the newest version of Joint Publication *Operational Contract Support* defines the terms as follows:

> **Contingency contracting.** The process of obtaining goods, services, and construction via contracting means in support of contingency operations (JCS, 2019 p. GL-6).

> **Operational contract support**. The process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of combatant commander-directed operations. Also called OCS. (JCS, 2019 p. GL-6)

The doctrine suggests that it's possible to carry out and handle contingency contracting within a single service framework without the need for the OCS hierarchy (JCS, 2019). To oversee an OCS function within a Joint command, one must comprehend the

structure. The OCS procedure for preparing and procuring resources operates within a framework consisting of three pillars that are relevant to any stage of the operation.

b. OCS Phases and Framework

The primary goal of Operational Contract Support (OCS) is to effectively manage the process of planning, executing, and evaluating contracted support (JCS, 2019). As per the joint OCS doctrine, OCS is composed of three functions: "contract support integration (CSI), contracting support (CS), and contractor management (CM)" (JCS, 2019, p. I-4). CSI, the initial function, encompasses the strategic planning for contracted support and guarantees the smooth integration of contracted support requirements into the commander's operational plan (OPLAN). Secondly, CS focuses on executing contracting, which includes the processes of awarding and administering contracts in joint operations. Lastly, CM encompasses all the required activities to guarantee effective management and maintenance of contractors in the contingency environment. Each function has its specific characteristics and desired objectives, as illustrated in Figure 2. However, in most contingency environments, the boundaries between functions are unclear, and decisions made in one function can significantly impact the others.

Operational Contract Support Description and Subordinate Functions

Operational Contract Support
The process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of combatant commander-directed operations.

Contract Support Integration	Contracting Support	Contractor Management
The planning, coordination, and synchronization of contracted support in military operations.	The planning, coordination, and execution of contracting authority to legally bind contractors in support of military operations.	The oversight and integration of contractor personnel and associated equipment in support of military operations.

- Plan and integrate contract support
  - collaborate in boards, centers, cells, and working groups
  - conduct assessments and provide recommendations
- Manage requirements
  - develop requirements
  - approve requirements (includes consolidation, validation, and prioritization)
  - post-contract award oversight
- Information management and reporting

- Plan and organize for contracting support
- Coordinate/deconflict in-theater contracting
- Provide contracting support advice and assistance
- Translate requirements into contract documents
- Develop contracts
- Award and administer contracts
- Close out contracts

- Plan contractor management
- Prepare for contractor deployment
- Deploy/redeploy contractors
- Manage contracts
- Sustain contractors

Figure 2.   Operational Contract Support Description and Subordinate. Source: JCS (2019)

(1)   Planning Phases

Joint Publications 3–0, *Joint Operations,* and JP 5-0 *Joint Operations Planning* all outline the phases of any given operation and are broken down in Figure 3 (JCS, 2019). JP 4-10 also outlines the phases of operations. Enabling civil authorities is almost as important as Phase 0 within the operation. Given the cyclic nature of the Phases, failure in Phase 5 should create an anticipatory response for a new operation or Phase 0 planning practices. This can cause obvious issues with arguably the most important phases in a direct sequence of one another. Although not incorporated in the current JP 4-10 doctrines, Figure 2 outlines the notional OCS actions as they relate to JP 3-0 phase overlays. For this research, greater emphasis will be placed on Enable Civil Authorities and Shaping.

Figure 3.   Notional Operational Contract Support Actions by Phase of
Operation JCS (2019)

Phase 0 (Shape) is arguably the most important part of any given operation. Activities aimed at shaping the theater environment are crucial for the success of theater operations. The shaping activities involve active participation in military operations, deterrence actions, and security cooperation, all aimed at assuring allies, enhancing partner capability, and fostering stability in the region (JCS, 2019). The doctrine continues, outlining that such activities, which are driven by Combatant Command (CCMD) campaign plans, aid in identifying, deterring, countering, and mitigating adversary actions that could jeopardize regional and country stability. In the context of OCS, the doctrine points out that important shaping activities may include establishing cross-functional organizations related to contracts, developing, and implementing standard procedures, providing training and collecting OCS-related information.

In supporting OCS planning endeavors, security cooperation activities within OCS play a vital role in equipping U.S. forces with information about the local commercial vendor base and the broader business environment (JCS, 2019). The doctrine also adds that shaping activities, including major security cooperation initiatives, may be ongoing throughout all phases of theater operations, which is particularly important for OAW as it relates to the business climate.

The focus of these operations is to provide "joint force support to legitimate civil governance" (JCS, 2019 p. I-15) while simultaneously decreasing the number of deployed U.S. military and Contractors Authorized to Accompany the Force (CAAF) personnel in the area. Subordinate JFCs are known to apply stricter controls to new requirements that do not directly contribute to the withdrawal of forces. During times of redeployment, drawdown, or withdrawal, requirements include: "packing, crating, and freight services; commercial transportation of military equipment; construction and management of vehicle wash racks; and environmental cleanup" (JCS, 2019 p. I-15, 2019). Particularly in Afghanistan, we had a heavy focus on materials handling equipment. A significant amount of attention should be given to the synchronization of force drawdown and reduction in contracted support.

As the level of contracted support diminishes, there is a possibility of a negative effect on the living conditions experienced by the remaining personnel. At the same time, contracting activities that support these operations will focus on terminating or closing out contracts or adjusting them to theater support type contracts with local host nation contractors outlined in the "Notional Contract Support Drawdown Timeline" in JP 4-10 (JCS, 2019). The doctrine also outlines that if any contract support capabilities need to be maintained after the operation, arrangements must be made with successor organization(s).

Given the summation of the doctrine outlined above, it's easy to point out the underlying issues that were known and contributed to the collapse in Afghanistan. While the intention isn't to focus solely on the collapse, the point is that if failure is imminent or even possible, this should activate planning for secondary implications. In this case, Phase 0 is humanitarian contract support.

2.   Contract Support Integration

In this section of JP 4-10, an overview is provided about the incorporation of contracted support within military operations. The chapter explains the actions that can be undertaken by the supported GCC to promote the readiness and organization of subordinate JFC Service component commands, supporting Combat Support Agencies (CSAs) and functional component commands when orchestrating OCS functions. The execution of this requirement by the supported GCC is encompassed within the logistics directive authority, as specified in JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (JCS, 2019).

This section also discusses various other contract support integration factors. Additionally, it covers topics such as "fiscal authorities, transition to stabilize and enable civil authorities, homeland defense (HD) and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), and National Guard (NG) operations under Title 32, USC" (JCS, 2019 p. III-1). For this research, the focus will be seen through the lens of planning considerations, interagency support, and FHA as those topics relate to the operational parameters of OAW.

a.   *Planning and Integration*

It's important for the GCC, subordinate JFCs, and the supporting component staff to understand their responsibility in planning and integrating OCS (JCS, 2019). They are the deciding factor in how the support is garnered. GCC's consider organic support, facilitated through Services, local nation services, or via contracted support that can be augmented both locally and abroad. The GCC has robust staff elements to coordinate these functions and integrate across the battlespace to meet the commander's intent.

The GCC leads the OCS planning effort, even though several OCS-related organizations may provide advice, support, or assistance. OCS functions are not limited to logistics and involve non-logistics staff. The contracted support has both direct and indirect costs and can impact non-logistical matters such as Force Protection (FP) and civil-military aspects. Coordination among all staff members is necessary to ensure efficient and effective OCS planning while minimizing risks and achieving the commander's end state.

This process and subsequent staff roles are often codified through OCS planning cells and working groups. While these groups can encompass a multitude of planning efforts, Figure 3 shows an overview of how robust of a construct is required for a given Area of Responsibility (AOR). While these all serve a common purpose, some can be more important than others, particularly in the Shaping Phase. JP 4-10 emphasizes that the Operational Contract Support Integration Cell is one of the "key organizational elements to effective and efficient OCS planning and integration" (JCS, 2019, p. A-1). This remains true in both cessation of services in later Phase Five and the planning for new services in earlier phases.

The primary responsibility of the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) and its subordinate OCS Integration Cell (OCSIC) is to oversee and execute the OCS planning and implementation process for the entire joint force (JCS, 2019). Doctrine acknowledges the potential presence of OCSIC or designated staff within Service and functional components, enabling them to undertake similar tasks within their respective domains. It is the responsibility of the OCSIC to acquire and unify OCS-related information from various sources, which encompass the LSC/LSCC contracting activity or JTSCC SCO, joint logistics operations center, civil-military operations center, IFO-related cells or working groups, and joint facilities utilization board.(JCS, 2019, p. A1). This information is used to develop the command's OCS-related operational picture, which enables stakeholders to access and integrate OCS information and data via the common operational picture (COP). The OCSIC effectively serves as the linchpin, ensuring that stakeholders can easily access and use the OCS information provided. They serve as the OCS knowledge management team in an operational context and interpret OCS information to make it palatable and actionable for various stakeholders. The responsibility continues with a smooth flow of information, interpretation, and incorporation of important insights within both the organization and OCS activities. The information shared can vary from a straightforward geographical representation of contracting activities within the Joint Operations Area (JOA), to intricate reports on contractor management and other mission-specific reports. It is challenging to quantify the benefits of effective OCS planning, but inadequate planning can lead to reduced effectiveness and mission failure. While each operation has distinct layers of complexity, a well-thought-out plan with built-in flexibilities can be the difference between success and

failure. Part of that inherent flexibility is how the plan is executed through the different types of contracted support.

Distinctions exist in the planning process for different categories of contracted support, such as systems support, theater support, and external support contracts (JCS, 2019, p. I-7). Through the Joint Contracting Support Board (JCSB) process, both the GCC and subordinate JFC assume the responsibility of determining the utilization of theater support and external support contracts by making informed decisions (JCS, 2019). Civil Augmentation Program (CAP), or Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) in OAW's case, holds significant advantages in early-stage and certain extended operations, particularly in situations where military support capability is either absent or deemed redundant. Doctrine further outlines that through a collaborative approach, the GCC, should furnish official guidance in Annex W concerning the deployment of CAP or other contracted support. These documents should also encompass directives on transitioning these capabilities when deemed appropriate. In the decision-making process, it is essential to account for operation-specific variables, like cost, schedule and performance. Depending on the operation, security and the availability of local and small business alternatives should also be considered. In OAW for example, the primary consideration was speed and performance in initial phases, while the latter phases considered management and administrative responsibilities.

b.   *Requirements Management and Key Considerations*

Per JP 4-10, requirements management is comprised of three principle functions: requirements development, requirements review, approval, and post-contract award oversight (JCS, 2019 p. III-13). Like other management tasks, it is the responsibility of the operational command rather than contracting; the JFC and component commanders have the responsibility to ensure that subordinate units are trained in requirements management tasks, preferably prior to deployment (JCS, 2019 p. III-13). Although it is not the contracting command's responsibility to conduct such tasks, they should be intimately involved in developing the level of training required for each task. For example, at the tactical level, an emphasis on COR training matches the finalized requirement from the required activity.

To ensure efficient contract development and adherence to cost, schedule, and performance limitations, it is imperative to undertake the essential steps of identifying, synchronizing, and prioritizing requirements, thereby enabling the subordinate JFC to receive the necessary contracted support (JCS, 2019). It is much more beneficial to determine accurate requirements upfront rather than trying to modify them in real-time. Accurate and timely development and validation of requirements, coupled with effective management of their execution in the theater of operations, form the cornerstone of success in contract support.

Commanders must take into account various other OCS planning and execution factors. These factors include implementing and maintaining information tracking system, coordinating joint and multinational operations, and assessing the civil-military factors during stability operations (JCS, 2019 p. III-19). While there are various considerations to cover, the following paragraphs will focus more on activities faced during OAW. A key emphasis in this section of JP 4-10 is the role OCS plays in shaping activities.

Unique challenges may be presented for OCS planners during shaping activities of an operation. These challenges can include the lack of contingency acquisition authorities and lack of funding or clarity in execution of funding. Certain aspects of contractor personnel can also lack clarity depending on the location of contingency. While personnel presented planning difficulties, funding was the biggest ambiguity during the initial stages of OAW. Another factor to consider in relation to OAW was that most contingency planners were used to OCONUS contingency operations that typically hold easier policies to navigate.

Interagency and Non-Governmental Agencies (NGO) support is another factor that is not an atypical consideration but an important part of OAW. Like multinational support, U.S. forces may need to offer organic support both U.S. government (USG) departments and agencies as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Although DOD support to these entities is typically limited in scope, in certain operations it may be necessary to synchronize planning among all stakeholders. Doctrine codifies that the lead Service will typically provide this support via "theater support contracts, CAP task orders, or both," as was the example in OAW and atypical in hasty operations (JCS, 2019 p. III-23).

To achieve effective interagency support, its essential for CCMD planners, including the OCSIC, to have knowledge of and be actively engaged in interagency and NGO planning initiatives (JCS, 2019).

In Joint operations such as OAW, planners can't simply consider support responsibilities that are inherently DOD, but for other agencies and even non-government organizations (NGOs), as these factors can significantly influence the operational constraints faced by the JFC and subordinate commanders. Early establishment of coordination channels with interagency partners and NGOs is crucial during the planning cycle, and these channels should be integrated into the order process. This element was not conducted in great detail for OAW and was further complicated by Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funding that was primarily authorized for this mission set and will further be addressed in this chapter.

There are both commonalities and notable variations in the planning and management of contracted support between HD and DSCA operations and foreign military operations. To illustrate, in DSCA missions, the challenges related to the integration of contractor personnel are often noticeably diminished owing to a decreased threat level and less rigorous pre-deployment requisites. This should be a key consideration for planning factors as it relates to speed and execution in low-threat environments. Doctrine emphasizes that the planning and execution in foreign operations compared to that of CONUS can exhibit substantial differences. As discussed, these differences must be taken into account when planning and managing contracted support for these types of operations; a Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract moves faster in peacetime environments. In OAW, the first people on the ground were LOGCAP contractors, beating a majority of the military force and already working with base commanders to establish timelines.

3. Contracting Support

To support complicated operations, various DOD contracting activities and authorities provide contracts for performance or supply delivery. While the focus of these contracting activities is primarily on specific Services, it remains crucial to engage in joint planning and guidance from the CCDR with the goal of promoting command-specific interests (JCS, 2019).

As JP 4-10 outlines, the focus will be on the "organization, roles, and CCDR-assigned tasks of Service contingency contracting organizations, not only in providing theater support contracts but also in coordinating other contracting efforts within the operational area" (JCS, 2019 p. IV-1).

a. In-Theater Contracting Organization

In-Theatre contracting organizations are established by the GCC to oversee contracting activities in support of an operation. The GCC has the authority to select a particular Service as the Lead Service for Contracting Coordination (LSCC). The responsibility of the LSCC is to facilitate the coordination of theater support contracting and other external support contract actions within a defined geographical region. The LSC was a hierarchy that was not used in OAW and will be discussed in Chapter IV. The LSC is typically used to formulate a hierarchy structure for contracting entities. The use of this in joint operations is predominately to ensure efficiency and coordination among contracting activities (JCS, 2019).

The LSCC, along with the OCSIC will also have subordinate echelons to help facilitate assistance, analysis, and information sharing across the battlespace. The primary tasks for the lead service are outlined in Figure 4. Typically, the driver of which structure depends on the scale of complexity, but also size, phase, security and time. The author will argue in a later chapter that other parameters should be considered, or at least the ability to transition between constructs as mission dictates.

Lead Contracting Activity Primary Tasks

JTSCC — Provides command, control, and contracting authority for all deployed contingency contracting units/personnel; coordinates in-theater contracting in the JOA via the JCSB; assists in OCS-related analysis of the OE effort; most applicable in complex, large-scale, long-term operations.

LSC — Leads theater support contracting actions tied to lead Service CUL directives, most capable contracting service and/or BOS-I assignments in designated country, region, JOA, or expeditionary base; coordinates other potentially overlapping in-theater contracting actions via JCSB; assists in OCS analysis of the OE effort. Applicable to small-scale, short-term operations.

LSCC — Coordinates potentially overlapping in-theater contracting actions via JCSB and assists in OCS analysis of the OE effort in designated country, region, JOA, or expeditionary base. Most applicable to small-scale, long-term, Service-centric operations, as well as shaping activities.

Legend

|			
BOS-I	base operating support - integrator	LSC	lead Service for contracting
CUL	common user logistics	LSCC	lead Service for contracting coordination
JCSB	joint contracting support board	OCS	operational contract support
JOA	joint operations area	OE	operational environment
JTSCC	joint theater support contracting command		

Figure 4. Lead Contracting Activity Primary Tasks. Source: JCS (2019)

The LSCC structure allows components within an operation to retain command and control (C2) of their own organic contracting support elements (JCS, 2019). In most cases, particularly the Army, these consist of Contracting Teams (CTs) or Contracting Detachments (CONDETS). Within the confines of a LSCC, a lead Service will action tasks received from the drafted annex W. Doctrine also acknowledge that this structure is best suited for an operation that is spread across multiple areas of a JOA. The geographic separation lends itself to avoiding contract fratricide, in which Services seemingly use the same local contractor base, thus depleting through duplication. Historically, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army and Air Force are the Services most likely to serve in this capacity.

Similarly, the GCC has the authority to assign a specified service component as the LSC, in the case of OAW this was not the chosen structure (JCS, 2019). The doctrine emphasizes that this structure typically is used for geographic regions not as dispersed. This also gives the LSC command and control over varying contract entities among Services. Chapter IV will discuss the fact that OAW did not designate an LSC in their Annex W and later how the LSC function might garner benefits when considering withdrawal or closure, not just geographic placement of forces.

According to JP 4-10, in situations where one Service has a substantial superiority in forces, the LSC option is the most suitable approach for operations characterized by a smaller scale and an extended duration (JCS, 2019). It has advantages, including reducing competition for limited local vendor bases and economies of scale purchases. While the benefits outlined are true, other scholars studying the effects and planning of OCS during GWOT present supplemental findings. An NPS thesis by Ocampo and Mapp, in which they interviewed several senior leaders in Afghanistan, also outlined the importance of the bare minimum of coordination authority, particularly during Phase Zero (Anderson & Flaherty, 2003). The author will present findings that this structure presented in JP 4-10, can also be adequate during the end or complete withdrawal of forces.

b. In- Theater Planning and Coordination

While OAW's Annex W will outline the chosen terms above, there are a number of other factors that require additional planning and consideration. Similar in nature to OCS planning, but executed by various contracting agencies. Contracting planning is a function that involves the "development, awarding, and administration of contracts in support of operations directed by GCC" (JCS, 2019 p. xiv). The FAR, DFARS and possibly the Annex W will outline the requirement in sequence with specificity. The guidance for planning is derived from various sources, including operational guidance and policy guidance. In the context of OCS, contracting planning involves ensuring that contracts provide the necessary supplies, services, and construction while following regulations and HCA guidance.

One of the important aspects of OAW as it relates to planning and coordination were the financial arrangements, Service and Joint Acquisition Instructions (AI), contract coordination, and Contingency Contracting Administration Services (CCAS). The financial arrangements are very important in any aspect of an operation but can often get overlooked as to fiscal law constraints and even further construed with multiple agencies. Often this leads to an inter-Service memorandum or memorandum of understanding (MOU) from the agency that holds the purse strings. In this case, DHS. Service and Joint AIs are useful and relevant but often fall to the wayside when speed is a factor. This means contracting activities simply follow their own policy and develop mission-specific policy when feasible. Mission-specific guidance is typically seen in longer-term mission sets like the long-standing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

One of the significant challenges in contracting planning is the transition from external support to theater support contracts and how they should be done by JCSB members (JCS, 2019, p. IV-7). Ongoing monitoring of CAP task orders is imperative, particularly in missions where the focus transitions from combat to stability activities. This helps verify the continued necessity of the requirements while also facilitating the departure of CAP contractors when appropriate. This requires significant coordination amongst all activities for a smooth transition, and why the author argues that smaller construct of contracting personnel can lead to easier C2 across theater during these transitions.

Within the operational area, the Service takes the lead in the Contingency Contracting Administration Services (CCAS) process, overseeing the centralized administration of chosen CAP task orders and remaining theater support contracts (JCS, 2019). CCAS involves various acquisition corps specialties such as Administrative Contracting Officers (ACO), contract administrators, Quality Assurance (QA), property administrators, and Service component Contracting Officer Representatives (CORS). Technical inspectors may also be employed to assist in "technical surveillance matters in some complex contracted services" (JCS, 2019, p. IV-8). The extent of CCAS implementation and the organizational support structure depends on the range of operational requirements that exist. When planning for CCAS, the Service is generally

responsible for deploying contract administration SMEs such as Administrative Contracting Officers (ACOs), quality surveillance, and property administration (PA) personnel (JCS, 2019, p. IV-9). If the Service does not have adequate personnel, augmentation can be requested through Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and should be further codified in Annex W. The Army is particularly low on manpower as it relates to CCAS and uses DCMA personnel in Afghanistan in both ACO and QA capacities. The deployment CCAS experience was another bonus for OAW's mission; most Army contracting teams had recently redeployed from Afghanistan and were familiar with CCAS-type contract support (Bohlen, 2016).

While the aim of this publication is to offer basic concepts and direction regarding the preparation, planning, implementation, and supervision of OCS support, there still remains a lot of doubt as to the proper execution of such activities. While several factors contribute to the issuance of doctrine, a number of the important ones come from academics still, not only the craft but research as well.

C. ACADEMIC BODIES OF RESEARCH AND FRAMEWORK

While the lessons from long-standing GWOT played a significant role in what doctrine has become today, it would be negligent not to outline the contributions of academics in the field. This section outlines the bodies of research that helped build current doctrine and continue to contribute towards a better contingency contracting response across the DOD. Considering the challenges associated with incorporating ideas into doctrine, it is essential to include an analysis of academic frameworks in light of real-world mission requirements as an integral component of any significant research in OCS planning.

The two models presented have garnered interest from scholars, procurement offices, and strategic planners across agencies. The broad, foundational aspect of these models also makes them relatable to essentially any service component in support of OCS operations worldwide.

1. Yoder Three-tier Model

The Yoder Three-tier model (YTTM) identifies the shortcomings as it relates to the coordination and integration of contracting operations and focuses on perhaps our most important resource- people. This model is quite simple if the aim is to be more efficient and effective with OCS objectives. Let's focus on how we align the people involved in the process. YTTM outlines three employment models for contingency contracting officers, each with distinct functions, educational requirements, developed skills, and personnel characteristics (Yoder, 2004). These tiers are interdependent and integrated in a hierarchical manner and further outlined in Figure 5.

Model Tier Level & Model Title	Functions/Education/Rank	Highlights and Drawbacks
Ordering Officer—Tier One	- basic ordering - some simplified acquisitions - training: DAU CON 234 - DAWIA Certified CON Level I or II - junior to mid-enlisted, junior officers, GS-7 to GS-9 1102 series civilians	- simple buys - little integration - no operational planning - no broad liaison functions
Leveraging Contracting Officer—Tier Two	- leverages to local economy - reduces "pushed" material support - training/education: - DAU CON 234, recommended higher education - DAWIA Certified CON Level II or III - senior enlisted, junior to mid-grade officers, GS-11+ 1102 series civilians	- better local operational planning - some integration - more capability for the operational commander - no planned theater integration - no broad liaison functions - may perform to optimize local operations at the detriment to theater ops
Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE)—Tier Three	- highest level of planning and integration—joint - linked/integrated with J-4 and J-5 - creates and executes OPLAN CCO strategy - provides direction to tier two and one - links operations strategically to theater objectives of COCOM - education: Master's degree or higher and, JPME Phase I and II - DAWIA Certified CON Level III, and other DAWIA disciplines (LOG, ACQ, FIN, etc) - senior officers (0-6+), senior civilians, GS-13+ or SES	- performs operational and theater analysis, integrates results into OPLAN - link between COCOM and OPLAN to all theater contracting operations - coordinates theater objectives with best approach to contracted support - can achieve broader national security goals through effective distribution of national assets - includes planning, communication, coordination, and exercising with NGO and PVO in theater

E. Cory Yoder, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004.

Figure 5.   Yoder Three-Tier Model for Contingency Contracting Operations
Source: Yoder (2004)

The passage describes three models of employment for contingency contracting officers. The Ordering Officer Model is the most basic, followed by the Leveraging Contracting Officer Model, which includes collaboration and market research within local businesses. The Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) Model is the highest-tiered model, where tenured CCOs help facilitate operational-planning phases of contingencies to meet operational objectives (Yoder, 2004). Yoder proposes integrating IPE CCOs within J-4 (Logistics), J-5 (Planning/Operations), and Exercise organization structures to achieve desired synergies and eliminate competing demands. Further analysis will be considered in later chapters on the implementation of this model in operations like OAW.

With this framework, Yoder takes the theory to practice and compares small examples in real-world applications primarily based on an Army acquisition structure. The author looks at combatant commanders as it relates to a humanitarian mission to see the benefits of integration. The research also aims to see if integration with J-4 and J-5 staff occurred and what that meant for mission achievement – were we using YTTM unknowingly, and did it work? Another item to consider is the highly experienced personnel and their integration into the planning agencies. Is the IPE model feasible with current manning and geographical constraints, or do other people have to be prepared to step up in that role? The fourth looks at NGO support and their understanding of the model. Early integration with NGOs can save a lot of time and duplication of effort from CCOs or ordering officials on the ground. OAW provided a unique circumstance with NGOs that validated this point quite clearly.

2. Three Integrative Pillars of Success

Yoder's TTM is simply a precursor to yet another integrative success model in the *Three Integrative Pillars for Success,* or TIPS. This model, along with the research, focuses again on Phase Zero Contracting Operations (PZCO) planning efforts at which we analyze the contracting plan prior to an event. The three pillars are outlined in Figure 6.

Note. APEX = Adaptive Planning & Execution System; GCC = Global Combatant Commander; IPE = Integrated Planner and Executor; JCASO = Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office; PD2 = Procurement Defense Desktop; SPS = Standard Procurement System; TPFDD = Time Phased Force Deployment Data

Figure 6.   TIPS Source: Yoder et al. (2013)

The personnel pillar can be addressed by implementing the Three-Tier Model (TTM) outlined above. Note the IPE is also listed, as its one of the more important aspects within the personnel pillar and also part of the further analysis relating to OAW. The platforms pillar can be addressed by integrating contracting into the existing platforms, like the Adaptive Planning & Execution System (APEX), and embedding it with complementary platforms like the Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) system (Yoder et al., 2013). The protocols pillar embodies a series of protocols and practices that regulate the planning and execution of the contracting plan, including strategic planning guidance, military doctrine, and acquisition and contracting-specific laws and regulations. Annex W, at minimum, must address the three pillars in Figure 7 while also incorporating the key elements to achieve mission success. While mandatory, the importance also stems from the timing at which Annex W is implemented. Joint strategic planning products like OPLANs, CONPLANs, and operation orders (OPORDS), along with their annexes, including Annex W, must involve contracting and acquisition

personnel for successful integration in virtually all aspects and phases of the operation. While much of this research will evaluate JP 4-10, under the Protocols pillar, certain aspects relating to Personnel will also be discussed and analyzed. The general argument for the pillars for integrative success is simply that contracting is still not fully integrated into planning and execution and remains an afterthought until it is too late, and a theme we will see in OAW as well.

While the updated JP 4-10 and the work of Dr. Jacques Gansler's report, *Urgent Reform Required,* and Academics alike have offered substantial improvements, there is still notable progress that can be made. Failure to fully align processes with the joint community can result in an overall disconnect between contracting professionals and GCC staff responsible for planning operations (Yoder et al., 2013). This is yet another reason to be fervent advocates for fluid refinement of process and policy.

D.   AFTER ACTION AND LESSONS LEARNED REPORTS

This section takes the reader through the lessons learned reports used to analyze OAW and how they came about. This information is critical for validating, refining, and building effective policies rooted in past knowledge and real-world application. Utilizing the experiences in such a complex environment, in multiple geographic locations, can help garner the context for what is required in future contingencies. The U.S. Army's Field Manual (FM) 6–0 discusses the importance of creating knowledge within an organization using After Action reports and analysis (DA, 2022). The FM goes on to outline how AARs create more avenues for in-depth analysis, research, and innovation. Organizations can become more adaptable by learning from their experiences, and AARs are an effective tool to facilitate this process (Edmondson et al., 2017).

The databases queried DHS' Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL), Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS), The Army's Center for Lessons Learned (CALL), and Dudley Knox Library's Calhoun database. The author also contacted the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Procurement (ODASA-P) as well as U.S. Army North (ARNORTH) for their respective lessons learned not accessible via common portals. The lessons learned reports are outlined in Table 2.

Table 2.   Provided and Queried Lessons Learned and After-Action Reports

Agency	Report Title
DHS	DHS Did Not Adequately or Efficiently Deploy Its Employees to U.S. Military Installations in Support of Operation Allies Welcome
DHS	The DHS Unified Coordination Group for Operation Allies Welcome Coordinated Afghan Resettlement but Faced Challenges in Funding and Authority
DODIG	Special Report: Lessons Learned From the Audit of DOD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals
DA	Operation Allies Welcome The United States Army's Support to the Department of State and Department of Homeland Security
ARNORTH	Operation Allies Welcome Summary Report
ODASA (P)	After Action Report in Support of Operation Allies Refuge & Operation Allies Welcome

This method incorporates the lessons learned from varying agencies' perspectives. The information creates an informative baseline for which to compare doctrinal principles with what went right and what went wrong during OAW and will be discussed in Chapter IV. The reports not only strengthen the policy associated with Joint Mission sets but also the argument laid out in GAO report 15–243. Overall, the adequate gathering of lessons learned from all services and the importance of making it a standard practice is paramount for future operations (Doll, 2017). The author will also address the ongoing successes in gathering this information, along with how we can use it in the future.

E.   CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter discusses the current Joint Doctrine associated with OCS, some of the academic frameworks that contributed and continue to contribute to policy, GAO reports that outline the significance of the research and lessons learned, along with After Action

reports to further address research questions discussed in Chapter I. The incorporation of a robust after-action reporting process after GAO 15–243 created a necessary repository of after-action reports across the DOD. The chapter also discussed learning organizations and the importance of AARs, and the studies that indicate how AARs promote a culture of learning and continuous improvement (Edmondson et al., 2017), which are essential for successful joint operations. AARs also help to identify gaps in planning, execution, and communication in complex environments, which is not only the aim of our study but the aim of doctrine in general. Real-world contingencies, along with thorough after-action analysis, are a sound basis for doctrine validation, justification, and overall effectiveness. The published AARs, subsequent key leader interviews, and the author's personal experience in OAW will lend themselves the thorough analysis and validation doctrine needed to remain relevant.

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III. METHODOLOGY

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines the process of data collection and analysis used to achieve the research objectives and provides answers to the research questions posed in Chapter 1. The readily available After-action analysis for this mission is unique in the sense that various layers and entities dissected the mission post-mortem. This, combined with the author's own experience, presented a unique way of analyzing the doctrinal application from varying lenses. All after-action analysis was conducted through interviews or working groups with personnel intimately involved in the mission set. With that in mind, the formality of after-action analysis lends itself to a certain palatability filter the author sought to break through. To get finer points of mission planning, a survey was also used with hopes of genuine and open discussion.

B. INTERVIEW GOALS AND DESIGN

The interview was implemented to garner the finer points of the planning and to highlight the issues in terms of precedence and importance. To gather valuable insights, we opted to conduct topical qualitative interviews as a means of collecting lessons learned (Rubin & Rubin, 2011). The after-action analysis presented several findings but didn't necessarily rank them in terms of importance. The interview also sought out unfiltered data that the author possessed from being on the ground. The author's knowledge only spanned across one task force element and location, Fort Picket. While this represented a tactical level of knowledge and application, it doesn't paint the picture strategically. The strategic portion would need to come from a higher-level leader to get at the finer points of our research questions that AARs didn't get to.

C. INTERVIEW SUBJECT

To gain insight from a strategic perspective on the lessons learned over the entire OAW mission, the author selected an interviewee who holds a senior leadership role for contracting functions within the LSCC and designated JFLCC command for the OAW

mission. The author selected the Chief of Acquisition and Contracts for a major command involved in the OAW mission. The senior leader was heavily involved and saw the entire mission from beginning to end. The interviewee was selected based on the experience and understanding of contracting's role in not simply OAW but the bigger strategic picture. The senior official was further qualified with career involvement in contracting operations at differing levels and capacities throughout his career.

D.   FRAMEWORK

According to ADRP 3–0 Army Operations, strategic and tactical capabilities refer to different levels of planning and execution in military operations. With so many planning functions rooted in operational doctrine, the author wanted to break the application of joint doctrine from two perspectives: tactical and strategic. Strategic capabilities are concerned with the big picture and long-term objectives, while tactical capabilities are more focused on immediate objectives and actions needed to accomplish those objectives (Department of Army, 2019).

Army doctrine also outlines both strategic and tactical capabilities are essential to a successful military campaign, and they require different skills, resources, and approaches to achieve success. The data supports this process of differing perspectives and application of OCS doctrine. The reports from DODIG and U.S. Army offer a strategic perspective, and the interviewee fills in gaps from those reports offering unfettered strategic analysis of the entirety of the mission. The remaining reports from ARNORTH and ODASA-(P) focus on the technical and tactical side of OCS and will be analyzed as such. The framework for the analysis is depicted in Figure 7.

Figure 7.   Analysis Framework

E.   ANALYTICAL PROCESS

The analytical approach to examine published lessons learned and the supplemental data from that our interview and the author's experience with OAW was primarily implemented to identify recurring themes to answer our research questions. Given the range of viewpoints, as it relates to contingency contracting and this specific operation, the common themes were considered noteworthy. The results of the interview and analysis of lessons learned answered specific questions outlined in Chapter I. These findings provided a foundation to make recommendations and validations based on the data analyzed.

F.   SUMMARY

The initial three chapters of research served as a basis for the study. Chapter I presented the background, purpose, and significance. Chapter II consisted of an extensive review of current doctrine, academic bodies of research, major oversight findings, and current OCS principles. This chapter outlined the analysis methodology to include interviewee selection and data analysis. Subsequent chapters will present findings, analysis, and areas for further research.

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IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A. INTRODUCTION

The analysis presented in this chapter aims to assess the effectiveness of current OCS policies in addressing real-world events by examining the experiences and evidence-based lessons learned from individuals directly involved in OAW. The objective is to critically evaluate the practical application of existing policies in real-world scenarios and determine whether they effectively address the challenges and limitations encountered by the people on the ground. By drawing upon individual experiences and documented evidence, this analysis aims to identify specific limitations within the policies and establish their direct correlation with observed events. Through this examination, a comprehensive understanding of JP 4-10's efficacy can be achieved, providing valuable insights for potential improvements and adjustments. This analysis chapter serves as an important contribution to the ongoing evaluation and enhancement of policies or doctrine to ensure their alignment with the realities of those directly impacted by their implementation. The analysis will address our primary and secondary research questions discussed in Chapter I.

Through a rigorous evaluation, we briefly go over the contracted support required during OAW and assess the effectiveness of contracted support in meeting the operational objectives set forth in OAW, considering factors such as timeliness, cost-effectiveness, and operational impacts. Finally, we identify and analyze the strengths and weaknesses of JP 4-10, examining how well it aligns with the unique demands and complexities of contracted support in OAW. By addressing these critical aspects, this chapter aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the role of contracted support in OAW and assess the extent to which JP 4-10 effectively supports the fulfillment of operational requirements.

B. KEY CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED

The Operation Allies Welcome (OAW) mission presented numerous challenges and valuable lessons for strategic planners in the Department of Defense (DOD). From the constraints of funding allocation to the complexities of interagency coordination and contract planning, the mission shed light on critical areas that require attention and improvement. The

disregard for proper planning and interagency agreements in the early stages of the operation led to the reprogramming of funds and increased the risk of misappropriation violations. Furthermore, issues with medical personnel licenses, specialty care provisions, interpreter service contracts, and funding restrictions highlighted the need for better integration, coordination, and adherence to doctrine. This analysis of the OAW mission and its associated reports underscores the importance of early planning, interagency cooperation, and effective contract management to ensure the success and efficiency of future operations. Each section will walk through the key challenges related to the topic of doctrine and address the issue and key lessons for future contingencies.

1.   Contract Support and Funding Constraints

An overview of contracted support and funding within this chapter is essential, particularly when considering the challenges associated with OHDACA funding. Understanding the intricacies of contracted support provides context for comprehending the complexities of financing and resource allocation in OAW. The OHDACA funding mechanism, aimed at supporting humanitarian and disaster relief efforts, presents unique challenges due to its specific requirements and limitations. By exploring the overview of contracted support, readers can grasp the financial landscape and constraints within which contracting operations are conducted. This understanding enables a more comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and its applicability to specific OHDACA-funded contract actions while shedding light on potential areas for improvement. Incorporating an overview of contracted support enriches the analysis of JP 4-10 and provides an understanding of the interplay between doctrine, contracting operations, and resource allocation in OAW.

OHDACA funding in and of itself brought about complications throughout the phases of the operation. The primary services that were both required and allocated by all ten installations via contract were pulled from the DODIG (2022) report, first with what could be allocated correctly:

- Temporary shelters, such as tents
- Temporary health facilities
- Medicines and immunizations
- Winterized clothing, blankets, and beds

- Hygiene facilities and latrines (DODIG, 2022 p. 23)

What OHDACA funding could not provide, but was still required, according to the DODIG (2022) report:

- provision of non-humanitarian goods and services
- any support for the administration or enforcement of immigration laws, regardless of location
- provision of supplies or equipment, including generators, food, and medical facilities that will remain on military installations or with the partner security forces
- support to law enforcement, detention, or security functions
- military construction
- provision of vocational education
- restoring facilities; and
- support to religious, social, or recreational activities (DODIG, 2022, p. 23)

While the complications from OHDACA constrained some of the acquisition processes, it was not the only contract-related matter to navigate. LOGCAP V and the Task Order for OAW was a letter contract. A letter contract, also known as Undefinitized Contract Action (UCA), is defined in Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 16.603 as: "A written preliminary contractual instrument that authorizes the contractor to begin immediately manufacturing supplies or performing services" (FAR 16.603, 2023).

Using a letter contract entails certain risks and benefits, particularly in contingency situations like OAW. One of the primary risks associated with letter contracts is the lack of detailed terms and conditions, which can lead to ambiguity and potential disputes between the government agency and the contractor. The absence of a comprehensive agreement exposes both parties to uncertainties regarding pricing, scope of work, and performance expectations (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 2023). Additionally, the contractor may face financial risks as they may incur costs without a fully defined contract in place, which happened during mobilization for OAW (US Army North [ARNORTH], 2022). However, in urgent and time-sensitive scenarios such as OAW, where rapid response and immediate support are critical, letter contracts offer distinct advantages. They allow for the prompt mobilization of contractors and resources to address emergent needs (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 2023). Letter contracts provide flexibility in contingency operations, better

accommodating evolving requirements. Despite the inherent risks, the benefits of utilizing letter contracts in OAW outweighed the potential drawbacks, as they enabled a swift response to the urgent and unpredictable demands of the humanitarian mission. While the benefits exist in terms of performance and speed, it does come at an expense; the DOD expended $2.5 billion in OHDACA funding (DODIG, 2022).

Operational environments are inherently uncertain, with unpredictable variables and evolving dynamics. Letter contracts recognize and accommodate this uncertainty by providing a flexible framework for engagement. In OAW, they enabled DOD personnel to initiate other essential activities while allowing for contract adjustments and modifications as the situation unfolded. This adaptability reduces at least some of the burdens of extensive planning requirements joint logistic planners incur. The focus shifts to responsiveness and adaptive decision-making rather than detailed pre-contractual specifications when this type of contract is in play. By embracing the advantages of letter contracts, the DOD was able to optimize its planning processes for OAW, enabling a more agile and responsive approach to achieving mission objectives. While the use of a letter contract often lends itself to higher costs, the type of contract selected appeared to be an excellent choice overall for this operation.

While the type of contract and LOGCAP, in general, was touted as successful, some portions of the LOGCAP contract faced issues at implementation. Medical services were one of those services and presented some difficulties when refugees began to stay longer than the planned 21-day window (Center for Army Lessons Learned [CALL], 2022). Extending their stay meant greater terms of specialty care were required, something this contract didn't necessarily incorporate. To further complicate, medical services in LOGCAP contracts are completely unique to LOGCAP V, as LOGCAP IV did not have medical included in its Master Statement of Work (MSOW). Another complicating factor, the Army, or HCA in this case, has another agency that typically administers support involving medical services. The United States Army Health Contracting Activity (USAHCA) is one of MEDCOM's subordinate commands, a separate entity from the Army's Contracting Command (ACC) (St. Peter & Hall, 2022). The disjunction between USAHCA and ACC could pose problems in the future as it relates to contingency operations and medical support. In the case of OAW,

the contractors augmented with joint uniformed service personnel, which provided a buffer for the ad hoc medical requirements in specialty care.

Though each base found itself with a need for critical care, each base found itself in its own unique position regarding state jurisdictional license requirements too. ARNORTH had to request an exemption from the state medical licensing board to include contractors providing medical services for the DOD, who were jurisdictionally authorized for the OAW mission since previous law restricted contractor exemption (US Army North [ARNORTH], 2022).

JP 4-10 largely doesn't account for contracting for medical services, let alone specialty care. Most of JP 4-10 speaks to the CAAF personnel and their medical screening requirements and the subsequent planning required of the Joint Force Surgeon to support CAAF personnel (JCS, 2019). The lack of doctrinal guidance and the organizational structure for medical services should warrant concern for some acquisition professionals. While concerning medical care is still somewhat inherently governmental. As is the case for OAW, contracted medical personnel and military medical personnel were integrative to the success. If medical support is incorporated into the new LOGCAP contracts, integration should take place between ACC and USAHCA to maximize requirements and avoid duplication of effort. ACC will also likely require USAHCA's expertise as it relates to medical services for future conflicts, while USAHCA will likely require LOGCAP expertise.

Earlier in this section, the benefits and flexibility of letter contracts were highlighted as a key components for fluid environments. While the contract type for LOGCAP met this metric, some contracts did not. Interpreter service contracts were scrutinized due to the rigidity of their contract structure and the geographical disbursement of contracting officers and CORS. While the demand for linguists was very high, flexibilities for state-side support proved difficult to execute given the rigid nature of their contracts, which were primarily sourced for OCONUS (DODIG, 2022). The Department of Army G2 and U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command managed these contracts and were not ready to maneuver to state-side linguistic support. CORs rarely went to actual sites, which meant contracting teams assigned Government Technical Monitors (GTMs). GTMs were often used when appointed CORs were not within physical proximity to the work site, as was the case for OAW

(DA, 2010). The planning was initially based on refugee to linguist ratio of 1:40 but later identified that given the vast levels of quality, a tier system would have been better suited to translate critical information relating to medical services where other services required less concise language (US Army North [ARNORTH], 2022). The Task Forces also had a significantly difficult time modifying or reducing linguistic numbers in a timely manner, primarily due to poorly defining the requirement and rigidity of contract structure.

This overview becomes even more significant when considering the principles outlined in the doctrine. The doctrine highlights that CAP support, despite potentially higher costs compared to theater support contracts, offers invaluable corporate management competencies that are challenging to replicate through other means (JCS, 2019). JP 4-10 continues in that CAP support proves particularly advantageous during the early stages of operations (JCS, 2019). While some of the contracted support items don't bear the inherent flexibilities ideal for contingency environments, larger strategic elements like using a LOGCAP contract did align with doctrine and work. The doctrine supporting the nonmonetary benefit in the corporate knowledge gained through CAP-type contracts legitimizes the author's claim that this type of contract eases logistical planning factors for the DOD and should be considered the ultimate contract type for decisive logistical support, particularly in earlier phases, as doctrine suggests (JCS, 2019).

Whether it is in the context of contracted support, resource allocation, or logistical planning, the presence of built-in flexibilities is crucial for addressing challenges and maximizing OCS effectiveness in any contingency. While JP 4-10 addresses flexibility as a nonmonetary cost, it does not emphasize its inherent importance in fluid environments.

2.   Lack of Interagency Coordination

Integration agreements between DOS, DHS, and DOD were virtually non-existent in the earlier days of the operation. Federal law specifies government entities establish agreements for interagency operations, including reimbursement terms and conditions (JCS, 2019). The importance of these types of agreements is further outlined in DOD Instruction 4000.19, which gives the DOD the specific components of "entering into agreements to support other Federal agencies" (DOD, 2020, p. 6). The instructions go further in specificity,

outlining responsible parties, periods of support, and the overall scope for each agency, all important aspects that should have been considered.

The agreements are very important in Joint environments and are the very structure under which support operates. As the lead government agency, at least in the initial stages, DOS even refused to sign some of the agreements drafted by the DOD by author-witnessed accounts as well DODIG's report (DODIG, 2022). This was a systemic problem and was witnessed firsthand at Fort Pickett in the initial stages of the OAW mission. The seemingly simple agreement significantly slowed the acquisition process as the reimbursement drew concern for DOD entities. This created a stonewall for new acquisitions and forced the DOD to use their own Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funds without the fidelity it would even be repaid given the lack of cost-sharing responsibilities typically outlined in these agreements. While LOGCAP, the primary support contract, was funded via OHDACA funding, new requirements and GPC purchases that were required while LOGCAP was mobilized were of great concern to the contracting personnel on the ground. The particular concern was both misappropriation violations and the simple ability of active-duty components to spend funds directly tied to their operational readiness.

JP 4-10 outlines the importance of these responsibilities as well, acknowledging that significant effort is required to synchronize not only other government agencies but non-government (NGO) agencies as well (JCS, 2019). This requirement of coordination alone is in at least three different sources of DOD doctrine and yet still was not executed at strategic or tactical levels. This is an important part for planners to consider, but it was not considered early as recommended in JP 4-10. The report goes on later to claim the MOAs were drafted almost two months into the operation (US Army North [ARNORTH], 2022). This shows the difficulties faced when contingency doctrine exists but is simply not applied upfront and early.

While interagency coordination is addressed in several layers of doctrine and law, as previously mentioned, it is also addressed in the DHS's own National Response Framework (NRF). The framework outlines that government entities at the federal level have the ability to establish agreements for reimbursement and coordination purposes, both within and between agencies, as authorized by the Economy Act and other relevant authorities (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2019). The report concludes that the process and

guidelines for executing such agreements are outlined in the Financial Management Support Annex, which is a part of the NRF. Fundamentally, interagency coordination was one of the most emphasized requirements through doctrine and law across the entire government, but it was still met with dissent.

The framework for such coordination must be dictated at the highest levels of government for swifter execution. A broad memorandum of agreement would establish the structure required for hasty joint execution. The quick changeover from DOS to DHS also brings into question if DOS should have been designated the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) from the very beginning. There should be structured templates used for specific humanitarian missions such as OAW. Where there is distinct geographic separation, local agencies should be able to supplement agreements based on requirements on the ground. This level of integration should be common practice. It is imperative that this coordination begins early, with the highest agency taking the lead and actively engaging in the process. By doing so, the intricate details of contract execution and seamless integration of agencies can be fine-tuned at the tactical level, ensuring fidelity and cohesion throughout the entire operation. This proactive approach minimizes delays, maximizes efficiency, enhances overall mission effectiveness, and, perhaps most importantly, is supported by law and policy.

3. Enhancing Planning, Integration, and Personnel

This section highlights the importance of planning, integration, and organizational contract personnel. The successful integration of various elements and adherence to established doctrine and procedures contributed to the overall success of the mission. However, light is also shed light on areas that could use improvement. By analyzing these experiences, valuable insights can be gained to enhance planning, integration, and the selection of personnel that supports future operations.

As the JFLCC, ARNORTH had significant responsibility for the entire operation. While ARNORTH is a three-star command, they only had one single OCS planning staff member assigned. The OAW contracts accumulated to roughly $4B in the aggregate, according to the DODIG report, making this a significant undertaking for one person (DODIG, 2022). This is immediately complicated by the fact Defense Logistics Agency's

(DLA) Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) ceased to exist after September 2020, making OAW one of the first contingencies after the closure of this office. The JCASO, originally directed by Congress in 2008, was to enhance the management of contingency contracting procedures, given the dependence on commercial support solutions in Iraq and Afghanistan (Reece, 2020). The DLA effectively relinquished this mission back to the military services after two years of training logistical planners at the joint level prior to its demise. While the Army is working on OCS Theater Planning Teams (TPTs), it does not appear to be happening fast enough. ARNORTH acknowledges the shortcoming within the OCS cell and is actively pursuing personnel allocations, therefore not requiring further analysis or recommendation (US Army North [ARNORTH], 2022). While significant, this is not the only complication faced in OAW as it relates to personnel.

Each Task Force seemed to have unique circumstances to the response of OAW. TF Mccoy and TF Bliss both had heavy command structures and housed the most refugees. TF Bliss had the entire 1st Armored Division's staff dedicated to the mission. The early integration and command relationship provided a clear understanding of the mission while possessing a robust staff benefited greatly. This robust staff allowed early integration of Staff Judge Advocates (SJA) with varying backgrounds. Having a legal team held significant value in navigating civil, criminal, and fiscal laws. TF Picket, for example, only had one criminal attorney to navigate the entire gauntlet of legal woes faced during this operation. Similar deficiencies existed when standing up OCSICs within the Task Force. Tenured OCSICs were able to harness cross-agency requirement organizations as well as leverage NGO support. Trained OCSICs understood the importance of NGOs in bridging support gaps created by using restrictive OHDACA funding. For example, contracting teams found it difficult or were legally not allowed to purchase some items due because they were within the military's medical supply chain, but they could not be acquired quickly through those means. NGOs were able to acquire several of the items while avoiding a number of fiscal law constraints contracting personnel couldn't avoid. NGOs had the ability to harness social media platforms to hastily acquire items that had an emotional connection to the local population. These types of resources create public awareness and solidarity within the surrounding community.

Overall, a nonexistent, untrained, and unengaged OCSIC negatively impacted the mission, while a trained and enabled OCSIC was the inverse.

Another success supported by doctrine is the integrated Liaison Officers (LNOs). Similar to IPEs in Yoder's TTM, these LNOs spearheaded efforts to a commercial solution while coordinating efforts of sustainment and OCS in meetings where decisions were being made. This type of business advice to mission partners is essential when time and communication are critical to the mission. The LNOs also identified and solved issues with processes and working groups like the CARB and requirement validation boards (ODASA-P, 2022). This further supports the need for not only well-trained OCSICs but also LNOs at the contracting team level to help guide them through the process when they are ill-equipped or trained for the mission presented. JP 4-10 emphasizes the importance of LNOs as well and highlights that the scope of LNOs can greatly expand when supporting stability and civil authority operations – a true statement for OAW (JCS, 2019).

This seemingly simple integration also lends itself to success in the latter stages of OAW. Disposition, de-scope, and closeout operations, particularly in TF Pickett and TF McCoy, appeared to be largely a success due to early integration and a bi-weekly meeting chaired by the TF representative G4. The TF focused on OHDACA-procured items and had all relevant members participate in the meetings. Ultimately, the importance lies at the earliest stages of the operation. In Fort Pickett, for example, disposition was considered right away by contracting personnel, or LNOs, and emphasized through the OCSIC. Contracting personnel must be good stewards and sound business advisors throughout the mission, regardless of the stage they are in. Part of this is simply attending meetings and understanding long-term impacts. TF Pickett initially wanted to purchase a number of items when a lease was likely more appropriate, which led to easier disposition when the mission was complete. This simple guide can facilitate the alignment of requirements and prompt the required activity to think forward.

Highlighting the successes as part of the descope activities in OAW is important and warrants highlighting some of the circumstances surrounding the withdrawal from Afghanistan. According to ODASA(P)'s report, the absence or forceful relocation of acquisition personnel to support Over the Horizon (OTH) operations severely limited the

ability to contract personnel to provide valuable business advice and oversight (ODASA-P, 2022). This limitation, as discussed in Yoder's TTM, could have been mitigated by having an Integrated Planning Element (IPE) present during planning and withdrawal discussions. Furthermore, the contractor accountability system, SPOT, was found lacking in providing real-time data for on-ground assessments, emphasizing the need for accurate and reliable information from folks on the ground. The absence of Contingency Contracting Officers at critical locations such as Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) further impacted the withdrawal process and subsequent support at the tactical level.

The neglection of incorporating this personnel had a significant impact in addressing the cessation of services and the associated risks posed to contractors. Planners lacked a comprehensive understanding of the demobilization requirements for contractors and the operational implications, which contracting personnel could have facilitated and streamlined. Additionally, the involvement of contracting personnel in meetings held in secrecy, with Top Secret clearances, would have provided valuable insights for handling de-scopes and stop-work orders and improved accounting of labor, equipment, and materials at each site. By foreseeing potential challenges and complications, such as settlement claims and terminations, contracting personnel could have ensured a more structured and efficient process rather than relying on ad-hoc measures. Overall, these examples underscore the importance of early integration, informed decision-making, and the active participation of contracting personnel throughout the mission, from the onset of planning until the final stages of withdrawal.

C.   FINDINGS FROM THE INTERVIEW

As explored in Chapter III, the interview served as a complementary component to the research, focusing on uncovering intricate details regarding the execution and planning processes that preceded this mission. The primary objective of this section is to examine specific aspects that may have been overlooked in broader lessons learned documents. The author's intent was to capture and support the themes identified above while garnering finer details of the execution from a strategic perspective.

1. Importance of Oversight, Early Integration, and People

When asked about any discernable trends for task forces that executed OCS better (or worse) compared to overall mission objectives, the interviewee suggested they all executed tasks in a manner that was "indiscernible" (D. McGowan, personal communication, February 24, 2023). He continues that once review boards were established along with the establishment of contract oversight via CORs, the task forces were doing very well, given the parameters of the mission. The interviewee later surmised that if there were any identifiable differences, it was inappropriate personnel capital for contract oversight. Simply put, those that had adequately been trained and technical representatives CORS established contracted support quicker and were more effective at addressing requiring activity needs. This is another marker for not only the importance of oversight through CORS but also early integrated OCSICs and Contracting Personnel. The earlier this personnel infrastructure is established, the earlier the support is triaged and administered. This was discussed earlier and is an important piece in both the initial stages of OAW and the subsequent withdrawal noted by the ODASA(P) report.

The interviewee was open and upfront about the planning of OAW, "there was none" (D. McGowan, personal communication, February 24, 2023). The lessons learned documents paint a more optimistic picture, but the reality is that there wasn't. The chaos and disorganization witnessed by the author in the beginning stages, particularly when refugees were received, is hard to even describe. The integration of OCS into the OPLAN was minimal, and the interviewee acknowledged that it was a "contact drill" right from the beginning. Unfortunately, this is the status quo we are trying to diminish, particularly in the early stages of an operation. This operation did have a uniqueness to it in that the overall approach was defined at the Pentagon before NORTHCOM even got the mission set, according to the interview (D. McGowan, personal communication, February 24, 2023). This begs the question as to why the government didn't dictate other facets required for support, like the interagency MOAs and funding.

2. Continued Challenges with OHDACA Funding

When pressed about challenges faced during the planning phase, the interviewee noted, "If there was a challenge, it was the use of OHDACA appropriations" (D. McGowan, personal communication, February 24, 2023). The restrictive use of these funds is highlighted in this chapter to a rather large extent. The interview response drew similar concerns and difficulties as the OHDACA appropriation is primarily to be used in "matters of abating human suffering." The use of these funds is codified in USC 2561 and reads:

> To the extent provided in defense authorization Acts, funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense for a fiscal year for humanitarian assistance shall be used for the purpose of providing transportation of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide. (Humanitarian Assistance, 2013)

In the broad context of the definition, it's easy to see how difficult it was to use and operate under this appropriation. The DOD is used to O&M funding, which is largely ambiguous and fits the mold under most circumstances in which we operate; OHDACA funding did not. The interviewee pointed out that several difficulties came down to authorities; the DOD appropriated the humanitarian assistance monies but required LGA support to authorize them. This and the unestablished MOAs between agencies created almost a standstill to a drawn-out bureaucratic process.

3. Senior Leader Buy-in and Metrics for Success

One of the important aspects when looking at both tactical and strategic implementation is the senior leader's buy-in and overall understanding of OCS. The interviewee outlined that "senior leaders understood that contracts and contracting take time and cost money" (D. McGowan, personal communication, February 24, 2023). He continues in that the task force commanders were primarily general officers that were in the rank of Brigadier General or Major General and had some background in contracting from Iraq or Afghanistan. Where they tended to get frustrated was how long it took to get some of the contracts and personnel in place. All too often in Afghanistan, things simply happened and often happened quickly. The interviewee also emphasized that the mission, in general, had tremendous implications as well as pressure to put these refugees in established safe havens.

When the interviewee was pressed for the metrics used to gauge the success of the mission, most concerns dealt with speed and quality and simply the sheer number of Afghans that were safe, fed, clean, and clothed (D. McGowan, personal communication, February 24, 2023). Given the triple constraint of cost, schedule, and performance, one can quickly ascertain where the government took on the risk – cost. Ultimately, the interviewee stressed the "speed to need" and whether the refugees "were fed, clothed, clean and safe." Given these simple requirements, it's hard to argue that this mission wasn't a success in terms of support from the DOD. An overwhelming facet in all the analysis remains that, ultimately, human suffering was avoided for a vast number of refugees and replaced with only minor inconveniences. Notably, most concerns were drawn from loved ones that remained in unstable, Taliban-controlled Afghanistan (DODIG, 2022).

4. Effectiveness of Doctrine and Lessons Learned

The final question in the interview had to do specifically with doctrine and whether it was used effectively. When asked if the doctrine was used appropriately, he stated, "We are effectively leveraging doctrine now" (D. McGowan, personal communication, February 24, 2023). He continues that prior to COVID, ARNORTH was simply toeing the line in terms of OCS. He asserts that the COVID response that ARNORTH was involved in helped them improve on these general concepts in OCS doctrine. The benefit of the COVID response is that it virtually coincided with the OAW response and allowed retention among OCS entities and staff. The interviewee expands that during OAW, they were successful at implementing OCSICs, and OCS working groups and establishing a firm emphasis on oversight and requirement definition. A majority of those members had the importance of these cells fresh in their memory (D. McGowan, personal communication, February 24, 2023). Overall, the proof is in the result and highlighted in one of the DODIG special reports:

> In addition, we determined that despite having minimal time to prepare for the Afghan evacuees, the DOD successfully provided housing, sustainment, medical care, and security for more than 34,900 Afghans traveling through two installations in Germany and more than 73,500 Afghan evacuees temporarily staying at eight U.S. installations (DODIG, 2022).

Despite the chaotic nature of getting people to safe havens stateside, the mission overall was touted as a tremendous success for the DOD. When asked if anything in particular led to the success of the DOD, the interviewee pressed that "the OCSIC amongst organizations both interagency (DHS, OSD) across staff (ARNORTH, ARSOUTH) and at echelon (Subordinate and superior) provided the key communication required for such a robust element of support" (D. McGowan, personal communication, February 24, 2023). He continues, noting OCSICs as the "key communication vehicle" that saved a tremendous amount of time.

While several things paralleled the subsequent findings across services, the emphasis on the OCSIC success lies primarily on the abilities of personnel and the inherent use or application of this function. The interviewee expresses that part of the full implementation of the OCSIC was the initiation of its use during the COVID response(D. McGowan, personal communication, February 24, 2023). ARNORTH was the JFLCC when Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin called on active duty to support federal vaccination efforts across the United States and had just closed out that support two months prior to OAW (Brading, 2021). Prior to this operation, the interviewee admits that efforts in OCS doctrine were minimal. Part of this research is to extract realities of recent and relevant lessons learned to validate doctrine, but also address when current doctrine works. The only real significance in applying the doctrine in this scenario was the unique mix of having back-to-back missions requiring a similar application of OCS.

While leveraging the doctrine provided a successful outcome for ARNORTH, where does that leave combatant commands without the operational realities laid forth in ARNORTH's back-to-back mission sets? The model of consecutive mission sets highlighted the critical role of human capital in effectively leveraging doctrine and achieving successful outcomes. The interviewee acknowledged that previously held missions in COVID response laid the groundwork and perhaps even the motivation for policy integration (D. McGowan, personal communication, February 24, 2023).

In the interview findings, it was observed that oversight, early integration, and personnel were key factors in executing OCS effectively during the mission, with task forces performing better when contract oversight and personnel capital were appropriately

established. The convergence of themes, such as the constrained utilization of OHDACA funding, alongside emerging topics like senior leader buy-in and comprehension of OCS, as well as the importance of metrics, played a pivotal role in achieving the mission's success. The inclusion of specific details, such as the presence of OCSIC personnel who had recent operational knowledge from COVID operations a mere two months prior, added significant value to this analysis. The effectiveness of the doctrine was highlighted, particularly through the successful implementation of OCSICs and the emphasis on oversight and requirement definition. The interviewee emphasized the importance of personnel and communication facilitated by OCSICs for a robust element of support.

D.   OBSERVATIONS

1.   Strategic Implications

While the obligation and documentary evidence requirements for Government Obligations are outlined in Section 1501, Title 31 of the United States Code, along with varying other binding agreement requirements between the agency providing support and the receiving support, was a significant hurdle in OAW. Given the extent of the issue and the sheer volume of law, policy, and doctrine covering it, perhaps it was simply confused as to who specifically should do the heavy lifting in interagency coordination. JP 4-10 outlines that the JCASO should be responsible for interagency coordination and OCS as necessary (JCS, 2019). As discussed earlier in this chapter, the JCASO position held by Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) was formally dissolved at the end of FY 2020. JP 4-10 also outlines a "Multinational/Interagency Coordinator" as part of its Lead Service for Contracting Organization Chart with duty description as follows:

> This coordinator position could either be part-time or full-time, depending on specific operational factors. An experienced contracting officer, preferably with interagency experience, should fill this position (JCS, 2019).

Similarly, in Yoder's TTM, in that of an IPE, this coordination position must be a highly qualified individual. Unfortunately, these positions are not specifically laid out in JP 4-10 and are part of "other LNOs," and are further outlined in Figure 8. The vagueness in doctrine coupled with the overarching requirement to coordinate assumes a team advocate role for interagency coordination and agreements. In the smaller task forces, legal, finance,

and contracting personnel teamed up to stress the importance of inter-agency agreements, particularly with OHDACA funding. While the overarching agreements should be established at the strategic levels, finite details should have been established at the task force or tactical level.


Figure 8.   Lead Service for Contracting Organization Chart Source: JCS (2019)

The strategic synchronization of contracted support also didn't apply doctrinal concepts that would have likely aided integration and collaboration in real time. The interviewer stated that some decisions were simply dictated by the Pentagon, which was the use of large LOGCAP contracts among services, all with different names but inherently the same function, including the Navy Civil Augmentation Program (NAVCAP) and Air

Force Civil Augmentation Program (AFCAP) (D. McGowan, personal communication, February 24, 2023). Part of the use of these differing contracts was the cultural differences in application. The Army, for example, sent people boots on the ground for all locations while the Air Force did not, according to our interviewee. This presented unique circumstances and synchronization issues across acquisition personnel.

The integration and synchronization of the contracted support structure are discussed in an NPS Thesis by Ryan Ocampo and Jennifer Mapp, in which they interview senior officials from Iraq and Afghanistan to gain "corporate" knowledge of contingency contracting operations. In this report, they discuss the delegation of the HCA has authority for all combined/joint operations areas (CJOAs) in Iraq and Afghanistan except for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) (Ocampo & Mapp, 2012). They discussed that, at a minimum, the HCA should have coordination authority with all contracting activities. JP 4-10 has incorporated a similar structure in current doctrine, and in this operation, ARNORTH, or the JFLCC, was designated as the LSCC for the "coordination of contracting" but did not designate any one service as the LSC or JTSCC. The JP 4-10 strictly outlines the designation of all, some, or none of these organizations but emphasizes they are primarily introduced for joint planning efficiency and effectiveness. The lack of designation for the Army to be the LSC or JTSCC led to varying levels of support with complex coordination. Part of Ocampo and Mapp's research led to a recommendation that: "Thorough consideration and planning for command and coordination authority should be conducted during Phase Zero to ensure effective support from day one of execution" (Ocampo & Mapp, 2012, p. 133).

This recommendation from their research sums up, yet again, that structure can be a catalyst that serves itself best when established during Phase Zero. The lack of designation of an LSC, particularly in a challenging environment such as OAW, is problematic. The designation would have synchronized contracting across the geographic task forces from day one.

Interestingly, similar issues existed during the withdrawal from Afghanistan, according to ODASA(P)'s report (ODASA-P, 2022). The lack of an LSC with at least the minimum coordination authority for all contracting entities in theatre, as discussed by

Ocampo and Mapp, could have been the remaining entity at the table for planning discussions. This central figure and organizational infrastructure are paramount at the beginning and end of complex operations and provide fidelity to the OPLAN. This dereliction, in the very end, also strengthens the arguments made for the incorporation of IPEs in Yoder's TTM. Yoder has argued the importance of credential-based personnel hierarchy since the inception of his model, yet the optimization his model presents for planners and executors is still negated when it matters most (Yoder, 2004). While Yoder's model emphasizes the importance of beginning phases of complex operations, the author contends it remains relevant at the end as well. In fact, when BOG numbers are diminishing, the infrastructure presented by JP 4-10 and a properly positioned IPE could be the quintessential link for a smoother withdrawal.

2. Tactical Implications

The formulation of a skeleton, the on-ground contracting staff, isn't the only application the author found for Yoder's TTM model. Looking retrospectively, the lower-level leadership in contracting teams often unknowingly followed or recommended certain aspects of this model. The Army's primary contingency contracting deployable force is that of a Contracting Team (CT). These teams were the BOG representation at each site and often deployed autonomously as a single, five-person unit. Typically consisting of a senior commissioned officer, senior Noncommissioned Officer (NCO), and two to three junior NCOs, a CT is largely responsible for each element of the presented CCO model Yoder presents and further depicted in Figure 5.

First, it's important to outline the sequence of this contingency operation. As discussed throughout this report, funding was an issue right away, which lends itself to several Government Purchase Card (GPC) purchases in the initial stages. This is a CONUS contingency function since GPCs are not typically used OCONUS. This process mirrors the 'Ordering Officer' and 'Leveraging Contracting Officer' models presented in Yoder's TTM. GPC purchases did several things, empowered junior leaders in the command, provided market research for CCOs, forced liaison functions, and improved local operational planning.

Notably, the highlights mentioned above are all presented in the TTM, but what's more important is the information shared within the team from such functions. The information gained is advantageous to senior members of the contracting team when leveraging both Contracting Officer and IPE roles. The point is that Yoder's model can be synchronous, and there are likely benefits not originally forecasted when thoughtfully applied at the tactical level. It also helps conceptualize a small force when compared to JP 4-10's broader context of "other liaisons" with larger staff elements.

E.   SUMMARY

This chapter presents a comprehensive analysis of current policies in addressing Operation Allies Welcome (OAW). Drawing on the experiences and lessons learned from individuals involved in OAW, the analysis critically evaluates the effectiveness of these policies. Key challenges and lessons learned from the mission are highlighted, including funding constraints, interagency coordination issues, and contract management complexities. The analysis delves into the intricacies of contracted support and funding, emphasizing the unique challenges posed by OHDACA funding and the advantages of utilizing letter contracts in contingency situations. It also examines the lack of interagency coordination and underscores the importance of establishing documented agreements for effective collaboration. The chapter emphasizes the need for early planning, interagency cooperation, and better integration of policies to enhance the success and efficiency of future operations.

The findings from the interview shed light on several key themes already addressed, but also new details that help the reader understand the root causes of systemic successes. Oversight, early integration, and personnel capital are highlighted as crucial factors in executing OCS effectively during the mission. Task forces that established review boards and contract oversight through CORs performed better in meeting mission objectives than those that were slower to the process. Early integration of OCSICs and contracting personnel facilitated quicker and more effective support. The lack of planning and initial chaos highlighted the need for earlier integration of OCS into the operational plan, as well as the establishment of interagency MOAs and funding requirements. Challenges

stemming from restricted OHDACA funding and the importance of senior leader buy-in and understanding of OCS are emphasized. The effectiveness of the doctrine is underscored through successful OCSIC implementation and the emphasis on oversight and requirement definition. The presence of personnel with recent operational knowledge from the COVID response contributed to OCSIC's success. Coordination issues arose from the lack of a designated LSC or JTSCC. Tactical implications stress the importance of on-ground contracting staff and a properly positioned Individual Point of Entry (IPE) to facilitate smoother operations from start to finish, including the withdrawal of Afghanistan.

The next chapter will outline recommendations and conclusions derived from the analysis conducted in this chapter. By addressing these core elements, the recommendations and conclusions presented in Chapter V aim to enhance the success, efficiency, and effectiveness of future operations, ultimately ensuring optimal support for operational requirements while answering our research questions.

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V.   RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

This chapter encompasses the culmination of analysis, aiming to guide future actions and answer research questions identified in Chapter I. In this chapter, the research outcomes are synthesized and interpreted, highlighting their significance and relevance to a broader practical context. Additionally, the chapter presents actionable recommendations based on the study's results, aiming to address existing gaps, improve existing practices, or propose new avenues for further exploration. Finally, the author summarizes the chapter with hopes of empowering future contributions to OCS through funding paradigms and Artificial Intelligence (AI).

A.   CONCLUSION TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This project focused on validating doctrine by analyzing the beginning stages of a humanitarian operation stemming from the withdrawal from Afghanistan, an operation that went from a state of war to a state of emergency. The phase is characterized by unique challenges that stress the importance of foundational knowledge gained through lessons learned. In this section, we aim to answer research questions that brought purposeful direction to this research.

(1)   Do we use OCS planning principles when it matters, and how does it work in real-world contingency environments?

The successes and failures of this mission were directly related to the application or non-application of operational doctrine. The success in relation to incorporating OCSICs locally within Task Forces was highlighted throughout. Part of that success is rooted in personnel, as the COVID response bled into the OAW humanitarian response for a select number of personnel with OCSIC responsibilities. Prior to the COVID response, some of these simple principles were not used at ARNORTH, much less to the extent required during OAW. This begs the question as to how we can have real-world forcing mechanisms to integrate the importance of OCSICs and other requirement-generating functions. The implications of having personnel on back-to-back missions is an unlikely scenario but

warrants replication in future operations. The importance of these roles and the emphasis that must be placed during training is paramount for future operational success.

The use of OCS and accompanying doctrine matters and, although brought about through a tenured war effort, works across multi-domain operations when used appropriately. The incorporation of simple principles led to the success of this mission for the DOD. Most setbacks occurred from not using established principles outlined in doctrine or simply not having the time or personnel to accomplish them. The complication of missions like OAW only lends itself to relying on doctrine even more heavily. One of the TF leaders' quotes captures the essence of this research question and parallels his own lessons learned quite nicely, in that: "My own personal lesson learned is to have faith in our Army, our doctrine, and our systems" (Norrie, 2021).

Leaders must have faith in current doctrine and rely on it heavily in times of ill-defined mission requirements because it does matter and does work. OCS doctrine itself is broad enough in application to satisfy both wartime and humanitarian operations; we simply must use it. Success was driven in most cases by simply having the right people who were able to apply doctrine from recent experiences. While the doctrine is appropriate and applicable, it is only as good as the people that choose to use it and the forcing mechanism that surrounds it.

  (2) Is OCS policy too rooted in the wars in the middle east or OCONUS in general?"

While the existing doctrine demonstrated a marginal focus on the wars in the Middle East, it fully encompasses the diverse range of contingency operations the U.S. will likely face in future operations. While the doctrine was brought about by the challenges faced in the middle east, it is not exclusive to that region alone. The lessons learned from the GWOT are incorporated into a doctrine that is adaptable, flexible, and effective in addressing varying operational environments, and OAW was a prime example of this. Embracing a comprehensive approach allowed the leverage of lessons learned to be incorporated into such malleable doctrine.

OCS policy does not appear to be too rooted in the GWOT. However, a larger consideration of types of funding could help alleviate some processes in earlier stages of contingencies. While not necessarily rooted in GWOT, funding was not as significant, particularly in the latter stages. JP 4-10 even has an appendix outlining the transition planning and process for the support of stabilizing/enabling civil authorities. It stresses the importance of organization and manning within these environments but does not conclude with any advice when transitioning from "unstable" environments, which the withdrawal in Afghanistan quickly became. Though the emphasis on organization and manning would remain the same, it is still important to outline a potentially critical step of humanitarian support elsewhere when withdrawing from an unstable environment and the logical steps thereafter. Emphasizing the importance of adaptable doctrine, we broaden our capability to respond to the constantly evolving nature of contingencies. This approach enables us to fulfill our mission successfully by considering a wider range of scenarios and effectively addressing diverse challenges.

(3)   What generally happens when doctrine is followed or not followed?

Following doctrine or deviating from it often leads to distinct outcomes. When doctrine is diligently followed, it sets a solid foundation for success. By adhering to established principles, strategies, and best practices, organizations can benefit from the collective wisdom of history. The following doctrine ensures a consistent and unified approach and fosters effective communication, coordination, and decision-making. It enables teams to operate with a shared understanding and clarity of purpose, leading to higher levels of efficiency, effectiveness, and, ultimately, success in achieving mission objectives. We saw this firsthand with the early implementation of OCSICs, command structure, and basic liaison efforts in direct support of OAW. This ability to apply principles embedded in doctrine hastily facilitates all of the positive outcomes outlined above.

On the other hand, deviating from doctrine can result in failures or setbacks. When individuals or organizations disregard established doctrine, they risk losing the advantages gained from collective knowledge and experience. Departing from prescribed principles and strategies can lead to inefficiencies, confusion, and fragmentation within varying

elements of teams. It can undermine coordination, diminish effectiveness, and hinder the ability to adapt to dynamic situations. The simple example in OAW was the lack of interagency coordination that was to happen immediately according to several elements of doctrine but didn't. This lack of planning had rippling effects across the operational battlespace and even reverberated throughout the operation amongst agencies at some locations.

In summary, the following doctrine is generally associated with success, as it provides a framework built on lessons learned and proven methodologies. Conversely, straying from doctrine increases the likelihood of failures or setbacks, as it diminishes the benefits gained from established guidance. Similarly, it undermines the cohesive and disciplined approach necessary for achieving results, particularly in fluid environments such as OAW.

B.   RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH

While the research indicates that following doctrine is a pathway to success, it would be unreasonable to ignore the valuable lessons learned and recommendations derived from this research. It is crucial for the reader to understand that doctrine is not simply a static construct but an adaptive framework continuously improves through learning and refinement.

1.   Recommendations to JP 4-10

While the research had outlined that the JCASO office was dissolved in September of 2020, JP 4-10 still mentions 'JCASO' over 60 times in its current version from 2019. Obviously, JCASO is rather significant, given the sheer volume mentioned, but it can cause confusion in gap years where a replacement isn't officially outlined. JCASO played a crucial role in coordinating, training, and synchronizing OCS activities, and its absence warrants revision of JP 4-10. The revision needs to include alternative organizations or mechanisms that fulfill similar functions carried out by JCASO. Updates ensure that the doctrine remains relevant and aligned with the ever-changing landscape of OCS and its ability to address challenges in contemporary operational environments. While the issue

may be the lack of clarity in the title, as each component is now responsible for training personnel to assume these roles, it still requires elaboration through JP 4-10.

While CORs are critical and stressed within JP 4-10, it doesn't outline the difficulties in getting some of these personnel from command elements already stretched thin. The importance is not to be addressed from the bottom up but through the top down via Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs) or through the Annexes. The dictation through the operational process removes confusion and stresses the importance of top-down implementation. The earlier this is dictated, the better commands can augment their force along with the requirement definition. This seemingly small recommendation worked in OAW at Fort Picket and streamlined communication while avoiding resistance to support command elements.

Another aspect JP 4-10 should evaluate is differentiating between LSCC, LSC, and JTSCC. While an LSCC was outlined in the ANNEX W, the structure of an LSC or JTSCC might have lent itself to better outcomes in a Joint environment. Choosing one service to be the LSC or JTSCC may have led to a more succinct outcome, particularly in circumstances where the Air Force contracting personnel were not supported by BOG personnel. The distinction between LSC and JTSCC is also unclear in terms of actual benefits. Findings by Ocampo ad Mapp outline the importance of this structure, particularly when entering and leaving an operational environment (Ocampo & Mapp, 2012). Their research outlines that compartmentalized contracting structures lend themselves to poor communication and coordination with both internal agencies and contractors. The lessons learned documents from the withdrawal from Afghanistan continue to support their assertions from 2012. The command structure of OCS is important, and lessons learned from the withdrawal from Afghanistan must be incorporated.

2.   Areas of Future Research

As we conclude this research, it is important to reflect on the implications and recommendations for future studies in relation to doctrine and its ongoing relevance. This project has shed light on the dynamic nature of doctrine, the importance of its use, and the need for continuous adaptation to meet evolving operational requirements. To further

enhance the doctrine's applicability, future research should focus on exploring emerging trends, technologies, and strategic shifts that may impact its effectiveness. This section will briefly go over these items.

a.   Early Reprogramming and Colorless Funding for Contingencies

The research highlighted several issues associated with OHDACA funding in the use of humanitarian support settings. The speed and capabilities of OHDACA funding should warrant concerns of misappropriation violations, particularly when met with the haste of contingency operations. While funding for OAW was reprogrammed retroactively, future research should investigate the early integration of reprogramming Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for humanitarian and stability operations, particularly at the culmination of Iraq and Afghanistan. While likely more palatable, there is also another budgetary aspect to consider.

The Department of Defense (DOD) operates within a complex financial framework, where funds are designated with specific colors for various purposes. While this system has served its intended purpose, there is a compelling argument to be made for removing the color of money specifically for contingency operations. By eliminating this distinction, the DOD can unlock significant advantages and streamline resource allocation, ultimately enhancing its ability to respond effectively and efficiently to unpredictable contingencies such as OAW. Research could present the case for removing the color of money in contingency operations and highlight the potential benefits, or lack thereof, for the DOD. The research can evaluate the inherent flexibility in this resource allocation, interoperability and interagency coordination, and the rapid response to shifting priorities, all of which were themes throughout this research.

b.   Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI)

While doctrine fundamentally provides a solid framework for guiding our actions, it is evident that we still face challenges and repeat mistakes that all too often are addressed in doctrine or lessons learned. Simply having a well-defined doctrine is not enough if it is not effectively communicated, understood, and applied by those responsible for executing it. Inadequate training, insufficient resources, and competing priorities often hinder the

implementation process, resulting in deviations from established doctrine. The author contends that if the doctrine and repository of lessons learned are sound, further research in transformative opportunities to harness or implement it should be addressed.

The author contends that by leveraging AI algorithms and data analytics, we can efficiently extract valuable insights from sources such as after-action reports, lessons learned, and historical data and draw comparative analyses to present conflict. AI-powered systems have the capability to process vast amounts of data quickly and accurately, identifying patterns, trends, and correlations that may otherwise go unnoticed. By analyzing past operational experiences, AI algorithms can detect recurring challenges, successes, and failures, providing actionable intelligence for decision-makers in developing effective contingency responses. This real-time access to lessons learned can enhance situational awareness, guide strategy formulation, and inform operational plans.

Further research could evaluate the use of AI in extracting lessons learned with the advantage of objectivity and impartiality. Unlike manual analysis, AI algorithms are not influenced by personal biases or preconceived notions. This ensures a more comprehensive and unbiased evaluation of past experiences, allowing for a comprehensive understanding of the factors contributing to success or failure. Future research in the realm of developing contingency responses using the integration of AI technology might offer an opportunity to harness the value of recent lessons learned in real-time. Further research could find that integrating AI technology could ensure that past experiences are leveraged to the maximum extent possible. Current DOD discussions involving AI are met with resistance in ethical considerations and elements of vulnerability within the data. The author proposes that future research can address these risks incrementally through its use in data-driven analysis. Leveraging AI with data the DOD already has, like lessons learned, with human decision-makers is worthy of research.

3.   Way Forward

The time has come for the DOD to break the cycle of repetitive mistakes in contingencies and embrace the transformative power of AI. By incorporating AI into the analysis of lessons learned and the application of doctrine to contingencies, we can usher

in a new era of informed decision-making and effective planning. AI offers a unique opportunity to mitigate the inherent biases that plague human decision-making, enabling us to transcend our limitations and achieve superior outcomes. Through AI, we can leverage our own data, extracting valuable insights that might have remained hidden. However, it is crucial to recognize that human decision-making still plays a vital role. To ensure a seamless and low-risk integration of AI, we must embrace a collaborative approach that combines the analytical prowess of AI with the knowledge, intuition, and ethical reasoning of human operators. It is within this interplay of AI and human decision-making that we will unlock the full potential of our capabilities and chart a future where contingencies are met with foresight, agility, and success. The time to propel our contingency planning through low-risk AI, is now.

C.   SUMMARY

In the final chapter, the research outcomes are interpreted to guide future actions and address the research questions identified in Chapter I. The research validates the effectiveness of doctrine in real-world contingency environments, emphasizing the importance of following operational planning principles. The successes of incorporating OCSICs and adhering to established doctrine highlight the significance of personnel and the need for thorough training. The study also confirms that the OCS doctrine is adaptable and applicable to various operational environments beyond wars in the Middle East.

This chapter provides actionable recommendations to improve doctrine and operational practices. It suggests revisions to JP 4 10 to address the absence of JCASO and clarify roles and responsibilities. Additionally, it emphasizes the need for top-down implementation of CORS and highlights the importance of differentiating between LSC, LSCC, and JTSCC. These recommendations aim to enhance coordination, communication, and organizational effectiveness in future operations. Areas of future research are also identified. The first area focuses on early reprogramming and colorless funding for contingencies, exploring the integration of OCO funding for humanitarian and stability operations. The research suggests removing the color of money distinction within the DOD for certain emergencies to streamline resource allocation and improve the DOD's

responsiveness to contingencies. The second area of research involves the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to extract insights from lessons learned and improve decision-making processes. AI algorithms can analyze vast amounts of data objectively, identifying patterns and providing actionable intelligence for developing effective contingency responses.

The chapter concludes with the hope of empowering future contributions to OCS through funding paradigms and the integration of AI. It highlights the importance of ongoing research, adaptation, and refinement of doctrine to address evolving challenges and ensure the continuous improvement of operational practices with hopes of feeding that data to an AI driven system. The author underscores the need to leverage transformative opportunities such as AI to harness the value of recent lessons learned and enhance decision-making in real time. By embracing these advancements, the DOD can navigate future operations more effectively and maximize the potential of its operational capabilities.

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