

# Vulnerabilities and Social Engineering in Acquisition Scenarios

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
# Research Question

Social engineering activities, intelligence gathering, and supply chain threats are key tactics used by US competitors and adversaries.

How may these tactics be used to exploit Government Agency acquisitions?


# Operational Social Engineering: A Real-World Example

## Phase 1: Investigation




Email sent with invitation to submit bids. Looks genuine, but upon closer inspection, note the different spelling of "Labour" vs. "Labor".

## Phase 2: Hook




Website where proposals are uploaded again looks genuine, however it contains a malicious link.

## Phase 3: Play



Link asks the user to enter credentials in order to submit the bid. The malicious link has now provided access.

## Phase 4: Exit



The final stage; the Attacker now has unlimited access. Once credential are inputted, directs to "true" DOL sites to the user's MS 365 account and is provided

# Scenario 3: Market Research Information Gathering

## Scenario:

- A malicious actor identifies the acquisition of interest
- The USG Agency posts RFI that include CS' email address on SAM.gov
- The malicious actor submits an email response to the RFI with a PDF attachment that contained malware
- The CS has unknowingly forwards the RFI response with a malicious attachment to the entire technical program team
  - At least one member clicks the link results in unauthorized backdoor access into the USG Agency network

## Potential impact:

- The malicious actor combs through USG Agency system exfiltrating valuable health, personnel, and duty records
- The malicious actor is able to piece together sensitive operational details of the USG Agency
- The malicious actor is able to provide sensitive records back to their home country, including those who operated in their country

## Recommendations:

- Move towards publicizing acquisition information in tightly controlled portals
- Vendors should be required to register for the portal and undergo a verification process before gaining access
- Each RFI/RFP published should also be limited based on 'need-to-know' basis based on NAICS codes or prior experience
- Measures allow for fair competition, while verifying Vendors and reducing risk of malicious actors accessing sensitive info

# Research Findings

- Completed 10 Unclassified and 15 Classified Scenarios to demonstrate potential acquisition vulnerabilities
- Research shows that Government acquisitions are most likely targets for social engineering activities, intelligence gathering, and supply chain threats
  - The potential acquisition attack surface area is large
  - There is a dichotomy between information security and Competition in Contracting Act
  - Hypothesis of the problem is ongoing, and the scale is much greater than the community realizes
- Examined the recommendations from all the scenarios to see what steps should be taken
- **Proposal**: The DoD community needs a process to assess and mitigate these threats
  - Current risk assessments focus on cost, schedule, performance of the supply or service
  - Acquisition Strategy Counterintelligence Risk Assessment (ASCRA) is a notional framework to meet this need but requires further development and refinement



# Acquisition Strategy Counterintelligence Risk Assessment (ASCRA)

Risk Level	Recommended Countermeasures
<b>ALL Acquisitions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Improved social engineering and CI training for industry (specific examples such as malicious links, dangers of market research, etc.)</li><li>- Improved social engineering and CI training for Gov't acquisition and security personnel</li><li>- An assessment of the CI risk of an acquisition conducted during the acquisition strategy approval process that determines what the threat level and appropriate mitigations are.</li></ul>
<b>Low</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- SCRM / SBOM/ HBOM requirements for all IT purchases, and Labor contracts where software is created, modified, updated, etc</li><li>- Non-IT: No action needed</li></ul>
<b>Medium</b>	All LOW measures plus use of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Trusted vendor list,</li><li>- Identification of critical components,</li><li>- Supply chain attack reporting,</li><li>- SCRM audits</li></ul>
<b>High</b>	All LOW and MEDIUM measures, plus use of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Physically/logically separate market research site,</li><li>- Pre-publication review and scrubbing publicly released announcements (J&amp;A, sources sought, RFPs, etc.)</li><li>- Limited blind sites for RFP material,</li><li>- More rigorous subcontractor vetting</li></ul>

**We'd love to hear more about instances of social engineering attacks that you have encountered within your organizations. Please reach out to us!**

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