Enhancing Defense Industrial Cooperation Between Australia and the United States

Cynthia R. Cook Henry H. Carroll Katy Buda

Full Report: <u>Enhancing Defense Industrial Cooperation Between</u> <u>Australia and the United States</u>

A Joint Project between the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group and Australia Chair at CSIS

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AUTHORS Cynthia R, Cook Charles Edel Kathryn Paik Gregory Sanders Henry H. Carroll Katy Buda John Augé

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Background

- Funded by the Strategic Policy Grant Program through Australia's Department of Defence
 - Research plan evolved to meet sponsor interests
- Quantitative data derived from U.S. International Trade
 Commission, U.S. contracting data and Stockholm International
 Peace Research Institute
- Qualitative data from
 - Public and private roundtables
 - Interviews with 9 U.S. companies and 19 Australian companies

Figure 2.1: Australian Imports and Exports of Major Arms Systems, 1990–2023



Source: "SIPRI Arms Transfers Database," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, May 2024, https://www.sipri.org/ databases/armstransfers; and CSIS analysis.

Figure 2.2: U.S. Arms Trade with Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, 1990–2023



Note: The dataset does not account for reexported arms, which may inflate values in certain categories. Dual-use small arms are not included.

Source: "DataWeb," U.S. International Trade Commission, May 18, 2024, https://dataweb.usitc.gov/; and CSIS analysis.

Figure 2.3: U.S. DOD Prime Contracts with Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom



Source: Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) and CSIS analysis.

Type of Barrier	Representative Examples
Budgetary	Differences in funding priorities or availability of resources
	Inability to determine or agree to fair share (costing requirements)
Bureaucratic	Sheer number of stakeholders and organizations
	Over-classification of communications (default to NOFORN)
	Conflicting priorities and incentives within U.S. and partner organizations
Cultural	Differing approaches or expectations regarding military cooperation
	Reluctance or inability to share sensitive or classified data
	Historical experience in bilateral or multilateral engagements/ relationships
Political	Government restrictions or limitations external to a nation's defense department
	Domestic pressures or influences from industry, legislatures, or popular opinion
IS CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES	Note: *New elements added by CSIS to the Moroney et al. framework. Source: CSIS modification of Jennifer D. P. Moroney et al., Overcoming Barriers to Working with Highly Capable Allies and Partners in the Air, Space, and Cyber Domains: An Exploratory Analysis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, July 2023), https://www.rand. org/pubs/research_reports/RRA968-1.html.

Type of Barrier	Representative Examples
Regulatory	Written prohibitions or limitations to collaboration in U.S. legal code, congressional legislation, or departmental instructions Ally/partner legal or executive-level restrictions on collaborations with foreign partners
Strategic	Diverging national interests and threat perceptions Differences in priorities concerning collaboration with the United States and other allies and partners
Technical	Lack of compatible systems or procedures to share information Imbalances in scientific or domain experience Lack of confidence in ally/partner's ability to effectively protect classified or sensitive information
Economic	*Insufficient business case to incentivize cooperation for industry *Cost of learning new, foreign acquisition system or setting up a subsidiary and office in the partner nation *Misaligned business strategies as companies prioritize different end markets and products

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Figure 5.1: Pathways of Connection by Difficulty



Source: CSIS analysis.

Recommendations – Budgetary and Technical Barriers

- Align requirements for new systems whenever possible
- Use AUKUS or other arrangements as venues for defining and implementing shared standards

Recommendations – Regulatory and Bureaucratic Barriers

- Equivalency agreements for defense standards
- Mutual recognition of accreditation of standards
- Joint procurement panels to deepen AUKUS coordination
- Mutual recognition of security clearances
- Expand AUKUS+Canada ITAR exemptions



Recommendations – Cultural, Political and Strategic Barriers

- DOD and ADOD should conduct audit of industrial cooperation efforts before each AUSMIN to track change
- DOD and ADOD should (be required to) furnish annual reports on defense industrial integration to their respective legislatures
- US Department of State should increase education on AUKUS waivers and Austrade should support Australian industry education

Recommendations – Economic Barriers

- Defense industry groups should establish an AUKUS focus consortium
- Both governments should subsidize overhead costs of consortia for AUKUS Pillar II topics
- U.S. should use Other Transaction Authorities for AUKUS
- Australian government should increase investment in acquisition education for industry
- DOD should enhance training of its acquisition workforce on international cooperation
- Embrace Modular Open Systems Approaches to reduce barriers to entry and expand cooperation