

# Capability and Development Time Tradeoff Analysis in Systems-of- Systems

Muharrem Mane

Email: [mane@purdue.edu](mailto:mane@purdue.edu)



Daniel DeLaurentis

Email: [ddelaure@purdue.edu](mailto:ddelaure@purdue.edu)

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## Overview

- Development of SoS is complex
  - Numerous interdependencies
  - Changing over time
- SoS capability comprised of system capabilities
  - Interdependent system requirements
  - Legacy systems
- Goal: make the AoA smarter in pre-acquisition
  - Potential capability vs. expected development
- A high-level approach can aid in the early development stages and requirement definition and allocation





## Research Questions

- Given a network of systems
  - How do system-specific (node) characteristics impact the successful development of SoS capability?
  - How do system interdependencies impact the development process?
    - How do disruptions propagate in complex networks of interdependent systems?
    - How can we quantify the cascading effects of development risk?
    - Focus of previous year research
- What is the tradeoff between SoS capability and expected development time?
  - Key tradeoff in analysis of alternatives (AoA)
  - Focus of this year's work


## Methods of Approach

- Simulation Approach
  - Developing Computational Exploratory Model (CEM)
  - Discrete-event, stochastic simulation based on steps in DoD SoS SE Guide
  - First-order modeling of capability
  
- Analytical Approach
  - Based on probability and network theory
  - Analysis of expected delay propagation for given SoS network configurations




## Current Research Efforts

- Analysis of alternatives in the context of
  - Development time
  - Capability level
- First-order capability estimation model
- Capability / development time tradeoffs for alternative compositions of Airborne Laser system
  - Categories of components comprise the capability
  - Proof of concept application



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




## Development Model (CEM)


- Discrete-event, stochastic simulation
  - Disruption occurrence and propagation
- System risk ( $R_{sys}$ ) as a function of system readiness-level ( $m$ )
  - Similar to TRL metric and SRL metric proposed by Sauser et al.
- Impact of disruptions a function of
  - Network topology and strength of system interdependencies

$$R_{sys}(i, r) = \alpha_i \left( 1 - m(i, r)^{\beta_i} \right)$$




# Capability Modeling

- Assume desired ABL capability to “disable threat from 600 km (slant range)”
  - Categories of systems and requirements create different capability levels
- Identify functions that comprise capability
- Identify systems that perform each function
- First-order quantification of capability
  - Aircraft system indirectly considered (host of other systems)




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# Capability Contributors


- Detection and tracking system
  - Detects threat and generates track to enable engagement
  - Capability contribution: detection time,  $T_d$ 
    - Higher detection time reduces available dwell-time,  $t_e$
- Adaptive Optics (AO) system
  - Accounts for atmospheric disturbances to deliver maximum laser power to target
  - Capability contribution: beam quality diffraction limited,  $b_q$ , that increases Strehl ratio,  $S_R$
- COIL beam power
  - Laser power to disable a liquid fuel ICBM
  - 32 MJ/m<sup>2</sup> required ( $F_c$ )



- $F_c$ : energy required to disable target
- $D$ : laser beam diameter
- $\lambda$ : laser beam wavelength
- $R$ : slant range
- $P$ : laser power
- $t_e$ : dwell-time
- $S_R$ : Strehl ratio




# ABL Capability Space



## Analysis of Alternatives Results


- 81 possible solutions
  - Three alternatives for each constituent system
- Non-dominated solutions result in a Pareto frontier



- Clear tradeoff between capability and expected development time
  - Higher capability requires higher development time (result of non-mature technology)
- Seven solutions identified here
  - Combination of new and existing systems (high and low capability)

## Observations

- No single optimal solution
  - Tradeoff between capability and development time
- Non-dominated solutions are comprised of legacy and new systems
  - Development model captures higher order impact of interdependencies



Solution	D&T System	Aircraft System	COIL beam System	AO System	ABL Capability [slant range, km]	Expected Completion Time [time units]
1	STSS	new system	Alternative-1	Alternative-3	285	152
2	STSS	new system	Alternative-1	Alternative-2	307	153
3	UAV	new system	Alternative-1	Alternative-2	371	157
4	UAV	new system	Alternative-1	Alternative-1	402	160
5	new system	new system	Alternative-1	Alternative-1	461	170
6	new system	new system	Alternative-2	Alternative-1	533	185
7	new system	new system	Alternative-3	Alternative-1	596	215

## Conclusions

- CEM and capability modeling enables analysis of alternatives early in development process
  - CEM captures cascading effect of developmental disruptions
    - Enabling enhanced selection of constituent systems and requirements
- Analytical tools early in acquisition and development phase enhance decision-making
  - Build intuition and guide acquisition efforts


## **Future Work**

- Analytical model for measuring system development performance
  - Indicators of good network structure
  - Identification of features that can lead to problems or success
- Requirement evolution is at root of most development issues
  - Want more / better capability
  - Get schedule and cost overruns
- Continue development of a capability module for CEM
  - Analysis of impact of requirement dependencies on both development and capability
  - Can we “design” a controller for requirement evolution?
    - Ability to measure impact of requirement evolution on system (and SoS) development



## A network graph visualization showing a dense cluster of nodes and edges. The nodes are represented by small red circles, and the edges are blue lines connecting them. The graph is highly interconnected, with many nodes having multiple connections, suggesting a complex system or dataset. The nodes are arranged in a roughly circular pattern, with a dense core of connections in the center and more sparse connections towards the periphery.

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- The diagram illustrates the MMT database structure and its role in programmatic system interdependencies. It is divided into two main sections: 'Capabilities / Functional Areas' (top left) and 'Systems / Programs' (bottom right).
- Capabilities / Functional Areas:** This section shows a hierarchy of capabilities. At the top level are 'CC' (Command and Control) and 'BA' (Battle Awareness). 'CC' is linked to 'FP' (Force Protection) and 'FA' (Force Allocation). 'BA' is linked to 'FA'. 'FP' and 'FA' are both linked to 'Determine CFEL' (Determine Capability for Effect). 'Determine CFEL' is linked to 'Destroy moving aerial targets' and 'Bypass ground obstacles'. 'Destroy moving aerial targets' is linked to 'Link 16' and 'JLENS'. 'Bypass ground obstacles' is linked to 'Link 16' and 'JLENS'. 'Link 16' is linked to 'SLAMRAAM', 'Navy Std. Missile', and 'WIN-T'. 'JLENS' is linked to 'SLAMRAAM', 'Navy Std. Missile', and 'WIN-T'. 'SLAMRAAM' is linked to 'Navy Std. Missile' and 'WIN-T'. 'Navy Std. Missile' is linked to 'WIN-T'.
- Systems / Programs:** This section shows a hierarchy of systems. At the top level are 'DDG 51', 'F-18', 'EA-18G', 'CV-22', 'SSGN', 'LCS', 'JTRS', 'SSN-774', 'P-8', 'E2-C', 'CEC', and 'PAC3'. 'DDG 51' is linked to 'F-18', 'EA-18G', 'CV-22', 'SSGN', 'LCS', 'JTRS', 'SSN-774', 'P-8', 'E2-C', 'CEC', and 'PAC3'. 'F-18' is linked to 'EA-18G', 'CV-22', 'SSGN', 'LCS', 'JTRS', 'SSN-774', 'P-8', 'E2-C', 'CEC', and 'PAC3'. 'EA-18G' is linked to 'CV-22', 'SSGN', 'LCS', 'JTRS', 'SSN-774', 'P-8', 'E2-C', 'CEC', and 'PAC3'. 'CV-22' is linked to 'SSGN', 'LCS', 'JTRS', 'SSN-774', 'P-8', 'E2-C', 'CEC', and 'PAC3'. 'SSGN' is linked to 'LCS', 'JTRS', 'SSN-774', 'P-8', 'E2-C', 'CEC', and 'PAC3'. 'LCS' is linked to 'JTRS', 'SSN-774', 'P-8', 'E2-C', 'CEC', and 'PAC3'. 'JTRS' is linked to 'SSN-774', 'P-8', 'E2-C', 'CEC', and 'PAC3'. 'SSN-774' is linked to 'P-8', 'E2-C', 'CEC', and 'PAC3'. 'P-8' is linked to 'E2-C', 'CEC', and 'PAC3'. 'E2-C' is linked to 'CEC' and 'PAC3'. 'CEC' is linked to 'PAC3'. 'PAC3' is linked to 'P-8', 'E2-C', 'CEC', and 'PAC3'.
- Activity:** A large blue arrow points from the 'Capabilities / Functional Areas' section to the 'Systems / Programs' section, indicating the flow of information and interdependencies between the two sections.
- MTT database contains Programmatic information i.e. programmatic system interdependencies**





## Network-Level Metric

- Compute expected accumulated delay
  - Measure of network performance
    - Measure of system criticality / vulnerability when contributions from each system are ranked
- Compute variation about the expectation
  - Measure of the risk associated with the estimated network performance

$$\zeta(n+1) = A\zeta(n) \quad \text{subject to } \zeta(0) = b$$

$$F(n | x_j(0)) = c\zeta(n)$$

$$E[F(n | x_j(0))] = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} ncA^n b$$



**Thank You**

## **Back-Up Slides**

## Contributors to Capability: Detection & Tracking

- Capability assumptions
  - 170 seconds of boost-time (engagement window)
  - Desired raid size of 12 missiles: determines required dwell-time
  - Ideal detection time is 10 seconds; allows interception of 12 missiles
- Development assumptions
  - Normalized TRL indicates initial readiness-level
    - Determines probability of disruptions during development

Detection Alternative	Detection time [sec]	TRL Level	Initial Readiness-Level [ $m^o(i,r)$ ]
New System	10	6	0.67
UAV	11	8	0.89
STSS	12	9	1.00



# Contributors to Capability: Adaptive Optics

- Capability assumptions
  - Only a function of the beam quality diffraction limit,  $b_q$
  - Ideal beam quality diffraction limited is 1.2
- Development assumptions
  - Normalized TRL indicates initial readiness-level
    - Determines probability of disruptions during development

Detection Alternative	Beam Quality Diffraction Limited	TRL Level	Initial Readiness-Level [ $m^o(i,r)$ ]
Alternative 1	1.2	2	0.22
Alternative 2	1.3	3	0.33
Alternative 3	1.4	5	0.56


## Contributors to Capability: COIL beam

- Capability assumptions
  - Published “achievable” COIL beam power of 3 MW
- Development assumptions
  - Normalized TRL indicates initial readiness-level
    - Determines probability of disruptions during development
  - Published TRL level of 4 for a power of 3 MW

COIL beam Alternative	Power [MW]	TRL level	Initial Readiness-Level [ $m^o(i,r)$ ]
Alternative 1	3	4	0.44
Alternative 2	4	3	0.33
Alternative 3	5	1	0.11



# System Risk and Interdependencies

- Candidate families of systems can have different combinations of system-risk and interdependency strengths
  - These characteristics have different impact on development success




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