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Acquisition Agility in Foreign Military Sales: A Comparative Analysis of Lead Time, Competition, and Vendor Diversity in FMS vs U.S. Funded Contracts

June 2026

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Prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

ABSTRACT

This study presents a comparative analysis of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and U.S.-funded Department of Defense contracts to assess how acquisition structure influences procurement lead time, competition, and vendor diversity. Using contract-level data from Fiscal Years 2019 through 2025, a matched dataset of 128 contract actions was constructed across four cohorts: FMS products, non-FMS products, FMS services, and non-FMS services. Each FMS contract was paired with a structurally equivalent non-FMS contract based on Product Service Code, standardized dollar value band, and contract action type to ensure comparability. Findings indicate that FMS contracts consistently exhibit longer procurement administrative lead times (PALTs), lower rates of competition, and reduced small business participation relative to non-FMS contracts, despite operating within identical markets and contract scales. These differences persist across both product and service acquisitions, suggesting that they are driven by structural characteristics of the FMS acquisition pathway rather than market conditions. Interpreted through Transaction Cost Economics, Institutional Theory, the Resource-Based View, and Principal Agent Theory, the results highlight the impact of statutory requirements, governance complexity, and coordination demands on acquisition performance. The study provides empirical evidence to inform policy and process improvements aimed at enhancing FMS acquisition agility.



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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACC	Army Contracting Command
AECA	Arms Export Control Act
AlInvest	AlInvest (financial forecast source)
CAR	Contract Action Report
DCS	Direct Commercial Sales
DFARS	Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
EDA	Electronic Data Access
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FPDS	Federal Procurement Data System
HUBZone	Historically Underutilized Business Zone
IDC	Indefinite Delivery Contract
IDIQ	Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity
J-series PSC	Maintenance and Repair Services Product Service Codes
LOA	Letter of Offer and Acceptance
LOR	Letter of Request
PALT	Procurement Administrative Lead Time
PIEE	Procurement Integrated Enterprise Environment
PO	Purchase Order
PSC	Product Service Code
RBV	Resource-Based View
SAM.gov	System for Award Management
SAMM	Security Assistance Management Manual
SDVOB	Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business
TCE	Transaction Cost Economics
USAspending.gov	USAspending (federal spending database)
WOSB	Women-Owned Small Business



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DISCLOSURES

Our thesis advisor approved the limited use of generative artificial intelligence tools in a limited editorial support role during preparation of this thesis. We used Microsoft Copilot only for two non-analytical activities: generating a properly formatted acronym list and alphabetizing our reference list. We selected this tool because these tasks are time-intensive, require strict adherence to formatting standards, and benefit from automated organization while still allowing us to maintain full control over the content and interpretation of our research.

To generate the acronym list, we provided Copilot with the acronyms already present in our draft and asked it to format them according to Naval Postgraduate School thesis guidelines. For the reference list, we supplied the complete set of citations and used Copilot only to alphabetize them in accordance with APA 7th-edition requirements. In all cases, the tool operated solely on material we had already created, and it did not generate, analyze, or modify any part of our research content.

To mitigate risks associated with generative AI including the possibility of formatting errors, inaccurate outputs, or unintended language insertion we reviewed every AI-assisted element for accuracy and compliance with NPS standards. We verified each acronym, cross-checked the alphabetized references, and ensured that no AI generated text altered the meaning, analysis, or conclusions of our work. The authors independently conducted all research activities, data analysis, interpretation and substantive authorship, and retained full responsibility for the accuracy and integrity of the work.



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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is a key part of U.S. security cooperation. It allows partner countries to buy U.S. defense equipment and services through agreements between governments. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) manages FMS and helps support U.S. foreign policy by building alliances, improving cooperation, and strengthening regional security (Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies, 2024; U.S. Department of State, 2024). Demand for U.S. defense systems is growing. FMS sales went from \$81 billion in 2023 to \$118 billion in 2024 and are expected to go over \$150 billion by 2027 (AInvest, 2025). This growth puts more pressure on the acquisition system to deliver capabilities quickly, reliably, and transparently.

Despite its significance, the FMS program continues to encounter continuous challenges. Independent assessments including a Department of Defense Inspector General audit and RAND research have identified delays in case execution, restricted competition, and limited vendor access as significant issues that undermine responsiveness and partner nation satisfaction (Department of Defense Inspector General, 2020; RAND Corporation, 2024). These challenges are further aggravated by statutory requirements unique to FMS, including Arms Export Control Act (AECA) notifications, technology release reviews, and international agreement rules, all of which add additional administrative processes not required in U.S.-funded contracting (Congressional Research Service, 2022, 2023). By comparison, U.S.-funded defense contracts are executed under Title 10 (Armed Forces) and Title 41 (Public Contracts) which form the statutory foundation for domestic DoD procurement. The governing authorities are the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), which place strong emphasis on competition, transparency, and small business participation. The differences between FMS and U.S.-funded contracting naturally raise questions about how each acquisition pathway shapes lead times, competition, and the overall contractor diversity.



B. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Although FMS is essential, the program continues to face prolonged Procurement Administrative Lead Time (PALT), limited competition and limited small business participation. Independent reviews highlight constant delays in FMS procurement, resulting from disjointed roles and responsibilities, inadequate performance metrics, and complex compliance requirements (Department of Defense Inspector General, 2020; RAND Corporation, 2024). These delays lead to diminished partner trust, hinder timely delivery of capabilities, and compromise strategic security.

Vendor diversity within FMS is significantly lower than U.S.-funded defense contracting. Small businesses are often faced with obstacles such as export controls, platform specific requirements and limited access to FMS opportunities (U.S. Department of Defense, 2023). Despite the efforts to improve FMS and implement new strategies, policymakers still lack the data needed. Without the ability to compare FMS contracts to U.S.-funded contracts in a meaningful way contracting officers, program managers and policymakers can't identify reforms that would improve responsiveness across acquisition pathways.

C. PURPOSE STATEMENT

The purpose of this research is to conduct a data-driven comparative analysis of FMS and U.S. funded defense contracts to assess how acquisition structure influences lead time, competition and vendor diversity. By analyzing contract level data from Fiscal Years 2019 to 2025, this study aims to identify structural factors underlying performance differences and to provide actionable recommendations for enhancing FMS agility and strengthening the defense industrial base.

D. RESEARCH QUESTION

Our study aims to address four primary research questions:

- Lead Time
How does PALT differ between FMS and U.S. funded defense contracts, and which statutory or procedural requirements account for these differences?



- **Competition**
What structural and regulatory factors contribute to differences in competition between FMS and U.S. funded contracts?
- **Vendor Diversity**
How does small businesses' participation vary between the two acquisition pathways, and which mechanisms drive these differences?
- **Acquisition Design**
To what extent do solicitation design and acquisition regulations influence responsiveness and vendor access in FMS compared to U.S. funded contracting?

E. BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH

This study provides several practical and academic benefits:

- **Improved Acquisition Agility**
Identification of structural drivers of lead-time delays supports ongoing DoD and DSCA reform initiatives aimed at accelerating capability delivery (RAND Corporation, 2023, 2024).
- **Enhanced Competition and Vendor Access**
Findings will assist acquisition professionals to understand how regulatory frameworks influence competition outcomes and vendor participation.
- **Support for Industrial Base Resilience**
Insight into small business participation contribute to DoD's strategic goals to strengthen and diversify the defense industrial base (U.S. Department of Defense, 2023).
- **Evidence Based Policy Recommendation**
The comparative approach fills a gap in the existing literature, which currently lacks empirical analysis at the contract level analysis.

F. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH

This research is subject to several limitations:

- **Data Availability**
FMS case-level milestones, including timelines from the Letter of Request (LOR) to Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), are inconsistently reported in public systems. Consequently, these inconsistencies limit the degree to which comparative timeline analysis can be conducted with precision.
- **Scope**
The study excludes Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) and classified programs. As a result, the findings are generalizable only to unclassified FMS and U.S.-funded contracting pathways.



- **Generalizability**
The findings identify structural differences but do not provide predictive timelines for specific countries or commodities.
- **Data Accuracy**
Reporting inconsistencies in Federal Procurement Data Systems (FPDS) and SAM.gov may affect data precision; however, cross-validation across multiple datasets reduces, though it doesn't eliminate, this risk.

G. OUTLINE OF REPORT

The structure of this thesis is organized as follows:

Chapter I introduces the research problem, purpose, questions, benefits, limitations, and structure.

Chapter II provides a comprehensive literature review, including theoretical foundations, policy context, and prior research.

Chapter III describes the research methodology, data collection approach, sampling strategy, variable selection, and analytical framework used to compare FMS and U.S.-funded Department of Defense contracts.

Chapter IV presents the findings and analysis of the comparative dataset, including differences in PALT, competition, vendor participation, and the implications of those findings within the defense acquisition environment.

Chapter V concludes the study by summarizing the key findings and overall contributions of the research.

H. SUMMARY

FMS is strategically significant but faces operational constraints, including delays, limited competition, and low vendor diversity. This chapter established the necessity for a comparative, data-driven analysis of FMS and U.S. funded contracting. The following chapter will examine existing research and policy frameworks to interpret the study's method for analysis.



II. CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews the existing literature on FMS performance challenges, acquisition structures, and the gaps that still exist in comparing the two. It looks at the main theories, policy framework, and prior studies that help set the stage for this analysis.

I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This thesis focuses on three theories to explore why FMS and U.S.-funded contracts differ in terms of lead time, competition, and vendor diversity. These theories do not drive analysis by themselves but give insights to think about how acquisition systems function and why certain outcomes might occur.

Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), introduced by Williamson (1975, 1985), focuses on the administrative effort and coordination required to complete a transaction. For acquisitions, this includes the reviews, approvals, and compliance processes that agencies need to work through before awarding a contract. FMS acquisitions require several statutory requirements, and an example of this would be technology release reviews, whereas U.S.-funded contracts do not. TCE explains why these additional processes can extend lead time and why responsiveness is a variable in this thesis.

The Resource-Based View (RBV), first outlined by Wernerfelt (1984) and further expanded on by Barney (1991), stresses the importance of having access to a diverse and capable vendor base. In defense acquisition, this included both traditional contractors and small businesses. RBV is important because small business participation in FMS is significantly lower than in U.S.-funded contracts. If the vendor base is narrower, the system is less flexible or innovative, which relates to the thesis's focus on vendor diversity.

Institutional theory, as examined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Scott (2014), examines how rules, norms, and organizational structures influence behavior. This theory is useful for comparing FMS and U.S.-funded contracts because each operates with a different set of authorities and regulatory expectations. Institutional



Theory explains how these rules affect competition, vendor access, and acquisition decision-making. It also supports this thesis in the solicitation structure by showing how regulatory environments can either expand or restrict opportunities for industry participation.

Principal agent theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989) examines relationships in which one party (the principal) delegates authority to another (the agent), often giving rise to challenges related to information asymmetry, monitoring, accountability, and incentive alignment. In the context of FMS, the U.S. Government functions as an agent on behalf of a foreign partner nation while simultaneously responding to multiple domestic principals, including Congress, oversight organizations, and security authorities. This multi-principal governance environment increases coordination demands, imposes extensive procedural safeguards, and introduces additional layers of review into the acquisition process. Principal agent theory provides a useful lens for understanding how governance complexity within the FMS system contributes to longer procurement lead times, constrained competition, and reduced vendor participation relative to U.S.-funded contracting pathways.

Together, these perspectives provide a foundation for understanding how acquisition structure influences the three variables examined in this study. They help connect the practical challenges observed in FMS, such as long lead time, limited competition, and reduced small business participation, to broader concepts about administrative burden, organizational behavior, and supplier diversity.

J. POLICY OVERVIEW

The FMS program operates under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), which is part of Title 22 Foreign Relations and Intercourse of the U.S. Code (Arms Export Control Act [AECA], 2022; Defense Security Cooperation Agency [DSCA], n.d.). AECA lays the legal groundwork for how the United States transfers defense article and services to partner nations and the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) provides detailed procedures for carrying out those requirements (DSCA, 2025). These authorities apply to every FMS case, this also includes cases funded through FMF as they are still required to move through the FMS system and remain subject to SAMM procedures



(DSCA, n.d; DSCA, 2025). As a result, FMS cases require steps that do not exist in U.S. funded contracts such as technology release reviews and are subject to international agreement constraints.

U.S.-funded contracts that are within the FMS framework fall under different statutory requirements. These statutory requirements are covered under Title 10 Armed Forces and Title 41 Public Contracts which are implemented through the Federal Acquisition Regulation (Federal Acquisition Regulation [FAR], 2026) and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement [DFARS], 2025). This distinction is important because Title 22 governs FMS while Title 10 and Title 41 govern U.S. federal procurement which focuses on competition, transparency and small business participation (FAR, 2026). It is important to identify these differences to avoid confusion especially since some FMS cases are funded with U.S. dollars through FMF to meet partner nation needs, not to fulfill U.S. procurement objectives.

K. PAST RESEARCH

Prior research has documented persistent challenges within the FMS system, but few studies provide contract-level comparisons between FMS and U.S.-funded defense contracting. Much of the existing literature focuses on systemic or structural issues rather than empirically measuring how those issues affect acquisition performance.

Independent assessments consistently identify delays in FMS case execution. A Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) audit found that FMS case development and execution frequently experience extended timelines due to fragmented roles and responsibilities, insufficient oversight mechanisms, and the number of required reviews and approvals embedded in the FMS process (Department of Defense Inspector General, 2020). RAND's analysis of FMS governance similarly concludes that unclear authorities, overlapping organizational responsibilities, and limited performance metrics contribute to slow case progression and reduced responsiveness (RAND Corporation, 2024). Although these studies highlight structural drivers of delay, they do not quantify how FMS procurement lead times compare directly to U.S.-funded contracts, leaving a gap in the empirical literature.



Research also points to constrained competition within the FMS environment. RAND (2024) found that many FMS procurements rely on sole-source actions due to platform-specific requirements, technology release constraints, and long-standing vendor relationships. These structural factors help explain why competition is limited, but prior studies do not compare competition rates between FMS and U.S.-funded acquisitions, making it difficult to determine whether reduced competition is inherent to FMS or a function of acquisition design choices.

Small business participation represents another recurring concern. Studies from the Department of Defense (2023) show that small businesses face barriers such as export controls, limited visibility into FMS opportunities, and the specialized nature of many FMS requirements. While these studies describe the challenges small businesses encounter, they do not provide contract-level comparisons to U.S.-funded defense contracting. As a result, the literature identifies the problem but does not measure its extent.

Overall, most prior research relies on qualitative assessments, case studies, or high-level observations. What is missing is a systematic, data-driven comparison of FMS and U.S.-funded contracts using consistent metrics for lead time, competition, and vendor diversity. This study addresses that gap by analyzing contract-level data across both acquisition pathways to provide a clearer understanding of how acquisition structure influences performance.

L. THIS RESEARCH'S CONTRIBUTION TO LITERATURE

This study adds to the current literature by providing a systematic, data-driven comparison of FMS and U.S.-funded defense contracts. Prior research has identified recurring challenges in the FMS process such as long lead time, limited competition, and limited small business participation, but this data has largely been based on qualitative assessments or high-level observations (Department of Defense Inspector General, 2020; RAND Corporation, 2024). Through analyzing contract-level data across both acquisition pathways, this study offers empirical evidence that helps quantify the extent of these issues and evaluates whether they differ from U.S.-funded contracting.



A second contribution of this research is its examination of how acquisition structure influences performance outcomes. Prior analyses outline the statutory and regulatory distinctions between FMS and U.S.-funded contracting, including AECA requirements, Title 22 authorities, and SAMM procedures (Congressional Research Service, 2022, 2023; Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2025; RAND Corporation, 2024), but these studies do not evaluate how those structural differences translate into measurable differences in lead time, competition, or vendor diversity.

This research also supports ongoing reform efforts by providing empirical evidence that can inform policy decisions. Organizations such as the Department of Defense Inspector General and RAND have recommended improvements to FMS processes, but many of their recommendations are based on case studies or stakeholder interviews rather than comparative data. By presenting measurable differences between FMS and U.S.-funded contracts, this study provides policymakers with a stronger analytical foundation for evaluating proposed reforms and identifying areas where structural changes may improve responsiveness.

Finally, this study contributes to the literature on small business participation in defense acquisition. Prior research has documented barriers that small businesses face when attempting to participate in FMS, including export controls, platform-specific requirements, and limited visibility into opportunities (U.S. Department of Defense, 2023). However, these studies do not compare participation rates across acquisition pathways. Through analyzing contract-level data, this research offers new insight into how small business engagement in FMS differs from U.S.-funded contracting and highlights the implications for industrial base diversity and resilience.

Together, these contributions address long-standing gaps in the literature and provide a more comprehensive understanding of how acquisition structure influences performance across FMS and U.S.-funded defense contracting.

M. SUMMARY

Chapter II examined the theoretical, policy, and empirical foundations that shape the FMS acquisition environment. The chapter started by outlining four theoretical



perspectives, Transaction Cost Economics, Resource-Based View, Institutional Theory and Principal Agent Theory, that help explain why FMS and U.S.-funded defense contracts may produce different outcomes. These theories provide insight for understanding how administrative burden, supplier diversity, and institutional rules influence lead time, competition, and vendor participation (Barney, 1991; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2014; Wernerfelt, 1984; Williamson, 1975, 1985).

The chapter then reviewed the statutory and regulatory frameworks governing both acquisition pathways. FMS functions under Title 22 and the Arms Export Control Act, guided by the Security Assistance Management Manual, while U.S.-funded defense contracting is governed by Title 10, Title 41, the FAR, and the DFARS. These authorities create separate processes, oversight mechanisms, and compliance requirements that determine how contracts are executed and how vendors engage with each system (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2023; FAR; DFARS).

Past research has identified several recurring challenges within the FMS process, including prolonged case execution timelines, limited competition, and reduced small business participation (RAND Corporation, 2024; Department of Defense Inspector General, 2020). However, most of this research relies on qualitative assessments, case studies, or high-level observations. While these studies describe system-wide issues, they do not provide contract-level comparisons to U.S.-funded defense contracting. As a result, the literature identifies problems but does not quantify their extent or evaluate whether they differ meaningfully across acquisition pathways.

This study contributes to the literature by addressing these gaps. Through a data driven comparison of FMS and U.S.-funded contracts, the research evaluates how acquisition structure influences lead time, competition, and vendor diversity. It also provides empirical evidence that can support ongoing reform efforts and offers new insight into small business participation in FMS. By linking theoretical perspectives, policy frameworks, and empirical analysis, Chapter II establishes the foundation for the research questions and methodology that follow.



III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

A. RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH

This study employs a comparative, descriptive research design to evaluate acquisition agility across two procurement pathways: FMS and U.S.-funded DoD contracts. The purpose of the research is to examine whether differences in statutory authority and acquisition structure are associated with observable differences in lead time, competition, and vendor diversity. In this context, statutory authority and acquisition structure refer to the overarching legal and institutional frameworks governing FMS and non-FMS pathways, rather than differences in contract award strategies or competition decisions at the individual contract level.

The analytical approach emphasizes structural comparability rather than causal inference. Rather than predicting acquisition outcomes, the study compares contract actions operating within comparable markets to assess whether FMS contracts differ systematically from non-FMS contracts when controlling for key observable characteristics, including product or service type, contract value, and contract action type. This approach is particularly appropriate for defense acquisition research, where procurement outcomes are influenced by regulatory frameworks, funding authorities, and market access constraints rather than random variation

Both products and services are examined as integral components of the research design. FMS execution relies not only on the procurement of defense articles, but also on sustainment, training, logistics, engineering, and construction services that directly support partner nation capability delivery. Accordingly, assessing acquisition agility across both categories is necessary to capture the full scope of FMS execution.

The matched comparative design employed in this study strengthens comparability across observable characteristics such as product or service type, contract value, and contract action structure. However, it does not eliminate unobserved differences, including internal staffing levels, acquisition planning quality, or program specific urgency. Accordingly, findings are interpreted as comparative associations



between acquisition pathway structure and observed outcomes rather than as evidence of causal attribution.

N. DATA SOURCES AND SYSTEMS

This study relies exclusively on U.S. Government procurement systems, with each system serving a clearly defined role in the data collection and validation process. A deliberate distinction was maintained between systems used for contract identification, authoritative data extraction, and data verification to ensure analytical rigor, transparency, and data accuracy.

1. Contract Identification and Discovery

USAspending.gov (U.S. Department of the Treasury, n.d.) was used as the primary contract discovery and exploratory identification tool. Its advanced filtering capabilities and user-friendly interface enabled efficient identification of candidate DoD contract awards across multiple fiscal years.

USAspending.gov was used to:

- Identify potential FMS and comparable non-FMS contract actions
- Screen contracts by awarding agency, fiscal year, Product Service Code (PSC), and award type
- Apply keyword searches such as “FMS” and “foreign military sales” during exploratory searches

USAspending.gov was used strictly for identification and scoping purposes. No analytical variables were sourced directly from USAspending.gov data fields.

2. Authoritative Contract Action Data

Once candidate contracts were identified through USAspending.gov, all analytical data were retrieved directly from SAM.gov (U.S. General Services Administration, n.d.) which presents the official FPDS Contract Action Report (CAR) records.

SAM.gov served as the authoritative system of record for:

- Contract value
- Award dates
- Contract action type
- Product Service Codes



- Competition indicators
- Authority and acquisition method fields

All observations included in the dataset are based on FPDS CARs, ensuring that analysis relies on official, standardized acquisition data rather than derivative or summarized datasets.

3. Vendor Size and Socioeconomic Verification

SAM.gov entity records were also used to verify vendor attributes where necessary including confirmation of small business status and reported socioeconomic classifications (e.g., WOSB, SDVOSB, HUBZone).

Vendor attributes were crosschecked when discrepancies or ambiguities were observed in FPDS reported fields, ensuring accurate classification in the analysis of vendor diversity. While detailed socioeconomic categories were not used as primary analytical variables, this verification supported data integrity.

4. Targeted Validation Tools

The Procurement Integrated Enterprise Environment (PIEE) and its Electronic Data Access (EDA) system (U.S. Department of Defense, n.d.) were used selectively and only where necessary to validate contract characteristics that could not be conclusively confirmed through SAM.gov alone. These systems were used to confirm contract action structure, validate awards, and resolve anomalies identified during data cleaning.

PIEE and EDA were not used as primary data sources, but rather as supplemental validation tools to strengthen data integrity.

O. TEMPORAL SCOPE, UNIT OF ANALYSIS, AND SAMPLE SIZE

1. Timeframe

Contracts included in the dataset were signed between 1 October 2018 and 30 September 2025, corresponding to Fiscal Years 2019 through 2025. Fiscal year attribution is based on Date Signed, consistent with federal acquisition reporting conventions that define the fiscal year as 1 October through 30 September.



This timeframe was selected to capture recent and policy relevant acquisition activity while ensuring sufficient data availability and reporting consistency within FPDS. The period reflects contemporary contracting practices during sustained growth in FMS demand and increased emphasis on acquisition responsiveness within the DoD.

Earlier fiscal years were excluded to avoid incorporating legacy acquisition practices that may not reflect current regulatory, operational, or market conditions, while more recent data beyond FY2025 were not included due to reporting lag and incomplete contract action records at the time of data collection.

2. Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis for this study is the individual contract action, defined as a single award recorded in FPDS as Modification 0 (Mod 0).

Included contract actions consist of:

- Purchase Orders (POs)
- Definitive contracts
- Indefinite Delivery Contracts (IDCs/IDIQs)

Restricting the dataset to Mod 0 awards ensures that each observation reflects an initial contracting decision, rather than subsequent modifications that may represent funding adjustments, administrative changes, or scope realignment. Task orders and contract modifications beyond Mod 0 were excluded to avoid double counting and preserve comparability.

Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) task and delivery orders were excluded from the dataset. Orders are not reported consistently with standalone solicitation dates in FPDS CARs and frequently inherit characteristics, such as competition context and administrative lead time, from the parent contract vehicle rather than reflecting independent acquisition decisions.

Excluding IDIQ orders ensures consistency in the definition of PALT, preserves one-for-one comparability across acquisition pathways, and aligns the unit of analysis with discrete contract award actions under direct contracting office control.



3. Sample Size and Dataset Composition

To support balanced and structurally comparable analysis, this study employs a fixed and symmetrical sample design across all four analytical cohorts.

The final dataset consists of 128 contract actions, distributed as follows:

- 32 FMS product contracts
- 32 Non-FMS product contracts
- 32 FMS service contracts
- 32 Non-FMS service contracts

Contracts were selected using a purposive, criteria driven approach, with each contract action individually reviewed and validated to ensure alignment with the study's matching framework. Initial exploratory data pulls informed iterative refinement of PSC family selection to balance representativeness with analytical control.

The selection of 32 contract actions per cohort reflects a deliberate balance between analytical comparability and data quality assurance. Because this study employs a one-for-one matched design across FMS and non-FMS pathways, each observation requires detailed manual validation to confirm alignment across PSC dollar value band, and contract type.

A sample size of 32 per cohort was determined to be sufficient to capture variability across procurement categories while remaining small enough to support rigorous, contract level validation. This approach prioritizes internal validity and structural comparability over large sample statistical generalization, which is consistent with the study's descriptive and comparative research design.

This balanced structure ensures that comparisons between FMS and non-FMS acquisition pathways are not influenced by unequal sample sizes and allows for detailed manual validation of each observation. Because the sample is purposively selected and matched, findings are intended to support structural comparison rather than statistical generalization to the full population of DoD contract actions.



P. IDENTIFICATION OF FMS AND NON-FMS CONTRACTS

Contract identification and classification followed a structured two stage process, combining exploratory contract discovery with authoritative data validation.

First, candidate contract actions were identified using USAspending.gov. Baseline filters were applied to isolate DoD contract awards within the defined study timeframe, including:

- Awarding agency: Department of Defense
- Award type: Contract actions
- Time period: Fiscal Years 2019–2025
- Award status: New awards only

Keyword searches using “FMS” and “foreign military sales” were applied to identify candidate FMS contracts. Non-FMS contracts were identified using the same baseline filters, excluding FMS-related indicators. These exploratory searches were not used as the basis for final classification.

Second, all candidate contract actions were retrieved and reviewed in SAM.gov, where FPDS CARs served as the authoritative source for classification and data extraction.

FMS classification was determined primarily using the Foreign Funding field within FPDS CARs. Contract actions explicitly identified as FMS in this field were classified as FMS-funded actions.

To ensure classification accuracy, additional corroborating indicators were reviewed, including references to FMS within contract descriptions and contextual indicators consistent with FMS execution. These secondary indicators were used to validate the primary FPDS based classification rather than independently determine FMS status.

All contract classifications were manually reviewed to ensure consistency, accuracy, and alignment with the study’s inclusion criteria. Although FPDS classification fields provide the primary basis for identification, classification remains dependent on accurate data entry and may not capture all nuances of FMS funding structures.



Q. PRODUCT AND SERVICE SCOPE DEFINITION

The study includes both defense products and defense services, reflecting the integrated nature of modern defense acquisition and FMS execution. Products and services were classified based on PSCs, which provide a standardized federal taxonomy for consistent classification and comparison across acquisition pathways.

A PSC family approach was used to define analytical scope, ensuring adequate market coverage while maintaining structural comparability.

1. PSC Family Selection

PSC family selection was refined iteratively based on exploratory data review to balance representativeness with analytical control. Relevant acquisition activity was observed to cluster consistently within specific PSC families.

For products, acquisition activity was concentrated within PSC families beginning with

- 10: Weapons
- 13: Ammunition and explosives
- 23: Ground vehicles
- 58: Communications, radar, and electronic equipment

For services, relevant activity was concentrated within:

- J series PSCs (maintenance, repair, and rebuild)
- R series PSCs (professional, engineering, administrative, and logistics support)
- Select U and Y series PSCs related to training and construction

This approach reflects empirically observed acquisition patterns rather than reliance on platform specific or purely theoretical classification.

R. DATASET STANDARDIZATION

All contract records were standardized following extraction from SAM.gov to ensure consistent comparison across datasets. Standardization procedures included:

- Recalculation of fiscal year based on date signed
- Normalization of total contract value
- Assignment of standardized dollar value bands:



- < \$100K
- \$100K–\$1M
- \$1M–\$10M
- \$10M–\$100M
- \$100M+
- Formatting PSCs to a consistent four-character structure
- Classification of contract action type into POs, definitive contracts, and IDCs.

Standardized dollar value bands were applied to normalize contract value comparisons and facilitate structured matching across acquisition pathways. Banding mitigates the effect of extreme value variation and allows contracts of similar acquisition scale to be compared without distortion from outliers.

The selected thresholds reflect commonly observed tiers in federal procurement that correspond to meaningful differences in acquisition complexity, oversight requirements, and competitive dynamics.

Using standardized value bands also enables consistent one-for-one matching between FMS and non-FMS contract actions, ensuring that comparisons are conducted across contracts of similar scale rather than absolute dollar equivalence.

All contract actions included in the dataset exceed the micro-purchase threshold, ensuring that the analysis focuses on formally executed procurements subject to standard acquisition regulations and procedures.

1. Data Matching and Validation Framework

To control for market and scale effects, the study applies a one-for-one matching framework across the balanced dataset of 32 contract actions per cohort.

Each FMS contract action was matched with a structurally comparable non-FMS contract action using three criteria:

- Identical four-character PSC
- Identical standardized dollar value band
- Equivalent contract action type



Initial automated comparisons were followed by manual validation, including review of FPDS CARs and, where necessary, supplemental documentation in PIEE or EDA.

After validation, the final dataset achieved complete matching parity: every FMS contract action has a corresponding non-FMS contract action within the same PSC and dollar value band.

S. ANALYTICAL METHODS

The analysis relies on descriptive statistics and crosstabulation to compare acquisition characteristics across pathways. Analytical outputs include

- Contract counts by fiscal year
- Contract counts by dollar value band
- Distribution of PSCs
- PSC by dollar value band profiles
- Comparative assessment of FMS and non-FMS products and services

Results are presented in tabular form to highlight structural alignment. Because the study employs a descriptive and comparative design, the analysis does not rely on inferential statistical testing but instead focuses on identifying consistent patterns across matched observations.

T. METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS

This study is subject to several limitations, including dependence on FPDS reported data, which may contain reporting inconsistencies; the exclusion of Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) and classified programs; and the use of purposive matched sampling rather than random sampling.

Additional limitations relate to data availability and measurement. Incomplete reporting of solicitation dates in certain FPDS CARs limited the consistent calculation of PALT. Contract actions missing solicitation date information were excluded and replaced with contract actions meeting identical matching criteria during the matching process to preserve analytical consistency.



PALT is measured from solicitation issuance to contract award due to data availability within FPDS. This approach does not capture earlier stages of procurement request development and acceptance and therefore reflects the solicitation to award phase rather than the full pre-award acquisition life cycle. However, it provides a consistent and comparable measure of acquisition execution across both FMS and non-FMS pathways.

Some IDC structures appeared to support both FMS and U.S.-funded requirements. Because the research design relies on a clear separation between FMS and non-FMS cohorts, contract actions with indications of mixed FMS and non-FMS funding were excluded and replaced with contract actions meeting all classification criteria.

The exclusion of IDIQ task and delivery orders limits the scope of the analysis to base contract awards. This constraint is necessary to ensure consistent measurement of solicitation to award timelines, as task and delivery orders often inherit acquisition characteristics from parent contract vehicles and may not reflect independent procurement actions.

Taken together, these limitations indicate that the study's findings are intended to support comparative insight into acquisition pathway performance rather than predictive or causal conclusions for individual programs or partner nations.

U. SUMMARY

This chapter presents a transparent methodology for comparing acquisition characteristics across FMS and U.S.-funded defense contracts. By integrating exploratory contract identification through USAspending.gov, authoritative data extraction and vendor verification through SAM.gov's FPDS CARs, and targeted validation using PIEE and EDA, the study supports a high degree of data integrity and analytical rigor.

The resulting dataset provides a robust empirical foundation for the comparative analysis presented in subsequent chapters.



IV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the empirical findings from a comparative analysis of FMS and U.S.-funded DoD (non-FMS) contracts. Building on the dataset construction, matching framework, and analytical methods described in Chapter III, the analysis evaluates whether observable differences in acquisition outcomes are associated with acquisition pathway structure rather than differences in market composition, contract scale, or commodity type.

The dataset analyzed in this chapter consists of 128 contract actions, evenly distributed across four analytically distinct cohorts: FMS products, non-FMS products, FMS services, and non-FMS services, with 32 contract actions per cohort. Each contract action represents a single award decision and was manually validated to ensure one-to-one matching between FMS contracts and their non-FMS counterparts. Specifically, each FMS product and service contract was paired with a corresponding non-FMS contract sharing the same PSC, standardized dollar value band, and contract action type, as detailed in Chapter III.

The purpose of this chapter is to (1) confirm descriptive equivalence across datasets; (2) examine differences in PALT, competition, and vendor diversity; and (3) analyze patterns that emerge across both products and services. These findings establish the empirical foundation upon which implications and recommendations are developed in subsequent sections.

The analysis compares FMS and U.S.-funded contracts under matched conditions, controlling for product or service type, contract value, and contract action characteristics.

V. FINDINGS

This section presents the findings derived from the matched FMS and non-FMS datasets described in Chapter III. The analysis proceeds in two stages. First, descriptive statistics are used to confirm that the datasets are structurally equivalent across time,



contract value, and market composition. Second, acquisition outcomes are evaluated across the measures introduced above.

1. Descriptive Profile and Structural Equivalence

As established in Chapter III's matching framework, each FMS contract action was paired with a structurally equivalent U.S.-funded contract based on PSC, standardized dollar value band, and contract action type. Descriptive statistics are used here to confirm structural comparability across the matched datasets prior to evaluating acquisition outcomes.

a. *Contract actions by fiscal year*

Table 1 and Figure 1 present the distribution of contract actions by fiscal year for all four datasets: FMS products, non-FMS products, FMS services, and non-FMS services.

Table 1. Contract Actions by Fiscal Year

Fiscal Year	FMS Products	Non-FMS- Products	FMS Services	Non-FMS- Services
FY2019	2	5	5	5
FY2020	5	4	5	4
FY2021	4	4	3	2
FY2022	5	2	4	5
FY2023	8	6	2	5
FY2024	3	5	5	8
FY2025	5	6	8	3
Total	32	32	32	32






Figure 1. Contract Actions by Fiscal Year Distribution

Contract actions across all cohorts span Fiscal Years 2019 through 2025. While the number of contracts awarded each year varies, no single fiscal year disproportionately dominates any dataset. This temporal distribution mitigates concerns that observed acquisition patterns reflect fiscal year-specific anomalies, policy interventions, or short-term execution dynamics. Instead, the data reflect sustained acquisition activity across multiple budget cycles and organizational contexts, strengthening confidence that subsequent analyses capture structural differences between acquisition pathways rather than time-specific effects.

b. Contract actions by dollar value band

To control for contract scale and acquisition complexity, all contract actions were categorized into standardized dollar value bands. Dollar value is a recognized indicator of acquisition complexity, as higher value contracts typically involve increased documentation requirements, additional review and approval layers, and greater statutory and regulatory oversight. Table 2 summarizes contract counts by dollar value band across all four datasets.

Table 2. Contract Actions by Dollar Value Band

Dollar Value Band	FMS Products	Non-FMS Products	FMS Services	Non-FMS Services
< \$100K	3	3	5	5
\$100K – \$1M	2	2	4	4
\$1M – \$10M	14	14	7	7
\$10M – \$100M	7	7	8	8
\$100M+	6	6	8	8
Total	32	32	32	32

The distributions are identical between FMS and non-FMS datasets for both products and services. Each cohort contains the same number of contract actions in each dollar value band, ranging from contracts valued under \$100,000 to contracts exceeding \$100 million. All contract actions included in the dataset exceed the micro-purchase threshold, ensuring that the analysis captures formally executed procurement actions subject to standard acquisition processes.

This equivalence supports comparison between contracts of comparable dollar values and anticipated administrative burden. Observed differences in acquisition outcomes are therefore less likely to be explained by variation in contract value distribution across the datasets. Lower value bands primarily reflect purchase orders and smaller definitive contracts, while higher value bands capture major platform acquisitions, sustainment efforts, and large service contracts involving heightened oversight requirements.

By aligning contract magnitude across datasets and evaluating outcomes within identical dollar value bands, the analysis focuses on differences associated with acquisition pathway characteristics rather than differences driven by contract size or complexity. This control strengthens the internal validity of subsequent findings related to procurement lead time, competition, and vendor participation.

c. Product Service Code coverage

To confirm that FMS and non-FMS contracts operate within identical product and service markets, PSC coverage was examined for both datasets. Tables 3 and 4 list the PSCs represented in the product and service datasets, respectively.



Table 3. Product PSC Coverage

PSC Code	Description
1005	Guns, through 30mm
1010	Guns, over 30mm up to 75mm
1075	Degaussing and mine sweeping equipment
1095	Miscellaneous weapons
1377	Cartridge and propellant actuated devices
2350	Combat, assault, and tactical vehicles, tracked
5820	Radio and television communication equipment, except airborne
5821	Radio and television communication equipment, airborne
5825	Radio navigation equipment, except airborne
5826	Radio navigation equipment, airborne
5840	Radar equipment, except airborne
5841	Radar equipment, airborne
5855	Night vision equipment
5865	Electronic countermeasures equipment
5895	Miscellaneous communication equipment

Table 4. Service PSC Coverage

PSC Code	Description
J010	Maintenance/repair of weapons
J014	Maintenance/repair of guided missiles
J016	Maintenance/repair of aircraft components
J019	Maintenance/repair of ships and craft
J028	Maintenance/repair of engines and turbines
J069	Maintenance/repair of training devices
R408	Program management support
R425	Engineering/technical support
R706	Logistics support
U006	Vocational/technical education and training
U009	General education and training
U012	IT/telecommunications training
U099	Other education and training
Y1AA	Construction of office buildings

PSC coverage is identical between the FMS and non-FMS datasets within both product and service categories. Product acquisitions span weapons systems, vehicles, communications and navigation equipment, radar systems, night vision devices, and



electronic warfare equipment. Service acquisitions include maintenance and repair, logistics support, engineering and technical services, training, and construction activities.

Identical PSC coverage confirms that both acquisition pathways operate within the same product and service markets. This equivalence is consistent with the matching strategy described in Chapter III and indicates that differences observed later in this chapter are not driven by variation in procurement missions, commodity mixes, or functional requirements. Subsequent differences in acquisition outcomes are therefore consistent with characteristics of the acquisition pathways themselves.

d. PSC distribution by dollar value band

To further assess structural equivalence across acquisition pathways, PSCs were examined within each standardized dollar value band. This analysis ensures that specific commodities or service categories are not disproportionately concentrated at particular contract values under either the FMS or non-FMS acquisition pathway. Tables 5 and 6 summarize the PSCs observed within each dollar value band for product and service contracts, respectively.

Table 5. Product PSCs by Dollar Value Band

Dollar Value Band	Product Service Codes Observed
< \$100K	1075, 5821
\$100K – \$1M	1005, 1095
\$1M – \$10M	1005, 1010, 1095, 1377, 5820, 5825, 5826, 5855, 5865, 5895
\$10M – \$100M	1005, 2350, 5820, 5826, 5840, 5865
\$100M+	2350, 5840, 5841, 5865

Table 6. Service PSCs by Dollar Value Band

Dollar Value Band	Product Service Codes Observed
< \$100K	R425, U009
\$100K – \$1M	R408, R425, U009, U012
\$1M – \$10M	J016, R408, R425, R706, U006, U009, U099
\$10M – \$100M	J010, J014, J016, R425, R706, U006, Y1AA
\$100M+	J014, J028, R425, R706



The distributions indicate that PSCs appear across multiple dollar value bands rather than clustering exclusively at either high or low contract values. Higher value contracts include major weapons systems, vehicles, radar and electronic warfare equipment, and large-scale logistics support, while lower value contracts encompass weapons components, communications equipment, training, and engineering or technical services.

The presence of identical PSC value band combinations in both FMS and non-FMS datasets provides additional evidence of structural equivalence at a granular level. This finding reinforces the interpretation that subsequent differences in acquisition outcomes are less likely to be explained by market composition or contract magnitude. Instead, the observed differences are consistent with characteristics of the acquisition pathways themselves rather than differences in the types of goods or services procured at particular contract values.

e. Contracting activity distribution

To provide organizational context for the analytical dataset, contract actions were drawn from a diverse set of DoD contracting activities spanning the Army, Navy, Air Force, and other defense agencies. These activities include centralized enterprise organizations, most notably the Army Contracting Command (ACC) and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), as well as Service-specific systems commands, installation-level contracting offices, and specialized defense agencies.

Product acquisitions in both the FMS and non-FMS datasets are predominantly executed by centralized contracting organizations, particularly ACC and DLA. This distribution reflects the institutional structure of Army and Department-wide materiel acquisition, under which procurement of weapons systems, vehicles, communications equipment, and other complex defense articles is largely centralized to achieve economies of scale, technical oversight, and standardization. The prominence of ACC and DLA in the product datasets is therefore consistent with their designated roles within the defense acquisition enterprise and does not represent an atypical contracting pattern.



Service contracts, by contrast, exhibit a more dispersed distribution across contracting activities. While ACC remains a significant executor of service contracts, particularly for engineering, logistics, and sustainment support, service acquisitions are also executed by Navy systems commands, Air Force Life Cycle Management Centers, installation-level contracting organizations, and other Department of Defense agencies. This broader distribution aligns with the more decentralized nature of service acquisition, which frequently supports locally managed operational and sustainment requirements.

Importantly, both FMS and non-FMS contracts are executed by the same set of contracting enterprises within each procurement category. This overlap indicates that the same acquisition workforce and organizational structures are responsible for executing contracts across both acquisition pathways. As a result, observed differences in procurement administrative lead time, competition, and vendor diversity are unlikely to be explained by differences in contracting organizations alone. Rather than introducing organizational bias, the contracting activity distribution reinforces the validity of the comparative design and supports the interpretation that acquisition pathway characteristics, rather than contracting office or Service affiliation, are key factor of observed differences in procurement performance.

Table 7 provides a high-level summary of contracting activity distribution across major Department of Defense acquisition enterprises. A detailed contracting office-level breakdown is provided in Appendix C for descriptive completeness; consistent with the analytical approach of this chapter, contracting office is not treated as an explanatory variable in the outcome analysis.



Table 7. Contracting Activity Distribution by Enterprise Category

Contracting Enterprise	FMS Products	Non-FMS Products	FMS Services	Non-FMS Services
Army Contracting Command (ACC)	19	5	10	6
Other Army organizations (non-ACC)	2	2	2	2
Defense Logistics Agency	1	6	0	0
Navy systems commands & warfare centers	4	8	7	9
Air Force contracting organizations	3	7	10	11
Other DoD agencies	3	4	3	4
Total	32	32	32	32

Note: Contracting offices are grouped by enterprise category for clarity. ACC includes subordinate offices such as ACC-APG, ACC-PICA, ACC-RSA, and ACC-Orlando. Navy and Air Force categories include systems commands, warfare centers, and installation-level contracting activities.

2. Procurement Administrative Lead Time

PALT serves as a central indicator of acquisition agility in this study, capturing the duration of the contracting process under the control of the acquisition enterprise. PALT reflects the cumulative effects of procedural sequencing, review and approval requirements, coordination demands, and contracting strategy decisions, making it a useful measure for comparing execution efficiency across acquisition pathways.

a. Measurement

PALT was operationalized as the number of calendar days between solicitation issuance and contract award. This measure was calculated using the solicitation date and contract signed date fields reported in FPDS Contract Action Reports accessed through SAM.gov. PALT was calculated for each contract action within the analytical dataset.

This measurement approach intentionally isolates the procurement execution phase largely within the contracting activity's control, excluding upstream requirements development and downstream contract administration. By focusing on the period between



solicitation issuance and award, the analysis captures process characteristics associated with acquisition planning, competition strategy, statutory and regulatory compliance, interorganizational coordination, and approval sequencing. This approach is consistent with the measurement framework described in Chapter III and aligns with prior acquisition research that employs PALT as an indicator of contracting efficiency. In traditional acquisition metrics, PALT is often defined as the time from receipt or acceptance of a complete procurement request (PR) to contract award. Because PR acceptance dates are not consistently available in FPDS data, this study uses solicitation issuance as a standardized proxy for the start of the procurement phase. As a result, the PALT measure employed here reflects the solicitation to award portion of the acquisition process rather than the full pre-award life cycle.

Because the matched datasets control for PSC, dollar value band, and contract action type, observed differences in PALT are not attributable to variation in what is being procured or the scale of the procurement. Instead, PALT differences reflect execution characteristics associated with the acquisition pathway itself.

b. PALT results

Table 8 and Figure 2 summarize PALT statistics across the four datasets.

Table 8. PALT Summary Statistics

	Mean PALT(Days)	Median PALT(Days)	Min PALT(Days)	Max PALT(Days)
FMS Products	142	76	14	1048
Non- FMS Products	118	97	8	391
FMS Services	160	124	20	539
Non- FMS Services	95	47	10	565






Figure 2. Mean and Median PALT by Dataset

FMS product contracts exhibit a higher average PALT than structurally equivalent non-FMS product contracts. Although the median PALT for FMS products is slightly lower, the substantially higher mean indicates greater variability in execution timelines. This divergence between mean and median values suggests that while some FMS product awards proceed relatively efficiently, a subset of contracts experiences significant delays during the procurement execution phase.

The range of PALT values further illustrates this variability. FMS product contracts display a much higher maximum PALT than non-FMS products, indicating that delays are not uniformly distributed across FMS actions but instead concentrated among specific contract actions. These long-duration cases exert upward pressure on the mean, highlighting the presence of execution bottlenecks within the FMS pathway that are not consistently present in non-FMS product acquisition.

The divergence between FMS and non-FMS outcomes is more pronounced in service acquisitions. On average, FMS service contracts require substantially longer procurement lead times than their non-FMS counterparts, with mean PALT approximately 65 percent higher and median PALT more than double that of non-FMS services. Unlike products, where median values are relatively close, both central tendency measures for service contracts indicate longer execution timelines under the FMS

pathway. This pattern suggests that extended lead times in FMS services are not isolated to a small number of outliers but instead reflect a consistent structural difference affecting procurement execution.

The persistence of this pattern in services is particularly notable. Service contracts typically involve fewer exportability, configuration, and platform-specific constraints than major defense articles. The presence of longer PALT for FMS services therefore suggests that procedural sequencing, interorganizational coordination, and statutory requirements unique to the FMS pathway affect procurement execution timelines beyond product-specific challenges.

c. Summary of PALT findings

Across both product and service acquisitions, FMS contracts exhibit consistently longer procurement administrative lead times relative to non-FMS contracts, despite operating within identical markets and contract-scale categories. These differences persist across both average and median measures, indicating that extended lead times are not solely driven by a small number of extreme cases but reflect broader structural patterns within the FMS acquisition pathway.

Because the analysis controls for contract magnitude, commodity type, and contract action characteristics, and because both acquisition pathways are executed by the same contracting enterprises, the observed PALT differences most consistent with features inherent to the acquisition pathways themselves. These findings establish PALT as a critical dimension along which the FMS pathway demonstrates reduced acquisition agility relative to non-FMS procurement.

3. Competition

Competition serves as a central indicator of acquisition strategy and market engagement, reflecting the extent to which contracting activities solicit and evaluate multiple offers prior to award. In this study, competition is examined to assess whether acquisition pathway structure influences the government's ability or willingness to employ competitive procurement approaches under otherwise comparable market and contract conditions.



When controlling for product or service type, contract value, and contract action characteristics, FMS contracts exhibit substantially lower rates of competition than U.S.-funded contracts.

a. Measurement

Competition was assessed using competition and statutory authority fields reported in FPDS Contract Action Reports accessed through SAM.gov. A binary competed/not-competed indicator was constructed for each contract action to facilitate consistent comparison across datasets. Contract actions identified as competed include full and open competition and competitive procedures conducted under simplified acquisition thresholds, while actions identified as not competed include sole-source awards and those executed under statutory exceptions to competition.

For non-competitive contract actions, the associated statutory authority was recorded to characterize the justification for awarding without competition. This supplemental classification provides insight into whether non-competitive outcomes reflect discretionary contracting choices or constraints imposed by statute, regulation, or international agreement. This approach enables comparison not only of competition rates, but also of the structural drivers underlying competitive and non-competitive procurement outcomes across acquisition pathways.

b. Competition results

Table 9 and Figure 3 summarize competition rates across the four datasets.

Table 9. Percentage of Contracts Competed

	% Competed
FMS Products	3%
Non-FMS Products	50%
FMS Services	16%
Non-FMS Services	41%






Figure 3. Competition Rates by Dataset

FMS product contracts exhibit minimal competition relative to non-FMS product contracts. Nearly half of non-FMS product awards were competed, compared to only three percent of FMS product actions. This disparity persists despite identical Product Service Code coverage and standardized dollar value band distributions, indicating that differences in competition rates are not attributable to variations in commodity type, contract scale, or market availability.

While competition rates are higher overall for service acquisitions, FMS services remain substantially less competitive than non-FMS services. More than forty percent of non-FMS service contracts were competed, compared to only sixteen percent of FMS service contracts. Unlike product acquisitions where proprietary systems or platform integration may constrain competition, service contracts often face fewer technical or intellectual property barriers. The persistence of lower competition within FMS services therefore suggests that competitive acquisition strategies are not systematically leveraged within the FMS pathway even in markets where competition is generally feasible. Notably, the distribution of statutory authorities for non-competitive service contracts suggests that both FMS and non-FMS acquisitions rely on similar justification categories in certain cases, particularly under “only one responsible source” authorities. This pattern indicates that constraints on competition in FMS services are not solely driven by unique

statutory authorities but may also reflect how existing authorities are applied within the FMS acquisition context.

Because PSC coverage and contract magnitude are held constant across datasets, these differences are less likely to be explained by vendor availability or market structure. Instead, the results indicate that competition outcomes are shaped by characteristics intrinsic to the acquisition pathway rather than differences in what is being procured.

c. Statutory authorities for non-competitive awards

To further contextualize observed competition outcomes, statutory authorities associated with non-competitive awards were examined across datasets. Figure 4 presents the distribution of non-competitive contracting authorities by dataset, highlighting the legal and procedural frameworks under which sole-source and limited-competition awards were executed.

Figure 4 does not account for 100% of non-competed actions because a small percentage of observations were associated with less frequently occurring competition authorities that were not individually reflected in the visualization. The majority of non-competed actions clustered around International Agreement authority (FAR 6.302-4) and Only One Responsible Source authority (FAR 6.302-1), making those categories the most analytically meaningful to display. Residual observations included authorities such as Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP) Non-Competition (FAR 13), Public Interest (FAR 6.302-7), National Security (FAR 6.302-6), Unique Source determinations, and isolated 8(a) sole-source actions. Collectively, these observations represented approximately seven (7) to eight (8) percent of non-competed actions and were omitted from the figure to maintain readability and avoid overcomplicating the visualization with minimally represented categories.






Figure 4. Distribution of Non-Competitive Contracting Authorities by Dataset

Figure 4 shows that non-competitive FMS contracts are predominantly executed under International Agreement authority (FAR 6.302-4) and Only One Responsible Source authority (FAR 6.302-1). The concentration of these authorities within the FMS datasets indicates that reduced competition is largely driven by statutory and structural constraints embedded within the FMS framework rather than discretionary contracting practices.

In contrast, non-FMS contracts exhibit a broader distribution of statutory authorities, reflecting greater flexibility in acquisition strategy and wider application of competitive procurement procedures. This distinction suggests that contracting officers executing FMS actions operate under more constrained decision environments with respect to competition, even when market conditions could otherwise support competitive approaches.

d. Summary of competition findings

Across both product and service acquisitions, FMS contracts display substantially lower rates of competition than non-FMS contracts executed under comparable market

and contract-scale conditions. This pattern is consistent across acquisition categories and persists even in service markets where competitive procurement is generally more practicable.

Analysis of statutory authorities indicates that non-competitive outcomes within the FMS pathway are primarily consistent with structural and statutory constraints rather than discretionary contracting choices. Together, these findings reinforce the conclusion that acquisition pathway structure plays a central role in shaping competition outcomes, with implications for pricing, vendor participation, and overall acquisition agility examined in subsequent sections.

Reduced competition under the FMS pathway has implications for acquisition agility, as constrained market engagement can limit alternatives, increase coordination burden, and restrict flexibility in procurement execution.

4. Vendor Diversity and Small Business Participation

Vendor diversity represents a key dimension of acquisition performance, reflecting the extent to which procurement processes enable participation by a broad range of firms, including small businesses. In this study, vendor diversity is examined to assess whether acquisition pathway structure influences small business participation under otherwise comparable market, contract scale, and commodity conditions.

When controlling for contract type, value, and commodity, vendor diversity, measured through small business participation, is consistently lower in FMS contracts than in U.S.-funded contracts.

a. Measurement

Vendor diversity was assessed using business size determinations recorded by the contracting officer in the FPDS Contract Action Report at the time of award. A binary small-business indicator was constructed for each contract action within the analytical dataset to enable consistent comparison across acquisition pathways. FPDS business size fields capture the contracting officer's recorded size determination for the awarded vendor at the contract-action level, based on vendor information associated with the awardee's identifiers and SAM registration at the time of award.



Where available, reported socioeconomic attributes such as disadvantaged, women-owned, or veteran-owned status were retained as supplemental descriptive information but were not used as analytical variables. This approach focuses the analysis on overall small business participation as a baseline indicator of vendor diversity while maintaining comparability across datasets.

Because the matched datasets control for PSC, standardized dollar value band, and contract action type, differences in small business participation are less likely to be explained by variations in commodity type, procurement scale, or functional requirements. Instead, observed differences in vendor diversity reflect execution characteristics associated with the acquisition pathway.

b. Vendor diversity results

Table 10 summarizes small business participation rates across the four datasets.

Table 10. Small Business Participation by Dataset

	Small Business Vendors
FMS Products	28%
Non-FMS Products	47%
FMS Services	28%
Non-FMS Services	56%

Small business participation is consistently lower in FMS contracts than in non-FMS contracts for both products and services. For product acquisitions, small businesses account for just over one-quarter of FMS awards, compared to nearly one-half of non-FMS product awards. This gap indicates that, even within identical market segments and contract value categories, small businesses are substantially less likely to participate in FMS product contracts.

The disparity is more pronounced in service acquisitions. While non-FMS service contracts exhibit majority small business participation, FMS service contracts remain below one-third. This divergence is particularly noteworthy given that service contracts, such as engineering support, logistics, training, and program management, are sectors in which small businesses traditionally play a significant role. The persistence of lower



small business participation in FMS services therefore suggests that barriers extend beyond product-specific complexity or proprietary constraints.

Because PSC coverage and contract magnitude are identical across datasets, these differences are unlikely to be explained by small business capability or market accessibility. Instead, the findings indicate that vendor diversity outcomes are shaped by characteristics intrinsic to the acquisition pathway, including procedural complexity, competition strategy, and coordination requirements.

Lower small business participation within the FMS pathway suggests reduced access to a diverse supplier base, which may constrain adaptability and responsiveness, particularly in service dominated acquisition environments.

c. Summary of vendor diversity findings

Across both product and service acquisitions, FMS contracts demonstrate consistently lower small business participation than structurally equivalent non-FMS contracts. These findings suggest reinforcing relationships between lead time, competition, and vendor participation.

When considered alongside longer procurement lead times and lower competition rates, reduced small business participation reflects broader structural patterns within the FMS acquisition pathway. Extended timelines and limited competition may discourage small business participation, while reduced vendor diversity may further constrain competitive acquisition strategies. Together, these findings indicate that acquisition pathway structure, not external market factors, is a primary driver of observed differences in vendor diversity and overall acquisition agility.

5. Discussion of Findings

The findings presented in this chapter reveal a consistent and systematic pattern across both product and service acquisitions: FMS contracts underperform relative to structurally equivalent non-FMS contracts across all three indicators of acquisition agility: PALT, competition, and vendor diversity. This pattern persists across identical PSCs, equivalent dollar value bands, and comparable contract action types, indicating that observed differences are not attributable to market composition or contract scale.



Taken together, these findings suggest that acquisition outcomes within the FMS pathway are not independently determined but are instead interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Reduced competition limits the pool of vendors engaged in the acquisition process, which in turn may constrain pricing dynamics and discourage participation by smaller firms. Longer procurement timelines may further exacerbate these effects by increasing uncertainty and administrative burden, particularly for small businesses with limited resources. Conversely, reduced vendor diversity may limit competitive pressure and contribute to prolonged execution timelines. These interactions point to systemic inefficiencies within the FMS acquisition pathway rather than isolated execution challenges.

The persistence of longer lead times and reduced competition in FMS service contracts is particularly noteworthy. Because services generally involve fewer proprietary or exportability constraints than major defense articles, this pattern suggests that pathway-level procedural requirements, rather than product-specific complexity, materially influence acquisition outcomes.

Because the analytical dataset controls for what is being procured and the scale of each contract action, differences in acquisition outcomes are less likely to be explained by procurement mission, commodity mix, or contract magnitude. Instead, the results point to features inherent to the FMS acquisition pathway such as procedural sequencing, coordination requirements, and statutory or regulatory constraints as primary contributors to observed disparities. The use of matched datasets across multiple analytical dimensions strengthens the internal validity of the analysis and increases confidence that the findings reflect acquisition pathway characteristics rather than unobserved external factors.

These findings can also be interpreted through established acquisition and organizational theory frameworks. Consistent with TCE, the additional coordination requirements, approval layers, and governance constraints embedded within the FMS pathway are associated with longer procurement lead times. These transaction costs increase administrative complexity and extend execution timelines compared to more streamlined U.S.-funded contracting processes.



From a principal agent perspective, the multi-principal structure of FMS where responsibilities are distributed across the DoD, the Department of State, and partner nations, introduces additional oversight, reduces decision making flexibility, and increases monitoring requirements. These dynamics are associated with lower rates of competition and reduced vendor participation, particularly among firms with limited capacity to navigate complex compliance and coordination requirements.

Together, these theoretical perspectives provide a consistent explanation for the observed relationship between acquisition pathway structure and differences in procurement performance.

Across all three indicators, the interaction between extended procurement timelines, reduced competition, and constrained vendor diversity reflects reinforcing dynamics that limit acquisition agility within the FMS framework. These findings establish a strong empirical foundation for examining the institutional implications of FMS acquisition practices and inform the discussion of potential reforms and policy considerations in subsequent chapters.

a. Consistency of results across datasets

The consistency of observed differences across products and services, across multiple dollar value bands, and across three distinct indicators of acquisition agility strengthens confidence in the robustness of the findings. Because all comparisons are conducted within identical PSCs, standardized contract value bands, and equivalent contract action types, the results are not sensitive to market composition or contract scale.

While the analysis does not capture unobservable organizational factors such as staffing levels or internal approval timelines, the persistence of observed patterns across multiple datasets and analytical dimensions suggests that such factors are unlikely to fully account for the magnitude or consistency of the differences observed. Instead, the stability of results across categories reinforces the conclusion that acquisition pathway structure plays a central role in shaping procurement outcomes under the FMS program. The consistency, magnitude, and cross category persistence of these findings indicate that



the observed differences are systemic in nature, reflecting enduring characteristics of the FMS acquisition framework rather than isolated inefficiencies.

6. Implications of Findings

The findings presented in this chapter extend beyond descriptive differences and point to deeper structural implications for how the FMS acquisition pathway functions. When interpreted through the theoretical frameworks outlined in Chapter II, Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), the Resource-Based View (RBV), Institutional Theory, and Principal Agent Theory, the results demonstrate that the performance differences observed between FMS and U.S.-funded contracts are not isolated anomalies. Instead, they reflect predictable outcomes of the statutory, regulatory, and governance structures that define the FMS system.

From a Transaction Cost Economics perspective, the consistently longer PALT observed in FMS contracts reflects the higher administrative burden imposed by Title 22 authorities. Requirements such as technology release reviews, congressional notifications, international agreement constraints, and multi-layered coordination steps increase transaction costs relative to U.S.-funded contracting. These findings reinforce TCE's prediction that additional compliance mechanisms extend lead time, even when market conditions and contract scale are held constant.

Institutional theory further explains why these differences persist. FMS operates within a distinct institutional environment shaped by foreign policy objectives, export controls, and intergovernmental agreements. These institutional pressures create norms and expectations that prioritize assurance, oversight, and risk mitigation over speed or market flexibility. The empirical results, particularly the low competition rates and reduced small business participation, demonstrate how institutional rules shape acquisition behavior and constrain the range of feasible contracting strategies.

The findings also have implications for the Resource-Based View. Lower small business participation in FMS contracts suggests that the pathway may inadvertently limit access to the diverse supplier base that strengthens the defense industrial base. RBV emphasizes that capability, innovation, and resilience depend on a broad and competitive



vendor ecosystem. The reduced vendor diversity observed in FMS acquisitions therefore signals potential long-term risks for industrial base agility and innovation.

Finally, Principal Agent Theory provides a unifying explanation for the interconnected patterns observed across PALT, competition, and vendor diversity. In FMS, the U.S. Government acts as an agent for a foreign principal while simultaneously satisfying domestic oversight bodies, security review authorities, and statutory compliance requirements. This multi-principal environment increases monitoring, reduces agent discretion, and introduces additional approval layers. The empirical results, such as longer timelines, constrained competition, and limited vendor access, reflect the predictable consequences of this complex agent structure.

Taken together, these implications suggest that the performance differences between FMS and U.S.-funded contracting are rooted in structural and institutional features of the FMS pathway. As a result, improving acquisition agility will require reforms that address these underlying design characteristics rather than isolated process adjustments.

7. Recommendations Based on Findings

Building on these implications, this section outlines targeted recommendations to improve acquisition agility, competition, and vendor diversity within the FMS pathway. The implications above point to several opportunities for improving acquisition agility, competition, and vendor diversity within the FMS pathway. While the structural constraints of Title 22 cannot be eliminated, targeted reforms can mitigate their effects and enhance responsiveness.

a. Streamline procedural sequencing to reduce transaction costs.

Consistent with TCE, the extended PALT observed in FMS contracts reflects high administrative burden. DSCA and implementing agencies should evaluate opportunities to consolidate reviews, eliminate redundant documentation, and delegate approval authority where appropriate. Process mapping and workflow automation could reduce transaction costs without compromising statutory compliance.



b. Expand competitive feasibility within Title 22 constraints.

The findings show that competition is underutilized even in service markets where multiple vendors exist. Agencies should explore competitive contracting strategies that remain consistent with International Agreement authority, such as competitive pre-solicitation phases, modular contracting, or competitive subcontracting structures. Clearer guidance on when competition is permissible under AECA could also increase contracting officer discretion.

c. Improve transparency and predictability for vendors, especially small businesses.

Reduced vendor diversity suggests that small firms face disproportionate barriers in FMS. Publishing predictable timelines, standardizing communication practices, and increasing visibility into upcoming FMS requirements could reduce uncertainty and encourage broader participation. This aligns with RBV by strengthening the supplier base.

d. Develop targeted small business integration strategies for FMS acquisitions.

Given the structural constraints identified, DSCA and DoD could implement tailored outreach, pre-qualified small business pools, or incentives for prime contractors to include small businesses in FMS work. These strategies would support industrial base resilience while remaining consistent with Title 22 requirements.

e. Modernize FMS governance to reduce coordination friction.

Principal agent theory highlights the coordination challenges inherent in multi-stakeholder environments. Digital case management tools, standardized templates, and improved interagency data sharing could reduce delays associated with information asymmetry and approval sequencing.

f. Reevaluate statutory and policy interpretations that limit acquisition flexibility.

A policy review of how International Agreement authority is applied may identify opportunities to introduce competitive elements or streamline execution without



undermining foreign partner commitments. This aligns with Institutional Theory by addressing the rules and norms that shape acquisition behavior.

g. Integrate acquisition pathway reforms into broader security cooperation modernization efforts.

Because the observed inefficiencies stem from structural design choices, reforms should be aligned with DSCA's ongoing modernization initiatives, including digital transformation, workforce training, and performance metric development. This ensures that improvements are systemic rather than incremental.

Together, these recommendations provide a pathway for improving FMS responsiveness while preserving the oversight and assurance functions that are central to the program's mission.

8. Summary

This chapter presented the empirical findings from a matched comparison of FMS and U.S.-funded defense contracts and demonstrated consistent differences across procurement lead time, competition, and vendor diversity. These differences persist across identical PSCs, contract value bands, and contract action types, indicating that they arise from structural characteristics of the FMS pathway rather than market composition or contract scale.

Interpreted through the theoretical frameworks introduced in Chapter II, the findings show that FMS performance challenges reflect predictable outcomes of higher transaction costs, institutional constraints, and multi-principal oversight structures. Longer PALT, reduced competition, and lower small business participation are not isolated issues but interconnected consequences of the statutory, regulatory, and governance environment that defines the FMS system.

The implications and recommendations presented in this chapter highlight the need for reforms that address these structural dynamics. Improving acquisition agility within the FMS pathway will require balancing oversight with flexibility, modernizing governance processes, and expanding opportunities for competition and vendor



participation. These insights provide a foundation for the policy analysis and reform strategies explored in Chapter V.



V. CONCLUSION

This study examined how acquisition pathway structure is associated with procurement outcomes by comparing FMS contracts to U.S.-funded DoD contracts across three key indicators of acquisition agility: PALT, competition, and vendor diversity. Using a matched dataset that controlled for product and service type, contract value, PSC, and contract action characteristics, the analysis evaluated differences associated with acquisition pathway structure rather than differences in market composition, procurement scale, or acquisition complexity.

The findings reveal a consistent pattern across both product and service acquisitions. Relative to structurally equivalent U.S.-funded contracts, FMS contracts are associated with longer procurement lead times, lower rates of competition, and reduced small business participation. These differences persist across identical PSCs, standardized dollar value bands, and comparable contract action types, indicating that the observed disparities are less likely to be explained solely by procurement mission, commodity mix, or contract magnitude. Instead, the results are consistent with the interpretation that acquisition pathway structure plays an important role in shaping procurement outcomes.

Taken together, the findings suggest that acquisition outcomes within the FMS pathway are not independently determined but instead operate as interconnected and mutually reinforcing dynamics. Reduced competition limits the range of vendors participating in the acquisition process, which may constrain pricing pressure and discourage participation by smaller firms. Longer procurement timelines may further intensify these effects by increasing administrative burden, uncertainty, and coordination demands, particularly for firms with limited resources. At the same time, reduced vendor diversity may constrain competitive opportunities and contribute to prolonged procurement execution timelines. These interactions suggest that the observed differences are not isolated inefficiencies, but rather reflect broader structural conditions associated with the FMS acquisition process.

The persistence of these patterns in service acquisitions is particularly significant. Unlike major defense articles, service contracts generally involve fewer proprietary,



exportability, or configuration related constraints. Despite this, FMS service contracts exhibit substantially longer procurement lead times, lower rates of competition, and reduced small business participation relative to non-FMS service contracts. This pattern suggests that pathway level procedural and institutional requirements, rather than product specific complexity alone, play a meaningful role in shaping procurement outcomes across the FMS environment.

These findings are consistent with the theoretical frameworks presented in Chapter II, which collectively emphasize the role of institutional constraints, transaction costs, and multi-principal governance structures in shaping acquisition performance.

The consistency of observed differences across products and services, across multiple dollar value bands, and across three distinct indicators of acquisition agility strengthens confidence in the robustness of the findings. Because all comparisons were conducted within identical PSCs, standardized contract value bands, and equivalent contract action types, the results are less sensitive to variation in market composition or acquisition scale. Although the study does not capture unobservable organizational factors such as staffing levels, internal approval practices, or workforce experience, the persistence of observed patterns across multiple analytical dimensions suggests that such factors alone are unlikely to fully account for the magnitude or consistency of the differences identified.

This study contributes to the existing body of acquisition research by providing a systematic, contract level comparison of FMS and U.S.-funded defense contracting under controlled analytical conditions. While prior research has frequently identified challenges associated with FMS execution, much of the existing literature relies on qualitative assessments, case studies, or high-level observations. By contrast, this research quantifies observed differences across procurement lead time, competition, and vendor diversity while controlling for key acquisition variables. In doing so, the study provides empirical evidence linking acquisition structure to observable procurement outcomes.

At a broader level, the findings underscore the importance of acquisition system design as a factor associated with procurement performance. Differences in acquisition outcomes are not solely the product of execution at the contracting activity level, but are



also shaped by the institutional, statutory, and governance frameworks within which contracting activities operate. As a result, efforts to improve acquisition agility may benefit from considering not only process execution, but also the structural characteristics of acquisition pathways.

While this study provides a structured comparison of FMS and U.S.-funded contracting, several areas warrant additional investigation.

Future research could expand the scope of analysis to include Direct Commercial Sales and classified programs to capture a more comprehensive view of defense acquisition pathways. Additional work is also needed to evaluate the full acquisition life cycle, including pre-solicitation phases such as the Letter of Request and Letter of Offer and Acceptance processes, which are not fully reflected in PALT measurements.

Further studies could examine causal drivers of observed performance differences, including workforce capacity, approval timelines, and program-level complexity. Expanding analysis to include partner-nation or regional variation may also provide insight into how FMS performance differs across implementation contexts.

Finally, future research should assess the effectiveness of ongoing FMS reform initiatives, including process streamlining, digital systems, and policy adjustments aimed at improving competition, vendor participation, and acquisition speed. Such work would support continued modernization of the FMS system while maintaining its strategic objectives.

Ultimately, this study demonstrates that acquisition pathway structure is consistently associated with observable differences in procurement outcomes within the defense acquisition environment. While the FMS program serves critical foreign policy, security cooperation, and alliance building objectives, the findings suggest that the statutory and institutional features embedded within the FMS framework may constrain acquisition agility relative to comparable U.S.-funded contracting pathways. As global demand for U.S. defense capabilities continues to expand, understanding how acquisition system design influences responsiveness, competition, and industrial base participation will remain increasingly important to policymakers, acquisition professionals, and defense leadership. The findings presented in this study provide an empirical foundation



for continued examination of how FMS processes may evolve to improve responsiveness and procurement performance while maintaining the oversight, security, and policy objectives central to the program's mission.

This study addressed four primary research questions related to lead time, competition, vendor diversity, and acquisition design. The findings provide clear and consistent answers across each dimension. PALT is systematically longer in FMS contracts than in structurally equivalent U.S.-funded contracts across both products and services.

FMS contracts also exhibit substantially lower competition rates, even within identical markets and contract value ranges. This pattern reflects structural and statutory constraints, including reliance on International Agreement and sole-source authorities, rather than differences in vendor availability. Similarly, small business participation is consistently lower in FMS contracts, with the largest disparities observed in service acquisitions. This suggests that procedural complexity, reduced competition, and limited visibility create barriers that restrict access for smaller firms.

Finally, the findings indicate that acquisition pathway design plays a central role in shaping procurement outcomes. Differences in responsiveness, competition, and vendor participation are closely tied to statutory authority, oversight requirements, and the multi-stakeholder coordination inherent in the FMS system. Collectively, these results demonstrate that acquisition outcomes are driven more by institutional and structural features of the FMS pathway than by underlying market conditions.



APPENDIX. DATA

Contract ID (PIID)	Contracting Office	Product or Service Description	Total Contract Value	PALT (Days)	Competition?	Authority?	Small Business?
FMS Products							
SPRWA120C0006	SPRWA1 – DLA AVIATION AT WARNER ROBINS, GA	MISCELLANEOUS WEAPONS	\$3,456,441.60	267	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	Y
W15QKN25C0026	W15QKN – W6QK ACC-PICA	GUNS, OVER 30MM UP TO 75MM	\$1,337,940.00	172	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	Y
W91CRB25C5050	W91CRB – W6QK ACC-APG	RADIO AND TELEVISION COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT AIRBORNE	\$29,635,553.37	55	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
W91CRB23C5040	W91CRB – W6QK ACC-APG	MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT	\$300,000.00	85	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N
W91CRB20C5022	W91CRB – W6QK ACC-APG	RADIO NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT, AIRBORNE	\$5,148,000.00	47	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
W56HZV23P0008	W56HZV – W4GG HQ U.S. ARMY TACOM	COMBAT, ASSAULT, AND TACTICAL VEHICLES, TRACKED	\$35,490.00	43	N	SAP NON-COMPETITION (FAR 13)	N
W15QKN25P0011	W15QKN – W6QK ACC-PICA	GUNS, THROUGH 30MM	\$190,835.00	90	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	Y
W56KGY21C0021	W56KGY – W6QK ACC-APG	RADAR EQUIPMENT, AIRBORNE	\$434,657,835.37	259	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	Y
FA821320C0025	FA8213 – FA8213 AFLCMC EBHK	CARTRIDGE AND PROPELLANT ACTUATED DEVICES AND COMPONENTS	\$1,812,684.24	153	Y	FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION	N
N6133121P0040	N61331 – NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER	DEGAUSSING AND MINE SWEEPING EQUIPMENT	\$75,000.00	19	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	Y



N0002425C5501	N00024 – NAVSEA HQ	RADAR EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT AIRBORNE	\$818,935,606.69	331	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
M6785423C2003	M67854 – COMMANDER	RADIO AND TELEVISION COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT AIRBORNE	\$10,424,819.52	73	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N
W58RGZ21D0010	W58RGZ – W6QK ACC-RSA	ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES, COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURES AND QUICK REACTION CAPABILITY EQUIPMENT	\$404,650,396.80	77	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
W91CRB23D5000	W91CRB – W6QK ACC-APG	RADIO NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT, AIRBORNE	\$64,786,234.00	1048	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
W15QKN20D0036	W15QKN – W6QK ACC-PICA	GUNS, THROUGH 30MM	\$78,709,973.29	414	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
FA880724CB004	FA8807 – FA8807 MIL COMM AND PNT SSC/CGK	RADIO NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT AIRBORNE	\$8,598,512.00	71	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N
W91CRB22C5013	W91CRB – W6QK ACC-APG	NIGHT VISION EQUIPMENT, EMITTED AND REFLECTED RADIATION	\$5,110,825.24	29	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N
W15QKN22C0052	W15QKN – W6QK ACC-PICA	GUNS, THROUGH 30MM	\$2,193,147.05	193	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	Y
W15QKN22C0049	W15QKN – W6QK ACC-PICA	GUNS, THROUGH 30MM	\$1,620,227.32	20	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	Y
W56HZV23C0015	W56HZV – W4GG HQ U.S. ARMY TACOM	COMBAT, ASSAULT, AND TACTICAL VEHICLES, TRACKED	\$128,557,867.20	159	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N
N0038325P0093	N00383 – NAVSUP WEAPON SYSTEMS SUPPORT	RADIO AND TELEVISION COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT, AIRBORNE	\$35,411.00	36	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
W91CRB20C5013	W91CRB – W6QK ACC-APG	NIGHT VISION EQUIPMENT, EMITTED AND REFLECTED RADIATION	\$1,157,832.00	76	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N



W91CRB23C5020	W91CRB – W6QK ACC-APG	ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES, COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURES AND QUICK REACTION CAPABILITY EQUIPMENT	\$1,301,425.00	62	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
W91CRB19D5001	W91CRB – W6QK ACC-APG	MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT	\$30,197,059.00	22	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
HQ014719C0008	HQ0853 – MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY (MDA)	RADAR EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT AIRBORNE	\$350,788,429.69	25	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
W15QKN23C0012	W15QKN – W6QK ACC-PICA	COMBAT, ASSAULT, AND TACTICAL VEHICLES, TRACKED	\$118,375,739.60	75	N	PUBLIC INTEREST (FAR 6.302-7)	Y
W15QKN24C0037	W15QKN – W6QK ACC-PICA	GUNS, THROUGH 30MM	\$39,075,000.00	19	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
N0017421C0013	N00174 – NSWC INDIAN HEAD DIVISION	GUNS, THROUGH 30MM	\$37,222,432.05	202	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N
FA880722C0002	FA8807 – FA8807 MIL COMM AND PNT SSC/CGK	RADIO NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT, AIRBORNE	\$1,310,215.93	14	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N
W91CRB23C5037	W91CRB – W6QK ACC-APG	NIGHT VISION EQUIPMENT, EMITTED AND REFLECTED RADIATION	\$2,326,593.00	43	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N
N0025322C5000	N00253 – NAVAL UNDERSEA WARFARE CENTER	ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES, COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURES AND QUICK REACTION CAPABILITY EQUIPMENT	\$4,511,887.00	283	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N
W91CRB24C5044	W91CRB – W6QK ACC-APG	MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT	\$4,321,862.15	91	N	AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE (FAR 6.302-5(A)(2)(I))	Y

Non-FMS Products



SPRPA120CR016	SPRPA1 – DLA AVIATION AT PHILADELPHIA, PA	MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT	\$8,928,000.00	11	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
SPE7L424P1902	SPE7L4 – DLA LAND AND MARITIME	GUNS, THROUGH 30MM	\$498,960.00	13	Y	COMPETED UNDER SAP	Y
SPE7L524P0516	SPE7L5 – DLA LAND AND MARITIME	DEGAUSSING AND MINE SWEEPING EQUIPMENT	\$98,606.25	20	Y	COMPETED UNDER SAP	Y
W912JM20P0244	W912JM – W7M3 USPFO ACTIVITY GA ARNG	COMBAT, ASSAULT, AND TACTICAL VEHICLES, TRACKED	\$34,323.72	24	Y	COMPETED UNDER SAP	Y
SPRPA119CX037	SPRPA1 – DLA AVIATION AT PHILADELPHIA, PA	RADIO NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT, AIRBORNE	\$2,343,423.06	220	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
FA865824CB005	FA8658 – FA8658 AFLCMC EBR EBZ	RADIO NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT, AIRBORNE	\$4,257,708.40	35	Y	FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION AFTER EXCLUSION OF SOURCES	Y
SPE7L123C0009	SPE7L1 – DLA LAND AND MARITIME	MISCELLANEOUS WEAPONS	\$1,970,414.38	67	Y	SERVICE DISABLED VETERAN OWNED SMALL BUSINESS SET-ASIDE	Y
N0017425C1005	N00174 – NSWC INDIAN HEAD DIVISION	CARTRIDGE AND PROPELLANT ACTUATED DEVICES AND COMPONENTS	\$1,686,875.60	87	Y	FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION	Y
W56HZV20C0065	W56HZV – W4GG HQ U.S. ARMY TACOM	GUNS, OVER 30MM UP TO 75MM	\$1,412,572.72	111	Y	SMALL BUSINESS SET ASIDE – TOTAL	Y
W900KK19C0018	W900KK – W6QK ACC- ORLANDO	RADIO AND TELEVISION COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT AIRBORNE	\$39,906,590.00	94	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N



FA873021C0022	FA2204 – FA2204 THTR BTTL CNTRL AFLCMC/HBD	RADAR EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT AIRBORNE	\$945,129,586.61	98	Y	FULL AND OPEN COMPETITIO N	N
H9240821C0001	H92408 – HQ USSOCOM	RADAR EQUIPMENT, AIRBORNE	\$264,067,644.32	299	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
N6883621P0264	N68836 – NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR JACKSONVILLE	RADIO AND TELEVISION COMMUNICATIO N EQUIPMENT, AIRBORNE	\$28,534.05	14	Y	COMPETED UNDER SAP	Y
SPRDL123C0014	SPRDL1 – DLA LAND WARREN	GUNS, THROUGH 30MM	\$2,484,977.16	95	Y	FULL AND OPEN COMPETITIO N AFTER EXCLUSION OF SOURCES	Y
N0010423CK912	N00104 – NAVSUP WEAPON SYSTEMS SUPPORT MECH	GUNS, THROUGH 30MM	\$1,012,083.09	68	N	NATIONAL SECURITY (FAR 6.302-6)	Y
W911QX21C0043	W911QX – W6QK ACC-APG ADELPHI	RADIO NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT AIRBORNE	\$3,754,952.00	108	N	NOT COMPETED UNDER SAP	N
N0038325CA025	N00383 – NAVSUP WEAPON SYSTEMS SUPPORT	NIGHT VISION EQUIPMENT, EMITTED AND REFLECTED RADIATION	\$1,995,618.00	126	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
SPE4A725C0005	SPE4A7 – DLA AVIATION	NIGHT VISION EQUIPMENT, EMITTED AND REFLECTED RADIATION	\$3,651,200.00	167	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
SPRDL125C0117	SPRDL1 – DLA LAND WARREN	NIGHT VISION EQUIPMENT, EMITTED AND REFLECTED RADIATION	\$7,958,102.60	216	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N



SPE4A622C0126	SPE4A6 – DLA AVIATION	ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES, COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURES AND QUICK REACTION CAPABILITY EQUIPMENT	\$1,624,411.53	128	Y	COMPETED UNDER SAP	Y
HDTRA124C0046	HDTRA1 – DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY	ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES, COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURES AND QUICK REACTION CAPABILITY EQUIPMENT	\$1,442,155.00	8	N	UNIQUE SOURCE (FAR 6.302-1(B)(1))	N
W56HZV19C0035	W56HZV – W4GG HQ U.S. ARMY TACOM	COMBAT, ASSAULT, AND TACTICAL VEHICLES, TRACKED	\$1,013,885,211.86	391	Y	FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION	N
W56HZV23C0078	W912CH – W6QK ACC- DTA	COMBAT, ASSAULT, AND TACTICAL VEHICLES, TRACKED	\$107,617,952.35	22	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
N0002425C4127	N00024 – NAVSEA HQ	RADAR EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT AIRBORNE	\$145,771,374.00	270	N	AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE (FAR 6.302-5(A)(2)(I))	N
N0002422C5350	N00024 – NAVSEA HQ	GUNS, THROUGH 30MM	\$22,977,537.00	22	N	AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE (FAR 6.302-5(A)(2)(I))	Y
N0017425C0010	N00174 – NSWC INDIAN HEAD DIVISION	GUNS, THROUGH 30MM	\$34,586,649.00	131	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	Y
W52P1J20C0044	W52P1J – W4MM USA JOINT MUNITIONS CMD	RADIO AND TELEVISION COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT AIRBORNE	\$14,609,303.02	100	Y	FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION	Y



W58RGZ23D0058	W58RGZ – W6QK ACC-RSA	ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES, COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURES AND QUICK REACTION CAPABILITY EQUIPMENT	\$481,831,356.00	196	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
FA869124DB007	FA8691 – FA8691 AFLCMC WINK SENSORS	RADIO NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT, AIRBORNE	\$99,900,000.00	178	Y	FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION AFTER EXCLUSION OF SOURCES/ NATIONAL SECURITY (FAR 6.302-6)	N
H9240319D0002	H92403 – HQ USSOCOM	GUNS, THROUGH 30MM	\$49,937,299.50	299	Y	FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION AFTER EXCLUSION OF SOURCES / SMALL BUSINESS SET ASIDE – TOTAL	Y
N6833519D0151	N68335 – NAVAIR WARFARE CTR AIRCRAFT DIV	MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT	\$13,345,514.00	90	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
FA821223C0003	FA8212 – FA8212 AFSC OLH PZABA	MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT	\$312,914.00	77	Y	FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION	N
FMS Services							
W31P4Q22C0060	W31P4Q – W6QK ACC-RSA	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT- GUIDED MISSILES	\$307,100,000.00	21	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
FA862019C2003	FA8620 – FA8620 AFLCMC WIJK BIG SAFARI	SUPPORT-MANAGEMENT: LOGISTICS SUPPORT	\$335,019,012.56	348	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N



FA852325CB001	FA8523 – FA8523 AFLCMC ESKA	SUPPORT-PROFESSIONAL: ENGINEERING/ TECHNICAL	\$175,646,426.13	336	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N
W58RGZ25C0020	W58RGZ – W6QK ACC-RSA	SUPPORT-MANAGEMENT: LOGISTICS SUPPORT	\$1,008,294.00	53	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
N6133122P0045	N61331 – NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER	SUPPORT-PROFESSIONAL: ENGINEERING/ TECHNICAL	\$24,859.58	21	Y	COMPETED UNDER SAP	Y
W91CRB24P5003	W91CRB – W6QK ACC-APG	SUPPORT-PROFESSIONAL: ENGINEERING/ TECHNICAL	\$46,283.00	140	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N
N6133123P0199	N61331 – NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER	SUPPORT-PROFESSIONAL: ENGINEERING/ TECHNICAL	\$62,983.07	27	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	Y
N0042119C0018	N00421 – NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER AIR DIV	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT-WEAPONS	\$30,709,214.21	134	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N
FA823224C0010	FA8232 – FA8232 AFLCMC WWMK	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT-AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS AND ACCESSORIES	\$2,564,093.00	252	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N
HQ014719C5001	HQ0147 – MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY (MDA)	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT-GUIDED MISSILES	\$506,260,950.96	183	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
N0001924C0002	N00019 – NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND	SUPPORT-PROFESSIONAL: ENGINEERING/ TECHNICAL	\$20,353,861.12	321	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N



N0042120C0015	N00421 – NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER AIR DIV	SUPPORT-PROFESSIONAL: PROGRAM MANAGEMENT/ SUPPORT	\$10,347,234.90	69	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N
FA823225DB001	FA8232 – FA8232 AFLCMC WWMK	SUPPORT-PROFESSIONAL: ENGINEERING/ TECHNICAL	\$987,000,000.00	539	Y	FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION	N
W58RGZ20D0069	W58RGZ – W6QK ACC-RSA	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT- ENGINES, TURBINES, AND COMPONENTS	\$342,759,079.00	232	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
W91CRB19D0028	W91CRB – W6QK ACC-APG	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT- WEAPONS	\$130,000,000.00	35	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	Y
FA300223D0009	FA3002 – 338 ESS CC	EDUCATION/ TRAINING– VOCATIONAL/ TECHNICAL	\$89,939,500.00	275	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE – OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
FA300225D0006	FA3002 – 338 ESS CC	EDUCATION/ TRAINING– VOCATIONAL/ TECHNICAL	\$12,876,526.68	44	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE (8(a) sole source)	Y
W15QKN22P0036	W15QKN – W6QK ACC-PICA	EDUCATION/ TRAINING- GENERAL	\$29,000.00	87	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N
W91CRB25C5055	W91CRB – W6QK ACC-APG	EDUCATION/ TRAINING– INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY/ TELECOMMUNICATIONS	\$338,130.00	68	N	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	Y
W91CRB25C5069	W91CRB – W6QK ACC-APG	EDUCATION/ TRAINING– INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY/ TELECOMMUNICATIONS	\$167,971.09	28	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE – OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N



W912ER21C0014	W912ER – W076 ENDIST MIDDLE EAS(PROVIS)	CONSTRUCTION OF OFFICE BUILDINGS	\$10,581,704.73	114	Y	FULL AND OPEN COMPETITIO N	N
FA300222C0003	FA3002 – 338 ESS CC	EDUCATION/ TRAINING- GENERAL	\$4,882,262.50	356	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	Y
FA868924C2025	FA8689 – FA8689 AFLCMC WIIK UAS	SUPPORT- MANAGEMENT: LOGISTICS SUPPORT	\$48,538,640.00	131	N	INTERNATIO NAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N
FA863025CB016	FA8630 – FA8630 AFLCMC WFK AFSAC	SUPPORT- PROFESSIONAL: PROGRAM MANAGEMENT/ SUPPORT	\$4,695,412.92	128	N	INTERNATIO NAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	Y
N6133121P0004	N61331 – NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT- SHIPS, SMALL CRAFT, PONTOONS, AND FLOATING DOCKS	\$135,000.00	23	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	Y
N6134025C0002	N61340 – NAWC TRAINING SYSTEMS DIV	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT- TRAINING AIDS AND DEVICES	\$64,146,202.00	259	N	INTERNATIO NAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N
N6833520P0272	N68335 – NAVAIR WARFARE CTR AIRCRAFT DIV	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT- AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS AND ACCESSORIES	\$99,305.00	65	Y	FULL AND OPEN COMPETITIO N	N
W58RGZ20C0004	W58RGZ – W6QK ACC-RSA	SUPPORT- PROFESSIONAL: ENGINEERING/ TECHNICAL	\$3,967,454.09	299	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
FA861519C6051	FA8615 – FA8615 AFLCMC WAMK F16	SUPPORT- MANAGEMENT: LOGISTICS SUPPORT	\$271,604,175.00	295	N	INTERNATIO NAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N



FA488724P0026	FA4887 – FA4887 56 CONS CC	SUPPORT- PROFESSIONAL: ENGINEERING/ TECHNICAL	\$108,960.00	20	Y	COMPETED UNDER SAP	Y
FA823220C0013	FA8232 – FA8232 AFLCMC WWMK	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT- AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS AND ACCESSORIES	\$1,315,172.04	89	N	INTERNATIO NAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N
W900KK22C0041	W900KK – W6QK ACC- ORLANDO	EDUCATION/ TRAINING- OTHER	\$6,650,212.99	119	N	INTERNATIO NAL AGREEMENT (FAR 6.302-4)	N
Non-FMS Services							
FA930124P0046	FA9301 – FA9301 AFTC PZIO	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT- AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS AND ACCESSORIES	\$85,625.20	51	Y	COMPETED UNDER SAP	Y
N6449825P2037	N64498 – NSWC PHILADELPHIA DIV	SUPPORT- PROFESSIONAL: ENGINEERING/ TECHNICAL	\$41,682.00	29	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	Y
W911QX25C0006	W911QX – W6QK ACC-APG ADELPHI	SUPPORT- PROFESSIONAL: ENGINEERING/ TECHNICAL	\$15,357,924.36	83	N	AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE (FAR 6.302- 5(A)(2)(I))	Y
FA850522C0002	FA8505 – FA8505 AFLCMC WAQKB	SUPPORT- PROFESSIONAL: ENGINEERING/ TECHNICAL	\$3,949,527.68	200	N	AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE (FAR 6.302- 5(A)(2)(I))	Y
FA301624C0001	FA3016 – FA3016 502 CONS CL	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT- AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS AND ACCESSORIES	\$3,208,069.80	61	N	AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE (FAR 6.302- 5(A)(2)(I))	Y



FA521524C0028	FA5215 – FA5215 766 ESS PKP	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT- AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS AND ACCESSORIES	\$4,131,120.00	34	Y	COMPETED UNDER SAP	Y
W912JM23C0002	W912JM – W7M3 USPFO ACTIVITY GA ARNG	SUPPORT- MANAGEMENT: LOGISTICS SUPPORT	\$1,102,365.16	19	N	AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE (FAR 6.302- 5(A)(2)(I))	Y
N0025322C0003	N00253 – NAVAL UNDERSEA WARFARE CENTER	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT- WEAPONS	\$14,873,939.99	26	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
HT003824C0001	HT0038 – DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY	SUPPORT- PROFESSIONAL: PROGRAM MANAGEMENT/ SUPPORT	\$14,297,931.73	35	N	AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE (FAR 6.302- 5(A)(2)(I))	Y
HDTRA121C0054	HDTRA1 – DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY	SUPPORT- PROFESSIONAL: ENGINEERING/ TECHNICAL	\$185,346,482.00	344	Y	FULL AND OPEN COMPETITIO N	N
W31P4Q23C0014	W31P4Q – W6QK ACC-RSA	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT- GUIDED MISSILES	\$240,551,321.00	23	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
N0003022C6002	N00030 – STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT- GUIDED MISSILES	\$252,076,583.00	140	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
W52P1J19C0010	W52P1J – W4MM USA JOINT MUNITIONS CMD	SUPPORT- MANAGEMENT: LOGISTICS SUPPORT	\$227,328,475.37	36	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
W58RGZ19C0024	W58RGZ – W6QK ACC-RSA	SUPPORT- MANAGEMENT: LOGISTICS SUPPORT	\$663,401,809.34	193	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N



HT001122C0010	HT0011 – DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY	EDUCATION/ TRAINING – OTHER	\$4,187,716.00	61	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	Y
N6852025P0036	N68520 – FLEET READINESS CENTER	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT-SHIPS, SMALL CRAFT, PONTOONS, AND FLOATING DOCKS	\$125,000.00	43	Y	COMPETED UNDER SAP	Y
W900KK20C0050	W900KK – W6QK ACC-ORLANDO	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT-TRAINING AIDS AND DEVICES	\$38,807,490.00	10	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
HDTRA119C0035	HDTRA1 – DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY	SUPPORT-PROFESSIONAL: PROGRAM MANAGEMENT/ SUPPORT	\$6,339,488.00	122	Y	FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION AFTER EXCLUSION OF SOURCES/ SMALL BUSINESS SET ASIDE – TOTAL	Y
FA255020P0032	FA2550 – FA2550 50 CONS PKP	SUPPORT-PROFESSIONAL: ENGINEERING/ TECHNICAL	\$64,500.00	19	Y	COMPETED UNDER SAP	Y
N6660423P0607	N66604 – NUWC DIV NEWPORT	SUPPORT-PROFESSIONAL: ENGINEERING/ TECHNICAL	\$25,462.44	15	Y	COMPETED UNDER SAP	N
N0042124P2111	N00421 – NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER AIR DIV	SUPPORT-PROFESSIONAL: ENGINEERING/ TECHNICAL	\$110,000.00	11	Y	COMPETED UNDER SAP	N
N6523622C1005	N65236 – NIWC ATLANTIC	SUPPORT-MANAGEMENT: LOGISTICS SUPPORT	\$48,490,262.12	114	N	AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE (FAR 6.302-5(A)(2)(I))	N
N0016421PW011	N00164 – NSWC CRANE	EDUCATION/ TRAINING-GENERAL	\$30,000.00	15	N	NOT COMPETED UNDER SAP	Y
FA300220C0002	FA3002 – FA3002 338 ESS CC	EDUCATION/ TRAINING-GENERAL	\$4,395,243.44	38	N	AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE (FAR 6.302-5(A)(2)(I))	Y
W52P1J20C0034	W52P1J – W4MM USA JOINT MUNITIONS CMD	EDUCATION/ TRAINING-INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY/ TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRAINING	\$257,400.00	14	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE-OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N



FA521519CA013	FA5215 – FA5215 766 ESS PKP	EDUCATION/ TRAINING- INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY/ TELECOMMUNIC ATIONS TRAINING	\$104,000.00	16	Y	COMPETED UNDER SAP	Y
W50S9824C0001	W50S98 – W7N1 USPFO ACTIVITY TNANG 134	CONSTRUCTION OF OFFICE BUILDINGS	\$12,378,000.00	124	Y	FULL AND OPEN COMPETITIO N AFTER EXCLUSION OF SOURCES/ SMALL BUSINESS SET ASIDE – TOTAL	Y
H9240323D0010	H92403 – HQ USSOCOM	EDUCATION/ TRAINING- VOCATIONAL/ TECHNICAL	\$59,970,000.00	133	Y	FULL AND OPEN COMPETITIO N	Y
N3220524D0033	N32205 – MSCHQ NORFOLK	EDUCATION/ TRAINING- VOCATIONAL/ TECHNICAL	\$36,056,405.00	113	Y	FULL AND OPEN COMPETITIO N	Y
FA812223D0004	FA8122 – FA8122 AFSC PZAAB	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT- ENGINES, TURBINES, AND COMPONENTS	\$424,297,874.13	189	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
FA823219D0005	FA8232 – FA8232 AFLCMC WWMK	MAINT/REPAIR/ REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT- WEAPONS	\$200,000,000.00	565	N	ONLY ONE SOURCE- OTHER (FAR 6.302-1 OTHER)	N
FA703724D0001	FA7037 – FA7037 AMIC DET 2 JBSA	SUPPORT- PROFESSIONAL: ENGINEERING/ TECHNICAL	\$400,000,000.00	149	Y	FULL AND OPEN COMPETITIO N	N



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