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Defense Real Estate Acquisition and Management Vis-a-Vis the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense of the Philippines: A Strategic Coherence Approach

June 2026

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Prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943.

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ABSTRACT

This capstone research report provides an in-depth analysis of the strategic coherence of defense real estate acquisition and management in relation to the Philippines' Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC). Using the Three-Legged Stool framework (Ends-Ways-Means), the research examines the alignment of the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Security Policy (NSP), National Defense Strategy (NDS), legal frameworks, and institutional arrangements governing defense real estate. The study focuses on the interagency roles and coordination among the Department of National Defense (DND), Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Department of Agrarian Reform, National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), Land Registration Authority (LRA), and the Local Government Units (LGUs). Findings reveal that the Philippines does not suffer from a strategy problem but from systemic governance execution issues characterized by fragmented authority, legal rigidity, institutional silos, local-national disconnect, and sequential governance. While the NSS, NSP, NDS, and CADC are strategically aligned, the governance system remains fragmented and inefficient. The study concludes that defense real estate is not fully treated as a strategic capability and recommends establishing a Centralized Defense Real Estate Authority and a National Defense Real Estate Strategy to improve governance integration and support CADC.



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING	1
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
B.	PROBLEM STATEMENT	4
	1. Primary Research Question	5
	2. Secondary Research Questions.....	5
C.	OBJECTIVES OF THE PROBLEM.....	5
D.	SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY	6
E.	SCOPE AND LIMITATION	6
F.	METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW.....	7
G.	CAPSTONE RESEARCH REPORT OUTLINE	8
II.	LITERATURE REVIEW	11
A.	INTRODUCTION TO THE REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE	11
B.	ARCHIPELAGIC DEFENSE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS	11
	1. Geography as a Determinant of Military Strategy	12
	2. Archipelagic Defense Theory as a Strategic Framework for the Philippines.....	13
C.	PHILIPPINE DEFENSE POLICY AND STRATEGIC FRAMEWORKS.....	15
D.	MILITARY MODERNIZATION, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND DEFENSE REAL ESTATE AS CAPABILITY ENABLERS	17
E.	LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND KEY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN DEFENSE REAL ESTATE GOVERNANCE	18
F.	INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, AND THE LGUS' ROLE	20
G.	STRATEGIC COHERENCE, GRAND STRATEGY, AND POLICY INTEGRATION	23
H.	LITERATURE GAP.....	25
III.	RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	29
A.	RESEARCH DESIGN	29
B.	DATA SOURCES AND DATA COLLECTION	30
C.	DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURES	31
D.	VALIDITY, RELIABILITY, AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS	32



E.	RESEARCH FRAMEWORK.....	33
IV.	ANALYSIS OF LEGAL, POLICY, AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS	35
A.	INTRODUCTION: THREE-LEGGED STOOL ANALYSIS.....	35
B.	ENDS: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES.....	35
1.	The NSP, NSS, NDS, and CADC Strategic Framework	35
2.	Synthesis on the Ends: Strategic Objectives.....	37
C.	WAYS: LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN RELATION TO CADC	38
1.	Constitutional Provisions and Their Impact on CADC	38
2.	Fragmented Legal Regime	39
3.	Synthesis on Legal Frameworks in Relation to CADC	43
D.	WAYS: INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND LGU DYNAMICS.....	43
1.	Interagency Coordination Challenges and Policy Conflicts	44
2.	Synthesis on the Ways: Interagency Coordination and LGU Dynamics	51
E.	MEANS: LAND, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY	52
1.	Defense Land Assets and Physical Infrastructure	52
2.	Institutional Capacity and Constraints.....	55
3.	Synthesis on the Means: Land, Infrastructure, and Institutional Capacity	58
F.	THE STRATEGIC COHERENCE ASSESSMENT	59
V.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	61
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	61
B.	OVERALL CONCLUSION.....	61
C.	KEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS	62
D.	STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS.....	69
E.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	71
F.	AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH.....	77
G.	FINAL SYNTHESIS.....	78
	APPENDIX A. DRAFT FRAMEWORK FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENSE REAL ESTATE STRATEGY 2026–2036.....	79
	APPENDIX B. CENTRALIZED DEFENSE REAL ESTATE AUTHORITY DRAFT BILL	86



LIST OF REFERENCES	93
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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	The Three-Legged Stool Framework. Adapted from Lykke (1989).....	34
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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Strategic Framework Alignment. Adapted from National Security Council (2023).	37
Table 2.	Statutory Laws Governing Defense Real Estate in Relation to CADC. Adapted from The LawPhil Project (2026).	41
Table 3.	Institutional and Interagency Mapping of Defense Real Estate Governance. Adapted from EO 292 (1987), The Local Government Code (1991) and The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (1997).	44
Table 4.	DND/AFP Real Estate Covered under BCDA Law. Adapted from Bases Conversion and Development Authority (1992).	49
Table 5.	Summary of the AFP Modernization Program Funds Allocation. Adapted from Department of Budget and Management (2026).	54
Table 6.	Institutional Resources in Defense Real Estate Governance. Adapted from EO 292 (1987), RA 7160 (1991), and RA 8371 (1997).	57



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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A&D	alienable and disposable
AADS	Active Archipelagic Defense Strategy
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFPM	Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program
AFPSBP	Armed Forces of the Philippines Strategic Basing Plan
BCDA	Bases Conversion and Development Authority
BSSD	Bases/System Support Development
CA	Commonwealth Act
CAD	Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense
CADC	Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept
CARP	Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
CARPER	Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Extension with Reforms
CDREA	Centralized Defense Real Estate Authority
DAR	Department of Agrarian Reform
DENR	Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DND	Department of National Defense
DPG	defense planning guidance
ECC	environmental compliance certificate
EEZ	exclusive economic zone
ENIPAS	Expanded National Integrated Protected Areas System
EWM	ends, ways, and means
EO	executive order
FOB	forward operating bases
FPIC	free, prior, and informed consent
GIS	geographic information systems
IP	indigenous people
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
LGUs	local government units
LRA	Land Registration Authority



NCIP	National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NDRES	National Defense Real Estate Strategy
NSC	National Security Council
NSP	National Security Policy
NSS	National Security Strategy
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OASPP	Office of the Assistant Secretary for Plans and Programs
PD	Presidential Decree
PMC	Philippine Marine Corps
RA	Republic Act
WPS	West Philippine Sea



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This research examines the strategic coherence between defense real estate acquisition and management and the implementation of the Philippines' Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC). The study argues that defense real estate is a critical component of national defense because land, military bases, infrastructure, and strategic facilities, among others, directly support territorial defense, force projection, logistics, maritime domain awareness, and operational readiness in an archipelagic environment.

Using Lykke's (1989) Three-Legged Stool (Ends-Ways-Means), the study analyzes how the strategic ends embodied in the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Security Policy (NSP), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and CADC are translated into operational realities through governance systems and institutional mechanisms. The study emphasizes that the Philippines possesses a coherent strategic vision for archipelagic defense, but its effective implementation depends heavily on the governance and management of defense real estate.

The study uses a qualitative, descriptive, and policy-analytic approach. The "Ends" focused on the strategic objectives of national defense and territorial security. The "Ways" examined the legal frameworks, institutional arrangements, and interagency coordination mechanisms governing the acquisition and management of defense real estate. The "Means" assessed the availability and utilization of the lands, infrastructure, and institutional capacities necessary to implement the CADC. Likewise, the study analyzed constitutional provisions (Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987), national laws, executive issuances, defense modernization policies, interagency mandates, and institutional processes involving the Department of National Defense (DND), Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), Land Registration Authority (LRA) and local government units (LGUs).



The findings reveal that the Philippines does not suffer from a strategic deficiency but from systemic governance problems (Lanzona, 2019). The study identified fragmented authority as a major issue because no single institution exercises centralized control over defense real estate governance. Responsibilities are distributed among multiple agencies with overlapping mandates and differing institutional priorities, resulting in weak coordination, prolonged decision-making, and inconsistent policy implementation (Macapinlac et al., 2024). The study also found that legal rigidity significantly constrains defense development. Constitutional protections for property rights, agrarian reform, environmental regulations, ancestral domain protections, and land classification procedures create lengthy, inflexible acquisition processes that delay military infrastructure projects and strategic basing initiatives. Furthermore, institutional silos prevent collaborative governance, and a local-national disconnect between national defense priorities and LGUs' interests generates resistance to defense-related projects (Fikadu, 2025).

The study further concludes that sequential governance processes undermine the responsiveness required by the CADC. Government procedures largely remain linear rather than integrated or parallel, causing delays in project approvals, infrastructure development, land conversion, and strategic investments. These governance inefficiencies hinder the operationalization of CADC, particularly in strategically sensitive areas that require rapid infrastructure development and distributed defense capabilities. The analysis demonstrates that although the strategic “Ends” of the NSS, NSP, NDS, and CADC are coherent and mutually reinforcing, the “Ways” and “means” necessary to implement them remain fragmented and underdeveloped. Consequently, defense real estate is not effectively mobilized to support the strategic and operational requirements of the country's archipelagic defense posture.

To address these challenges, the study recommends establishing a Centralized Defense Real Estate Authority (CDREA) to integrate and coordinate all defense real estate functions across government agencies. It also proposes the formulation of the National Defense Real Estate Strategy (NDRES) that directly aligns defense land governance with



CADC objectives, modernization priorities, basing requirements, and infrastructure investments. The study further recommends legal reforms to streamline defense-related land acquisition and regulatory procedures while balancing constitutional safeguards and national security requirements. Additional recommendations include the institutionalization of interagency coordination mechanisms, integrated planning frameworks, shared information systems, and strong collaboration between national and local governments. The study concludes that the success of the CADC depends not only on military modernization and strategic planning but also on the Philippines' ability to strategically govern, acquire, manage, and mobilize defense real estate in support of national defense objectives.

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DISCLOSURES

This study utilized artificial intelligence (AI) tools for general writing assistance, including checking grammar, improving sentence structure, adjusting verb tense consistency, and refining active and passive voice usage. It is also used to enhance transitional phrases and develop concise headings, figure titles, and table captions.

Additionally, AI tools were used to brainstorm the research report's organization and structure. It also helped the researcher identify relevant studies for the literature review. The researcher maintained full responsibility for the accuracy, originality, and integrity of this study.



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I. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING

A. INTRODUCTION

As an archipelagic state composed of more than 7,600 islands and positioned at the crossroads of major maritime routes, the Philippines national defense is inherently shaped by geography. It necessitates a strategy capable of protecting its territorial integrity across land, sea, and air domains, as mandated by its Constitution (The Philippine Constitution, 1987). However, the country's defense policy prioritized internal security concerns, particularly insurgency and domestic instability, resulting in limited emphasis on external defense and territorial protection (De Castro, 2016). In fact, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have been compelled to fight with communist insurgents and Islamic groups alike, and the focus has been on internal defense (Kuznetsov et al., 2017)

After decades of attention to internal security operations and recent tensions over its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in January 2024, the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC) was implemented to strengthen the capability of the Philippines in protecting its territory, ensuring that the present and future Filipino generations can benefit from and sustain the country's natural resources (Nepomuceno, 2024). The CADC is the Philippines' first "grand strategy" that shifts military operations from internal counterinsurgency to external territorial defense. As a strategy, it seeks to address the Philippines' strategic vulnerabilities and strengthen the military's capacity to protect national interests through targeted long-term plans and initiatives (De Castro, 2024).

The CADC is a whole-of-nation strategy on a multi-domain defense posture that protects Philippine sovereignty, sovereign rights, and territorial integrity by integrating military, civilian, legal, economic, and diplomatic instruments across the entire archipelago. Furthermore, the current geopolitical shifts now mandate an urgent transition toward archipelagic defense, requiring the integration of real estate management with military infrastructure development to support a more credible and sustained presence across the archipelago (Villarin, 2025). Considering this, the AFP must strengthen its



defense capabilities, which depend not only on weapons systems and force structure but also on the strategic acquisition, development, and management of defense real estate.

The strategy views bases as strategic nodes rather than just isolated installations, emphasizing that location matters more than the base size. Recognizing a distributed and resilient posture across the archipelago, CADC prioritizes maritime domain awareness and emphasizes forward and distributed defense, treating islands and coastal areas as defense assets. This strategy necessitates transforming defense real estate from inland, population-centered camps to coastal island-based and strategically dispersed installations. The CADC by itself provides the “Ends” of the defense strategy. On the other hand, the governance processes, interagency coordination, and policy implementation on the AFP Modernization Program (AFPMP), among others, constitute the “Ways.” The “Means” necessary to achieve the “Ends” include defense real estate, infrastructure, funding, and institutional capacity.

Thus, defense real estate should neither be viewed as a repository of military units nor merely an administrative asset. It serves as a strategic enabler for the military, a force multiplier, and a deterrence enabler. Defense real estate provides sites for military camps, air bases, and naval stations. Likewise, it hosts the logistics hubs, depots, and maintenance facilities of the AFP’s different units and provides training and operational staging areas. Additionally, it is important to emphasize that the country’s defense real estate serves as a physical foundation upon which the military’s operational readiness, territorial control, force projection, and sustainment depend (De Castro, 2025a).

Although the effective alignment of defense real estate acquisition and management with the long-term objective of comprehensive archipelagic defense is both a strategic necessity and governance imperative, the enactment of the AFP Modernization Program (Republic Act [RA] 7898, 1995) did not reflect it. The law aimed to modernize the AFP for 15 years, focusing more on weapons systems and equipment and emphasizing the AFP’s capability development, force restructuring, logistics and support systems, and infrastructure and basing requirements (RA 7898, 1995).



Furthermore, to revitalize, strengthen, and extend the AFPMP for another 15 years, RA 7898 was amended by the Revised AFP Modernization Program (RA 10349, 2012). The new law reoriented the AFP from internal security operations toward external defense, maritime security, and territorial integrity. It stressed sustainability, logistics, and support systems, not just platform and weapons. As a result, the defense real estate must focus on forward operating bases and naval and air facilities in strategic coastal and island areas that would serve as surveillance, radar, and communications sites.

Likewise, the revised AFPMP necessitated the acquisition and development of land in maritime chokepoints, peripheral and archipelagic regions, and areas supporting air and naval power projection. The new law has structured modernization horizons with defined capabilities, emphasizing long-term planning that requires synchronization among land acquisition, infrastructure development, and capability timelines. This requires anticipating future force structure and basing needs by master planning military bases and long-term land banking to meet future defense requirements, thereby reducing long-term operating costs and infrastructure redundancy. The revised AFPMP impliedly allowed the AFP to consolidate camps and facilities, dispose of and convert excess and unutilized lands, or jointly or dual-use development of its camps and bases.

On the other hand, the enactment of RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Authority, 1992) had a great impact on the defense real estate governance. While it brought economic benefits, it contributed minimal modernization funds through the conversion of former military bases into economic zones, because the primary intent of this law is to develop and convert the lands covered under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America for productive civilian use. It also introduced tensions between economic development objectives and long-term defense requirements, as it reduces land areas primarily intended for military use and defense operations.

Moreover, defense real estate acquisition and management have received limited strategic attention. The same is further complicated by a fragmented institutional framework involving multiple government agencies. Defense real estate governance has been evolving because of overlapping institutional mandates and strong local autonomy. It



can be noted that military lands, particularly those classified as reservations, were established through presidential proclamations. Thus, the AFP holds those reservations as an administrator and does not own those lands, thereby denying the military full control of them.

On the other hand, land classifications, ownership, and disposition were governed by public land laws and environmental regulations. These create overlapping institutional mandates and strong local autonomy involving the Department of National Defense (DND), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Land Registration Authority (LRA), National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA), and the different Local Government Units (LGUs). These issues contribute to misalignment with the government's comprehensive archipelagic defense strategy, which counters the evolving territorial challenges the country faces.

Considering the strategic importance of defense real estate governance, there is a need to study this gap by examining the strategic coherence between defense real estate acquisition and management and CADC to ensure that infrastructure and land resources are strategically leveraged to support capability, readiness, and force projection as embodied in its comprehensive archipelagic defense strategy.

B. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Considering the strategic importance of defense real estate, there is insufficient integration between its acquisition and management and the country's comprehensive archipelagic defense posture. At present, defense real estate governance is characterized by fragmented institutional authority, legal ambiguity, and weak integration with defense planning and modernization. There is a limited understanding of how it supports or constrains the implementation of CADC. To address this concern, this study aims to address the lack of strategic coherence between the comprehensive archipelagic objectives and the governance of the Philippines' defense real estate.

To achieve this, the study answers the following real estate problems:



1. Primary Research Question

- What are the legal and policy frameworks governing the acquisition and management of defense real estate, strategically aligned with the Philippines' Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense (CAD) objectives?

2. Secondary Research Questions

- How do institutional arrangements and interagency coordination affect the strategic coherence between real estate governance and AFP's archipelagic defense and modernization requirements?
- What national policy and institutional reforms are needed to enhance strategic coherence between defense real estate acquisition and management and the objectives of comprehensive archipelagic defense?

C. OBJECTIVES OF THE PROBLEM

The primary objective of this study is to examine how defense real estate acquisition and management can be strategically aligned with the Philippines comprehensive archipelagic defense and military's modernization requirements to enhance capability development, basing infrastructure, and long-term defense readiness.

To achieve this overarching purpose, the study seeks to accomplish the following specific objectives:

1. Analyze legal and policy frameworks governing defense real estate acquisition and management, and their strategic alignment with the Philippines' CAD objectives.
2. Assess institutional and operational coherence in defense estate governance.
3. Evaluate the strategic alignment of defense real estate governance with the Philippines' CAD.
4. Develop and propose policy and institutional reforms to enhance strategic alignment and governance effectiveness.



D. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is significant in understanding how defense real estate acquisition and management directly influence the achievement of the Philippines' CAD objectives. By examining the legal and policy frameworks governing defense and real estate acquisition and management, and evaluating the alignment between the real estate governance and the country's comprehensive archipelagic defense posture, vis-à-vis the military's modernization requirements, the research contributes to establishing strategic coherence and ensuring that land-related decisions support capability development, long-term basing requirements, and the over-all modernization program of the AFP. The study also enriches the fundamental link between territorial defense and land governance, bridging administrative theory with national security imperatives.

This study assists the DND in formulating or refining policies that integrate defense real estate governance with national archipelagic defense posture and military modernization planning. The findings can support the development of clearer guidelines for land acquisition, disposition, and development that align with strategic capabilities, thereby enhancing policy coherence, accountability, and long-term planning.

The study helps the AFP establish a more unified and institutionalized framework for aligning real estate management with its role in the country's comprehensive archipelagic defense, particularly in achieving its capability development goals across the three Horizon phases of the AFPMP. It offers governance and legal mechanisms to optimize defense land assets, strengthen interagency collaborations,

The findings provide the public with insights into how the government is working to ensure that the protection of the country's territorial integrity is responsibly planned, economically sound, and supportive of community development. By clarifying how real estate decisions impact defense readiness and national security, the study promotes transparency and informed public discourse.

E. SCOPE AND LIMITATION

This study examines the strategic misalignment between defense real estate management practices and the CADC's objectives. Specifically, it analyzes how legal and



policy frameworks governing defense real estate acquisition and management are strategically aligned with the Philippines' Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense objectives.

To this end, an examination is conducted of the country's defense real estate governance in relation to the CAD as articulated in the official government and defense documents. This study also examines the institutional arrangements and interagency coordination that affect the strategic coherence between real estate governance and the AFP's archipelagic defense and modernization requirements. During this study, national laws, defense real estate governance policies, and institutions strategically involved in achieving the CAD are considered.

This research also studies what national policy and institutional reforms should be implemented to enhance strategic coherence between real estate acquisition and management and the Philippines' comprehensive archipelagic defense posture. This research evaluates issues documented in official reports, such as those from the DND, as well as relevant defense resource management studies.

The study is also limited in several ways. This study has limited access to classified and sensitive defense property data, and analysis relies primarily on publicly available documents, audit reports, and secondary literature. The study focuses on developments and documentation from 2010 onward, corresponding to the implementation phases of the AFP Modernization Program.

Earlier historical factors were referenced only when necessary for context. Lastly, the study excludes interviews, primary field research, and quantitative geospatial or cost-benefit analysis.

F. METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW

This study employs a qualitative-descriptive and policy analysis approach to how legal and policy frameworks governing defense real estate acquisition and management are strategically aligned with the country's Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense objectives.



By examining the interplay between legal and policy frameworks and the objectives of the CADC to determine its strategic alignment. This analytical approach allows for a nuanced understanding of real estate management as both an administrative function and a strategic enabler of defense modernization.

To guide the analysis, the study examines theories of strategic coherence, focusing on how well organizational actions, policies, and resource systems align with the CADC's overarching objectives. It also reviews frameworks related to institutional integration and public asset optimization, providing conceptual foundations for assessing how defense real estate can be effectively synchronized with military capability planning. These theoretical perspectives help identify which elements of the current system both enable and hinder coherence.

The research employs documentary and content analyses to identify patterns, gaps, and misalignments in existing laws, policies, procedures, and organizational practices related to defense real estate governance and military modernization requirements. These methods allow systematic examination and scrutiny of official documents such as property management directives, modernization plans, audit reports, and legal issuances. The goal is to identify recurring issues in institutional arrangements and interagency coordination that affect the strategic coherence between real estate governance and the AFP's archipelagic defense and modernization requirements.

It also focuses on the challenges and successes in institutional coherence, process alignment, interagency coordination, and the impact of real estate issues on CADC's objectives. Analysis of these challenges and successes, combined with the policy and documentary findings, serves as the basis for developing a Strategic Coherence Framework that integrates alignment among doctrine, institutions, and land governance.

G. CAPSTONE RESEARCH REPORT OUTLINE

The structure of this research is organized to ensure a thorough understanding of the importance of strategic coherence between the defense real estate acquisition and management and the objective of the comprehensive archipelagic defense.



This study covers the following chapters:

- Chapter I introduces the study and discusses the strategic importance of the research.
- Chapter II reviews related literature.
- Chapter III presents the research methodology.
- Chapter IV analyzes legal, policy, and institutional arrangements.
- Chapter V presents findings, conclusions, and recommendations.



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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION TO THE REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

The alignment of defense real estate governance with defense strategy, institutional arrangements, and modernization objectives is very much critical to national defense, especially in an archipelagic state like the Philippines.

To better understand this, important reviews using a strategic coherence approach were made on scholarly-written references related to defense real estate acquisition and management vis-à-vis the Philippines' CAD. Similarly, to identify the critical gaps in this interdisciplinary research, a thematic approach was used to synthesize the reviews of strategic studies, military geography, public land governance, defense policy, and Philippine national security literature.

Likewise, due to the sensitivity and classification of the data, the reviews were based on documentary sources. Interviews and surveys, among other fieldwork methods, were not conducted, but this study strictly adhered to the design methodology, ensuring analytical rigor.

B. ARCHIPELAGIC DEFENSE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

The concept of archipelagic defense is a strategic framework developed by the Philippines in response to increasing maritime security challenges in the West Philippine Sea (De Castro, 2025b). This strategy is applicable to maritime states composed of multiple islands for organizing defense posture, force deployment, and domain awareness across dispersed maritime territories. It emphasizes integrating the land, sea, and air domains to ensure the security of a state's dispersed geographic features and extensive maritime zone. The archipelagic defense concept recognizes that the defense of an archipelago cannot rely solely on territorial occupation but must incorporate dynamic, flexible operational strategies (Baquisal, 2025).



1. Geography as a Determinant of Military Strategy

In the national defense arena, geography is viewed as a permanent factor that dictates how nations plan for war and peace. The physical landscape remains constant, unlike technology and alliances that may change over time. Hence, in geopolitics, a leader's choices are neither purely personal nor ideological: the physical world forces them. Physical realities of the land, including mountains, rivers, seas, and deserts, limit leaders' options (Marshall & Scarlett, 2015).

Geographic systems are complex, in which interactions among numerous components, such as terrain, climate, human infrastructure, and military units, produce outcomes that are not simply the sum of their parts (Manson, 2009). Manson (2009) views military geography as non-static, where the intersection of natural factors and man-made road networks creates a complex environment. Hence, a strategist must view that certain terrain is a natural factor that influences logistics and combat.

Furthermore, geography, acting as the physical setting for strategic action, is a primary source of friction and remains central to national security as a determinant of force posture, logistics, and basing, rejecting the notion that technology has rendered physical location irrelevant (Gray, 2016). On the other hand, emphasis must be placed on the importance of considering the permanence of terrain and location, and on noting that ignoring physical maps leads to strategic failure (Kaplan, 2013).

Classical strategic theorists such as Carl Von Clausewitz emphasized that war is shaped by terrain, space, and physical constraints (Clausewitz et al., 1984). He considered geography as a dynamic friction that makes the simple difficult shapes the probability of victory. Accordingly, Clausewitz argues that defense is the stronger form of fighting than attack. Likewise, Clausewitz emphasized that natural obstacles make defenders inherently stronger because geography dictates the lines of operation along which they can move, while the attackers are stretched thin by the natural obstacles of a foreign landscape. It is important to highlight the importance of geographic features, such as island chains that function as both barriers and strategic platforms in maritime operations, underscoring the



value of island-based infrastructure in shaping military operations, especially in the Indo-Pacific region (Erickson & Wuthnow, 2016).

The different studies on military geography recognize that the control, access, and denial of space are foundational to military effectiveness. These studies view land not merely as a physical asset but as a strategic enabler that conditions the feasibility of effective military operations. Geography is also a force multiplier when leveraged through appropriate basing and infrastructure.

2. Archipelagic Defense Theory as a Strategic Framework for the Philippines

Archipelagic defense theory involves the strategic, legal, and defensive island nations through military operationalization. Its core functions emphasize sea control, sea denial, and maritime domain awareness. The theory highlights the challenges faced by states composed of dispersed islands in securing their extensive maritime borders and exclusive economic zones (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Plan and Programs [OASPP], Department of National Defense [DND], 2018). These necessitate specialized military strategies that leverage geographic dispersion and interconnected nodes (Baquisal, 2025).

Baquisal (2025) argues that archipelagic defense strategically covers basing distribution, maritime and air denial, and the rapid maneuverability across domains. Islands and chokepoints derive their defensive value from the ability to support a sustained presence rather than symbolic occupation. This concept underscores the importance of strategic locations in establishing enduring operational capabilities that enable effective surveillance, interdiction, and the projection of power across a vast maritime domain.

On the other hand, Krepinevich, Jr. (2023) proposes a distributed defense posture and argues that large military bases are increasingly vulnerable to precision strike capabilities. To have a resilient defense system, Krepinevich, Jr. (2023) suggests that a country must prioritize the distribution of bases, logistics systems, and integrated surveillance networks that can support multi-domain operations.



In the Philippine context, this kind of perspective is evident in the development of the CADC. This reflects a doctrinal shift in the Philippines defense planning that seeks to exploit the country's geographic configuration to enhance deterrence and defense capabilities (Baquisal, 2025). Baquisal (2025) opines that this strategy is not merely anchored on generic territorial defense principles. It relies on a combination of forward basing, coastal defense systems, maritime surveillance networks, and integrated air and missile defense. Likewise, CADC is a coherent attempt at organizing military strategy around the defense of an archipelago after decades of concentration on counterinsurgency operations against communist and secessionist movements.

With growing tensions in the country's maritime domain, the CADC enables the resourcing, allocation, and infrastructure development for maritime defense. It thereby recognizes that archipelagic defense is fundamentally a spatial strategy where distributed basing, mobility, and geographical dispersal are vital to complicate an adversary's targeting capability across multiple islands and maritime chokepoints. Furthermore, the Philippines must pursue a balanced strategy and emphasize that strengthening national capabilities is essential for protecting national interests and maintaining sovereignty in contested maritime areas (De Castro, 2016). Similarly, De Castro (2016) has emphasized that the Philippines has increasingly adopted a hard-balanced approach, allowing increased defense spending, modernization efforts, and the adoption of the CADC.

Specifically, the country's National Security Policy (NSP) 2023–2028 (National Security Council [NSC], 2023), being an overarching strategic framework guiding national defense planning, resource allocation, and institutional coordination among government agencies, has laid out the long-term national security vision of the Philippines. It envisions the country as a “free, resilient, peaceful and prosperous archipelagic and maritime nation, enabled and protected by reliable defense and public safety systems” (NSC, 2023). This vision underscores the country's development of a robust and adaptive defense posture capable of safeguarding its territorial integrity and maritime interests against evolving regional threats (Putra, 2026).

The NSP also highlights the importance of a whole-of-government approach to achieving maritime, air, land, and space security by emphasizing the need to strengthen



maritime awareness and surveillance capabilities through expanded radar networks, satellite-based monitoring systems, and forward operating bases strategically located across the archipelago. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) 2018–2022, supporting the NSP, provided that, as an archipelagic state, the Philippines must maintain effective territorial defense capabilities and ensure the protection of maritime domains and sea lines of communication (OASPP, DND, 2018).

Complementing this strategic objective, the Philippine Navy has implemented the Active Archipelagic Defense Strategy (AADS), aimed at repositioning the Navy from a coastal patrol force to a more capable maritime defense organization that can protect the country's exclusive economic zone (Ulay, 2021). This shift requires not only new equipment but also new operational doctrines, training systems, and infrastructure because survivability and resilience are key features of archipelagic defense. With technological advancements in precision weapons, multiple smaller bases may be more resilient than a few large installations, thereby underscoring the importance of defense real estate planning and management.

However, CADC, being the Philippines first coherent attempt to strengthen its national defense, remains an evolving framework. It requires a clearer articulation of operational priorities and implementation mechanisms. Without a detailed planning for infrastructure, logistics, and governance, CADC as a strategy may just remain a largely aspirational one (Baquisal, 2025).

These studies view archipelagic defense as the foundation of the Philippines' contemporary defense policy. However, it fails to discuss how archipelagic defense as a strategic defense can be implemented through coherent legal, institutional arrangements, and defense real estate governance systems.

C. PHILIPPINE DEFENSE POLICY AND STRATEGIC FRAMEWORKS

Philippine defense policy is anchored on three key documents: the NSP, NSS, and the NDS. These policy frameworks collectively articulate the country's strategic direction, emphasizing a shift from internal security to a robust external defense posture, particularly in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) (De Castro, 2024). It considers maritime and airspace



security a critical priority to safeguard the country's territorial integrity and sovereignty (Misalucha-Willoughby, 2024).

The NSP lays out the foundation of the country's national security goals and objectives. In particular, the NSP provides a comprehensive framework that integrates the military and non-military dimensions of security, and emphasizes a whole-of-nation approach, infrastructure, and resource management in national defense (NSC, 2023).

Furthermore, the NSS operationalizes these principles by identifying key threats and priorities (Memorandum Circular No. 75, 2024). The NSS emphasizes maritime security, interagency coordination, and infrastructure development as essential components of national security. The NSS identifies strengthening of territorial defense capabilities as a critical priority to ensure maritime security, particularly in the WPS (Kuznetsov et al., 2017).

The NDS translates these priorities into military strategy, focusing on modernization, joint operations, and infrastructure development. This is further elaborated in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), which restructures the AFP to effectively address challenges to territorial integrity and maritime security (De Castro, 2016). The NDS recognizes that infrastructure is a critical enabler of operational capability. This includes the development of the Philippine Marine Corps (PMC)'s coastal defense system capabilities (Ulay, 2021).

The CADC integrates these strategic objectives into a foundational approach to external defense and territorial integrity. This concept aligns with the broader objective of developing a self-reliant defense posture, as embodied in RA 7898 and RA 10349, by fostering capabilities across the land, sea, and air domains (Avila & Matthews, 2022).

These literature references provide a view of the Philippines evolving defense policy, underpinned by the imperative to protect the country's sovereignty and maritime interests, but it does not thoroughly address the integral role of defense real estate governance in translating these policy aspirations into tangible operational capabilities, particularly concerning strategic deployment and sustainment of forces in a geographically fragmented battlefield.



D. MILITARY MODERNIZATION, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND DEFENSE REAL ESTATE AS CAPABILITY ENABLERS

The modernization of the AFP was founded by RA 7898, which was later amended by RA 10349 (RA 10349, 2012). These laws aim to enhance the AFP's capabilities, but modernization extends beyond equipment acquisition to include infrastructure and institutional capacity. Effective implementation of modernization efforts requires robust real estate governance to facilitate the strategic development and management of military installations, training areas, and logistical hubs that are crucial to supporting advanced weaponry and expanded operational requirements (Ong et al., 2023).

Infrastructure is essential for operational capability, enabling force projections, sustainment, and interoperability. Infrastructure encompasses the development of airfields, naval bases, and logistical hubs that are critical to supporting the country's military operational imperatives (Arugay, 2018). In the archipelagic context, infrastructure supports distributed operations and strengthens the country's capacity for active archipelagic defense (Ulay, 2021).

The NDS emphasizes the importance of infrastructure in supporting joint operations and external defense (Baquisal, 2025). This includes the robust logistics backbone to ensure the sustainment of operations across a dispersed environment. The CADC further highlights the need for forward operating bases and maritime domain capabilities.

Defense real estate is central to this process, encompassing the acquisition and management of land for military purposes. The strategic location and development of these properties are vital to enhancing the AFP's readiness, facilitating the deployment of advanced defense systems, and establishing critical logistics hubs (Torres & Tapia, 2025). Effective governance ensures that infrastructure aligns with strategic objectives (Rachman et al., 2023), thereby optimizing the distribution of forces and resources across the archipelago. As a capability enabler, defense real estate influences the flexibility and operational reach of military assets, particularly in archipelagic defense, where dispersed basing is paramount for resilience against more sophisticated threats (Wu, 2024).



This literature review underscores the critical role of integrated defense real estate governance in maximizing the value of AFP Modernization initiatives and achieving strategic objectives within the country's defense framework. However, it rarely delves into the complexities of land tenure, environmental regulations, and local government engagement, all of which are crucial to the efficient and timely development of military infrastructure.

E. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND KEY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN DEFENSE REAL ESTATE GOVERNANCE

Defense real estate acquisition and management in the Philippines involves multiple agencies and legal frameworks, creating a complex institutional environment. This situation challenges the efficient acquisition and development of land, particularly for critical defense projects, which require streamlined processes and interagency coordination (Macapinlac et al., 2024).

The legal aspects of defense real estate acquisition and management are primarily anchored in constitutional provisions, statutory laws, and executive issuances that delineate property rights and land classifications, among others. These legal frameworks address both the allocation of land for public use and the mechanisms for government acquisition, such as eminent domain proceedings, necessary for the development of military installations and other facilities supporting its operations.

Environmental land-use considerations are governed by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), whose regulatory authorities affect defense projects, as provided by the country's Administrative Code (Executive Order [EO] 292, 1987). Specifically, DENR plays a vital role in classifying land as alienable and disposable, forest reserves, national parks, timberland, and military reservations, among others.

In the context of defense real estate governance, the DND provides policy direction, while the AFP implements on-the-ground operations and manages military installations and other support facilities necessary to achieve its defense strategic objectives (EO 292, 1987). Moreover, the specific classification of land as a military reservation, as well as properties owned, registered, and titled by the DND and the AFP, falls under the purview



of the DENR. The current intricate legal landscape is further complicated by numerous sectoral laws governing specific land types, leading to jurisdictional overlaps and fragmented policy implementation (Lanzona, 2019).

This necessitates the close coordination between defense agencies, environmental and sectoral bureaus to reconcile national security imperatives with environmental sustainability and regulatory compliance, as provided under the said sectoral laws. For instance, defense lands often encompass diverse ecosystems, such as forests and agricultural areas, which can lead to potential conflicts between national security needs and environmental conservation or food security (Tretiak et al., 2020).

The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) is a key agency, as many defense real estate projects are well within the ancestral domains, requiring careful consideration of indigenous land rights and cultural heritage (Perdana et al., 2026). This particular issue on overlapping claims between military reservations and ancestral domains necessitates intricate negotiations and resolutions (Apostol et al., 2024).

Another government agency primarily involved in the defense governance of defense real estate is the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). By virtue of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657, 1988), DAR plays a crucial role in areas covered by the law. The conflict arises when military lands and reservations are classified as agricultural lands, and those considered as idle or unutilized are subject to land distribution under the said law. This often poses challenges for balancing national security needs with agrarian reform objectives, requiring an integrated approach to land management and resource allocation (Eleazar et al., 2013).

The LRA is instrumental in titling and registering land, including military reservations, a process that is crucial for establishing clear ownership and preventing encroachment. This ensures the legal security of military holdings and facilitates future development or disposition, though the process itself can be protracted due to historical ambiguities in land records. The fragmented nature of land administration in the Philippines, characterized by the lack of an integrated approach to tenure governance,



contributes significantly to these ambiguities and often leads to prolonged legal disputes (Lanzona, 2019).

The overlapping legal mandates of these government agencies require coherent interagency collaboration. However, continued adoption of new, sometimes contradictory, laws and ill-designed procedures often obstructs these interagency operations (Camerin & Gastaldi, 2018). This creates substantial obstacles to unified policy execution and effective resource distribution, as different government agencies operate under competing mandates and priorities.

The literature review identifies fragmentation and overlapping mandates as major challenges in governance, necessitating institutional reform.

F. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, AND THE LGUS' ROLE

Institutional arrangements are critical to defense real estate governance. The involvement of multiple agencies creates a complex coordination environment. The NSP emphasizes a whole-of-government approach integrating national agencies and LGUs. This integrated approach seeks to overcome the challenges of fragmented land administration and to ensure more effective implementation of defense real estate policies by leveraging resources and expertise across various levels of government.

Moreover, this interagency coordination is often hindered by disparate land information systems and varying levels of technological adoption across governmental bodies, further complicating efforts towards unified land management (Balicanta et al., 2023). Such fragmentation necessitates robust interagency frameworks and standardized protocols to facilitate data exchange and collaborative decision-making, particularly given the critical role of local government units in land-use planning and enforcement (World Bank, 2017).

The involvement of agencies such as DENR, DAR, NCIP, BCDA, LRA, and LGUs creates overlapping mandates and potential conflicts. The involvement of these government agencies requires a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities, along with



robust coordination mechanisms, to achieve coherent and efficient defense real estate management (Bartsch, 2022).

To address this, strengthening interagency coordination frameworks through mechanisms such as joint task forces and standardized communication protocols is crucial for aligning military doctrine with national security and broader government initiatives, as successful governance relies on networked collaboration rather than isolated entities (Martinez, 2025). This perspective aligns with the understanding that integrated operations, while often focused on interagency coordination within a military context, must be broadened to encompass interorganizational coordination. Consequently, this aims to achieve a truly holistic, whole-of-government approach that includes non-government partners and international actors, thereby enabling the achievement of strategic objectives in complex environments (Jensen et al., 2019).

The LGUs play a critical role due to their authority over land use and zoning. Their cooperation is essential for project implementation. With its mandate anchored on the Local Government Code (RA 7160, 1991), the LGUs are empowered to enact ordinances and regulations that directly influence land development and resource allocation, making their engagement indispensable for the successful execution of defense real estate projects (Ballesteros et al., 2023)

However, local governments frequently encounter substantial capacity limitations, including “limited technical expertise, weak institutional framework, and scarce financial resources,” which hinder their effective participation in these complex, multi-sectoral initiatives (Cabaguing et al., 2024).

These limitations can lead to delays in implementing defense real estate governance policies necessary to achieve the country’s strategic defense objectives. These challenges underscore the need to strengthen local institutional capacities and foster genuine collaborative partnerships between national defense agencies and LGUs to ensure the coherent and timely execution of defense real estate strategies (Enriquez et al., 2018).

Institutional theory suggests that organizational structures and practices influence coordination outcomes. This implies that the design of formal and informal rules governing



interorganizational interactions significantly impacts the efficiency and effectiveness of defense real estate management. This theoretical lens highlights the importance of analyzing existing institutional frameworks to identify potential barriers to seamless collaboration and to design interventions that foster more integrated governance practices (Alcántara-Ayala et al., 2025).

Therefore, an in-depth examination of the existing institutional landscape is warranted to identify specific impediments to inter-organizational coordination and to propose structural and procedural reforms that align with a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach for optimized defense real estate governance. Such an examination would reveal that, despite decentralization efforts, a center-periphery relationship often persists between national government agencies and LGUs (Jensen et al., 2019). It is further complicated by inadequate central government support for fiscal independence and accountability at the local level (Alvarez et al., 2021).

Formal coordination mechanisms, such as interagency committees, are necessary to improve governance. These committees can facilitate the harmonization of policies, laws, and regulations, thereby addressing the prevalent issues of restricted synchronization and confined among a wide variety of public institutions geared towards policymaking and its implementation (Maula & Prasajo, 2021). Capacity building is also essential for effective coordination. This involves enhancing the technical expertise and administrative capabilities of relevant government agencies and local government units to manage defense real estate efficiency (Alcántara-Ayala et al., 2025).

Civil-military integration is critical for aligning defense objectives with civilian governance. This integration necessitates mechanisms for knowledge exchange and joint planning exercises to ensure that defense real estate developments support broader socio-economic goals and environmental sustainability (Corsame, 2016). Furthermore, effective civil-military integration can foster public trust and legitimacy, which are essential for successful project implementation, particularly in the context where defense initiatives may intersect with local community interests and resource allocation.



Such integration also mitigates the risks of organizational silos, fostering an environment in which communication gaps are minimized and power relationships are balanced, thereby helping overcome informal decision-making processes that often plague complex governance structures (Fikadu, 2025).

The section highlights the need for strong interagency coordination and institutional reforms to address fragmentation and improve efficiency.

G. STRATEGIC COHERENCE, GRAND STRATEGY, AND POLICY INTEGRATION

Strategic coherence involves aligning national objectives, policies, and resources. The CADC represents an effort to achieve coherence by integrating NSP, NSS, and NDS. This integration is vital for translating strategic guidance into actionable policies, fostering a unified approach to national security and defense.

This shared understanding is foundational for horizontal and vertical coordination, enabling integrated solutions across diverse policy areas and government tiers (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2023). This necessitates the development of integrative capacity within governmental bodies, which encompasses robust coordination mechanisms and coherent institutional architectures to facilitate effective policy integration (Vince et al., 2024). Achieving true policy coherence remains an aspirational goal, often hindered by fragmented policy processes and the complexity inherent in multi-level governance (Cairney, 2025).

Overcoming these challenges requires a concerted effort to foster policy integration, ensuring that diverse policy areas are not only coordinated but also synergistically aligned towards overarching strategic goals (Milhorance et al., 2022). This comprehensive alignment is essential for translating high-level strategic visions into actionable, integrated implementation plans that leverage all available tools to their maximum advantage, thereby strengthening national engagement in complex operational activities (Greenwood et al., 2016).

Furthermore, this integrated approach to policy-making, often termed “policy integration,” aims to address complex issues by transcending individual programmatic and



agency goals, thereby ensuring a more holistic and effective government response (Bursztyn et al., 2022). This endeavor often contends with a challenge of governmental silos, while specialized departmentalization can impede effective horizontal coordination and integrated policy delivery (Scott & Gong, 2021).

However, challenges remain due to resource constraints and institutional fragmentation. Moreover, the persistent interplay between shifting political priorities and the absence of a clear top-level mandate further exacerbates these challenges, often overshadowing rationales for greater effectiveness or coherence in policy implementation (Mouritzen & Fischer, 2018).

Legal constraints, particularly those arising from Supreme Court rulings and land laws, must be integrated into strategic planning. This integration is crucial to prevent legal challenges that could derail critical defense projects and to ensure that all development initiatives comply with the established regulatory framework. Swaris et al. (2024) further underscore the necessity of robust policy integration mechanisms to bridge gaps among legal mandates, strategic objectives, and practical implementation, minimizing potential conflicts and enhancing overall governance efficacy.

Defense real estate governance is a critical component of strategic coherence, linking infrastructure with operational capability. Effective management of these assets directly impacts national security interests, requiring a coherent “national security strategy to articulate a national security-oriented strategic narrative within a grand strategy” (Ehlers & Blannin, 2021). This grand strategy should encompass a holistic approach to national power, integrating military and non-military instruments to address transregional and multifunction challenges across all domains (Parameters, 2020).

Likewise, leadership and governance play key roles in achieving coherence. Strong leadership is essential for fostering a shared vision and ethical conduct, while robust governance structures, particularly those that clarify roles and responsibilities, are crucial for effective coordination and minimizing redundancy in policy implementation (Mphahlele-Ntsasa & Jansen Van Rensburg, 2024). The efficacy of such leadership and governance frameworks is often tested by the inherent complexity of interagency



coordination and the frequent disjunction between political commitments and the institutional mechanisms required for intra-governmental coherence (Morin & Orsini Bled, 2013).

Long-term planning and evaluation mechanisms are also essential. These mechanisms enable continuous assessment of strategic alignment and policy effectiveness, allowing for adaptive adjustments to evolving geopolitical landscapes and emergent national security threats (Vera Delzo, 2018). Furthermore, the implantation of high-level coordinating mechanisms, such as inter-departmental councils or committees, can significantly enhance policy coherence by centralizing oversight and facilitating cross-sectoral dialogue (Wenger et al., 2023). This approach helps to institutionalize collaborative practices and ensure that security policies are consistently aligned with broader national priorities (Abu Azam, 2024).

In the context of national defense, the NSP provides a framework for coherence, but implementation remains a challenge. Overcoming this requires dedicated efforts to translate policy goals into actionable strategies, coupled with consistent monitoring and evaluation to ensure objectives are met effectively (Mpofu et al., 2026). The complexity of policy formulation and coordination often overshadows the substance of the policy itself, indicating a crisis of policymaking in which actors externalize responsibilities rather than develop strategic frameworks (Chandler, 2007).

These references emphasize that achieving strategic coherence requires integrating legal, institutional, and infrastructure components into a unified framework that promotes synergies across policy domains, particularly amid the complex, interconnected challenges of national defense and security.

H. LITERATURE GAP

The existing body of scholarship on archipelagic defense, military modernization, and strategic policy provides a strong theoretical and operational foundation for understanding how archipelagic nations like the Philippines conceptualize and execute national defense. Studies on archipelagic defense emphasize maritime domain awareness, distributed basing, and the strategic value of geography in enabling sea control and denial.



Literature on military modernization focuses on capability development, force structure, and acquisition processes, while strategic policy research examines national security frameworks.

However, a critical gap emerges in the treatment of defense real estate, where strategy is operationalized as a strategic variable. While basing and infrastructure are occasionally mentioned in discussions of force projection or logistics, they are rarely analyzed as a central component of defense strategy. An emphasis on this analysis is necessary as the effectiveness of military operations depends heavily on the geographic distribution, accessibility, legal status, and developmental readiness of defense lands. The absence of a systematic framework linking real estate assets to strategic outcomes limits policymakers' ability to translate doctrines into operational capabilities.

Moreover, the legal dimension of military land use remains underdeveloped in the literature. Existing legal studies tend to focus on general property law, environmental regulation, or indigenous rights, with limited integration into defense-specific applications. The laws, such as the AFP Modernization Program (RA 7898, 1995) and the Revised AFP Modernization Program (RA 10349, 2012), provide funding mechanisms for modernization, including infrastructure, yet there is insufficient scholarly analysis of how they interact with land acquisition, titling, zoning, and dispute resolution processes. The lack of a coherent legal framework anchored to defense real estate creates implementation ambiguities, delays project execution, and exposes the project to legal challenges such as encroachment or competing land claims.

Another underexplored area is interagency coordination in defense infrastructure development. Defense real estate governance inherently involves multiple stakeholders, including the DND, AFP, DENR, LRA, NCIP, BCDA, and various LGUs. While public administration and governance literature discuss interagency collaboration in general terms, there is limited research on how these institutions interact specifically in the context of defense land acquisition and management. This gap is particularly relevant, where overlapping mandates, bureaucratic fragmentation, and regulatory complexity can impede timely and strategic infrastructure development.



Most importantly, there is a lack of research addressing the concept of strategic coherence between land governance and the CADC. Existing studies tend to treat defense strategy and land management as separate domains, without examining how decisions in one domain affect outcomes in the other. Strategic coherence requires a deliberate alignment between defense objectives and the governance of land resources. Without such alignment, there is a risk of mismatches, such as modernization programs that prioritize platforms without corresponding investments in basing infrastructure, or strategically critical locations that remain underdeveloped due to legal or administrative constraints.

This study addresses these gaps by situating defense real estate at the intersection of law, policy, and strategy. It advances the argument that defense real estate should be treated not merely as a support function but as a strategic asset that directly influences military effectiveness. By integrating legal analysis, policy evaluation, and strategic alignment, the study seeks to develop a framework that links land governance to defense outcomes. This includes examining how legal instruments shape land availability, how interagency processes affect implementation efficiency, and how real estate decisions can be aligned with CADC objectives through well-structured approaches.

This research contributes to both theory and practice. Theoretically, it expands the discourse on archipelagic defense by incorporating spatial and institutional dimensions that have been largely overlooked. Practically, it provides policymakers with tools and insights to improve decision-making in defense infrastructure planning, enhance interagency coordination, and ensure that land-related investments are strategically aligned with national defense priorities. Bridging this gap in the literature is essential for achieving a more integrated, coherent, and effective defense posture in an archipelagic setting.



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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A. RESEARCH DESIGN

This study adopts a qualitative research design to examine the legal, institutional, and strategic dimensions of defense real estate governance in the Philippines. The qualitative approach is appropriate because the research seeks to understand complex relationships among policies, institutions, and strategic frameworks rather than to measure variables quantitatively. Defense real estate governance involves overlapping legal regimes, institutional arrangements, and strategic objectives that require interpretive and contextual analysis.

The research design is primarily descriptive-analytical, aiming to provide a detailed examination of how defense real estate governance operates within the Philippine context. It describes existing legal frameworks, institutional roles, and strategic policies, and analyzes their alignment with the CADC. This dual approach allows the study to both document current conditions and evaluate their effectiveness.

Additionally, the study incorporates elements of explanatory research, particularly in analyzing how institutional arrangements and interagency coordination affect strategic coherence. By identifying causal relationships between governance structures and strategic outcomes, the research goes beyond description to provide insights into underlying dynamics.

The study also employs a policy analysis framework to examine key national documents, including the National Security Policy (NSP), National Security Strategy (NSS), and National Defense Strategy (NDS). These documents are analyzed to understand how defense real estate governance is conceptualized and implemented within the broader national security framework.

A key feature of the research design is its integration of legal analysis. Philippine laws governing land acquisition, agrarian reform, indigenous rights, and environmental regulation are examined. This legal dimension is critical for understanding the constraints and opportunities affecting defense real estate.



Likewise, the research design views organizational behavior as shaped by established rules and norms rather than by purely rational decision-making. This perspective is useful for analyzing how government agencies interact within the defense real estate system. The study also incorporates a strategic analysis perspective, focusing on strategic coherence. This involves assessing whether legal frameworks, institutional arrangements, and resource allocations are aligned with national defense objectives, particularly those outlined in the CADC.

The qualitative design is specifically suited to addressing the research questions, which focus on governance, coordination, and policy alignment. These questions require in-depth analysis of processes and relationships rather than numerical data. The research design also acknowledges the complexity and multidimensional nature of defense real estate governance. By combining descriptive, explanatory, legal, and strategic analysis, the study provides a comprehensive understanding of the subject.

B. DATA SOURCES AND DATA COLLECTION

The study relies on secondary data sources, including official documents, laws, academic literature, and policy reports. These sources provide a comprehensive basis for analyzing defense real estate governance.

Primary sources include national security documents such as the NSP, NSS, and NDS. These documents define the strategic context within which defense real estate operates. Primary documentary sources include laws on modernization, property registration, land-use governance, agrarian reform, environmental regulation, protected areas, indigenous peoples, conversion, and sectoral authorities. Institutional data are derived from government publications and official reports, providing insights into the roles and functions of various agencies.

Academic literature provides theoretical and analytical perspectives, including works on archipelagic defense, institutional theory, and strategic coherence. Policy reports and studies from think tanks and research institutions are also included, offering practical insights and comparative perspectives. Data collection involves a systematic review of



documents, focusing on their relevance to the research questions. Documents are selected based on their credibility, authority, and relevance.

The study also employs thematic categorization, grouping data into categories such as legal frameworks, institutional arrangements, and strategic policies. A key aspect of data collection is integrating multiple sources to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the subject. The use of secondary data enables broad, in-depth analysis across multiple dimensions of defense real estate governance.

However, the study acknowledges limitations related to data availability and potential biases in secondary sources.

C. DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURES

Data analysis in this study follows a thematic, interpretive, and comparative approach, consistent with qualitative research methodology. The analysis employs the Three-Legged Stool framework – Ends, Ways, and Means (EWM) analytical lens to assess the strategic coherence of defense real estate governance in relation to CADC (Lykke, 1989).

The first stage of analysis involves data organization and coding. The qualitative data from legal documents, such as constitutional provisions related to defense real estate governance, statutes, executive orders, policy documents, NSP, NSS, NDS, and institutional reports, are systematically categorized into the three EWM dimensions.

Textual data are coded deductively, where statements reflecting strategic objectives and defense outcomes are classified as the “Ends.” Those that describe governance processes, interagency coordination, and policy implementation mechanisms are classified as the “Ways,” while those related to land assets, infrastructure, funding, and institutional capacity are under the “Means.” This structured coding allows the alignment of diverse data sources into a unified analytical framework.

The second stage is the thematic and comparative analysis within and across the three components of the stool. Key themes are identified for each dimension, such as basing spatial alignment on “Ends,” coordination efficiency on “Ways,” and resource constraints



on “Means.” These are then examined for consistency with CADC requirements and evaluated for internal coherence. This includes an analysis of how well the Ends, Ways, and Means reinforce one another. The analysis also identifies gaps, such as misalignment between strategic intent and land-use policies, fragmentation in interagency processes, and underutilization of available land infrastructure.

The synthesis and interpretation of findings from the EWM analysis are integrated to determine the overall stability of the “three-legged stool.” This stage involves assessing imbalances, such as strong policy articulation as the Ends but weak implementation mechanisms as the Ways, or adequate resources as the Means, all of which are constrained by legal and institutional barriers. This research methodology process emphasizes the strategic coherence of defense real estate governance.

The results are then translated into analytical narratives, matrices, and policy implications, highlighting critical gaps and proposing reforms to better align land governance with CADC’s strategic objectives. This is a process ensuring that the analysis remains systematic, transparent, and directly tied up to the research questions, while providing a clear linkage between qualitative evidence and strategic conclusions.

D. VALIDITY, RELIABILITY, AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Ensuring validity and reliability is critical in qualitative research. This study adopts multiple strategies to enhance credibility and trustworthiness. This reduces the risk of bias and enhances the robustness of conclusions. The study also employs construct validity, ensuring that concepts such as strategic coherence and governance are clearly defined and consistently applied.

Reliability is addressed through systematic documentation of data collection and analysis procedures. This ensures that the study can be replicated. The study acknowledges potential limitations, including reliance on secondary data and the subjective nature of qualitative analysis.

Ethical considerations include ensuring proper citation of sources and avoiding misrepresentation of data. The study also considers the sensitivity of defense-related



information and relies only on publicly available data. Transparency in methodology is maintained to ensure accountability. The researcher remains objective and avoids bias in analysis and interpretation to ensure that the study meets academic standards of rigor and integrity.

E. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

This framework can be explained through the Three-Legged Stool Analysis (Lykke, 1989), anchored in the Ends, Ways, Means construct, which clarifies how strategy translates into outcomes, as shown in Figure 1.

The “Ends” are defined by the CADC and the broader national strategic objectives of protecting national territory and preserving sovereignty. The CADC provides the strategic vision for defending an archipelagic state through distributed basing, maritime domain awareness, and sustained presence across key geographic areas. These ends establish the desired security condition that the entire system seeks to achieve.

The “Means” in the framework are represented by defense real estate, which includes military bases, camps, airfields, naval facilities, and other land assets. These are the physical resources that enable military operations, logistics, and force projection. However, the framework emphasizes that possessing these assets alone is insufficient. Their effectiveness depends on how well they are positioned, developed, and utilized in support of strategic objectives. Thus, defense real estate serves as the tangible foundation upon which strategy is executed.

The “Ways” are found within the central strategic alignment system, which comprises legal frameworks, institutional arrangements, and interagency coordination. These elements collectively define how defense real estate is governed and operationalized. Legal frameworks provide authority and rules, institutional arrangements define the roles and responsibilities of key agencies, and interagency coordination ensures collaboration among these actors. The interaction of these components produces governance mechanisms that enable the system to function effectively through governance, legitimization, and integration.






Figure 1. The Three-Legged Stool Framework. Adapted from Lykke (1989).

At the core of the “Ways” is strategic coherence, which represents the degree to which laws, institutions, and coordination mechanisms align with CADC objectives. Strategic coherence ensures that decisions regarding defense real estate, such as acquisition, location, development, and management, are directly linked to operational and strategic requirements. Without this coherence, gaps such as overlapping mandates, legal conflicts, and poor coordination can undermine the effectiveness of even well-resourced systems.

Furthermore, the framework demonstrates that successful defense outcomes depend on the alignment of ends, ways, and means. When CADC (“Ends”) is effectively translated through coherent governance mechanisms (“Ways”) and supported by properly managed defense real estate (“Means”), the system achieves improved resource optimization, governance efficiency, capability effectiveness, operational readiness, and reduced risk exposure. This alignment leads towards the achievement of the strategic objectives of protecting national territory and preserving sovereignty, highlighting that strong governance is the critical link between strategy and capability.

IV. ANALYSIS OF LEGAL, POLICY, AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

A. INTRODUCTION: THREE-LEGGED STOOL ANALYSIS

This study uses the Three-Legged Stool Framework anchored on the Ends, Ways, and Means. This analytical tool is intended to provide a useful lens for analyzing the strategic coherence of defense real estate in support of CADC.

The “Ends” represent the country’s strategic objectives as articulated in its various strategic policies. The “Ways” refer to how these Ends are achieved, particularly through legal frameworks that govern processes, interagency coordination, and policy implementation. The “Means” encompass institutional capacity, including resources such as defense real estate.

B. ENDS: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Strategic objectives, as the Ends, define the CADC’s desired outcomes, particularly the protection of territorial integrity, maritime sovereignty, and national security nationwide. The attainment of these objectives depends on how clearly they are translated into spatial priorities and integrated with defense real estate governance to ensure alignment with operational requirements.

1. The NSP, NSS, NDS, and CADC Strategic Framework

The strategic alignment of defense real estate governance in the Philippines must be understood within the broader context of national security frameworks. The NSP, NSS, and NDS collectively define the country’s security priorities. On the other hand, the CADC operationalizes these priorities into a coherent defense posture.

President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. approved the NSP 2023–2028 by virtue of EO 37 dated August 10, 2023 (EO 37, 2023). The NSP establishes a whole-of-nation approach, emphasizing that national security extends beyond military capability to include governance, infrastructure, and economic resilience (NSP, 2023). This approach integrates all instruments of national power to protect national interests, territorial integrity, and the



well-being of the Filipino people. As a policy, it inherently recognizes the importance of defense real estate, as land and infrastructure serve as the physical foundation for implementing national security strategies. It underscores a paradigm shift towards a more integrated and adaptive security posture, acknowledging the interconnectedness of various national assets in safeguarding geopolitical interests (Avila & Matthews, 2022).

To operationalize the policies and objectives of NSP 2023–2028, Memorandum Circular No. 75 dated December 20, 2024, adopted and directed the implementation of the NSS (Memorandum Circular No. 75, 2024). The NSS identifies maritime security as a critical priority. It highlights the need to secure sea lanes of communication, protect marine resources, and assert sovereignty over the country’s EEZ. These priorities directly require strategically located bases, ports, and airfields, underscoring the importance of defense real estate.

The NDS further operationalizes these objectives by emphasizing modernization and joint operations. Due to the magnitude and complexities of identified defense and security concerns, NDS explicitly calls for infrastructure development to support external defense, including the establishment of forward operating bases and enhanced logistics networks (OASPP, DND, 2018).

The Philippines recently implemented the CADC to integrate its defense measures across various domains. This shows positive progress with regard to the genuine efforts in responding to challenges occurring externally, like in the WPS (Marcos, 2024). In the context of defense real estate governance, the concept aims to achieve a unified security posture, directly influencing the strategic location and utilization of real estate to enhance operational effectiveness. This strategic framework, outlined in the NSS 2024, explicitly directs the integration of various government policies, particularly domestic, foreign, military, political, economic, social, and educational, to achieve national security objectives (Marcos, 2024). This is a cohesive approach, with defense real estate serving as a fundamental enabler for strategic initiatives involving all sectors.



Table 1. Strategic Framework Alignment. Adapted from National Security Council (2023).

Framework	Key Focus	Relevance to Defense Real Estate
NSP	Whole-of-nation security	Governance and infrastructure
NSS	Maritime security	Basing and domain awareness
NDS	Military capability	Infrastructure and logistics
CADC	Operational strategy	Distributed basing

Table 1 summarizes the alignment and relevance of the different strategic frameworks discussed to defense real estate. To address national security challenges, the NSP provided a whole-of-nation approach; the NSS laid down the maritime security framework; the NDS defined the military capabilities; and the CADC structured the operational strategy. While these policies emphasize the critical importance of infrastructure and basing, they present limited guidance on how defense real estate acquisition and management should be governed. Hence, there is a disconnect between strategic intent and implementation.

2. Synthesis on the Ends: Strategic Objectives

Overall, there is strong coherence across the four strategic documents because they consistently align on the strategic Ends of defending sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national resilience, forming a unified strategic narrative. The NSP emphasizes the core national objective of protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity through a whole-of-nation approach. The NSS operationalizes this by identifying maritime security as a critical priority, which requires the strategic siting of bases and other military infrastructure. The NDS translates these into defense priorities, including deterrence, force projection, and credible defense posture. CADC operationalizes these strategies through distributed basing, maritime denial, and mobility across the archipelago.

However, despite this alignment, defense real estate remains implicitly embedded rather than explicitly recognized as a strategic enabler. While all strategic documents assume the availability of land for basing and infrastructure, none establish a formal



doctrine or framework that links land governance to defense strategy. This creates a conceptual gap between strategic intent and implementation.

C. WAYS: LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN RELATION TO CADC

Defense real estate in the Philippines is governed by a multi-layered legal regime. This legal framework is anchored in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, implemented through statutes, and interpreted by the Supreme Court in cases brought before it. These legal instruments establish the parameters within which land acquisition and management must operate, particularly for defense real estate.

On the other hand, the attainment of CADC's strategic objectives depends on control of strategically located lands, distributed basing across the country, and rapid infrastructure development and military mobility. The disconnect now lies in the fact that the current legal regime does not prioritize defense as a dominant land use, as it balances defense with social justice, environmental protection, and indigenous rights, ultimately resulting in structural constraints on CADC implementation.

1. Constitutional Provisions and Their Impact on CADC

Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution establishes the Regalian Doctrine and State control of lands in the Philippines (Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987). It specifically provides that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. In the context of defense real estate governance, the DND and the AFP do not own land in an absolute sense, particularly land classified as military reservations. It only administers the lands subject to any policy shifts that the State may implement, and to the influence of other government agencies, such as the DENR and DAR, for classification and redistribution, respectively. This situation leaves the CADC's strategic basing without institutional permanence, weakening long-term land control for distributed defense.

Article XIII Section 4 provides that the State must undertake agrarian reform to promote equitable land distribution. This constitutional provision safeguarded social justice through agrarian reform. Hence, any portions of military reservations deemed idle and agricultural may be subject to redistribution under the CARP and CARPER, as



previously discussed (RA 9700, 2009). This constitutional limitation reduces CADC's strategic land reserves, undermining its training areas, expansion capacity, and distributed basing nodes.

The protection of indigenous cultural communities' rights to ancestral lands is mandated under Article XII, Section 5 of the Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987). The DND and AFP lands that are strategically located in Central Luzon, Palawan, and parts of Mindanao have overlapping claims under this provision. As discussed in the study, properties under this claim had limited the military's rapid deployment and infrastructure development because of the conditional consent required by law.

The Constitution's Bill of Rights, particularly Article III, Section 1, guarantees that no individual shall be deprived of property, liberty, or life without due process of law (Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987). On the other hand, Section 9 of the same Article states that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." Although the State has the power of eminent domain, the Constitution prohibits the acquisition of private property for public use without attending to the requirements concerning proper process and appropriate compensation (Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987). In the context of CADC implications, these Constitutional provisions make land acquisition for new bases more time-consuming and resource-intensive, thereby slowing strategic expansion and repositioning.

2. Fragmented Legal Regime

To emphasize the impact of the statutory provisions governing the implementation of CADC, this study tabulated the laws governing defense real estate, as shown in Table 2. Statutory Laws Governing Defense Real Estate in relation to CADC.

The implementation of CADC is significantly shaped and often constrained by the country's statutory legal framework governing land use, ownership, and development. These laws are anchored on the provisions of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and pursue legitimate socio-economic, environmental, and governance objectives. However, its implementation creates structural friction in defense real estate, affecting the



operationalization of the country's archipelagic defense. Basically, the different statutory laws governing defense real estate related to CADC, as shown in Table 2, can be categorized as: restrictive and regulatory; disposition and conversion; financing and implementation-enabler; and multi-level governance.

Restrictive and regulatory laws control land use through eligibility criteria, land classification, environmental review, and protected-area rules. These include the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657, 1988), the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Extension with Reform (RA 9700, 2009), the Indigenous Peoples Right Act (RA 8371, 1997), the Expanded National Integrated Protected Areas (ENIPAS) Act (RA 11038, 2018), the Environmental Impact Statement System (Presidential Decree [PD] 1586, 1978), the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act [CA] 141, 1936), the Local Government Code (RA 7160, 1991), and the Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development Act (RA 11201, 2019). Specifically, RA 6657, as amended by RA 9700, prioritizes land distribution. These laws subject military lands, particularly portions of military reservations classified as agricultural or underutilized, to redistribution. Commonwealth Act 141 further defines public lands, including but not limited to military reservations (CA 141, 1936). Likewise, RA 8371 requires the DND and the AFP to secure FPIC for their defense projects on properties with overlapping claims to indigenous territories, as discussed in the preceding section (RA 8371, 1997).

Environmental laws such as PD 1586 and RA 7586 regulate land use in ecologically sensitive areas. It establishes the Environmental Impact Assessment process, which requires the DND and the AFP to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) on defense projects (RA 7586, 1992). The provisions of these laws protect the environment by ensuring that all projects are environmentally friendly, but they also prevent the immediate implementation of defense-related priority projects until required compliance is achieved.



Table 2. Statutory Laws Governing Defense Real Estate in Relation to CADC. Adapted from The LawPhil Project (2026).

No.	Statutory Law	Key Provisions Relevant to Defense Real Estate	Impact on CADC
1	RA 6657 (CARP)	Covers agricultural lands, including portions of government lands not “actually, directly, and exclusively” used for public purpose	Causes fragmentation of military reservations; reduces strategic land reserves needed for distributed basing
2	RA 9700	Extends and strengthens CARP coverage; reinforces redistribution of underutilized lands	Intensifies pressure on AFP lands; limits long-term land banking for defense expansion
3	RA 8371 (IPRA)	Requires Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) for projects affecting ancestral domains; recognizes ancestral land ownership	Makes defense land conditionally accessible; slows infrastructure and limits rapid deployment in strategic areas
4	RA 12001	Institutionalizes a uniform, transparent, and market-based system for real property valuation	Enables faster acquisition of strategically located bases under AFP modernization
5	RA 11038	Expands protected areas and strengthens environmental restrictions	Further constrains military use of environmentally sensitive strategic terrain
6	PD 1586	Requires Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) prior to project implementation	Delays base construction and infrastructure; constrains speed of operational readiness
7	CA 141	Governs classification of lands (A&D vs. forest); only A&D lands may be titled or disposed	Defense use depends on DENR classification
8	RA 7160	Grants LGUs authority over land use planning, zoning, and local approvals	Introduces local-level constraints; may delay or oppose defense infrastructure projects
9	RA 11201	Integrates national land use and urban planning policies	Competes with defense land use in urbanizing areas; reduces available military space in key regions
10	RA 7898 (as amended by RA 10349)	Provides funding for modernization, including infrastructure and basing support systems	Enables CADC through funding, but lacks explicit land governance integration, limiting effectiveness
11	RA 9184	Governs procurement of infrastructure and development projects	Introduces procedural delays affecting timely base development and logistics infrastructure
12	RA 12009	Modernizes, streamlines, and standardizes the procurement process	Strengthens the process efficiency and improves the infrastructure delivery but does not fully align procurement with CADC objectives.
13	RA 10752	Expedite land acquisition for national infrastructure projects	It reduces project delays but no explicit provision prioritizing strategic military land acquisition
14	RA 7227	Converts former military bases into economic zones; authorizes disposition of military lands	Leads to loss of strategic control over key locations and reduces basing flexibility

The complexity of the laws shown in Table 2 slows base construction and operational readiness, causing delays incompatible with dynamic defense requirements. The financing and implementation-enabling laws, particularly RA 7898 as amended, RA 9184, RA 12009, and RA 10752, are vital in the military. These laws seek to modernize the AFP, fund structure, and valuation standards, and expedite acquisition. They support CADC by offering tools to build, acquire, and improve strategic locations. However, these statutes failed to integrate land governance into strategic planning, particularly RA 7898, as amended, which addresses only AFP modernization, basing support, and system development.

The Real Property Valuation and Assessment Reform Act (RA 12001, 2024) improves valuation uniformity, and the Right-of-Way Act (RA 10752, 2015) expedites the acquisition process, but neither law clearly prioritizes strategic military acquisitions under the CADC framework. There is no specific provision in these laws governing the valuation and acquisition of defense real estate, thus treating these assets no differently from other properties.

RA 7227, as amended, facilitates the conversion of military bases into commercial and economic zones, but it does not provide sufficient funds for the AFPMP, whose primary purpose is to fund the development of former U.S. military bases for productive civilian use (BCDA, 1992). Although the statutory provisions allow revenue generation to support national development and AFP modernization, they reduce exclusive military control over strategically located areas, thus limiting the distribution of resilient bases across the archipelago.

Furthermore, the Local Government Code (RA 7160, 1991) and the Government Procurement Reform Act (RA 9184, 2002) introduced procedural and jurisdictional complexities. It should be noted that RA 7160 empowers local government units (LGUs) to influence land-use decisions. These land-use decisions are primarily anchored in local leaders' priorities for economic growth, with little regard for the country's overall national objectives.



On the other hand, the procurement laws, namely RA 9184 and RA 12009, ensure legal procurement but do not align with CADC's objectives (RA 12009, 2024). These procurement regulations affect the pace of infrastructure development in support of the CADC's strategic objectives (RA 9184, 2002). Specifically, the competitive bidding provisions of these statutes constrain the AFP's ability to meet rapid acquisition requirements in response to evolving threats, leaving the military with limited viable options. The laws broadly address procurement, including the lease or acquisition of properties, and defer real estate rules to other laws, thereby fragmenting the legal regime and creating a lack of a unified framework tailored to defense real estate requirements.

Further analysis also reveals that these multi-level governance laws give authority across dispersed national agencies and local governments. Hence, defense real estate is governed not by a single strategic mechanism but by a fragmented administrative process involving DENR, DAR, NCIP, LGUs, procurement bodies, and land administration agencies.

3. Synthesis on Legal Frameworks in Relation to CADC

Considering the different provisions of the subject laws, they collectively create a fragmented defense real estate environment, conditional with respect to indigenous peoples' rights, regulated by environmental laws, commercialized by base conversion, and procedurally constrained by governance statutes.

These laws serve essential national objectives, but their lack of integration with defense strategy results in misalignment between legal governance and the operational requirements of CADC, which limits the DND and the AFP from fully operationalizing the archipelagic defense.

D. WAYS: INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND LGU DYNAMICS

Given CADC's strategic objectives, the role of defense real estate in their successful implementation is vital. The defense land assets also interact with the legal mandates of various government agencies and LGUs. The need for interagency coordination among national agencies and local government units is strategically critical.



As previously emphasized, defense real estate acquisition and management are inherently a multi-actor governance problem. Defense real estate is not merely an administrative resource but a determinant of the Philippines’ operational reach, strategic basing flexibility, and deterrence posture.

1. Interagency Coordination Challenges and Policy Conflicts

The “Ends” represent the national defense policy’s desired outcomes, as embodied in NSP, NSS, and NDS, and operationalized by CADC, encompassing territorial sovereignty and integrity, a distributed defense posture, maritime domain awareness, and strategic deterrence.

In the context of defense real estate, achieving these “Ends” requires secure, accessible, resilient, and strategically located land assets. However, its governance involves a complex network of institutions with overlapping mandates. Hence, examination of the roles of key agencies and their interactions is necessary, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Institutional and Interagency Mapping of Defense Real Estate Governance. Adapted from EO 292 (1987), The Local Government Code (1991) and The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (1997).

Agency	Legal Basis	Function	Conflict with CADC
DENR	EO 292	Land regulation	Limits basing in strategic terrain
DAR	EO 292	Agrarian reform	Reduces military reservations
NCIP	RA 8371	Indigenous rights	Restricts access to key areas
LRA	EO 292	Titling	Asserts Legal ownership process
LGUs	RA 7160	Zoning	May oppose national defense projects

EO 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987, establishes the structure, powers, and mandates of the executive department (EO 292, 1987). It covers agencies responsible for land, natural resources, and national security.



a. The Department of National Defense: Defense Primacy vs. Interagency Authority

The DND is responsible for safeguarding the national sovereignty and territorial integrity (EO 292, 1987). It has supervisory functions over the AFP. It is empowered to manage defense infrastructure, military lands, and reservations. It serves as the primary policymaking body, responsible for setting defense priorities and overseeing infrastructure development. On the other hand, the AFP implements these policies and manages military installations and operational requirements.

While the DND and the AFP are strategically aligned with defense objectives, under the provisions of EO 292, the DND has no exclusive jurisdiction over all defense-related lands, particularly those classified as agricultural or as part of the public domain. This gives the DND authority as the functional defense user, rather than the absolute landowner exercising full control over those military lands.

Furthermore, interagency coordination remains one of the most challenging issues facing the DND in relation to CADC. Its mandate overlaps with several government agencies such as the DENR, DAR, NCIP, LRA, and LGUs, which are legally mandated to classify land and title properties, protect the environment, and enforce local zoning. This fragmented governance structure results in a coordination environment that is sequential, compliance-driven, and often reactive rather than strategic. These disjointed processes significantly delay CADC project implementation and weaken the responsiveness of defense planning.

As previously emphasized, policy conflicts between these government agencies compound these coordination challenges. This leads to the filing of the National Defense Act (Senate Bill [SB] 146, 2025), the Proper Transformation Act (SB 384, 2025), and the DND Transformation Act (SB 1816, 2026), which aim to address the structural and policy issues. Senate Bill 146 proposes institutional rationalization that could empower DND with greater centralized authority over defense real estate, reducing fragmentation and enabling more decisive coordination (SB 146, 2025).



On the other hand, SB 384 focuses on harmonizing administrative processes and improving interagency collaboration to streamline approvals and reduce bureaucratic delays affecting CADC-related projects (SB 384, 2025). Furthermore, SB 1816 introduces mechanisms for strategic asset management to optimize land use while balancing defense and economic considerations (SB 1816, 2026). In the current decentralized, compliance-driven system in defense real estate governance, these legislative initiatives push for a more integrated, strategy-oriented framework.

Analyses of these bills reveal limitations in addressing deeper systemic issues. The transformative changes advocated by these bills are at risk without a well-defined lead authority or a binding interagency coordination mechanism. The DND may still be problematic in asserting strategic priorities over competing sectoral interests, particularly in the absence of explicit legal provisions establishing defense primacy in critical areas. The successful implementation of CADC depends on legislative reforms that go beyond procedural improvements and establish a unified governance structure. This integrates land management, policy alignment, and interagency coordination under a coherent national defense framework, ensuring that defense real estate is fully aligned with the strategic demands of archipelagic defense.

***b. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR):
Environmental Supremacy vs. Strategic Flexibility***

Under the same Executive Order, the DENR is tasked with managing and conserving public lands and natural resources. Aside from its critical role in environmental compliance, DENR has the authority to classify lands into alienable and disposable, forest lands, and protected areas, among others. Its authority over public lands and natural resources directly affects the feasibility of defense projects.

Many strategically valuable defense areas are classified as forest lands and protected areas under the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) (RA 7586, 1992) as amended by ENIPAS (RA 11038, 2018). Likewise, the DENR is mandated to implement PD 1586, known as the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System, a regulatory framework that requires government agencies and private entities to evaluate



the potential environmental impacts of proposed projects before they are approved or implemented (PD 1586, 1978). This law aims to balance socio-economic growth with environmental protection.

These laws and legal issuances evidently limit defense initiatives to establish Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), radar, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) installations, to cite a few. Furthermore, it delays the implementation of these projects, considering they must undergo the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) processes.

While the DENR prioritizes ecological preservation, CADC requires strategic adaptation of terrain for defense purposes. Thorough analysis of the said laws and executive order did not grant DENR the power to override defense needs without interagency coordination, nor did it provide a clear mechanism for doing so.

c. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR): Redistribution vs. Strategic Retention

The DAR is mandated to implement the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), which aims to redistribute agricultural lands to farmer-beneficiaries (RA 6657, 1988). It has the sole authority to identify and acquire CARP-covered lands. Lands under agrarian reform are subject to strict legal protections under Republic Act 6657, as amended by the CARPER Law (RA 9700, 2009), making conversion more challenging. The amendatory law extended the land acquisition and distribution program to complete the coverage of agricultural lands. It also provided a budget extension to accelerate distribution and prohibited the conversion of subject lands.

To further complicate matters, EO 75 was issued by then-President Rodrigo Duterte, directing all government agencies to identify government-owned lands that are devoted to or suitable for agriculture and to distribute them to qualified beneficiaries under agrarian reform (EO 75, 2019). EO 75 has direct implications for military and defense-related lands as it subjects idle or underutilized military reservations for possible redistribution to qualified beneficiaries. EO 75 significantly affected the DND's land-banking capacity for defense purposes, as well as its future defense options. This resulted



in institutional pressure for the DND to “use it or lose it” to justify the continued defense use of land assets, especially those not actively operational, those reserved but not developed, and those historically designated but strategically dormant.

As DAR operates on equity and redistribution, the DND, as the primary implementor of CADC, depends on strategic reserve and anticipatory land control. Neither these laws nor executive orders harmonize with the additional complexities in defense real estate governance.

d. The Land Registration Authority (LRA): Legal Formalism vs. Operational Urgency

As mandated by EO 292, the LRA governs land titling, registration, and the resolution of overlapping claims. It has sole responsibility for ensuring proper land titling and documentation, which are essential for securing defense real estate. The implementation of CADC faces the lack of formal titles over some of its properties. The DND and the AFP are also addressing issues involving overlapping claims by public or private entities, as well as ancestral domain claims.

These issues strategically affected the CADC’s infrastructure development and land acquisition initiatives and exposed the DND and the AFP to further legal disputes and encroachment by informal settlers, among other challenges. Understanding this situation emphasizes that while LRA focuses on formal legal certainty, CADC often requires rapid operational control, regardless of titling delays, to ensure that territorial integrity and national sovereignty are protected.

e. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP): Ancestral Rights vs. Strategic Access

The NCIP is formally established by virtue of RA 8371, and mandated to protect ancestral domains and indigenous rights (RA 8371, 1997). The NCIP also ensures that the Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) process is strictly followed in adherence to the provisions of the said law. As part of its role, the NCIP has the authority to certify whether a particular piece of land is within the ancestral domain and to approve or even block land



use through the FPIC. It can be noted that although the Commission was created by the said law, it still operates within the executive structure defined under EO 292.

Vast portions of the defense real estate all over the country are being claimed by indigenous peoples (IP). These claims must be settled under the FPIC before any CADC project will be implemented within the said claims. This indicates a lack of streamlined integration with the defense planning process to mitigate the impact of consent-based constraints on defense real estate governance.

***f. The Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA):
Monetization vs. Strategic Preservation***

Then-President Corazon C. Aquino signed RA 7227 into law on March 13, 1992, which created the BCDA (RA 7227, 1992). It must be emphasized that the primary intent of the law is not to fund the AFPMP but to support the development of former U.S. military bases into productive civilian uses. Table 4 shows the AFP camps and bases transferred to BCDA for development under the BCDA law.

Table 4. DND/AFP Real Estate Covered under BCDA Law. Adapted from Bases Conversion and Development Authority (1992).

No.	AFP Base / Property	Estimated Area (hectares)	BCDA Status / Disposition
1	Fort Bonifacio	723 ha	Majority converted to Commercial use
2	Villamor Air Base	173	Mixed civilian/military use
3	John Hay Air Station	570 ha	Transferred to BCDA
4	Wallace Air Station	167 ha	Mixed civilian/military use
5	O'Donnell Transmitter Station	1,755 ha	Transferred to BCDA
6	San Miguel Naval Communication Station	1,100 ha	Transferred to BCDA
7	Other Camps in Metro Manila	50–100 ha	Various parcels disposed or leased

The data indicate that more than 4,500 hectares of military land were transferred to BCDA for conversion. The conversion of these military lands for commercial and industrial use has limited the military's operational capabilities, given their critical importance to the country's strategic objectives.

Based on BCDA records, from 1993 to 2023, it has contributed ₱78.34 billion, ₱48.59 billions of which was for AFPMP and the remaining ₱29.75 billion for the replication of military facilities (De la Paz, 2024). However, the data show that while BCDA contributes revenue to support the AFP modernization, it has reduced the CADC's land availability. The BCDA's asset monetization reduced CADC's strategic depth by limiting the operational areas of the AFP that support national strategic objectives.

g. The Local Government Units (LGUs): Strategic National Objectives vs: Local Priorities

The LGUs play a decisive yet complex role in implementing the CADC. Primarily, the LGUs are empowered to exercise autonomy over land use, zoning, and local development planning under the Local Government Code (RA 7160, 1991). The decentralization framework of the said law mandated them to prioritize economic growth, environmental protection, and social services within their jurisdictions.

Its interaction with the national strategic objectives under CADC reveals a fundamental tension rooted in decentralized governance. While CADC advances territorial defense, force projection, and strategic basing, the LGUs are primarily concerned with economic development, social welfare, and political accountability to their constituents. This allows areas identified as strategic for national defense to be classified by the LGUs for commercial, residential, or environmental purposes, thereby creating misalignment between national security imperatives and local development agendas.

This divergence is further intensified when LGUs operate within localized political economies, allowing immediate and tangible benefits to outweigh long-term national defense considerations. Likewise, the interaction between the LGUs and the relevant national agencies shows a broader issue of coordination and integration within the CADC framework. The absence of a governance mechanism leads to fragmented engagement,



with LGUs participating late rather than as part of the strategic partnership. This situation underscores the need for a more integrated governance approach to implementing the CADC, bridging local and national objectives and ensuring that defense real estate and infrastructure are both strategically positioned and socially supported.

2. Synthesis on the Ways: Interagency Coordination and LGU Dynamics

To achieve the core objectives of national security, decisions on defense real estate require effective collaboration among the previously discussed government agencies.

Each agency performs its respective legal mandate, but they lack functional integration aligned with the national defense strategy. In other words, the respective mandates of these agencies are based on laws that operate independently and are not integrated into a unified defense real estate framework, thereby creating an overlapping jurisdiction and policy conflicts (Brillantes & Fernandez, 2011). The existing predominantly sequential coordination mechanisms further aggravate the problems. Based on the study, before the implementation of defense infrastructure projects, they undergo multiple layers of approval, including ECC clearance, land classification, non-CARP coverage clearance, FPIC process in areas within ancestral domain, and local zoning compliance.

Such fragmented coordination shows a typical bureaucratic system lacking integrative mechanisms (Peters, 2018). This creates a clearance chain rather than a synchronized governance framework. This leads to isolated decisions by the respective agencies to optimize their mandates rather than contribute to the shared CADC strategic objectives. Obviously, coordination between these agencies is compliance-driven and not strategy-driven. Based on statutory requirements, they assess defense real estate proposals without a unifying framework that prioritizes national security objectives. Thus, it makes legal compliance the end state rather than as a “means” to achieve strategic defense positioning.

The system is also institutionally decentralized. It lacks a coordinating authority that harmonizes competing priorities. As previously emphasized, while the DND oversees defense policy, it does not have a binding authority over other agencies cited. The



coordination relies on ad hoc interagency consultations and a memorandum of agreement rather than on an institutionalized mechanism to ensure efficiency.

Specifically, it shows four cross-cutting issues. The study reveals that there is no Unified Defense Land Policy, as the agencies operate independently, and no CADC-integrated land governance framework. There is also a temporal mismatch because the relevant government agencies are primarily focused on immediate outputs, such as titles, land redistribution, and revenue generation, whereas CADC requires a long-term perspective. Fragmented Authority is evident in the overlapping jurisdictions of these agencies, resulting in delays, conflicts, and inefficiencies. The study also notes a lack of strategic prioritization, failing to establish a mechanism to declare that strategic defense lands are immune to competing claims.

E. MEANS: LAND, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY

The “Means” of CADC consist of land, infrastructure, and institutional capacity that enable the AFP to translate strategic objectives into operational capability. Specifically, they provide the physical foundation, logistical networks, and organizational capability required for force projection and sustainment across the archipelago.

1. Defense Land Assets and Physical Infrastructure

The attainment of CADC’s strategic objectives depends on the means available to the DND and the AFP, particularly their tangible resources. These means consist of these three interrelated elements: land assets, physical infrastructure, and institutional capacity across agencies.

In carrying out its mandate, the AFP operates, maintains, and develops numerous bases across the country. These installations provide military forward-operating locations, logistics and sustainment hubs, and command-and-control hubs, among other purposes. These distributed basing structures are inherently advantageous in supporting archipelagic dispersion, redundancy, and operational reach.



Considering this advantage, the AFP capitalizes Section 4(c) of RA 7898, which explicitly establishes the Bases/Support System Development (BSSD) as a major component of the AFP Modernization Program (RA 7898, 1995). The subject statutory provision specifically mandates the establishment and upgrading of land, air, and naval bases aligned with the national defense strategies and government socioeconomic thrusts. Similarly, DND Department Circular No. 03, series of 2013, specifically provides that basing requirements must conform to the Approved AFP Strategic Basing Plan (AFPSBP) (RA 10349, 2013).

As a whole, this implies that basing is not purely a military matter. It must be integrated with the national development policy, which is critical to CADC. Hence, the military has implemented the AFPSBP as a general framework for defense posturing and in determining the requirements for site selection, construction, and development of new military bases.

Likewise, these statutory provisions allowed the basing as part of the AFP Modernization Program. It channels how modernization funds are translated into military operations. Table 5 reveals that the trajectory of the AFP modernization fund from 2013 to the present has shifted from minimal funding to a more strategically aligned resource base that increasingly supports national strategic objectives. In 2013, the ₱5 billion budget was allocated for an initial capability upgrade, during which defense planning was still largely oriented toward internal security and lacked the fiscal backing for territorial defense (Manhit & Mangahas, 2016).

This situation has limited the AFP to incremental capability improvements with the acquisition of initial major capability platforms. Likewise, it represents a misalignment between the strategic “Ends” of archipelagic defense, maritime domain awareness, and territorial integrity objectives and the available “Means” to fund and operationalize them.

A significant increase in funding occurred from 2014 to 2016, following the passage of the Revised AFP Modernization Program (RA 10349, 2012). This period corresponds to the transition from Horizon 1 to Horizon 2 of the AFPMP, where capability development began to shift toward minimum credible defense. It enabled the acquisition



of major assets, such as surface combatants, fighter aircraft, and surveillance systems. It marks the beginning of partial alignment between the “Ends” and the “Means,” as resources began to support maritime and air-domain capabilities essential for archipelagic defense. However, institutional and governance constraints, including procurement delays stemming from the broad provisions of the Government Reform Act affect these investments (RA 9184, 2002).

Table 5. Summary of the AFP Modernization Program Funds Allocation.
Adapted from Department of Budget and Management (2026).

Year	Programmed Appropriation for AFPMP (Billion Peso)	Horizon	Key Capability Focus
2013	5	H1	Initial capability build-up
2014	10.646	H1	Equipment upgrades
2015	25	H1	Air/ground assets
2016	25	H1	ISR, mobility
2017	20	H1	Completion of baseline
2018	25	H2	Naval assets, radar
2019	25	H2	Frigates, aircraft
2020	25	H2	Sustained acquisitions
2021	27	H2	Air/naval upgrades
2022	29.050	H2	Multi-domain capability
2023	27.5	H3	Missile systems, ISR
2024	40	H3	Advanced platforms
2025	35	H3	Mixed acquisition
2026	40	H3	External defense systems

Table 5 shows that from 2017 to 2026, the modernization budget was consistently ₱25 to ₱40 billion annually. This sustained investment reflects a stronger policy commitment to external defense, particularly amid the rising tensions in the WPS. Under the CADC, which requires integrated territorial defense across air, maritime, and cyberspace domains, the increased funding provides the necessary financial backbone for multi-domain capability development. The fund supports the ongoing Horizon 2 and the

planned Horizon 3 projects, including naval capabilities, advanced missile systems, and integrated air defense systems.

Even if the funding trajectory rises, showing alignment with CADC's strategic objectives, the previously identified challenges in this study remain in translating these appropriations into operational capability. Specifically, these challenges include legal rigidity, institutional silos, and sequential governance processes in the country. Hence, the effectiveness of CADC still depends on the reforms in defense real estate governance and interagency coordination to ensure the attainment of the strategic objectives.

2. Institutional Capacity and Constraints

The successful attainment of national objectives laid out in the NSP, NSS, and NDS, and operationalized by CADC, is determined by institutional capacity. It plays a decisive role in determining how the national defense strategy can be effectively translated into operational capability. Using institutional capacity as a "Means" in the analysis, this research considers the organizational resources of key agencies primarily involved in defense real estate acquisition and management, focusing on their roles, strengths, and constraints in relation to their alignment with CADC, as shown in Table 6.

As noted in earlier discussions, the DND serves as the principal policymaking body for national defense and is responsible for aligning military capabilities with strategic objectives. Through strategic planning, policy formulation, and oversight of defense programs, the DND defines requirements and long-term infrastructure needs consistent with CADC. But the DND is constrained by its limited authority over land governance processes, considering the respective mandates of the different government agencies. While it articulates the "Ends" of the defense strategy, the DND lacks the "Ways" that govern land acquisition and use, creating a structural disconnect between strategic intent and implementation.

The AFP, on the other hand, operationalizes defense strategy and possesses strong planning, logistics, and operational capabilities. It primarily identifies strategic basing locations based on the AFPSBP, training, and force deployment requirements to attain CADC's strategic objectives. However, the military is constrained by its reliance on



various government agencies that govern defense real estate. The military depends on the DENR for its land classification mandate, the LRA for titling processes, regulatory compliance with the DAR and NCIP, and land-use clearance from the LGUs, to name a few. Considering the evolving threats, especially in the WPS, this kind of dependency on the AFP reduces its ability to implement CADC requirements rapidly, particularly in time-sensitive and strategically contested areas.

The DENR is a critical gatekeeper as it significantly influences the usability of land for defense purposes. Its mandate for environmental sustainability conflicts with the CADC's infrastructure requirements, particularly in coastal and forested areas of strategic importance to national defense. Hence, although DENR has the technical capacity, its alignment with CADC's objectives is limited, constraining both the "Ways" and "Means" of defense real estate governance.

The DAR mandates are strong in land acquisition and beneficiary allocation processes relative to the agrarian reform policies provided for under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657, 1988). However, it introduces constraints regarding defense real estate governance. Specifically, it reduces available land for military use. It allows the distribution of large tracts of unused military land, which is primarily reserved for future operational use. The department's mandate to protect the country's social equity complicates land acquisition and management for defense operations. The conflict between social policy objectives and national defense requirements reflects the lack of strategic integration of land governance.

In the case of the NCIP, which is responsible for the protection of Indigenous Peoples' rights, particularly on ancestral domains, the Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) process established under the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act introduces additional procedural requirements, potential delays in project approval, and restrictions on access to strategic areas identified for defense purposes (RA 8371 1997). This kind of situation is in addition to the existing ancestral domain claims of these IPs over vast portions of military lands, anchored in their time-immemorial rights. These processes underscore the complexity of integrating the human rights aspects with defense imperatives.



The functions of the LRA are critical in DND land governance. It ensures legal certainty over the ownership of defense real estate assets and secures the tenure of the DND and the AFP in their infrastructure investments. However, with the current setup, the agency's role is administrative and reactive, focusing primarily on documentation rather than strategic prioritization. Hence, in the absence of a strategic framework, LRA's contribution to CADC is enabling but limited.

Table 6. Institutional Resources in Defense Real Estate Governance.
Adapted from EO 292 (1987), RA 7160 (1991), and RA 8371 (1997).

Agency	Primary Mandate	Role in Defense Real Estate	Capacity Strengths	Key Constraints	Effect on Means (Resources)
DND	National defense policy and strategy	Defines basing strategy, oversees military land use	Strategic planning capability; policy authority	Limited direct control over land classification and titling	Dependent on other agencies for land access
AFP	Military operations and defense capability	Operates bases, implements infrastructure, defines operational requirements	Strong operational and planning capacity; modernization support	Dependent on civilian agencies for legal and land processes	Constrained by land access and infrastructure gaps
DENR	Environmental protection and land classification	Determines land classification, ECC issuance, protected areas	Strong technical expertise in land and environmental governance	Environmental restrictions limit defense development; procedural delays	Restricts usable land and development
DAR	Agrarian reform and land redistribution	Determines CARP coverage, land reallocation	Strong legal authority over agricultural lands	Redistribution reduces defense land availability	Reduces land inventory for defense
NCIP	Protection of indigenous rights	Regulates ancestral domains, FPIC process	Strong legal mandate and rights protection framework	FPIC processes delay or restrict access to strategic areas	Limits access to land
LRA	Land titling and registration	Ensures legal ownership and land documentation	Strong administrative and legal systems	Reactive role; limited strategic involvement	Enables tenure security but not access
LGUs	Local governance and land use planning	Zoning, permits, land-use approvals	Strong local knowledge and governance authority	Local priorities may conflict with national defense; political factors	Affects land usability and timelines

Furthermore, the authority over land use, including zoning, permitting, and land use planning, is vested by RA 7160, as a statutory law, in the LGUs (RA 7160, 1991). This institutional capacity is anchored on local governance, planning, and community engagement. It allows LGUs to serve as enablers in facilitating local implementation. However, they also constrained the attainment of national defense objectives when these objectives conflict with local priorities, which are primarily anchored in political, economic, and community considerations. This situation introduces variability and unpredictability into defense real estate governance, complicating coordination.

3. Synthesis on the Means: Land, Infrastructure, and Institutional Capacity

Defense land assets provide the physical foundation for basing, logistics hubs, training areas, and forward operating sites essential to archipelagic defense. Investments in these resources facilitate the AFP's mobility, sustainment, and rapid force projection across the country's dispersed islands. However, its availability does not guarantee effectiveness, as its strategic value depends on the alignment with defense priorities, geographic positioning, and interoperability within a joint and interagency operational environment.

On the other hand, the country's institutional capacity is characterized by strong competence in individual agencies. However, the country's institutional capacity exhibits weak collective integration and divergent institutional priorities due to varying statutory mandates. In the context of CADC's strategic objectives, this results in a procedurally functional governance system that is legally compliant but strategically inefficient. Likewise, institutional capacity in defense real estate governance is not limited by the lack of technical expertise or authority within the respective agencies. Instead, the governance capacity is limited by the absence of a unified framework that aligns these capacities toward CADC's shared strategic objective.

The effectiveness of these "Means" is contingent upon governance coherence and systemic integration. However, the study shows that they are under-leveraged due to systemic governance challenges, which diminish the value of defense resources. Without a centralized framework for defense real estate governance, the potential for land and



infrastructure is constrained by procedural bottlenecks and competing priorities among government agencies. Hence, there is a need to strengthen institutional capacity through reforms in coordination mechanisms, legal frameworks, and the strategic planning process to ensure that these resources support the Philippines' comprehensive archipelagic defense objectives.

F. THE STRATEGIC COHERENCE ASSESSMENT

Considering the different findings and analysis in this study, the Philippines does not have a strategy problem, but has governance issues, as follows:

- **Fragmented Authority**

The study shows that no single entity controls defense real estate, leading to inefficiency. Fragmented authority in defense real estate governance undermines strategic coherence by overlapping decision-making powers among government agencies, lacking a unified command structure. Although the DND and the AFP define the operational requirements for CADC, they do not control land classification, titling, and disposition, which are mandated to be done by other government institutions. This results in delays in executing strategically important defense projects in response to the country's pressing external threats. Consequently, these delays weaken the alignment between strategic "Ends" and the operational "Means."

- **Legal Rigidity**

The analysis also shows that strong Constitutional and statutory property rights protection imposes lengthy, compliance-heavy processes that consequently slow military development, as embodied in the CADC's strategic objectives. Likewise, the legal rigidity constrains the flexibility required to rapidly align land acquisition and infrastructure development with the evolving CADC's defense priorities. Although these safeguards are essential for accountability and equity, they also limit the government's ability to respond quickly to strategic defense needs and hinder the timely establishment of critical military facilities and infrastructure.

- **Institutional Silos**



Based on this study, the different agencies involved in defense real estate governance act independently rather than collaboratively. Respectively, they prioritize their own mandate, procedures, and performance metrics without integrating broader defense objectives. This results in efforts duplication, information gaps, and inefficient resource utilization. This situation prevents the synchronization of land-use, infrastructure development, and operational planning. Eventually, this weakens the overall strategic coherence required in the CADC framework.

- Local–National Disconnect

The LGUs are not fully integrated into the defense strategy because of their local priorities. The research shows that the local- and national-level disconnection reflects the tension between national defense priorities and local government interests in land use and development. This conflict can delay or even obstruct the implementation of strategically important defense projects in key geographic areas identified as critical under CADC. The absence of mechanisms to harmonize local and national priorities may cause defense initiatives to fail.

- Sequential Governance

The established government processes are linear and follow a step-by-step administrative and regulatory process in defense real estate acquisition and management. The study shows that the relevant government agencies act in isolation and sequentially. This lack of integration extends project timelines and reduces the responsiveness to urgent defense requirements. These delays impede the rapid development of AFP bases and infrastructure necessary for archipelagic defense, highlighting the need for a more integrated and streamlined governance mechanism.



V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations derived from the analysis of defense real estate acquisition and management in relation to the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC) implemented by the Philippines to protect territorial integrity and maritime sovereignty, among other strategic objectives. Applying the Three-Legged Stool framework, the study revealed that the country has a strong strategic alignment across NSP, NSS, NDS, and CADC. However, significant challenges exist in the execution of governance mechanisms. Specifically, the primary issue is systemic deficiencies in governance execution that undermine the translation of strategic intent into operational capability.

B. OVERALL CONCLUSION

The study shows that the strategic “Ends” embodied in the NSP, NSS, NDS, and operationalized in CADC are coherent and aligned. However, this strategic strength is undermined by weaknesses in “Ways,” where fragmented legal frameworks, disjointed institutional arrangements, and inefficient interagency coordination prevail. The study shows that these systemic issues create barriers that undermine policy effectiveness, and translating strategic intent into operational capabilities remains constrained.

These deficiencies in the “Ways” directly affect the “Means,” particularly the defense lands, military infrastructure, and institutional capacity. Although there are vast resources, their utilization is neither optimized nor strategically directed. The disconnect lies in the governance gap, where available assets are not fully leveraged to support the strategic defense objectives, thereby diminishing the overall capability effectiveness.

The existing imbalance among the “Ends,” “Ways,” and “Means” results in a structurally weak system that limits the full realization of the CADC’s strategic objectives. Addressing this requires not only maintaining strategic coherence but, more importantly, reforming governance mechanisms and strengthening interagency coordination to ensure



that resources are effectively mobilized. Achieving this balance is essential for transforming defense real estate into a functional and strategic enabler of national defense.

C. KEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Based on analysis, several interrelated governance constraints collectively weaken the effective acquisition and management of defense real estate. Fragmented authority undermines accountability across agencies involved in the defense real estate governance. The legal rigidity identified in the study slows decision-making and limits adaptive responses to the situation's strategic requirements. The institutional silos that currently exist hinder coordination and prevent government agencies from operating in an integrated and collaborative manner. The situation is aggravated by the disconnect between the local and national governments, which creates misalignment in land use and development. The presence of sequential governance processes results in delays and inefficiencies, thereby limiting the timely and strategic implementation of initiatives outlined in the defense policies through CADC.

- **Fragmented Authority**

The finding on fragmented authority underscores a fundamental structural weakness in Philippine defense real estate acquisition and management. It has no single, centralized authority with clear command over policy direction, planning, and execution. It shows that governance responsibilities are divided among different government agencies, including the DND and the AFP, to meet operational requirements. The land classification and environmental compliance responsibilities fall under the DENR. Furthermore, ancestral domain claims are the purview of NCIP, while the LRA performs land titling and the LGUs enforce zoning and land-use regulations.

This fragmentation leads to a lack of unified decision-making, especially at critical stages of operationalizing the CADC's objectives. These stages include land acquisition, base development, and infrastructure expansion. Decisions are impeded by a fragmented approval process in which multiple agencies apply differing criteria and timelines, since no single body has total control. In some cases, a proposed military installation is strategically justified by the AFP, but still subject to DENR environmental clearances, NCIP consent



processes, LRA titling verification, and LGU zoning approval. These processes are not synchronized and often operate independently, thus resulting in delays, inconsistent outcomes, or even project abandonment. More critically, there is no institutional mechanism that prioritizes national defense imperatives over competing civilian or regulatory concerns. This situation weakens the Philippines' ability to respond decisively to emerging requirements under CADC, particularly in the West Philippine Sea.

The study also highlights the issue of overlapping jurisdictional mandates, in which multiple agencies exercise authority over the same parcel of land. Defense real estate may simultaneously fall under environmental protection laws, agrarian reform coverage, ancestral domain claims, and local land-use plans. This creates legal and administrative ambiguity. Without a well-defined hierarchy of mandates or authority, these overlapping functions generate conflicts that are often resolved through prolonged legal or administrative processes rather than through a coherent national strategy. This shifts defense priorities from commanded directives to negotiated trade-offs, which risks the stability of long-term plans for military footprint and positioning.

This decentralized oversight results in bureaucratic, consecutive coordination workflows. Interagency coordination is typically reactive, triggered only when specific requirements arise. This is contrary to the ideal one, which is institutionalized through standing mechanisms or joint planning bodies. Considering CADC's objectives, where rapid development of strategically located bases and infrastructure is essential to address emerging national security threats, such inefficiencies directly constrain the effective mobilization of land and infrastructure as "Means" in the Three-Legged Stool framework.

The issue of fragmented authority transforms defense real estate governance into a disjointed system lacking strategic coherence. The study finds that the strong policies "Ends" are not matched with coordinated "Ways" and effectively mobilized "Means." Considering the pressing national security issues confronting the country, the Philippines cannot fully implement its archipelagic defense strategy without major structural changes in the governance of defense real estate, such as a unified defense land authority or a formal way for agencies to work together.



- Legal Rigidity

The study shows that the Philippine legal framework governing land and property is anchored in strong Constitutional and statutory protections upholding ownership rights, due process, and social justice. These legal frameworks are essential for maintaining the rule of law and preventing abuse in land governance. However, these rights-based protections introduce a degree of rigidity that limits the country's ability to achieve CADC's strategic objectives.

The land acquisition processes become inherently time-consuming. The study shows that land acquisition must pass through multiple legal procedures and comply with agrarian reform and ancestral domain claims. Each step involves due process requirements, stakeholder engagement, and often judicial or quasi-judicial review. Although they ensure fairness and transparency, they extend timelines far beyond what is operationally desirable in defense planning. They delay responsive decisions necessary to address the evolving geopolitical threats and hinder the timely establishment or expansion of critical military facilities.

These legal protections limit flexibility in strategic land use, particularly in areas already subject to competing claims or classifications. Lands identified for defense purposes may overlap with protected environmental zones, agrarian reform areas, or recognized ancestral domains. Adherence to environmental regulations, the FPIC process, and clearance for non-coverage from agrarian reform is mandated regardless of the land's strategic importance to national security. Although legitimate and necessary, it restricts the government's ability to reclassify or repurpose land quickly for defense purposes. As a result, strategic utilization becomes contingent on multiple layers of legal approval, often without a mechanism to prioritize national defense imperatives.

Furthermore, regulatory requirements contribute to delays in infrastructure development. Defense infrastructure projects must comply with the procurement laws, zoning ordinances, and building regulations, which are governed by separate agencies with distinct processes. This fragmented yet stringent regulatory environment leads to sequential compliance rather than parallel execution, significantly slowing project implementation.



Consequently, legal rigidity directly impacts the pace at which CADC objectives can be realized. In a time-sensitive environment requiring rapid deployment, basing, and infrastructure, these delays reduce the responsiveness and effectiveness of national defense. Thus, while the legal framework upholds fundamental rights and governance principles, its current structure significantly constrains the agile execution of defense strategies as outlined in CADC.

- Institutional Silos

The study indicates that institutional silos are a critical governance challenge in the acquisition and management of defense real estate. The finding reveals that agencies operate within narrowly defined mandates with limited integration across the broader government system. Key institutions like the DND and the AFP focus on strategic and operational requirements, while the DENR, DAR, NCIP, and LRA perform regulatory and administrative functions. These agencies fulfill their respective legal mandates by establishing their own activities and procedures rather than creating a coordinated system with other government agencies. This fragmented approach prioritizes institutional autonomy over shared strategic goals, leading to a major obstacle for CADC, which relies entirely on unified, synchronized action.

Institutional silos limit interagency collaboration and constrain the ability to harmonize defense requirements with regulatory processes. The study shows that coordination among agencies tends to be ad hoc, issue-specific, and reactive rather than institutionalized and continuous. The finding shows that AFP planning for strategic critical sites occurs without early involvement from DENR, DAR, or NCIP, thereby limiting joint assessment and decision-making. The lack of early and sustained collaboration among these agencies prevents the integration of technical, environmental, legal, and social considerations into a unified plan, resulting in fragmented and often incompatible actions across institutions.

The study also reveals that agencies independently conduct assessments, validations, and approvals without shared systems and coordinated workflow. This results in redundant processes because multiple agencies require separate documentation, site



inspections, or compliance reports for the same project, each adhering to its own standards and procedures. This duplication increases administrative burden, prolongs timelines, and raises transaction costs for defense infrastructure development. Furthermore, the current system reinforces bureaucratic layering, in which each agency's internal processes add to the overall complexity of implementing projects under the CADC.

Another consequence of institutional silos is the conflicting policy outcomes as agencies pursue their respective mandates without a unifying strategic framework to reconcile differing priorities. The research shows that environmental protection policies restrict access to strategically important areas, while agrarian reform objectives prioritize land distribution over military use, and local government zoning decisions conflict with the national defense plan. In the absence of an integrated governance framework, there is no authoritative mechanism to align these policies with overarching defense objectives embodied in CADC.

Although institutional capacities are individually robust, they are not effectively mobilized toward CADC requirements. This misalignment underscores the need for a centralized or integrative governance approach that can bridge institutional differences, synchronize agency actions, and ensure that defense real estate governance supports rather than constrains strategic national objectives.

- Local-National Disconnect

The research reveals that the local-national disconnect in defense real estate governance reflects a structural tension between national defense objectives and LGU development. At the national level, the DND and the AFP are tasked with advancing strategic objectives under the CADC, which requires the rapid development of military bases, installations, and supporting infrastructure. On the contrary, the LGUs are mandated under RA 7160 to prioritize local economic growth, environmental protection, and community welfare. While both levels of governance serve legitimate public interests, their priorities are not always aligned, particularly when defense projects impose constraints on local land use or development plans.



Local governments base their project assessments on the project's immediate impact on the community, including potential displacement, environmental degradation, and opportunity costs from foregone commercial or residential development. The study reveals that while the AFP identifies lands that are strategically vital for national defense, the LGUs identify the same property for tourism, agriculture, or urban expansion. Anchored in the provisions of RA 7160, LGUs play a significant role in local decision-making, including environmental concerns such as coastal protection and forest preservation. They impose additional requirements, request modifications, or withhold endorsement, thereby complicating and prolonging the approval process for defense-related initiatives.

Additionally, the study finds that the disconnect further manifests in delays in project approval, as defense projects must comply not only with national regulations but also with local ordinances, zoning classifications, and permitting processes. The LGUs' significant authority over land-use planning gives them considerable influence over the pace and feasibility of defense projects. The absence of an integrated framework for national defense priorities in local development plans results in fragmented, sequential approval. Consequently, it results in prolonged negotiations, repeated revisions of project proposals, and, in some cases, indefinite deferment of strategically important developments as embodied in CADC.

Moreover, beyond procedural delays, the study reveals that a local-national disconnect generates active resistance to the development of defense infrastructure. Communities supported by LGUs sometimes oppose military projects through formal objections, political lobbying or public protests due to concerns about environmental impacts, livelihood disruption, or a perceived lack of local benefits. Such resistance increases the complexity and risk of implementing defense projects. Without mechanisms to align incentives, communicate strategic value, and integrate local interests into national defense planning, this disconnect undermines the effective mobilization of land and infrastructure as "Means" in the CADC framework. Considering the strategic objectives of the CADC, addressing this issue requires not only policy alignment but also institutional



innovations that bridge national and local governance to pursue shared security and development objectives.

- Sequential Governance

The study finds that sequential governance remains a major structural constraint in defense real estate management in relation to the CADC implementation. Government processes for land acquisition, environmental compliance, ancestral domain recognition, zoning approval, budgeting, and infrastructure development are generally undertaken in a linear, fragmented manner rather than in an integrated, synchronized manner. They resulted in the independent, sequential processing of requirements by the different government agencies involved in defense real estate governance. This governance arrangement results in extended timelines because each agency's actions depend on the completion of another agency's prior process before subsequent actions may proceed. Consequently, strategic defense projects experience prolonged implementation periods, delaying the operationalization of critical bases, logistics, and infrastructure required for CADC execution.

The sequential governance contributes to increased administrative burden and procedural inefficiency across the defense real estate governance system. Multiple requirements, repetitive clearance, overlapping evaluations, and uncoordinated approval procedures create excessive bureaucratic layers that consume institutional resources and slow decision-making processes. Instead of facilitating strategic coordination, the governance structure emphasizes procedural compliance and agency-specific mandates, leading to redundant administrative activities and duplicated functions. These inefficiencies reduce institutional responsiveness to rapidly evolving strategic and security requirements, particularly in areas requiring urgent infrastructure development, maritime domain support, force dispersal, and enhanced territorial defense. In highly contested and dynamic strategic environments, delays caused by sequential governance undermine the government's ability to rapidly mobilize resources and operationalize defense facilities in support of national defense objectives.



The findings indicate that sequential governance is fundamentally incompatible with the operational requirements of CADC, which demands speed, flexibility, adaptability, and integrated strategic coordination. The archipelagic defense framework requires responsive and agile governance mechanisms capable of rapidly supporting infrastructure expansion, force repositioning, logistics integration, and the development of strategic basing across the country's maritime and territorial domains. However, the current linear governance system limits the responsiveness to emerging security challenges and geopolitical conditions, especially in the WPS. Sequential governance hinders strategic agility, reinforces institutional rigidity, and slows the conversion of strategic plans to operational capabilities. This demonstrates that while strategic "Ends" embodied in the NSS, NSP, NDS, and CADC remain coherent, the governance "Ways" responsible for implementation remain procedurally constrained and insufficiently adaptive to the demands of modern archipelagic defense.

D. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

The identified governance issues in the study have profound implications for the country's national defense posture and the effective implementation of the CADC. The CADC requires a highly responsive and geographically distributed defense structure capable of protecting the Philippines' extensive maritime and archipelagic territory. However, governance inefficiencies in the acquisition and management of defense real estate significantly undermine the country's ability to establish and sustain strategically located military facilities. As a result, the operationalization of CADC is constrained not by the absence of strategic direction but by the inability of governance systems to translate strategic objectives into operational capabilities efficiently.

One major implication of these issues is the delay in basing and infrastructure development, which directly weakens the principle of distributed defense embedded in the CADC. The archipelagic defense strategy depends on the rapid establishment and modernization of dispersed military installations across critical maritime and territorial areas, particularly in northern Luzon, Palawan, the West Philippine Sea, and the country's eastern seaboard. However, prolonged land acquisition processes, overlapping regulatory



requirements, environmental clearance processes, and unresolved jurisdictional disputes significantly delay the development of these strategic facilities. Consequently, the AFP's ability to project presence, sustain logistics, and respond rapidly to evolving external threats is limited, reducing the overall effectiveness of territorial defense operations.

The governance challenges also restrict access to strategically important lands, thereby limiting operational flexibility. Defense planners require access to coastal zones, airfields, airports, communication corridors, and strategically located properties to support mobility, surveillance, deterrence, and force projection. The conflicting land classifications, ancestral domain claims, agrarian reform coverage, local zoning regulations, and environmental restrictions often constrain the AFP's access to these areas. In many cases, defense projects become subject to lengthy negotiations among government agencies and stakeholders before implementation can start. This undermines the military's responsiveness to rapidly changing security conditions, especially in areas with evolving geopolitical tensions and hybrid security threats.

Another significant implication is that fragmented decision-making reduces strategic coherence between national objectives and land governance policies. The study highlights that no single institution exercises centralized authority over defense real estate governance, resulting in disconnected and often conflicting decisions among agencies such as the DND, AFP, DENR, DAR, NCIP, LRA, and LGUs. Each institution operates according to its own mandates, procedures, and priorities, without an integrated strategic framework aligned with CADC. The absence of a unified framework results in fragmented administrative processes. This institutional fragmentation weakens policy synchronization and prevents the efficient alignment of defense infrastructure development with long-term strategic objectives.

The inefficiency of defense real estate governance processes also increases the country's vulnerability to emerging and rapidly evolving security threats. Contemporary challenges, like the gray-zone operations, maritime coercion, cyber-enabled disruptions, transnational crimes, and potential regional conflicts, require speed, adaptability, and strategic responsiveness. Critical defense infrastructure often experiences prolonged implementation timelines because agencies process approval independently rather than



simultaneously. This inability to mobilize land and infrastructure resources creates operational gaps that adversaries may exploit, particularly in strategically contested maritime areas where timely positioning is critical.

Furthermore, these governance concerns negatively affect defense resource optimization and institutional capacity development. Significant investments under the AFP Modernization Program may not achieve their intended strategic value if land acquisition, infrastructure development, and basing support systems remain delayed or poorly coordinated. Modern military assets require compatible facilities, logistics network, and operational support facilities to maximize capability effectiveness. However, fragmented governance systems prevent the efficient integration of modernization investments with strategic basing and territorial defense requirements. Consequently, defense resources risk becoming underutilized, while infrastructure gaps continue to limit operational readiness and force sustainability.

Collectively, these governance issues weaken the Philippines' ability to fully operationalize the CADC. While the strategic objectives under the NSS, NSP, NDS, and CADC remain coherent and mutually reinforcing, the governance mechanisms necessary to implement them remain fragmented and underdeveloped. The problem, therefore, lies not in the absence of strategic vision, but in the structural and institutional limitations that prevent the effective mobilization of land, infrastructure, and institutional capacity. Unless governance reforms are implemented to improve interagency coordination, streamline legal processes, and establish centralized strategic oversight of defense real estate, the Philippines will continue to face significant challenges in translating strategic defense concepts into credible, sustainable operational capabilities.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations presented in this study are intended to address systemic governance deficiencies affecting defense real estate and management with respect to CADC. These recommendations aim to improve strategic coherence among legal frameworks, institutional arrangements, interagency coordination mechanisms, and defense infrastructure planning to ensure that national defense objectives are effectively



translated to operational capabilities. Furthermore, the proposed reforms seek to strengthen the alignment between the strategic “Ends,” governance “Ways,” and institutional “Means” within the Three-Legged Stool framework, thereby enhancing the Philippines’s ability to develop a more responsive, integrated, and strategically adaptive defense real estate governance system capable of supporting long-term archipelagic defense requirements.

- **Develop National Defense Real Estate Strategy (Draft proposed in Appendix A)**

The development of a National Defense Real Estate Strategy (NDRES) is critical to establishing a coherent, long-term framework that aligns defense real estate governance with the broader national security environment in the Philippines. Currently, defense land acquisition and management remain largely fragmented and administrative, with limited integration into strategic defense planning. The absence of a centralized strategy results in inconsistent land utilization, overlapping institutional mandates, and reactive infrastructure development. By developing a comprehensive NDRES, the government can systematically connect defense real estate policies with the NSS, NSP, NDS, and CADC. Such alignment transforms defense real estate from a passive asset inventory into an active instrument of national security and territorial defense.

A comprehensive NDRES provides a strategic framework for identifying and prioritizing critical defense lands necessary for archipelagic operations. Without a national strategy, land acquisition and infrastructure development occur in an uncoordinated and piecemeal manner, leading to inefficiencies and capability gaps. The NDRES aims to establish criteria to determine strategic land priorities based on operational requirements, geographic vulnerabilities, emerging security threats, and force-projection needs. This enables the government to proactively secure and develop defense lands essential for long-term national defense objectives.

The proposed strategy integrates the full cycle of defense real estate management, including land acquisition, retention, development, utilization, and protection. The strategy turns the country’s defense real estate governance focus from administrative compliance to strategic sustainability. It relieves the DND and the AFP from conversion pressures,



overlapping claims, environmental disputes, and weak institutional protection. Under the NDRES, defense lands can be classified based on strategic value, operational necessity, and future military utility. This integrated approach ensures that military properties are not only acquired efficiently but also preserved and developed in accordance with the evolving defense requirements. Furthermore, the strategy establishes long-term infrastructure investment priorities that directly support force modernization and operational readiness under the CADC framework.

The NDRES facilitates enhanced interagency coordination and institutional coherence. It provides a common strategic direction that aligns these institutions' functions with national defense priorities. By establishing unified objectives, planning standards, and coordination mechanisms, the strategy improves the country's capacity to mobilize land and infrastructure resources efficiently.

Likewise, the NDRES ensures that defense real estate is formally recognized as a core strategic capability rather than a mere support function of the government. Land and infrastructure are indispensable components of military power because they enable basing, logistics, mobility, sustainment, and operational flexibility. Given the country's archipelagic geography and an evolving regional security environment, strategically managed defense real estate is a critical enabler of deterrence and national resilience. The NDRES institutionalizes this recognition by embedding defense land governance into the country's long-term security planning framework. Through strategic integration, coordinated development, and sustained institutional support, the NDRES strengthens the Philippines' ability to operationalize the CADC and enhance the overall national defense preparedness and responsiveness.

- Reform Legal Framework for Strategic Flexibility

The reform of existing legal frameworks is necessary to enhance strategic flexibility in defense real estate governance and ensure that military development can respond effectively to evolving national security requirements. The current legal environment governing land acquisition, environmental compliance, titling, and land-use regulation in the Philippines is heavily procedural and compliance-driven. Although these legal



standards are important for protecting constitutional rights, social equity, and environmental sustainability, they often create delays that hinder the timely implementation of strategic defense projects. The lengthy processes involved in land acquisition and regulatory approvals reduce the country's responsiveness to emerging threats. Legal reforms aim at strategic flexibility, therefore seek to modernize existing procedures while preserving the rule of law and democratic accountability.

One important aspect of these reforms involves establishing special legal provisions for the acquisition of defense-related land. Existing acquisition mechanisms are often subject to lengthy negotiations, overlapping claims, multiple agency clearances, and judicial challenges that significantly delay military infrastructure development. Strategic defense projects frequently compete with commercial, agricultural, environmental, and local land-use interests, making acquisition processes highly complex and politically sensitive. By introducing special procedures for defense-related acquisitions, the government can prioritize lands identified as essential to national security and operational readiness. These reforms may include expedited expropriation proceedings, strategic land reservations, emergency acquisition authorities, and simplified conversion mechanisms. Likewise, these measures allow the government to secure strategically critical locations more efficiently while ensuring that affected stakeholders continue to receive due process and just compensation as required by the Constitution.

Another area for reform involves streamlining regulatory processes for military projects. As previously emphasized, defense infrastructure projects undergo sequential clearances and approvals from multiple agencies, resulting in redundant reviews, bureaucratic bottlenecks, and prolonged project implementation periods. This sequential structure is incompatible with CADC's operational demands. Hence, legal reforms must institutionalize parallel processing systems, interagency coordination mechanisms, and expedited review procedures to reduce administrative delays and improve institutional efficiency.

Despite the need for greater strategic flexibility, legal reforms must continue to uphold constitutional safeguards and protect fundamental rights. The challenge is not to eliminate environmental regulations, agrarian protections, and indigenous peoples' rights



or local autonomy, but to harmonize these legal interests with legitimate national security requirements. A balanced legal framework recognizes that national defense itself is a constitutional responsibility of the State and must be integrated into broader governance systems. Reforms should therefore establish clear standards for transparency, accountability, consultation, compensation, and judicial oversight to ensure a more responsive defense decision-making. By balancing property rights with national security imperatives, the government can reduce legal rigidity without undermining democratic principles. These reforms create a more adaptive and strategically coherent legal environment that supports the long-term implementation of the CADC.

- Establish a Centralized Defense Real Estate Authority (**Draft proposed in Appendix B**)

The research proposes establishing a Centralized Defense Real Estate Authority (CDREA) under the strategic direction of the DND to address persistent fragmentation in defense real estate management and other governance deficiencies. The establishment of CDREA seeks to institutionalize a unified governance framework that synchronizes the fragmented functions of several government agencies under a single strategic direction aligned with CADC.

By enacting a law establishing the CDREA, defense real estate shall be recognized not merely as an administrative or property-management concern but also as a strategic national-security asset. This distinction is critical because land and infrastructure form the physical foundation of military readiness, force projection, logistics, maritime domain awareness, and territorial defense. Under the CADC, the Philippines requires dispersed and strategically located bases, ports, airfields, logistics hubs, and operational facilities capable of supporting and sustaining archipelagic operations. However, existing governance structures remain largely compliance-driven and institutionally divided, preventing defense land governance from responding rapidly to evolving security threats. Through CDREA, defense real estate management becomes strategically integrated into national defense planning, thereby strengthening the alignment between land governance and military operational requirements.



The proposed measure also aims to institutionalize functional integration among agencies while preserving their statutory mandates. Instead of abolishing or diminishing the authority of agencies such as the DENR, DAR, NCIP, LRA, and LGUs, the bill establishes a coordinated framework to align their actions with national defense priorities. This approach balances the need for strategic defense flexibility with constitutional protections involving environmental protection, agrarian reform, indigenous peoples' rights, and local autonomy. The proposed functional relationships also clarify the distinctions among strategic, operational, and integrating authority. The DND establishes the strategic direction, the AFP identifies operational requirements, and the CDREA operationalizes these requirements through coordinated land acquisition, development, titling, and infrastructure implementation. Such delineation minimizes bureaucratic ambiguity and promotes accountability across institutions.

The bill likewise addresses the current sequential governance mechanism that hinders the development of the defense infrastructure. Under the traditional system, agencies process applications independently and sequentially, prolonging delays in land acquisition, environmental compliance, titling, and project approvals. By mandating a parallel processing system, the proposed legislation transforms defense real estate governance into a more responsive and integrated mechanism, thereby allowing speed, flexibility, adaptability, and synchronized implementation of defense initiatives, as embodied in CADC. Simultaneous processing of permits, certifications, and approvals reduces administrative bottlenecks and accelerates the completion of strategic defense projects. The establishment of shared databases and centralized coordination through CDREA further enhances transparency and efficiency in interagency operations.

Likewise, the harmonization of local and national interests through structured LGU participation. Data shows that tensions have emerged between national defense priorities and local government concerns involving zoning, environmental protection, economic development, and community welfare. These tensions often lead to delays in project approvals or resistance to the development of defense infrastructure. The proposed measure addresses this disconnect by requiring LGUs to participate in joint planning activities, align the Comprehensive Land Use Plans (CLUPs) with defense priorities, and designate defense



coordination officers. It also integrates the LGUs into the strategic planning process and promotes collaborative governance to ensure that national security considerations remain protected.

The proposed CDREA institutionalizes accountability, performance monitoring, and strategic coherence in defense real estate governance. By establishing performance metrics based on processing time, coordination effectiveness, and alignment with CADC, the bill creates measurable standards for institutional performance. The proposed annual Defense Real Estate Performance Report further promotes transparency and policy oversight. More importantly, the bill transforms defense real estate governance from a fragmented administrative process into a strategic capability that directly supports national defense objectives. This strengthens governance structures and improves interagency coordination, enabling the effective mobilization of land, infrastructure, and institutional capacity necessary for the successful operationalization and sustainment of the CADC.

F. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Further studies may examine quantitative optimization of defense real estate to support more data-driven strategic planning and resource allocation. Using geographic information systems (GIS), predictive analytics, spatial modeling, and operational simulations, researchers can identify optimal locations for military bases, logistics hubs, and airfields, among other military facilities. Quantitative models may also help evaluate long-term sustainability in support of the CADC.

Comparative research may also be undertaken by examining other archipelagic nations facing similar maritime and territorial defense challenges. Countries like Indonesia and Japan provide useful case studies in strategic basing, island defense infrastructure, interagency coordination, and maritime security governance. A comparative study may identify best practices, institutional models, and policy approaches that can inform the modernization of the Philippines' defense real estate management and strengthen regional defense resilience.

Another important area for future research is assessing the impact of legal and institutional reforms on defense capability and operational readiness. Studies may evaluate



whether reforms in land acquisition, environmental regulation, interagency coordination, and infrastructure development lead to measurable improvements in military responsiveness, strategic mobility, and force projection. Such assessments can provide empirical evidence on how governance reforms directly influence the effectiveness of national defense implementation under the CADC framework.

G. FINAL SYNTHESIS

This study demonstrates that the Philippines already possesses a coherent strategic vision for national defense through the alignment of NSS, NSP, NDS, and CADC. These frameworks collectively establish clear national defense objectives focused on territorial integrity, maritime security, deterrence, and operational readiness across the Philippine archipelago. The challenge, therefore, does not primarily lie in the absence of strategy but in the institutions' capacity to implement and operationalize these strategic objectives effectively.

The study further reveals that the success of archipelagic defense depends mainly on the State's ability to mobilize, govern, and sustain defense real estate resources efficiently. Land, infrastructure, and basing systems are essential components of military capability because they support force deployment, logistics, surveillance, and strategic positioning. However, fragmented governance structures, legal rigidity, institutional silos, and delayed coordination processes continue to limit the effective utilization of these resources. Strengthening defense real estate governance is therefore critical to transforming strategic vision into operational capability and ensuring the long-term effectiveness and sustainment of the CADC.



APPENDIX A. DRAFT FRAMEWORK FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENSE REAL ESTATE STRATEGY 2026–2036

I. Executive Summary

This National Defense Real Estate Strategy (NDRES) establishes the policy and implementation framework for the acquisition, retention, development, protection, management, and rational disposition of defense real estate in support of national defense. It recognizes that the Philippines does not primarily face a strategy deficit. Instead, it faces a governance execution problem in converting defense strategy into outcomes for land, infrastructure, and basing. The National Security Policy (NSP) provides the broad security policy anchor, and CADC provides the operational logic for distributed archipelagic defense, forward presence, sustainment, and protection of maritime territories and sea lines of communications.

The strategy, therefore, treats defense real estate as a strategic capability rather than merely an administrative asset. It aims to correct fragmented authority, legal rigidity, institutional silos, local-national disconnect, and sequential governance by establishing a unified, defense-prioritized, and time-sensitive approach to land governance for national defense.

II. Vision

A strategically aligned, legally secure, climate-resilient, and operationally effective defense real estate system that enables the Philippines to sustain a credible archipelagic defense.

III. Mission

To ensure that defense land, bases, reservations, facilities, corridors, and supporting infrastructure are acquired, retained, developed, and governed in a manner that directly supports national sovereignty, territorial integrity, force mobility, maritime security, deterrence, and operational readiness.

IV. Strategic Context

The country's current defense trajectory is anchored on the protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national resilience under the NSP 2023–2028. The CADC is a defense shift aimed at protecting Philippine territory, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) resources, maritime borders, sea lanes of communication, and areas the nation is bound to protect.

Under CADC, defense real estate must support five strategic functions: presence, protection, projection, sustainment, and resilience. These functions require not only weapons systems and force structure but also bases, logistics hubs, dispersed support sites,



maintenance areas, munitions and fuel storage, port and airfield access, command-and-control facilities, mobility corridors, and protected staging areas.

V. Policy Statement

The State shall adopt a whole-of-government defense real estate strategy that:

1. Recognizes defense real estate as a strategic national security asset.
2. Aligns all defense land decisions with the NSS, NSP, NDS, and CADC.
3. Prioritizes retention and development of strategically significant areas over ad hoc disposal or conversion.
4. Streamlines interagency and local processes for defense projects.
5. Balances constitutional rights, environmental stewardship, indigenous rights, and local autonomy with legitimate national defense requirements.
6. Shifts government action from sequential compliance to parallel integrated execution.

VI. Strategic Diagnosis

This strategy is grounded in five core findings.

1. Fragmented Authority

No single entity currently exercises full-spectrum control over defense real estate governance. Responsibilities are divided among DND, AFP, DENR, DAR, NCIP, LRA, and LGUs, resulting in coordination gaps and inefficiencies.

2. Legal Rigidity

The legal regime strongly protects property rights, environmental safeguards, agrarian rights, and indigenous claims. These protections are legitimate, but they also delay defense acquisition, development, and expansion when no defense-oriented harmonization is in place.

3. Institutional Silos

Agencies act according to sector-specific mandates rather than a common defense land framework.

4. Local-National Disconnect

The LGUs shape zoning, permits, and land-use implementation, but local priorities often diverge from national defense requirements.

5. Sequential Governance

Defense projects frequently move in a linear process across agencies, causing delay and strategic drag.

VII. Strategic Objective



The NDRES shall pursue the following strategic objectives:

1. Secure Strategic Defense Footprint

Identify, map, and protect all defense lands and facilities critical to archipelagic defense, especially those necessary for forward basing, logistics, maritime surveillance, mobility, and sustainment.

2. Align Real Estate with CADC

Translate CADC into a geospatial basing and infrastructure logic, ensuring that land decisions directly support maritime territorial defense, distributed operations, and operational resilience.

3. Establish Unified Governance

Create a centralized or lead coordinating mechanism for defense real estate to integrate DND, AFP, DENR, DAR, NCIP, LRA, and LGUs.

4. Accelerate Delivery

Replace slow, sequential approval systems with parallel, time-bound, digitally tracked interagency processes for defense-related land and infrastructure projects.

5. Protect Strategic Lands from Erosion

Prevent loss, encroachment, fragmentation, incompatible use, or premature conversion of lands essential to long-term national defense.

6. Build Resilient Infrastructure Networks

Develop defense sites that are redundant, survivable, climate resilient, and capable of supporting distributed archipelagic operations.

VIII. Strategic Pillars

This strategy shall anchor its actions based on the following pillars:

1. Strategic Land Security

This pillar covers the identification, retention, acquisition, and legal protection of defense lands. All defense real estate shall be categorized according to mission value: core strategic sites, supporting operational sites, reserve expansion areas, and non-core properties. Core strategic sites shall be insulated from incompatible conversion and prioritized for titling, boundary control, and development.

Priority actions shall be:

- (a) Conduct a National Defense Real Estate Inventory and Cadastre;
- (b) Complete titling, registration, and boundary surveys for all priority sites;
- (c) Establish a strategic defense land categories with varying levels of protection;
- (d) Create a buffer zone and reserve areas around critical bases where justified.



2. CADC-Oriented Basing and Infrastructure

This pillar of land and infrastructure supports the operational requirements of archipelagic defense. The CADC is aimed at defending the country's maritime territory, sea lanes, EEZ, and critical approach areas, making distributed and defensible basing central to implementation.

Priority Actions

(a) Develop a Defense Geospatial Basing Plan covering northern, western, eastern, and southern operational arcs;

(b) Prioritize land and infrastructure for air, naval, littoral, ISR, logistics, and support nodes;

(c) Upgrade selected sites for dispersed operations, survivability, fuel and munition storage, and protected sustainment;

(d) Integrate the Army, Navy, Air Force, and joint basing needs under one real estate master plan.

3. Integrated Governance and Functional Relationships

This pillar addresses fragmented authority by creating clear functional relationships among agencies.

Functional relationships

(a) DND sets policy, strategic priorities, and defense plans guidance;

(b) AFP denies operational requirements and validates site utility;

(c) DENR handles land classification, protected-area concerns, and environmental compliance;

(d) DAR resolves agrarian coverage and exemption/conversion issues affecting defense land;

(e) NCIP oversees ancestral-domain processes and rights-based compliance;

(f) LRA prioritizes titling, registration, annotation, and land record integrity;

(g) LGUs align CLUPs, zoning, local permits, and local infrastructure with national defense priorities

Priority Actions

(a) Establish a Defense Real Estate Interagency Council chaired by DND or by a future Defense Real Estate Authority;

(b) Mandate defense focal persons in each agency

(c) Adopt shared service standards and time limits for defense land cases;

(d) Create a common digital dashboard for land status, approvals, disputes, and project tracking.

4. Legal and Regulatory Harmonization

This pillar addresses legal rigidity by harmonizing existing legal processes rather than abolishing them.

Priority Actions



- (a) Draft a Centralized Defense Real Estate Authority Act and related amendments;
- (b) Create special procedures for defense-critical projects without nullifying constitutional protections;
- (c) Develop standard interagency rules for environmental review, ancestral-domain engagement, titling, and agrarian clearance on defense-priority projects;
- (d) Establish a doctrine of strategic defense consideration for land-use decisions involving nationally critical sites.

5. National-Local Integration

This pillar closes the local-national disconnect currently existing in the country that delays CADC development projects.

Priority Actions

- (a) Require defense coordination inputs in provincial, city, and municipal land-use planning where defense sites are present;
- (b) Establish a local defense land coordination committee for the affected jurisdiction;
- (c) Offer fiscal, infrastructure, or service incentives for LGUs supporting defense-critical projects;
- (d) Build community defense protocols to reduce resistance and improve legitimacy.

6. Infrastructure Readiness and Resilience

This pillar ensures that real estate is not only legally available but operationally useful.

Priority Actions

- (a) Modernize runways, aprons, pier, depots, communications, housing, maintenance, and protection systems;
- (b) Integrate climate adaptation, redundancy, dispersal, and hardening measures;
- (c) Improve connectivity between bases and civilian transport, energy, and communications networks where appropriate;
- (d) Adopt a life-cycle asset management system for defense facilities.

IX. Strategic Programs

The NDRES shall be implemented through seven flagship programs:

1. National Defense Real Estate Inventory Program

A complete digital inventory of all military reservations, camps, bases, support areas, leased properties, easements, and disputed lands.

2. Strategic Site Protection Program

Legal and physical measures to secure priority defense lands against encroachment, fragmentation, and incompatible conversion.



3. CADC Infrastructure Acceleration Program

A rolling portfolio of priority-based and infrastructure projects linked to operational plans.

4. Defense Land Titling and Regularization Program

Fast-tract surveys, registration, titling, annotation, and documentary clean-up in partnership with LRA and DENR.

5. Interagency Parallel Processing Program

A one-stop integrated clearance system for defense projects.

6. National-Local Defense Land Alignment Program

Mechanisms to integrate LGUs into defense planning and land-use compatibility decisions.

7. Defense Land Analytics and Decision Support Program

A geo-spatial and data-driven platform to support planning, budgeting, and monitoring.

X. Implementation Framework

This strategy shall be implemented in accordance with this framework to achieve its vision.

A. Lead Agency

Pending legislation, the DND shall serve as the lead policy agency and designate an interim National Defense Real Estate Office. Once established by law, a Centralized Defense Real Estate Authority shall assume full leadership in implementation.

B. Planning Hierarchy

1. NSS/NSP/NDS
2. CADC and related AFP operational concepts
3. NDRES
4. Defense Geo-spatial Basing Plan
5. Annual Defense Real Estate Investment Program
6. Site-Level Master plans

C. Decision Rules

1. Core defense sites shall not be converted or disposed of without a national defense review;
2. Defense-priority projects shall receive parallel processing;
3. Agency disagreements shall be escalated to the interagency council within fixed timelines;



XI. Funding Strategy

The strategy shall be financed through:

- (a) AFP modernization appropriations, including infrastructure and support system development under the modernization framework;
- (b) General Appropriations Act line items for defense infrastructure and land management;
- (c) Authorized proceeds from the rational disposition of genuinely non-core assets, subject to strict safeguards;
- (d) Possible multi-year capital programming for strategic basing and resilience projects.

XII. Monitoring and Evaluation

The NDRES shall use the following key performance indicators:

- (a) Percentage of priority defense sites with completed title and survey status;
- (b) Average processing time for defense land approval;
- (c) Number of CADC-priority sites upgraded or protected;
- (d) Percentage of LGUs of defense-aligned land-use coordination mechanisms;
- (e) Number of interagency disputes resolved within prescribed time;
- (f) Percentage of infrastructure projects completed on schedule;
- (g) Reduction in encroachment, conversion risk, and land status uncertainty.

An Annual Defense Real Estate Performance Report shall be submitted to the President, the National Security Council, DND Leadership, and Congress.



APPENDIX B. CENTRALIZED DEFENSE REAL ESTATE AUTHORITY DRAFT BILL

**Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Twentieth Congress
Third Regular Session**
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on _____

REPUBLIC ACT NO.

AN ACT CREATING THE CENTRALIZED DEFENSE REAL ESTATE AUTHORITY, ESTABLISHING ITS FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH RELEVANT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS, AND PROVIDING FOR AN INTEGRATED AND STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR DEFENSE REAL ESTATE

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:*

SECTION 1. This Act shall be known as the “*Centralized Defense Real Estate Authority.*”

SECTION 2. *Declaration of Policy.* It is hereby declared the policy of the State to recognize defense real estate, including but not limited to military reservations, camps, bases, facilities, and other defense -related lands and infrastructure, as strategic national security assets essential to the protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national security. Toward this end, the principal thrusts under this Act shall be:

(a) The establishment of a centralized, coordinated, and efficient system for the governance, administration, acquisition, management, protection, development and utilization of defense real estate and the effective implementation of the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Security Policy (NSP), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC);

(b) The promotion of interagency integration and institutional coordination among national agencies, local government units (LGUs), government-owned and controlled corporations, and other stakeholders to ensure the strategic, sustainable, and lawful use of defense lands and related resources;

(c) The harmonization of national defense imperatives with local development objectives, environmental protection, property rights, and other lawful interests to achieve balanced, responsive, and strategically coherent defense real estate governance.

SECTION 3. *Definition of Terms.* For purposes of this Act:

(a) *Defense Real Estate* refers to all lands, military reservations, camps, bases, facilities, structures, easements, rights-of-way, ports, airfields, logistics hubs, training



areas, support infrastructure, and other properties used or intended for defense and military purposes;

(b) *Strategic Defense Areas* refer to locations identified as critical for the implementation of CADC and national defense operations;

(c) *Authority* refers to the Centralized Defense Real Estate Authority (CDREA) created by this Act;

(d) *Interagency Coordination* refers to the integrated and collaborative functions among national agencies and local government units involved in defense real estate governance.

SECTION 4. *Creation of the Centralized Defense Real Estate Authority (CDREA)*. There is hereby created a Centralized Defense Real Estate Authority under the Department of National Defense, which shall serve as the central coordinating and integrating authority for defense real estate.

SECTION 5. *Mandate of CDREA*. The CDREA shall:

(a) Integrate defense real estate governance with national defense strategy;

(b) Serve as the central coordinating and implementing body for all defense real estate matters;

(c) Ensure alignment of defense real estate with NSS, NSP, NDS, CADC, or any other similar national strategy and policy aimed to protect sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national security; and

(d) Promote strategic, efficient, and responsive governance of defense lands and infrastructure.

SECTION 6. *Powers of CDREA*. The CDREA shall exercise the following powers:

(a) Acquire, purchase, lease, reserve, exchange, expropriate, or otherwise obtain lands and properties necessary for defense purposes;

(b) Develop, construct, improve, maintain, and manage defense infrastructure and facilities;

(c) Retain and protect strategic defense lands from incompatible use, encroachment, and unnecessary conversion;

(d) Exercise centralized authority over defense real estate planning and management;

(e) Enter into contracts, agreements, memoranda of understanding, and joint ventures subject to existing laws;

(f) Establish defense real estate zoning and strategic land-use classifications;

(g) Recommend the reservation, reclassification, or withdrawal of lands for defense purposes;

(h) Establish and maintain a centralized digital inventory and geospatial database of all defense real estate.

(i) Issue rules, regulations, and standards governing defense real estate management;

(j) Exercise visitorial and monitoring powers over defense real estate projects;

(k) Perform such other acts necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

SECTION 7. *Functions of CDREA*. The CDREA shall perform the following functions:



A. Strategic Planning Functions

1. Formulate the National Defense Real Estate Strategy (NDRES);
2. Develop long-term basing and infrastructure plans;
3. Align defense land governance NSS, NSP, NDS, CADC, or any other similar national strategy and policy aimed to protect sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national security;

B. Land Management Functions

1. Conduct defense land inventory and cadastral surveys;
2. Manage titling, registration, and documentation of defense lands;
3. Administer defense land acquisition and retention programs.

C. Infrastructure Development Functions

1. Oversee construction and modernization of military facilities;
2. Coordinate strategic infrastructure investments;
3. Ensure climate resilience and sustainability of facilities.

D. Interagency Coordination Functions

1. Coordinate with DND, AFP, DENR, DAR, LRA, NCIP, LGUs, and other agencies;
2. Resolve interagency conflicts related to defense real estate;
3. Implement parallel processing systems for defense projects.

E. Monitoring and Regulatory Functions

1. Monitor compliance with defense land policies;
2. Evaluate strategic land utilization;
3. Publish annual performance and assessment reports.

SECTION 8. *Organizational Structure of CDREA*. The CDREA shall be governed by a Governing Board composed of:

Secretary of National Defense- Chairperson;
Chief of Staff, AFP- Vice Chairperson;
Secretary, DENR- Member;
Secretary, DAR- Member;
Secretary, DILG- Member;
Chairperson, NCIP- Member;
Administrator, LRA- Member;
Representative from DILG- Member;
Representative from LGUs- Member;
Director General, CDREA- Member.

SECTION 9. *Powers and Functions of the Governing Board*. The Board shall:

- (a) Approve policies, plans, and programs of CDREA;



- (b) Ensure Strategic alignment with NSS, NSP, NDS, CADC or any other similar national strategy and policy aimed to protect sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national security;
- (c) Resolve major interagency disputes;
- (d) Approve strategic land classifications and major acquisitions; and
- (e) Exercise oversight over the Authority.

SECTION 10. *Director General.* The CDREA shall be headed by a director general appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Director General shall:

- (a) Execute Board-approved policies;
- (b) Supervise day-to-day operations;
- (c) Represent the Authority in official matters; and
- (d) Perform other functions assigned by the Board.

SECTION 11. *Organizational Offices.* The CDREA shall establish the following offices:

- (a) Strategic Planning and Policy Office to formulate the long-term defense real estate strategies, plans, and programs;
- (b) Land Acquisition and Legal Affairs Office to manage land acquisition, titling, legal compliance, and resolution of property disputes affecting defense real estate projects;
- (c) Infrastructure Development Office to oversee the planning, construction, modernization, and maintenance of defense infrastructure and strategic military facilities;
- (d) Interagency Coordination Office to facilitate coordination and collaboration among government agencies, local government units, and other stakeholders involved in defense real estate governance;
- (e) Monitoring and Evaluation Office to conduct performance monitoring, compliance assessment, and evaluation of defense real estate programs and projects to ensure strategic effectiveness and accountability;
- (f) Information Systems and Digital Integration Office to develop and manage an integrated digital database, geographic information systems (GIS), and information-sharing platforms for defense real estate management; and
- (g) Local Government and Community Affairs Office to engage local government units, communities, and affected stakeholders to promote cooperation, address concerns, and support defense-related land and infrastructure initiatives.

SECTION 12. *Functional Relationships Among Agencies.*

A. Department of National Defense (DND), as the Strategic Authority, shall:

- 1. Provide policy direction and strategic guidance;
- 2. Exercise oversight over CDREA; and
- 3. Ensure alignment with NSS, NSP, NDS, CADC, or any other similar national strategy and policy aimed at protecting sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national security.

B. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), as the Operational Authority, shall:

- 1. Identify strategic basing requirements;
- 2. Provide operational and technical inputs; and



3. Validate strategic land and infrastructure requirements.

C. Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as the Land and Environmental Regulator, shall:

1. Provide land classification and environmental compliance;
2. Assign dedicated defense desks; and
3. Prioritize defense-related applications under expedited terms.

D. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), as the Land Redistribution Authority, shall:

1. Determine agrarian reform coverage;
2. Facilitate exemptions and conversions for defense lands; and
3. Prioritize strategic defense land cases.

E. National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), as the Ancestral Domain Authority, shall:

1. Ensure compliance with the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA);
2. Integrate databases with CDREA; and
3. Establish a joint review panel with CDREA.

F. Land Registration Authority (LRA), as the Titling and Legal Authority, shall:

1. Prioritize defense-related titling and registration;
2. Integrate the database with CDREA; and
3. Ensure real-time verification of land status.

G. Local Government Units, as the Local Implementation Authority, shall:

1. Align the Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) and zoning plans with national defense priorities;
2. Participate in joint planning with CDREA; and
3. Designate a defense coordination officer.

SECTION 13. *Interagency Coordination Council.* The CDREA shall establish a Defense Real Estate Interagency Council (DREIC) composed of all relevant agencies and shall function to:

- (a) Resolve interagency conflicts;
- (b) Synchronize planning and implementation;
- (c) Ensure alignment with National Strategy and Policy, like the CADC; and
- (d) Monitor compliance with defense real estate policies.

SECTION 14. *Parallel Processing System.* All agencies shall adopt a parallel system wherein:

- (a) Applications are processed simultaneously to reduce delays and improve efficiency;
- (b) Shared digital systems are utilized to facilitate real-time information sharing, coordination, and monitoring among concerned agencies; and



(c) Decisions are consolidated through CDREA to ensure strategic coherence and faster implementation.

This shall replace the traditional sequential governance process.

SECTION 15. *Hierarchy of Decision-Making.* In case of conflict:

(a) National defense considerations and strategic requirements shall take precedence in resolving conflicts involving defense real estate decisions;

(b) Strategic land use priorities for defense readiness and operational effectiveness shall prevail over competing developmental considerations; and

(c) Sectoral mandates of concerned agencies shall be harmonized and applied in a manner consistent with national defense objectives.

SECTION 16. *Accountability and Performance Metrics.* All agencies shall be evaluated based on:

(a) Processing efficiency in processing applications and approvals in a timely and efficient manner;

(b) Coordination effectiveness in interagency collaboration and information sharing;

(c) Compliance with strategic timelines in adherence to established schedules for strategic defense real estate projects and programs; and

(d) Alignment with national strategy objectives through the extent of actions and decisions that support national security and defense strategy objectives.

The CDREA shall publish an annual Defense Real Estate Performance Report.

SECTION 17. *Information Sharing and Digital Integration.* A centralized digital platform shall be established to:

(a) Integrate land and infrastructure data;

(b) Track applications and approvals;

(c) Support interagency coordination; and

(d) Monitor project implementation.

SECTION 18. *Funding and Support.* The initial funding for the CDREA shall be charged against the appropriations of the different national agencies. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

All concerned agencies shall allocate necessary resources to support CDREA.

SECTION 19. *Implementing Rules and Regulations.* Within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, the DND and the CDREA shall promulgate the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).

SECTION 20. *Separability Clause.* If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or provisions not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect.



SECTION 21. *Repealing Clause.* All laws, decrees, rules, and regulations inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SECTION 22. *Effectivity Clause.* This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of national circulation.

Approved,

ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO
President of the Senate

FAUSTINO G. DY III
Speaker of the House of Representatives

This Act, which is a consolidation of House Bill No. _____ and Senate Bill No. _____ was finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on _____.

Secretary of the Senate

Secretary General, House of Representatives

Approved:

FERDINAND R. MARCOS JR.
President of the Philippines



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