A Transactions Cost Economics (TCE) Approach to Optimal Contract Type

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Raymond Franck
dc.contributor.author	Francois Melese
dc.contributor.author	John T. Dillard
dc.date.accessioned	2020-03-16T17:28:21Z	-
dc.date.available	2020-03-16T17:28:21Z	-
dc.date.issued	2006-04-01
dc.identifier.citation	Published--Unlimited Distribution
dc.identifier.uri	https://dair.nps.edu/handle/123456789/402	-
dc.description	Financial Management / NPS Faculty Research
dc.description.abstract	This study examines defense acquisition through the new lens of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). TCE is an emergent field in economics that has multiple applications to defense acquisition practices. TCE's original focus was to guide make-or-buy decisions that define the boundaries of a firm. This study reviews insights afforded by TCE that impact government outsourcing (buy decisions), paying special attention to defense procurement.
dc.description.sponsorship	Acquisition Research Program
dc.language	English (United States)
dc.publisher	Acquisition Research Program
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)
dc.relation.ispartofseries	NPS-FM-06-074
dc.subject	Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)
dc.title	A Transactions Cost Economics (TCE) Approach to Optimal Contract Type
dc.type	Article
Appears in Collections:	Annual Acquisition Research Symposium Proceedings & Presentations

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