Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://dair.nps.edu/handle/123456789/4249
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Scott Rosen | - |
dc.contributor.author | Kelly Horinek | - |
dc.contributor.author | Andreas Tolk | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-12-02T22:32:05Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-12-02T22:32:05Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020-04-23 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Published--Unlimited Distribution | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://dair.nps.edu/handle/123456789/4249 | - |
dc.description | Acquisition Management / Defense Acquisition Community Contributor | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | This research focuses on the development of a game-theoretic approach to drive strategies for contract negotiations in government acquisition. The main objective of the approach is to provide the government the ability to move the bidding vendor into a preferred negotiation point and to understand potential trade-offs around these negotiation points. The approach also expedites the decision-making process in acquisition and provides more transparency of each side during the negotiation. Results from live experiments involving players with acquisition experience from government and industry using this approach will also be presented. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Acquisition Research Program | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | Acquisition Research Program | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Government Acquisition;SYM-AM-20-089 | - |
dc.subject | Government Acquisition | en_US |
dc.subject | Game-Theoretic Approach | en_US |
dc.subject | Negotiation | en_US |
dc.title | A Game Theory Approach and Application for Government Acquisition | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Annual Acquisition Research Symposium Proceedings & Presentations |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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SYM-AM-20-089.pdf | 1.28 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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