Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://dair.nps.edu/handle/123456789/4276
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dc.contributor.authorJoe Brewen-
dc.contributor.authorDave Couchman-
dc.contributor.authorChris Harvey-
dc.date.accessioned2020-12-04T20:21:30Z-
dc.date.available2020-12-04T20:21:30Z-
dc.date.issued2020-05-13-
dc.identifier.citationPublished--Unlimited Distributionen_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://dair.nps.edu/handle/123456789/4276-
dc.descriptionAcquisition Management / Defense Acquisition Community Contributoren_US
dc.description.abstractWe use a disciplined, data-driven approach to analyzing the effect that political connection has on possible excessive profits of DoD contractors. Such connections could serve to influence government acquisition and lead to non-ideal government cost outcomes. Our research follows the methodology of Wang (2014) in conducting biographical analysis of corporate governors and comparative analysis of ROA against non-defense firms, controlled for size and industry SIC. This research seeks to identify whether the political connections of Top 100 Defense Contractor leadership over 10-year period affect government cost outcomes.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipAcquisition Research Programen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherAcquisition Research Programen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolitical connection on excessive profits of DoD contractors.;SYM-AM-20-140-
dc.subjectCost Managementen_US
dc.subjectPolitical Connectionsen_US
dc.subjectDefense Contractorsen_US
dc.subjectExcessive Profitsen_US
dc.subjectTop 100 Defense Contractorsen_US
dc.titleDo Corporate Officers’ Political Connection Affect DoD Contractor Profitability? A 10-year, data-driven analysis of US public firms.en_US
dc.typePresentationen_US
Appears in Collections:Annual Acquisition Research Symposium Proceedings & Presentations

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