Assessing the Role of Congress in Defense Acquisition Program Instability

Abstract

This paper seeks to evaluate the impact of Congress on funding instability for defense acquisition programs. While the Department of Defense (DoD) requests specific funding levels for procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) programs each fiscal year in the president’s budget submission, Congress ultimately determines the funds that will be made available to those programs via the appropriations process. While lawmakers constitutionally hold the power of the purse and oversight authority over the DoD, changes between the requested and actual level of funding for programs can force defense officials and industry partners to adjust program schedules and funding requirements. At a macro level, changes can also disrupt wider defense planning and strategic priorities for the Department and the executive branch. This study assesses trends in funding for acquisition accounts and programs relative to the requested level of funding from Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 to FY 2020 to determine if Congress regularly funded programs above or below administrations’ budget requests over that time frame. It identifies specific procurement and RDT&E accounts that typically have their funding adjusted by lawmakers and trends in the differences between requested funding and the actual level of funding.