The Implications of “Service Common” for DoD Acquisitions

Abstract

The Department of Defense (DoD) promotes acquisition commonality to reduce redundancy, enhance interoperability, and streamline logistics. Yet, no formal mechanism enables the Services to adopt capabilities developed by United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), resulting in persistent integration failures. This thesis examines the institutional, procedural, and cultural barriers that hinder the transition of Special Operations Forces (SOF)-peculiar systems into Service portfolios. Through comparative analysis of USSOCOM’s Major Force Program (MFP)-11 acquisition authority against Service-based pathways—Major Capability Acquisition (MCA), Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA), and Urgent Capability Acquisition (UCA)—this study identifies friction points in requirements generation, funding alignment, and sustainment ownership. Case studies such as the F-35, MH-47G, MC-130J, RQ-11B Raven, and the Army’s TITAN program reveal how structural mismatches and fragmented oversight delay fielding and erode joint effectiveness. Regulatory reviews and visual models reinforce that promising SOF innovations remain stovepiped without formal adjudication processes and shared sustainment planning. The findings highlight the urgent need for coordinated policy reform to enable scalable integration, protect warfighter readiness, and prevent duplication across the Joint Force.