Weapons Acquisition Reform: Reform Act Is Helping DoD Acquisition Programs Reduce Risk, but Implementation Challenges Remain

Abstract

For several decades, the GAO has reported on poor outcomes encompassing cost and schedule growth on the Department of Defense's (DoD's) major weapon acquisition programs. Many problems can be traced to a culture where the military services begin programs with inflexible requirements, immature technologies, and overly optimistic cost and schedule estimates. Given pressures to reduce spending across the government, including the DoD, finding ways to prevent or mitigate cost growth is crucial to U.S. national security. A solid program foundation using good developmental testing and systems engineering, and reliable cost estimates is needed in order to help avoid cost overruns and promote better acquisition outcomes. There have been numerous attempts in the past to improve DoD acquisition outcomes, including the Packard Commission (President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 1986), the Goldwater Nichols Act in the 1980s (1986), and the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. More recently, Congress passed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Reform Act)1 to improve the way weapon systems are acquired and avoid cost and schedule overruns.