Basis for a Rational Defense: Acquiring the Right Capability

Abstract

Once the Soviet Union was gone, the United States set about adjusting its national security strategy and its planning approach to deal with what appeared to be a void in adversaries. Meanwhile, the United States dealt with the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. The U.S. military and its allies handled the Iraqi invasion quickly and in a manner that appeared effortless. The ease with which the United States and its allies operated in and over Iraq in 1991 was due largely to the formidable conventional capability available, a legacy of the Cold War. The first Gulf War proved to U.S. military planners, if nothing else, that other world actors could be dangerous; but who were they, and where and when might they become a real threat? Uncertainty became the focus of tailoring a military capability. However, military planners knew that some level of capability was required for the United States to remain the superpower. Consequently, threat-based planning gave way to capability-based planning. With the adoption of capability-based planning came problems. The most troubling problem was that capability-based planning drove the planning process to adjust necessary capability to fit a defense budget. This paper suggests that planners consider a more threat-based approach.