Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||Extended Warranty Management in the Department of Defense|
|Publisher:||Acquisition Research Program|
|Series/Report no.:||Extended Warranty|
|Abstract:||We provide a model of an extended warranty. In order to maximize profit, a producer always wants to sell with some type of warranty as opposed to selling with no warranty. The extended warranty is more likely to be provided as the consumer becomes more patient, as the producer becomes impatient, or if the likelihood of product failure does not increase too much in the extended period. Finally, we show that there is a separating equilibrium in which the high-quality producers sell with warranties and the low-quality producers sell without warranties, with the consumer purchasing from the high-quality producer.|
|Description:||Contract Management / NPS Faculty Research|
|Appears in Collections:||Sponsored Acquisition Research & Technical Reports|
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.