Complexity: A Cognitive Barrier to Defense Systems Acquisition Management

Abstract

The environment in which defense systems acquisition occurs has undergone significant change. The end of the Cold War has led to extreme reductions in defense spending in the United States and around the world. Downsizing of military forces and consolidation of the defense industry here and abroad have significantly altered the structure of the public and private sectors. The confluence of budgetary reductions, absence of a consistent, long-term, singular military threat, and expansion of the civil marketplace as a driving force behind technology has resulted in recent Department of Defense (DoD) adoption of an evolutionary acquisition process as the preferred method for meeting operational requirements (Gansler, 1999). Despite recognition of the need to do things differently, some things remain unchanged and, to a large extent, unrecognized. Real-world defense systems acquisition problems are largely nondeterministic in their behavior. Decisions concerning the acquisition process and its products can and do result in unanticipated outcomes. This is true regarding problematic situations encountered in implementing systems acquisition policy as well as in efforts to match defense system capabilities with operational and support requirements.