PPBE, Technology, Transition, and "the Valley of Death”

Abstract

Before they can be developed and deployed to help the U.S. warfighter accomplish its military objectives, all defense capabilities must obtain funding by passing through the stages of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. While PPBE has undergone systematic changes since its inception in the early 1960s, various issues have been attributed to its largely unchanged framework. In particular, the defense community has reported PPBE-related setbacks affecting technology transitions, joint efforts, and program lifecycles. This paper explores six case studies for critical or cutting-edge defense programs and organizations and PPBE’s impact on their progress. Findings suggest PPBE can slow the development of new capabilities supporting the warfighter, hamper fiscal flexibility, and make it harder for programs to adjust to the evolving needs of the combatant commands and services. However, findings from the six case studies also suggest PPBE’s impacts on technology transition are often exaggerated by the defense community. PPBE-related challenges can also be mitigated through strong senior leadership, the consolidation of program elements, the use of agile approaches such as the Middle Tier of Acquisition, sufficient congressional engagement, and other special efforts.