An Analysis Of Critical Material Failures Of The Close-In-Weapons-System Onboard U.S. Guided Missile Destroyers

Abstract

This thesis analyzes the current state of the Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) and decides what improvements can be used to improve system operational readiness and life-cycle support. Currently, CIWS is supported by a Readiness Based Sparing Model that has drawn criticism from senior naval leaders for the operational availability (Ao) that it provides. We analyze data to derive a list of five key offenders parts that heavily impact operational availability of CIWS. We also analyze how improving the sparing of these key offenders can potentially improve operational availability. Additionally, we analyze the timing of actual failures in the fleet. This paper addresses CIWS operational readiness and life-cycle support while exploring whether other processes can be used to improve the operational readiness of U.S. Guided Missile Destroyers CIWS systems. The major findings of our research are as follows: first, timing luck of failures accounted for a 7% difference between the worst-case scenario downtime and actual downtime. Second, that actual system availability was 86% of calendar days over fiscal years 2017 and 2018, exceeding NSWC's Ao predictions. Third, that the top five key offenders of which these parts can potentially affect account for a 3% improvement to operational downtime. Finally, that 10 of the 67 ships showed no downtime associated with CIWS, which could be a result of operational schedules.