Supply Chain Risk Management for Army Air to Ground Missile Acquisition Programs

Abstract

The Department of Defense (DoD) faces significant challenges in managing supply chain risk due to increasing complexity, globalization, and limited visibility into sub-tier suppliers. This thesis addresses a critical gap in the DoD’s ability to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities by applying a qualitative assessment framework to analyze supplier fragility and criticality within the Hellfire and Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM) programs. Using a combination of Sector-to-Sector, Tier-to-Tier (S2T2) analysis and Fragility and Criticality (FaC) assessment, the research integrates government, industry, and financial data to evaluate supplier dependencies and risks. Findings reveal that while prime contractors are generally stable, the greatest vulnerabilities exist among specialized, lower-tier suppliers exposed to global markets and limited substitutes. The study demonstrates that qualitative frameworks can help to increase supply chain visibility and inform risk mitigation, despite data limitations. Recommendations include integrating qualitative risk reviews into program management, strengthening supplier data reporting, and expanding the framework’s application across DoD programs. These steps aim to improve supply chain resilience and support proactive risk management for future defense acquisition efforts.